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PRE-DIṄNAGA BUDDHIST TEXTS ON LOGIC FROM CHINESE SOURCES

PRE-DIṄNAGA BUDDHIST TEXTS ON LOGIC FROM CHINESE SOURCES

TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION, NOTES AND INDICES

BY

GIUSEPPE TUCCI
Member of the Academy of Italy

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PREFACE.

To my friend Vidhuśekhara Śāstrī

οὐδὲν κρεῖσσον ἢ φίλος σοφός.

In this volume I have collected, translated, and commented upon the texts on logic or bearing upon the history and development of Indian logic, preserved in Chinese sources and anterior to Diṅnāga. Two of these texts, viz., the Upāyahṛdaya and the Tarkaśāstra, have been translated not into English but into Sanscrit, for the following reasons. First of all it has been proved that the more a text is translated into different languages, the more it is subject to alterations. Secondly these works are very technical, since they are concerned more with rules of dialectical debates, *vivāda*, than with epistemological theories. Although their bearing upon the first development of Indian logical theories is great, their theoretical interest is not so wide as that of some of later treatises like those of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti. Moreover, the contents of these two texts are such as to appeal very much to many of the naiyāyikas of modern India who are masters of Sanscrit, but very often possess a scanty knowledge of English. When we write on Indian subjects we must try, if possible, not to forget the large mass of the Indian pandits, whose deep learning I had very often the opportunity to admire, and from whose collaboration our studies might be largely benefited. As regards my translation I must say that it has not been my purpose to give any hypothetical *restoration* of our texts into Sanscrit. Even though the Chinese seems very often to adhere quite strictly to the original, we cannot state that it is literal in every passage. As a rule, the Chinese translators do not reproduce their text, *verbatim*, as the Tibetans do; they try to render the original in such a way that it becomes intelligible to Chinese readers. It is evident therefore that my Sanscrit text is nothing else than a *retranslation* into Sanscrit, which is perhaps often very near to the original, but which, in no way deviating from the extant Chinese texts, cannot claim to be a restoration. It is there-

fore needless for me to say that my Sanscrit does not pretend either to be elegant or perfectly idiomatic. My only purpose was to render as faithfully as possible the Chinese text and to be correct.

The greatest difficulty has been found in identifying the various logical terms that occur in our treatises; but a careful comparison with the extant Sanscrit sources and the Tibetan translation of some analogous passages, as in the case of the Jāti-section of the Tarkaśāstra, has helped me very much in finding with certainty the original Sanscrit form that was the basis of the Chinese. Since these logical terms represent some of the greatest difficulties that one meets in the Buddhist philosophical texts preserved in Chinese, they have been collected and arranged in the Index I. Considering that they may be of a wider interest, inasmuch as they are not concerned with mere logic, but also with some fundamental aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the other two texts, viz., the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Śataśāstra have been translated into English.

If the Vigrahavyāvartanī has a great bearing upon the history of Indian logic, since it embodies the criticism of Nāgārjuna relating to the theory of the pramāṇas, the Śataśāstra, though it cannot be considered as a logical work, contains some references to the Nyāyasūtras, the importance of which is self-evident. Therefore, I have thought it to be useful to add here the complete translation of this work, which, though already translated by me in an Italian review, has been accessible only to a few scholars. Its importance cannot be sufficiently emphasized. It is useless to say that these treatises also have been translated as literally as possible, so that the scholars who are interested with this same department of research, but do not know Chinese, may have an exact idea of the original. In defect of the Sanscrit which is lost, the Chinese is the only text at our disposal.

The "Notes" were composed when the four texts had already been printed: so, they embody also the corrections and emendations to them. They should therefore be always consulted while reading the texts.

I must apologize for my English, but I hope that it will

not be forgotten that this is not my own language, while owing to my continuous travelling it has been impossible for me to request some of my English friends to undergo the painstaking task of reading my writings.

Before concluding these introductory remarks I must express my gratitude to my friend Vidhuśekhara Śāstrī, Principal of Viśvabhāratī, whose advice was often required and to whom I am indebted for many valuable suggestions; to the Pandit Herambhanâtha Tarkatīrtha, with whom I discussed some points of the Upāyahṛdaya and the Tarkaśāstra: to Doctor Benoytosh Bhattacharya, Director of the Gaekwad Oriental Series, and Baroda Oriental Institute, who undertook the publication of this volume in the Series that he directs with the acknowledged competence and who made all possible arrangements for its printing. Nor can I forget the greatest care shown by the Baptist Mission Press, the only one in India which can undertake publications of this sort, in carrying my book through the press. To all my *kṛtajñatā*.

DACCA. GIUSEPPE TUCCI.

January, 1929.

ABBREVIATIONS.

As.	..	Asaṅgas works.
AS.	..	Abhidharmasaṅgītiśāstra by As., Nanjiō 1199, 阿毗達磨集論.
ASS.	..	Abhidharmasamyuktasaṅgītiśāstra by Sthiramati, Nanjiō 1178 阿毗達磨雜集論.
BCAT.	..	Bodhicaryāvatāra by Śāntideva—with ṭīkā ed. by L. De La Vallée Poussin. Bibl. Indica.
BEFEO.	..	Bulletin de l'Ecole française de l'Extrême Orient.
CS.	..	Carakasaṃhitā, ed., Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara, Calcutta, 1896.
HIL.	..	History of Indian logic by Vidyābhūṣaṇa, Calcutta, 1921.
IA.	..	Indian Antiquary.
IHQ.	..	Indian Historical Quarterly.
JA.	..	Journal Asiatique.
JAOS.	..	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JASB.	..	Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.
JRAS.	..	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
KKK.	..	Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya. Chowkh. Sanscr. Series, Benares.
MMK.	..	Mūlamādhyamikakārikās, edited by L. De La Vallée Poussin Bibl., Ind-Buddhica. IV.
MMV.	..	Commentary thereon by Candrakīrti (Prasannapadā), ibid.
MS.	..	Mīmāṃsāsūtras (Kāshī Sanscr. Series, 42, Benares 1910).
MSB.	..	Comm. thereon by Śabarasvāmin. ibid.
MV.	..	Mahāvyutpatti. ed. by Mironov, Bibl. Buddhica, XIII.
NB.	..	Nyāyabindu, by Dharmakīrti (Kāshī Sor. Series, 22, 1924).
NBT.	..	Ṭīkā thereon by Dharmottara.
NSB.	..	Vātsyāyana comm. on the Nyāyasūtras, ed. by G. N. Jhā (Chowkh. Sor. Series, 1925).

NK.		Nyāyakandalī, Vizianagam Scr. Series. IV, 1895.
NM.	..	Nyāyamukha by Diṅnāga, Nanjiō, 1223, 1224 and my translation (Heidelberg 1929).
NMc.	..	comm. thereon by Shen-t'ai 因明正理門論述記.
NMJ.	..	Nyāyamañjarī by Jayanta, Viz. Scr. Series VIII. 1895.
NP.	..	Nyāyapraveśa Gaekwad's Oriental Series, XXXIX, Part II.
NPc.	..	Comm. thereon by K'uei-chi 因明入正理論疏.
NR.	..	Nyāyaratnākara on ŚV.
NS.	..	Nyāyasūtras in NSB.
NSN.	..	Nyāyasūcīnibandha—in NSB.
NV.	..	Nyāyavārttika ed. by Dvīvedin, Benares 1915.
NVTT.	..	Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā, Kāshī Sanscr. Series, 24, 1925.
NVTTP.	..	Nyāyavārttikatātpāryaṭīkāpariśuddhi. Bibl. Indica.
PAV.	..	Prakaraṇāryavācāśāstra, Nanjiō 1177, 1178 顯揚聖教論.
PB.	..	Praśastapādabhāṣya, Benares Scr. S.
PKm.	..	Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Nirṇayasāgara Press ed.
PM.	..	Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, Poona, (Arhatamataprabhākara I).
PS.	..	Pramāṇasamuccaya, Mdo, ce (Narthang edition, University of Calcutta copy).
PSV.	..	vṛtti., Ibid.
SDS.	..	Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha, Poona, 1924.
SDSm.	..	Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya, ed. Suali, Calcutta, Bibl. Indica.
Sk.G.	..	Saṅkhyakārikā, with Gauḍapāda's comm., Chowk. Scr. S.
Sk.M.	..	Id. with Māṭharavṛtti, Ibid.
ŚŚ.	..	Śataśāstra—by Āryadeva, in this vol.
ŚŚc.	..	Comm. thereon by Ki-tsang 百論疏.

ŚV.	..	Ślokavārttika, Chowkh. Scr. S.
TR.	..	Tārkikarakṣā. From 'the Pandit' 1903.
TS.	..	Tattvasaṅgraha by Śāntirakṣita, Gaekwad's O.S.
TSP.	..	Commentary thereon by Kamalaśīla.
TŚ.	..	Text of the Tarkaśāstra as translated by me in this vol.
UH.	..	Upāyahṛdaya as translated by me in this vol.
VS.	..	Vaiśeṣikasūtras, in PB.
VV.	..	Vigrahavyāvartanī.
VVi.	..	Vādavidhi.
ZII	..	Zeitschrift für Indologie and Iranistik.
YBŚ.	..	Yogācāryabhūmiśāstra by Maitreya and Asaṅga 瑜迦師地論.

INTRODUCTION.

I.

THE TEXTS.

1. Nanjiō 1252. TARKAŚASTRA, 如實論.[1] It is a mere fragment containing a preliminary chapter on the wrong discussion and two other sections on the *jātis* and on the *nigrahasthānas*. The wórk was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha during the Liang Dynasty (552–557 A.D.). Paramārtha also wrote a commentary upon it, called 如實論疏 (in three sections) which is now lost. The book was widely known not only in India but also in Central Asia where Dharmagupta, if we are to follow the Chinese tradition,[2] explained it.

This text has been attributed by some authors of the Chinese catalogues of the canon to Vasubandhu. But there is no definite argument to support this view. There are of course many similarities between this text and Vādavidhi, so far as the *jātis* are concerned, but this fact can be well explained, since before Diṅnāga there was very little disagreement in regard to this particular point. But there are more important discrepancies, such as with the theory of syllogism. Our text follows the *pañcāvayava*-doctrine, while Vasubandhu reduced the members of the syllogism only to three—as stated by K'uei-chi in his commentary upon NP. Chp I[3].

[1] Cfr. BAGCHI. *Le canon Bouddhique en Chine*. I, p. 423. (6).

[2] Cfr. *Siu Kao Seng Chuan* chpt. II. (Taishō Ed. Vol. 50. p. 435) Cfr. S. LEVI in JA. 1913, XI s., Vol. II, p. 349. UI, *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, p. 84, n. 4.

[3] Taishō ed. Vol. 44 p. 94 上：世親菩薩論軌等說能立有三一宗二因三喻 "Bodhisattva Vasubandhu in *Vādavidhāna*, etc. says that the syllogism is threefold: *pratijñā*, *hetu*, *dṛṣṭānta*." But, strange enough, Hui-chao 慧沼, in his 因明義斷 attributes to Vasubandhu the theory of a fivefold syllogism. Taishō ed. Vol. 44, p. 144, 155, and 157. Though no express statement is found in this connection in his work, it seems that he does not consider the Tarkaśāstra as a work of Vasubandhu. Cf. *ibid*. p. 144 and 157.

One could also quote NV. pag. 136: *avayavatraya evaṃ akṣaṇenopapādite teṣaṃ trayo durvihitāḥ* (cfr. my note on Vādavidhi in IHQ, vol. IV, p. 636). But this passage is not conclusive, since it may mean either that Vādavidhi did not take into consideration the *upanaya* and the *nigamana*, because it did not regard them as members of the syllogism, or that it accepted, without objection, their definitions as given by NS. The attribution of "Tarkaśāstra" to Vasubandhu has been recently accepted by Mr. Lü Ch'eng 呂澂 in his Chinese translation of the Pramāṇasamuccaya 集量論釋略抄 published in 內學, IV, 4. p. 58. (cfr. also Ui's *Studies in Indian Phil. I.* p. 233). His chief argument is that TŚ shows the same classification of the *jātis* as VVi. according to the fragments quoted by PSV., and that the three *hetvābhāsas*, viz., *asiddha*, *anaïkāntika*, *viruddha* of TŚ. are the same as those alluded to by PS. as being expounded in VVi. Moreover VVi considers the *viruddha-hetu* (in the *parārthānumāna*) as *hetu* and *pratijñā-virodha* as TŚ. But these arguments cannot be considered as definitive.

In fact we do not know very much about the activity of the logicians before Diṅnāga, and from the mere similarity between the two texts as regards the catalogue of the *jātis* we cannot deduce that TŚ., and VVi. are one and the same treatise, because it is quite possible that other manuals on Vāda or Vivāda, in which a similar classification was followed, were in circulation at that time. The examples given of the three *hetvābhāsas*, as taken from VVi., do not correspond to those of TŚ., which are, on the other hand, similar to those of VS., and PB. Moreover, it seems to me rather strange that K'uei-chi does not say a single word about our text and its authorship in his works on logic, nor do we find any mention of it in the life of Vasubandhu written by Paramārtha, the translator of TŚ. I know that this fact is not definitive, since he does not speak of any other logical work written by the ācārya and because he might have thought, with Diṅnāga, that the authorship of VVi. was doubtful. Anyhow his silence is worth mentioning. For all these reasons I think that we are not as yet entitled to identify the two treatises.

I must add that the title 'Tarkaśāstra' is a hypothetical

one. But we must not forget that Tarkaśāstras are alluded to twice in PSV. (III a, 44a *anumeyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā* and, IVa 66.6, *pakṣadharmamātram hetuprayogaḥ*).

The reference which is made here to particular theories on some special points suggests that Diṅnāga had definite treatises in his mind and did not merely think of NS. or VS., which he included at the end of PSV. among the *tarkaśāstras*, while in the course of the book he always refers to them under their proper names, when criticising their doctrine.

II. Nanjiō 1247. UPĀYAHṚDAYA, 方便心論. The Sanscrit original of the title is doubtful; 方便 may correspond, in the logical treatises, also to *prayoga*. However, the restoration Upāyakauśalyahṛdaya proposed by Nanjiō (cfr. Bagchi, p. 245) cannot be accepted. This work is a very ancient one. It was translated into Chinese twice. The first translation, made by Buddhabhadra of the Eastern Tsin (Bagchi, p. 346) is now lost. The second one, still extant was made by Ki Kia Ye[1] at the time of the Northern Wei. The name of the author is lost, but it has sometimes been attributed to Nāgārjuna. We have no grounds for accepting such a view. First of all we cannot forget that many works, of unknown authorship, were attributed to this great dialectician. This is the reason why in the Chinese Canon as well as in the bsTan-agyur we find so many treatises ascribed to Nāgārjuna which are certainly works of a later date and written by another Nāgārjuna (Siddha Nāgārjuna).

It is true that we find in our text several allusions to the *śūnyavāda*; but, first of all, *śūnya* is not peculiar to Mahāyāna only: *śūnya*, *śānta*, *nirodha* are technical and general terms of Buddhist lore. Moreover the passage at p. 12, where mention of *śunya* is made, looks like an interpolation, since the *pratipatti* (or *sākṣātkāra* or *anubhava*) was not enunciated before and comes abruptly after the *prāptakāla*. On the other hand the sentence: *dvādaśa nidānāni, duḥkham, samudayaḥ, nirodhaḥ, mārgaḥ, saptatriṃśat pakṣāḥ, catvāri śrāmaṇyaphalāny ityadayo*

[1] Possibly from Central Asia, Serindia. Cfr. DÉMIEVILLE, BEFEO, XXIV. 1924. p. 65-66.n. BAGCHI, p. 245.

dharmā buddhasya saṃyagarthāḥ. (p. 7), which expounds the Buddhist siddhânta, as opposed to that of the heretics, embodies the fundamental tenets and categories of the Hīnayāna. The same thing may be deduced from the discussion at p. 18 on the existence of *nirvāṇa* and of the *arhatphala.* Moreover, in the present case we must not forget that there is another work, the title of which shows some similarity with that of ours, I mean the 論心 Vādahṛdaya of Vasubandhu, which is referred to by Shen-t'ai in his commentary upon the Nyāyamukha (Taishō ed. Vol. 44, p. 77). Whatever the case may be, there is no doubt that the work was considered as an authoritative one, as is evidenced by the fact that it was translated twice. Ki-tsang quotes from it in his commentary upon the ŚS. Moreover, as we shall see later on, it reflects ancient theories, which are akin much more to the classification of the heuristical categories, as contained in Carakasaṃhitā, than to the present redaction of NS.

This treatise has been critically edited,[1] translated into Japanese, commented upon and compared with the *Carakasaṃhitā* by Prof. Ui in his most important "Studies in Indian Philosophy" (in Japanese) 印度哲學研究, vol. II. p. 427 fol. (cfr. also I, p. 204).

III. Nanjiō 1251. VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ, 廻諍論. There is no doubt that this was the title of the work and not *Vivādaśamana* as suggested by Nanjiō, since there are some stanzas of this work which are quoted with the title itself of the original treatise in the commentary of Candrakīrti upon the Mūlamādhyamikakārikās. This is also the title found in the Tibetan translation of our text included in the bsTan-ḥgyur. (Mdo. Tsa, CORDIER, Cat. 291, 293.) The Chinese translation was made by Vimokṣasena and Gautama (Prajñā)-ruci in the year 541 A.D. (BAGCHI, pages 263 and 268) during the rule of the Eastern Wei. This translation is far from being perfect. First of all it is not literal; the translators tried to give the general sense of the text, rather than a literal rendering into Chinese.

[1] And in fact the text has not been well preserved and quite evidently it is in several places corrupt.

Sometimes they succeeded, but sometimes they failed to reproduce the concise expressiveness which is the peculiarity of the style of Nâgârjuna. Moreover the Chinese style itself is not always perfect; very often the sentence is modelled upon the Sanscrit original, quite against the rules of the Chinese syntax. So that here and there the meaning is obscure; and it is difficult to understand it correctly without the help of the Tibetan translation. For this reason I have added the edition of the Tib. version to my English rendering, while in the notes I have also explained, according to the Tibetan text, all the passages that in Chinese are obscure or do not reproduce exactly the sense of the Sanscrit original. The Vigrahavyāvartanī may be considered as a short treatise in which Nāgārjuna explains the fundamental tenets of the Śūnyavāda refuting the objections raised against him by his opponents, heretics as well as Hīnayānists.[1]

The text is divided into two parts.[2] In the first part the opponent is supposed to expound his chief objections; in the second Nāgārjuna replies. Moreover, we must distinguish in our text a *kārikā* portion and a *vṛtti*, both by Nāgārjuna. But they seem to have circulated quite independently, since in the bsTan-agyur they have been translated separately, though in the translation of the *vṛtti* the *kārikās* have been regularly incorporated. It embodies a long refutation of the theory of the *pramāṇas* which, as far as our knowledge goes, is the first of its kind that has come down to us and which is strictly related to NS.

IV. Nanjiō 1189. Śataśāstra, 百論.[3] It is so named because it formerly contained 100 *ślokas*, that is sentences of 32 syllables each. This also is a fragment. In fact we know from the preface written by Seng-chao 僧肇 and from the commenta-

[1] It was certainly written after the Mādhyamika-kārikās since a stanza from this work is quoted in the *vṛtti* (p. 36). It was, therefore, a reply to the criticism with which his *magnum opus* met.

[2] Or four if we consider the *kārikā* section (also divided into two parts) as indissoluble from the *vṛtti*, as it is in Chinese.

[3] BAGCHI: I, p. 198 (93) Cfr. UI. *Studies in Indian Philosophy I*, p 282 fol. PERI, in BEFEO. 1911, p. 361.

tor Ki-tsang 吉藏 that only the first part was translated by Kumārajīva (in the year 404 A.D.) and the second was left out because it was not considered to be very useful in China. Since each Chapter is said to have contained five ślokas and the first ten Chapters only have been translated we have here the first 50 *sūtras* or *ślokas* of the entire book.

The sūtra portion was written by Āryadeva, the pupil of Nāgārjuna, the commentary was written by Vasu who has been identified by Peri and others with Vasubandhu.[1]

It is a polemical work, the scope of which is to establish the exact doctrine of the *śūnya* after refuting other views. The criticism is not only directed against the Vaiśeṣika and the Sāṅkhyas but also against the various Hīnayāna schools.

Together with the works of Nāgārjuna this is one of the most important texts for the study of the mādhyamika doctrine. And in fact in China and in Japan it was considered as one of the fundamental authorities by the school of the "three śāstras" so called because it based its teachings upon the Mūlamādhyamikakārikā, the Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra and our text.

There is a great analogy between ŚŚ. and Catuḥśataka, though the arrangement of the objects is different. (Catuḥśataka IX., X. = IX. of ŚŚ. XI., XII. = V., VI., XVI. = VIII.).[2] The commentary by Vasu follows very often almost verbatim, the big work called Ta-che-tu-lun, *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* attributed to Nāgārjuna, which in its refutation of the Hīnayāna as expounded by Kātyāyanīputra seems to have been written with the purpose of opposing a Māhāyāna Abhidharma to that of the Sarvāstivādins.

There is a diffuse commentary on ŚŚ. by Ki-tsang (549-623 A.D.): the treatise 三論遊意義 by She

[1] I also am doubtful about this identification nor do I think that the arguments brought forward by Peri are definitive. That there were two Vasubandhus is known from *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*; L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. *Bouddhisme, Etudes et materiaux, Vasubandhu et Yaśomitra*, p. VIII, n. 2. Anyhow this question must be taken up again after a comparative study of all the works that have been attributed by the Chinese and the Tibetan tradition to Vasubandhu.

[2] Cfr. my *Studi Mahāyānici*, I, in Rivista di Studi Orientali, X, p. 521.

Fa-she though not a commentary, contains also much useful information about our text; so also the 三論玄義 by Ki-tsang.

V. The chapters of YBS by Maitreya and of the works by Asaṅga, which are concerned with logic have not been included here, since they have already been discussed by me in a separate paper.[1]

II.

The Contents.

In my Paper "Buddhist logic before Diṅnāga" I have tried to give a synthetical and historical survey of the logical theories accepted or elaborated by the greatest Masters of Buddhism from Nāgārjuna down to Vasubandhu and to show the relation and interdependence among the different views. I must therefore refer the reader to that paper for a discussion of the material which is collected in this volume.

In this Chapter I shall only arrange the contents of our text in synoptical tables, which may enable the reader to be easily acquainted with the theories peculiar to each of them and to put them in a comparative relation with other sources at our disposal.

[1] *Buddhist logic before Diṅnāga* (here abbreviated: BLBD.). JRAS. July 1929, p. 451, Cp. additions in same Journal October, 1929. The sanscrit names of the seven heads alluded to in YBŚ. have been preserved in MV 245, 1180: *vāda, vādādhikarana, vādādhiṣṭhāna, vādālaṅkāra, vādanigraha, vādaniḥ-sarana, vāde bahukarā dharmāḥ.*

The Categories.

NS.	CS.	UH.	YBS.; PAV.
I. Pramāṇa	1 vāda = X–XII } jalpa, vitaṇḍā	*1* dṛṣṭānta (=V, 12)	༡ vāda
		2 siddhānta (=VI, 16)	
II. prameya	2–7 dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, viśeṣa, samavāya (=II)	*3* vākyapraśaṃsā (=34)	༢ vādādhikaraṇa
			༣ vādādhiṣṭhāna (*a*) sādhya (dharmin and dharma)
III. saṃśaya	8 pratijñā	*4* vākyadoṣa (=XVI, 33)	
	9 sthāpanā		
IV. prayojana	10 pratiṣṭhāpanā	*5* pramāṇa (=I, 18–21)	(*b*) sādhana (5 avayavas and 3 pramāṇas)
	11–14 hetu, dṛṣṭānta, upanaya, nigamana		
		6 prāptakāla	
V. dṛṣṭānta	15 uttara	*7* hetvābhāsa (=XIII, 36, 37)	༤ vādālaṅkāra
VI. siddhānta	16 siddhānta (=VI)	*8* chala (=XIV, 35)	༥ vādanigraha (*a*) saṃnyāsa (*b*) abhibhava (*c*) doṣa
	17 śabdaḥ		
VII. avayava	18–21 pramāṇa (=I)		
	22 saṃśaya (=III)	II.	
VIII. tarka	23 prayojana (=IV)		
	24 savyabhicāra } (=VIII)		
IX. nirṇaya	25 jijñāsā } (=VIII)		
	26 vyavasāya (=IX)	*9* nigrahasthāna (XVI, 39–44, 53)	༦ vādaniḥsaraṇa
			༧ vāde bahukara dharmas
X. vāda	27 arthāpatti	III.	
	28 saṃbhava		
XI. jalpa	29 anujojya	*10* jāti (XV)	
XII. vitaṇḍā	30 ananuyojya		
	32 anuyoga		
XIII. hetvābhāsa	32 pratyanuyoga		
	33 vākyadoṣa (=XVI)		
XIV. chala	34 vākyapraśaṃsā		
	35 chala (=XIV)		
	36 ahetu } =XIII		
XV. jāti	37 atītakāla } =XIII		
XVI. nigrahasthāna	38 upalambha (=XIII)		
	39 parihāra		
	40 pratijñāhāni } XVI		
	41 abhyanujñā } XVI		
	42 hetvantara } XVI		
	3 arthāntara } XVI		
	44 nigrahasthāna } XVI		

PRAMĀṆA.

NS.	*pratyakṣa.*	*anumāna.*	*upamāna.*	*śábda.*
VS.	id.	id.	..	..
CS.	id.	id.	id.	id. (*aitihya*).
VV.	id.	id.	id.	id.
UH.	id.	id.	id.	id.
YBŚ., AS.	id.	id.	..	id.[1]
TŚ.	id.	id.	?	?
VVi.	id.	id.	?	?
PS., NM.	id.	id.	..	..
PB.	id.	id.	..	..

[SVARTHA]-ANUMANA.

(*a*) *pūrvavat.*

UH. If a man who has seen a child possessing some characteristic marks, some years later comes across an individual having the same marks as that boy, he infers that this man is that same boy. (p. 13.)

Ts'ing-mu[2] (comm. on the MMK. XVIII, 1-12). Being aware by previous experience that wherever there is smoke there is fire, a man who sees smoke knows that in

[1] It is usually believed that the Buddhists accepted only two *pramāṇas*: but, as it is evidenced by our texts, this is not true. The Yogācāras, seem to have adopted the theory of the three *pramāṇas* as expounded in YBŚ. and AS. even after the reform of Diṅnāga. So Sthiramati commenting upon the *Madhyāntavibhāga vṛtti* by Vasubandhu, (a copy of which has been brought by me from Nepal and will shortly be published) says: *ata āha : pramāṇatrayaṃ niśrityeti pramāṇatrayāvirodhena : pramāṇatrayaṃ punaḥ pratyakṣam anumānam agamaś ca.* Cf. also *Vijnāptimātratāsiddhi* by S. LEVI, p. 26. That this classification was peculiar to the sect, which did not accept the reform of new logic, is proved by the fact that Haribhadra in his *Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka* (1st chapter in my forthcoming edition) expounds the same theory: *pratyakṣānumānāgamapramāṇaiḥ* (more than once.)

[2] Ts'ing-mu 青 目 (=Blu-eye; according to Seng-jui, a disciple of Kumärajīva, this name is a translation of Sanscr., Piṅgala) must not be identified with Candrakirti nor with Āryadeva—Cfr. upon him PERI in BEFEO. 1911 p. 365 n. 1 UI. *Vaiś. Phil.* p. 45-46. WALLESER *Die Mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna, nach der chin. Version übertr.* 1912. p. X which embodies the transl. of his comm.

this case also there must be fire. (WALLESER'S Transl. p. 116, UI, *V. Phil.* p. 88 fll.).

Gauḍapāda on SK. 5. Inference of rain on account of the sight of clouds.

MSB. As Ts'ing-mu.

NSB. (*a*) Same as Gauḍapāda.

(*b*) Same as Ts'ing-mu.

(*b*) *śeśavat.*

UH. Having felt the salty taste of one drop of sea-water, one infers that other drops of sea-water must have the same taste (p. 13).

Ts'ing-mu. Perceiving that one grain has been cooked, one infers that all other grains of rice have been cooked.

Gauḍapāda. Same as UH.

NSB. (*a*) On seeing that rivers are swollen one infers that there was rain.

(*b*) When one says that sound is real, but non-eternal, then it may be either *dravya*, or *guṇa* or *karma*. Since it is neither *dravya* nor *karma*, it must be *guṇa*.

(*c*) *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa.*

UH. When a man knows that by movement he can go from one place to another, and sees that the sun and the moon occupy different places in the sky at different times, he infers that they also move. (p. 14 cfr. ŚŚ. p. 28).

Ts'ing-mu. Same as UH. Or inference of the ātman from pain, joy, etc., (theory of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya. cfr. notes on ŚŚ.)

Gauḍapāda. do.

MSB. As UH.

NSB. (*a*) do.

(*b*) Inference of *ātman* from pain, joy, etc.

PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA.

Daśavaikālika-niryukti by Bhadrabāhu and NB. p. 137: ten members.[1]

NS.	..	*pratijña,*	*hetu,*	*dṛṣṭānta,*	*upanaya,*	*nigamana.*
CS.	..	id.	id.	id.	id.	id.
VV.	..	id.	id.	id.	?	?
UH.	..	id.	id.	id.	[id.]	[id.][2]
AS.	..	id.	id.	id.	id.	id.
YBŚ.; PAV.		id.	id.	id.	*sapakṣa*	*vipakṣa.*[3]
ASS.	..	id.	id.	id.	*upanaya*	*nigamana.*
TŚ.	..	id.	id.	id.	id.	id.
VVi.	..	id.	id.	id.	..	..
PS. NM.	..	id.	id.	id.	..	..
PB.	..	*pratijñā,*	*apadeśa,*	*nidarśana,*	*anusan-dhāna,*	*pratyā-mnāya.*

TRAIRŪPYA OF THE HETU.

TŚ.	..	*pakṣadharma,*	*sapakṣe sattā,*	*vipakṣavyāvṛtti.*
VVi.	..	[probably, though no specific allusion is found in PSV.]		
PS.; NM.		id.	id.	*vipakṣāsattva.*

PAKṢĀBHĀSA.

TŚ.	..	*svavacanavir.,*	*pratyakṣavir.,*	*anumānavir.,*	*lokaviruddha.*
PS.; NM.		id.	id.	id.	id. *āgamavir.*

[1] The two classifications are independent.

That alluded to in NB. is mentioned by Diṅnāga in NM. comm. on last *kārikā.*

[2] Though they are not enunciated, we may infer that *upanaya* and *nigamana* were admitted by the author of UH. as it may be gathered from the examples given there. cfr. p. 10.

[3] These, according to K'uei-chi, are equal to 同 品 and 異 品 = *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa* (*dṛṣṭānta*).

HETVĀBHASA.

NS. ..	*savyabhi-cāra,*	*viruddha,*	*prakaraṇa-sama,*	*sadhya-sama,*	*kālātīta.*
	ahetu				
CS. ..	*saṃśaya-sama,*	..	id.	*varṇya-sama.*	(id.)
UH. ..	*savyabhi-cāra*	id.	id.	id.	id. *chala*
	yuktiv. dṛṣṭāntav.				
AS. ..	*viruddha*—a)	*aniścita,* b) *sādhyasama*	..	..	..
TŚ. ..	*asiddha,*	*anaikāntika,*			*viruddha.*
VVi. ..	id.	id.			id.
PS.; NM.	id.	id.			id.
PB. ..	id.	*sandigdha, anadhyavasita*			id.

SIDDHĀNTA

NS. ..	*sarvatantra,*	*pratitantra,*	*adhikaraṇa,*	*abhyupagama.*
CS. ..	id.	id.	id.	id.
TŚ. ..	id.	id.	id.	id.
UH. ..	id.	id.	..	..
	(*sarvasama*),	(*sarva-bhinna*),	*ādau samaḥ paścād bhin-naḥ,*	*ādau bhinnaḥ paścāt samaḥ.*

CHALA.

NS. ..	*vakchala*	*sāmānyachala*	*upacārachala.*
CS. ..	id.	id.	..
UH. ..	id.	id.	[id.]

VĀKYAPRAŚAṂSĀ (the Vākyadoṣa is the opposite of it).

CS. ..	*anyūna,*	*anadhika,*	*arthavat,*	*anapārthaka,*	*aviruddha.*
UH. ..	id.	id.	id.	..	id.
plus:	*ananuyojya,*		(*adigata-padārtha*),	*vacana-dharmani-baddha,*	*yuktiv. dṛṣṭāntav.*

JĀTI.

NS.	UH.		TŚ.[1]	VVi.	P.S. NM.[2]
I. sādharmyasama	id.	viparīta	1 sādharmya	id.	id.
II. vaidharmyasama	id.	viparīta	2 vaidharmya	id.	id.
III. utkarṣasama	id.	viparīta	3 vikalpa	id.	id.
		viparīta	4 aviśeṣa	id.	id.
IV. apakarṣasama	id.	viparīta	5 prāptyaprāpti	id.	id.
		viparīta	6 ahetu	id.	id.
V. varṇyasama	..	viparīta	7 upalabdhi	id.	id.
VI. avarṇyasama	..	viparīta	8 saṃśaya	id.	id.
		viparīta	9 anukti	id.	id.
		viparīta	10 kāryabheda	id.	..
VII. vikalpasama	..	asat	11 prasaṅga	id.	id.
VIII. sādhyasama	..	asat	12 arthāpatti	id.	id.
		asat	13 pratidṛṣṭānta	[?]	..
IX. prāptisama	id.	viruddha	14 anutpatti	id.	id.
X. aprāptisama	id.	viruddha	15 nitya	id.	id.
XI. prasaṅgasama	..	viruddha	16 svārthaviruddha	[?]	id.
XII. pratidṛṣṭāntasama	id.				
XIII. anutpattisama	id.				
XIV. saṃśayasama	id.				
XV. prakaraṇasama	..				
XVI. ahetusama	kālasama				
XVII. arthāpattisama	..				
XVIII. aviśeṣasama	..				
XIX. upapattisama	..				
XX. upalabdhisama	..				
XXI. anupalabdhisama	..				
XXII. nityasama	..				
XXIII. anityasama	..				
XXIV. kāryasama	id.				
	bhedābheda				
	praśnabāhulyam, uttarālpatā				
	praśnālpatā, uttarabāhulyam				

[1] It is interesting to note that if we are to follow Hui-chao op. cit. Vol. 44, p. 157, there was another work in which logical theories were discussed and which contained a list of *Jātis* absolutely similar to that of Tarka śāstra. This work was the 大乘心鏡論 composed by Nāgārjuna and translated by Kumārajīva. But I could not find anywhere mention of such work: anyhow, the fact remains that the table given by Hui-chao agrees perfectly with the list of *jātis* of TŚ.

[2] They are only *dūṣanābhāsas* (=hetvabhāsas, NP. 8). Cf. NB 133 *abhūtadoṣodbhāvanāni jātyuttarāṇīti.*

hetusama
vyāpti
avyāptisama
viruddha
aviruddha
asaṃśaya
śrutisama
śrutibhinna

NIGRAHASTHĀNAS.

	NS.	CS.	UH.	TŚ.
I.	pratijñāhāni	id.	id.	id.
II.	pratijñāntara	..	(id.)	id.
III.	pratijñāvirodha	-viruddha-	(id.)	id.
IV.	pratijñāsaṃnyāsa	..	(id.) .	id.
V.	hetvantara	id.	..	id.
VI.	arthāntara	id.	..	id.
VII.	nirarthaka	id. (vyartha)	..	id.
VIII.	avijñātārtha	..	id.	id.
IX.	apārthaka	id. (anarthaka)	(id.)	id.
X.	aprāptakāla	id. (atītakāla)	id.	id.
XI.	nyūna	id.	id. (vākyadoṣa)	id.
XII.	adhika	id.	id. (vākyadoṣa)	id.
XIII.	punarukta	id.	id. (vākyadoṣa)	id.
XIV.	ananubhāṣaṇa	..	id.	id.
XV.	ajñāna	id.	id.	id.
XVI.	apratibhā	..	id.	id.
XVII.	vikṣepa	..	id.	id.
XVIII.	matānujñā	id.	id.	id.
XIX.	paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa	id.	id.	id.
XX.	niranuyojyānuyoga	id.	id.	id.
XXI.	apasiddhānta	..	..	id.
XXII.	hetvābhāsa	id. ahetu.	(id.)	id.

This is the schematic summary of the logical doctrines that we find in our texts. It is evident that they are specially confined to *vāda* or *vivāda* rules to be followed in the course of debates among the representatives of different schools, a kind of *elenchoi*[1] consisting of a definition and of some examples. There were some arguments which seem to have been discussed with special interest by the followers of the various sects, since they were strictly connected with the fundamental tenets accepted by them. The disputes are regarding the eternity or non-eternity of sound, the eternity or non-eternity of ātman, the existence of *ākāśa* as an eternal element, the existence or non-existence of nirvāṇa, the relation between the whole and the parts, the existence or non-existence of *jāti*, and *sāmānya*, that is all those arguments which are discussed at length in later polemical works and which prove the antiquity and the continuity of these views. Except Upāyahṛdaya which perhaps reflects some Hīnayāna views, the other texts belong to the Mahāyāna and therefore we should not be astonished, when we see that the theories expounded there are those of the momentariness of everything, the impossibility of admitting the absolute and the fundamental voidness of every notion. The systems that are alluded to and the theories which are refuted are those of the Sāṅkhyas, the Mīmāṃsakas, but chiefly the Vaiśeṣikas. This quite agrees with what we know from other sources in which the Vaiseṣika is always the opponent to whom a greater importance is given.

III.

OUR TEXTS AND NS.

Now the question may arise: can the texts collected and studied here throw some light upon the vexed problem of the date of NS.? In fact it is known that the opinion of scholars differs as regards the time in which the ultimate redaction of the present NS. took place. Jacobi[2] maintained that NS. and

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[1] There is no doubt that catalogues of the *hetvābhāsas* were in circulation since old times; cf. besides the *hetucakra* of Diṅnāga the list contained in NV. 164 fll.

[2] JACOBI, *Die Indische Logik* (Nach. v.d. K. G. d. W. zu Göttingen, phil. hist. Kl. 1901. p. 460. fll.; *The dates of the Philosophical sūtras* (J.A.O.S. Vol.

VS. were composed between 200 and 450 A.D. Suali proposed for VS. the date 250–300 and for NS. the date 300-350.[1] Stcherbatsky had first maintained that NS. assumed its definite shape after the 5th century ; then, he changed his view and held that no certain conclusion could be derived from the fact that there are in NS. references to Buddhist Idealism, since this Idealism is not that of Vasubandhu, but an older one.[2] Ui proposed the date 150–250.[3] Prof. Dāsgupta is rather sceptical as regards the possibility of fixing the exact date when the Sūtras were codified.[4] I think that he is quite right, because we are not in a condition to determine the various strata that were superimposed in the actual redaction of the sūtras. First of all we must distinguish at least two different parts that must belong to two quite different periods, I mean the section dedicated to the pure *vāda* rules and the polemical one.[5] It is evident that while these may have been inserted in various times, when the system had began to develop and acquire a definite shape, so that it became necessary to defend its tenets against the theories of rival systems, the other section may have a quite different origin as it seems to be evidenced by our texts and other comparative materials at our disposal, such as Carakasaṃhitā. Adhyāya I and adhyāya V deal with the *vāda*-rules and have but little connection with the polemicals adhyāyas II, III, and IV. We must confess that we do not

XXXI, p. 1 fll.) *A contribution towards the early history of Indian Philosophy* IA. 1918. p. 101.

[1] Suali, *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia indiana*. p. 14.

[2] Stcherbatsky *Erkenntnistheorie und Logik nach der Lehre der späteren Buddhisten*, München, Kapitel I, and Anhang II. Nachtrag zu Kapitel I.

[3] Ui *Vaiśeṣika Phil.* p. 86. In his important essay upon *The Chronology of the systematisation of the Nyāya and the redaction of NS.* 正理學派の成立并に正理經に編纂代" (*Studies in Indian philosophy* p. 213) he proposes the date 200–250 for the systematisation of the doctrine and 300-350 for the redaction of NS. The essay of Prof. Ui is the best and the most exhaustive on the subject. Many of my conclusions agree with his views.

[4] S. N. Das Gupta. *History of Indian Phil.* p. 2 f. 9.

[5] That the NS. result from various *strata* was already stated by Haraprasāda Śāstrī, J.B.A.S. 1905.

know anything about their origin and the fact that they are of Buddhist origin can neither be affirmed nor denied by the sources at our disposal. It seems rather possible that when the systems had begun to assume a definite individuality and disputes among the various schools of thought increased, the practical importance of the *vāda*-rules came to be recognized by the various sects, so that we may logically assume that different Vāda-śāstras, a kind of *vademecum* for philosophical discussions always in vogue in India and well attested by Brahminical as well as Buddhist sources,[1] were in circulation quite independently, among the various schools. In all these treatises the heuristical element and purely formal logic are predominant; in fact the Pramāṇasamuccaya is perhaps the first extant work in which that epistemological element which was afterwards to be elaborated by Dharmakīrti and was to exercise a great influence upon the future development of Indian Nyāya had first come to the forefront. Various specimens of those *vademecums* of Vādas have come down to us. Besides NS. we have the chapters on vāda written by Maitreya and Asaṅga, the *vāda* sections of Carakasaṃhitā, Upāyahṛdaya and Tarkaśāstra translated here and Vādavidhi attributed to Vasubandhu. Moreover we should not forget the Tantrayukti in which we find the counterpart of some of the categories of CS. or UH. or NS.[2] If we compare the lists given in the preceding chapter we shall easily recognize that some classifications of NS. do not appear to be so old as those of Caraka, Maitreya[3], Asaṅga or Upāyahṛdaya. It is sufficient to compare *e.g.*, the lists of the Nigrahasthānas or of the *Jātis*; neither in Maitreya nor in Asaṅga nor in U. hṛdaya nor in Caraka is there

[1] References to *vāda* and *parṣat* have been collected by VIDYĀBHŪṢAṆA in his HIL. We may add that according to the traditions preserved in the Chinese Canon the greatest Buddhist masters such as Aśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, succeeded in establishing their views on account of their dialectical ability shown in public debates, against the most famous opponents; one must remember the *vādaduṃdubhis* which were kept at the court of all princes.

[2] On the Tantrayukti cf. RUBEN, *Zur Frühgeschichte der indichen Philosophie* (in Festgabe Jacobi p. 346).

[3] That Maitreya was an historical *ācārya* and not a mythical being has been proved by UI. *On the author of the Mahāyāna Sūtrālaṅkāra* ZII. 1928, p. 215. This is also implicitly indicated by Haribhadra in the *maṅgalācaraṇa* to his Abhisamayālaṅkārāloka.

such a systematical classification of these categories as may be compared to that of NS. Even Upāyahṛdaya shows a stage which is very near to that of Caraka, but more primitive than that of NS.; on the other hand there is a great analogy, I should rather say similarity, between NS. and Tarkaśāstra and Vādavidhi.[1] This fact shows that this section of NS. is closely related, if not as regards its sources, at least as regards the time of its compilation, to those Buddhistic treatises, which themselves have many similarity with the logical section of Praśastapāda. We cannot in fact, deny that when any new development took place in the elaboration of the *Vāda*-rules the change must have worked almost contemporaneously in all schools, because no discussion is possible without a fundamental agreement as regards the chief elements of the discussion itself. The same *vāda*-rules must have been accepted and followed by the two disputants.

As regards the second section, its polemical aspect is evident. Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsaka, but chiefly Buddhist theories are alluded to and refuted; of course we cannot gather many elements which can help us in fixing the date of this section, because, even when it is granted, as I said before, that it is independent of the first, we have no grounds for assuming that all the parts of this section were entirely written at the same time. On the other hand interpolations are traceable. The allusion to the Buddhist Idealism cannot be used as a definitive proof, as Jacobi thought.[2] It is wrong to state that Indian Idealism was inaugurated by Vasubandhu, since the idealistic views had already been expounded in such works as Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Sandhinirmocana, and already systematised by Maitreya etc.[3] And NS. IV. ii. 31, 32 can be quite well interpreted in the light of these books. So also the famous sūtra IV,

[1] The treatment of the *jātis*, shows an attempt towards a classification and a reduction of the types which announces Diṅnāga's theory. There is in fact agreement between NM and TŚ. and VVI.

[2] Cfr. KEITH *Indian logic and atomism*, p. 23, and STCHERBATSKY, Anhang I.

But Ui compares the *Viṃśikā* of Vasubandhu 16, 17 with NS. IV, II, 29, 31.

[3] Cfr. my notes on the Laṅkāvatāra, IHQ. Vol. IV, n. 3.

ii, 26: *buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānāṃ yāthātmyānupalabdhis tantvapakarṣaṇe paṭasadbhāvānupalabdhivat* has its counterpart in Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra p. 53: *goviṣāṇam aṇuśo vibhajyamānaṃ punar apy aṇavo vibhajyamānā aṇutvalakṣaṇenāvatiṣṭhante* and p. 207: *pralayo nāma ā paramāṇoḥ pravicayaparīkṣā vināśo*, etc., (Cfr. NV. 529 *paramāṇavo 'pi bhagaśo vivicyamānās tāvad yāvat pralayāḥ*.) More precision is possible as regards the reply to the criticism against the pramāṇas. There is no doubt that in this case the compiler of this section of NS. meant to refute the attacks of Nāgārjuna as contained in his Vigrahavyāvartanī and implicitly in MMK. As I have shown in the notes to this treatise it appears from the comparison of the two texts that they are here interdependent. The two objections raised by Nyāyasūtras against his criticism concerning the antinomy of the "reason" *viz.*, that if the "reason" is self-contradictory, the refutation would be impossible and that the pramāṇa, though an instrument of knowledge, can equally well be an object of knowledge, were known to Nāgārjuna. He, in fact, replies to them and shows that the answer of the opponent, *viz.*, *dīpavat*, (he has: *agnivat*) was understood by him in a way different from that of Vātsyāyana (who refers to the wrong interpretation of the Ācāryadeśīya NVTT. 371) but quite in accordance with NS. V, i. 10. All this would seem to indicate a contemporariness between Nāgārjuna and the writer of those sūtras. But this does not necessarily imply that the whole of NS. as we have it now, was definitely redacted at that time. In fact, Āryadeva in Śataśāstra quotes many sūtras from NS. These sūtras are: III, i, 12; III, i, 1; III, i, 18; III, i, 7; III, i, 14. Other sūtras seem to have been known to him II, i. 31; II, i, 41 (cfr. notes on ŚŚ). But these quotations are referred to by the commentator not as being taken from the Nyāya system, but from the Vaiśeṣikas. This fact seems to indicate that at the time of Śataśāstra and its commentator, the Nyāya system had not yet originated as a different school, but that the section II—IV was already existent as a part of a Vaiśeṣika treatise. This is in accordance with the fact that Bādarāyaṇa as pointed out by Bodas does not seem to know the Nyāya,[1]

[1] This seems also to agree with the fact that no mention of the *nyāya* can be found in old Buddhist Texts.

though he is aware of the Vaiśeṣika and that many Vaiśeṣika-sūtras are inserted in NS.[1] So we can only state that at the time of Āryadeva and Vasu some of the sūtras now belonging to the section II-IV were already existent though belonging to a Vaiśeṣika text and not to the NS. A better determination would be possible if we could use in this connection a passage from Tattvasiddhiśāstra (IV century A.D.) by Harivarman. The passage, already signalised by Ui, runs thus: "The six things such as *dravya*, etc., are real according to Ulūka, the 25 *tattvas* are real according to the Sāṅkhyas. The sixteen varieties of arguments (*artha*) are real according to the Na-ya-siu-mo 那耶修摩." (Tattvasiddhi Chp. 23 Taishō edit. Vol. XXXII p. 256 上.)

The chinese term may be restored into *Naya-sauma*[2]; where *naya* could be taken as a synonym for nyāya; moreover the number 16 exactly corresponds to the number of the *padārthas* of NS., as they were known to the later Chinese commentators such as Ki-tsang who, for the first time, gives in his commentary on ŚŚ (Chapter Vth.) the complete translation of the first sūtra of NS.

又摩醯首羅天說十六諦義一
量諦二所量三疑四用五譬喻六

[1] Cfr. Ui, *Vaiś. Phil.* and *Studies, etc.*, II, p. 190 fll. But there is no doubt that many sūtrās of VS. were quoted by Vātsyāyana and were afterwards considered as belonging to NS. Cfr. f. i. Ruben *Die Nyāyasūtrās.* P. 64, 67, etc.

[2] The *Saumas* are quoted as a particular heretical sect in a single passage as far as my knowledge goes *viz.*, in Bhāṣyacandra by Raghūttama, (NSB. ed. p. 30) *Cārvāka-sauma-saugata-jinā-'rhata-digambarāḥ ṣaḍ bāhyāḥ siddhāntāḥ; naiyāyika-vaiśeṣika-sāṅkhya-pātañjala-jaiminīya-bādarāyaṇiyāḥ ṣaḍ vaidikasiddhāntāḥ.* Another reference to the *Saumas* has been found by Prof. Bagchi in the *Akulavīratantra* (revealed by Mīnanātha f. 1. 6) and kindly communicated to me: *Samvādayanti ye kecin nyāya-vaiśeṣikas tathā* | *Bauddhās tu arihantā ye somasiddhāntavādinaḥ* |. As suggested by His Holiness Hemarāja Śarma Guru of His Highness the Mahārāja of Nepal, in a talk upon this subject that I had with him, it is quite possible that in the *Somasiddhānta* there is the earliest reference to the Tantric schools. It is known in fact the importance of *candra* in mystical theories of the Tantras: while *nayottara* (*naya*) is the name of some very old Tantras or rather categories of tantras; as a matter of fact the categories expounded by Ki-tsang as characteristic of the school agree much more with Tantric tenets than with the doctrine of the Jainas.

悉檀七語言分別八思擇九決十論議十一修諸義十二壞義十三自證十四雜難十五諍論十六墮負. "The (followers) of Maheśvara (Pāśupatas) expound the sixteen categories: pramāṇa etc., (= NS. I, I, 1): the category which does not seem to agree completely with NS. is 13 = "self-realization."

Moreover, in another part of his comm. (Chp. 7) he quotes among the various other *vidyās* the *nyāyavistara* 那邪毘薩多論明諸法道理 "*Nyāyavistaraśāstra*, which explains the logic of the dharmas." This means that he was well informed. It is therefore curious that he identifies the Na-ya su-mo (of Tattvasiddhi) with the Nirgranthas or *Jñātiputras, Ñataputtas and ascribes to them a series of sixteen topics which, have nothing in common with the 16 padārthas of NS. 尼揵子亦名那耶修摩[1] "Nirgranthas called also Na-ya-su-mo." This statement is surprising specially when we examine the list of the 15 topics attributed to them, which does not contain, any definite analogy with the well-known nirgrantha doctrines. The [Na-ya] su-mos are quoted also in a few other sources, but unfortunately even from there we cannot gather any substantial information.[2]

[1] The sixteen topics are divided as follows: (*a*) 8 derived from *śrutajñāna*: 聞慧生 viz. 1. astronomy and geography, 2. arithmetic, 3. medicine, 4. *mantras*, 5–8 four vedas, (*b*) 8 derived from the "cultivation-mind" (修慧生) 1–6 the cultivation of the six divine practices; 7 the cultivation of the worship (事) of the stars, planets and gods (星宿天); 8 the cultivation of the practice of ṛṣis

It is evident that no connection can be found between these doctrines and those accepted by the Jainas.

[2] These references are to be found in the so called *Sūtrālankāra* attributed to Aśvaghoṣa, but which is probably *Dṛṣṭāntapankti* of Kumāralāta (not *Kalpanāmaṇḍitikā* as given by LÜDERS. *Brüchstücke der Kalp. des Kumāralāta.* Cfr. S. LEVI. *La Dṛṣṭāntapankti et son auteur.* J. A. Tome CCXI 1927 p. 95). This text (translated into French by HÜBER), contains an allusion to a sect called 若提碎摩 Jo-t'i-suei-mo which Hüber, was inclined to consider as

Therefore I think that until new evidence is brought forward as regards this school and its tenets, the passage of Tattvasiddhi cannot be of great help in solving the present question.

Anyhow from what has been said above it seems quite probable that the actual NS. is the result of the combination of one section containing *Vāda*-rules posterior to those preserved in CS. or UH. but older than TŚ. and another, chiefly polemical, the existence of which or rather of some of its sūtras can be traced since the time of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

This codification must therefore have taken place after the appearance of this master and his commentator Vasu—(III A.D.); any further determination cannot be reached at present specially when we consider that we do not know anything about this Vasu, and we cannot even assert or deny that he is the same as Vasubandhu.

As regards Vâtsyāyana there is no doubt that he knew TŚ. since he quotes from it referring to its criticism of the *arthapatti* (cf. p. 25). The fact that he cites the doctrine of the ten members of the syllogism but says nothing about the reforms of Vasubandhu seems to indicate that the works in which the buddhist doctor had expounded his theories of the syllogism in three members were unknown to him.

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a transcription of *Jyotiṣṭoma*; but this seems to me impossible. The other reference is in the 順中論 *Madhyāntānugamaśāstra* (upon which see my *Studî Mahāyānici*, p. 3, n. 1) by Asaṅga, where the Na-y-su-mo are quoted in a passage in which logical theories are discussed (it has first been signalised by Ui in *Vais. Phil.* and in *Studies in Ind. Phil* I. p. 215).

PART I.

तर्कशास्त्रम् ।

[*Retranslation into Sanskrit.*]

तर्कशास्त्रम् ।

अथ प्रथमं प्रकरणम् ।

(शास्त्रमाह) भवान् मन्यतेऽस्मद्वचनमन्याय्यमिति चेद्भवतोऽपि वचनमन्याय्यम् । यदि भवद्वचनमन्याय्यं, तदास्मद्वचनं न्याय्यम् । यदि [भवतोच्यते] भवद्वचनं न्याय्यं, परमस्मद्वचनमन्याय्यं तन्न युक्तम् । किञ्च यदन्याय्यं तदेतत्स्वतो न्याय्यं, तस्माद् यदन्याय्यं तन्नास्ति । यदि स्वतो ऽन्याय्यं तदेतदन्याय्यमसच्चैव, तस्मादहमन्याय्य[वादी] इति चेद्भवतोच्यते तदयुक्तम् ।

अन्यच्च । मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति चेद्भवतोच्यते, ततो भवानज्ञ इति स्पष्टम् । कुत इति चेत् । यदन्याय्यं तन्निराभासम् । वचनं न्यायाभावाद्भिन्नमभिन्नं वा ? । अभिन्नं चेद्वचनमपि नास्तीति मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति भवता कथमुच्यते । अथ भिन्नं, ततो वचनं न्याय्यमिति मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति कथं भवतोच्यते । वचनस्वलक्षणखण्डनाच्च । भवत्खण्डनवचनमस्मद्वचनस्य समकालीनमसमकालीनं वा ? समकालीनं चेदस्मद्वचनखण्डनेऽसमर्थं, यथा गोशृङ्गेऽश्वकर्णौ वा परस्परं खण्डयितुं न शक्नुवतः । समकालीनत्वात् । असमकालीनश्चेद्, भवतः खण्डनं पूर्वमस्मद्वचनं पश्चात् । अथास्मद्वचनानुच्चारणात्, किं भवता खण्ड्यते ? । तस्माद्भवतः खण्डनमसिद्धम् । अथास्मद्वचनं

पूर्वं, भवतः खण्डनं तु पश्चाद्, एवं तर्ह्यस्मद्वचनसिद्धत्वात् कस्य खण्डनं भविष्यति ?। समकालीनश्चेत्, ततोऽस्मद्वचनं भवतश्च खण्डनमित्येतयोरेतत् खण्डनमेतच्च खण्डनीयमिति विशेषो न स्यात्। यथा नदीसमुद्रवारिसंयोगकाले विशेषासम्भवः।

अपरञ्च। भवतः खण्डनं स्वखण्डनार्थमस्वखण्डनार्थं वा ! स्वखण्डनार्थञ्चेत्, ततः स्वतः स्वार्थहीनं भवेदस्मद्वचनन्तु सिद्धम्। अस्वखण्डनार्थञ्चेद्, असिद्धम्। कुत इति चेत्, स्वार्थतः खण्डनासिद्धेः। सिद्धञ्चेत्, स्वार्थहानिः परार्थसिद्धिश्च।

किञ्चास्मद्वचनमन्याय्यमिति चेद्, वचनमेव न भवेत्। वचनञ्चेन्नैवान्याय्यम्। अन्याय्यमिति चेत्, तद्विरुद्धम्। यथा कुमारी पुत्रवतीति। यतो यदि कुमारी पुत्रवतीति न सम्पद्यते। यदि पुत्रवती, तर्हि नैव कुमारी। कुमारीति पुत्रवतीति चोभयं विरुद्धम्। तस्मान्मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति चेद्भवतोच्यते तदयुक्तम्। एतत्पुनः प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धम्। भवानस्माकं वचनं श्रुत्वाऽन्याय्यं मन्यते चेत्, तत्तर्हि श्रुतत्वात्प्रत्यक्षसिद्धम्। प्रत्यक्षं हि बलवत्तरं तस्माद्भवद्वचनहानिः। यथा कश्चिन्मन्येत श्रोत्रविज्ञानतः शब्दस्यानुपलब्धिरथ श्रोत्रविज्ञानतः शब्दस्योपलब्धिः प्रत्यक्षसिद्धेति, तदा प्रत्यक्षस्य बलवत्तरत्वात्तद्वचनहानिः।

अनुमानविरुद्धं चैतत्। मम वचनमनुमानेनोपलभ्यते चेत्ततो न्याय्यमिति स्पष्टम्। अन्याय्यं हि वचनं नैव विद्यते। यदि वचनमस्ति तदा न्याय्यमिति ज्ञायते। यथा कश्चिन्मन्येत शब्दोऽनित्यो हेतुमत्त्वात्। यच्च हेतुमत्तदनित्यं,

यथा घटः। स हेतुमत्त्वादनित्यः। यदि हेतुमांस्तदाऽनित्यः शब्दो, यदि नित्यो नैव हेतुमान्। इत्यनित्यतानुमानसिद्धा। अनुमानबलान्नित्यताहानिः। न्याय्यमिति, यद्वचनं तन्न्याय्यम्। यन्न्याय्यमित्यनुमानसिद्धं, तदन्याय्यमिति प्रतिषिद्धम्। लोकविरुद्धं चैतत्। यद्भवतोक्तं मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति तल्लोकविरुद्धम्। कस्मादिति, लोके हि चतुर्विधन्यायसत्त्वात्। [तथा हि] हेतुफलन्यायः सापेक्षन्यायः साधनन्यायस्तथतान्यायश्च।

हेतुफलन्यायः। यथा बीजमङ्कुरश्च।

सापेक्षन्यायः। यथा दीर्घं ह्रस्वं, पिता पुत्रः। साधनन्यायः। यथा पञ्चावयववाक्यं साधनार्थम्। तथतान्यायस्त्रिविधः। यथाऽनात्मतथताऽनित्यतातथता निरोधतथता च। इह लोके वचनं फलं, न्यायो हेतुरिति। इह लोके यदा फलं दृष्टं, तदा सहेतुकं ज्ञातम्। यदा वचनमुपलब्धं, तदा न्याय्यं ज्ञातम्। यन्मम वचनमन्याय्यमिति भवतोक्तं तल्लोकविरुद्धम्। अन्याय्यं वचनमित्यस्य नास्त्यवकाशः।

यद् (भवत)ोक्तं मम वचनमन्यद्विसंवादित्वादिति तदिदमिदानीं भवता सार्धं विचार्य निर्धार्यते। यदि कश्चिदन्यद्वदेत्तदा तस्य दोषः स्यात्। भिद्यते भवतः प्रतिज्ञाऽस्मत्प्रतिज्ञातः। अथ तद्भवतः स्वोक्तम्। तदान्यदुक्तम्। तस्माद्भवानेव दोषमापद्यते। यदि भवदर्थो ऽस्मदुक्तादन्यस्तदान्यत्वदोषो भवत एव न तु मम। यदि नान्यत्, तर्हि मत्पक्षतुल्यमेव, तेन नास्त्यन्यत्वम्। अथोच्यते ममान्यदिति तन्मिथ्या। अन्य-

चान्यस्मान्नान्यदित्यनन्यत्वम्। यद्यन्यदन्यस्मादन्यत्, ततोऽन्यन्न भवेत्। यथा मनुष्यो गोरन्यो न गौर्भवति, यद्यन्यदन्यस्मादन्यत्, तदा तदेकं भवेत्। यद्येकं ततो नान्यत्, तत्किमुच्यते ममान्यदिति। अतश्चैतन्न्याय्यमिति। अहं न्यायमवलम्ब्य भवता विवदे। तस्मादन्यथाहं वदामि। यद्यावयोर्भेद एव न स्यान्न तदा भवता विवादोऽहं तु भवदर्थमेव वदामि।

सर्वमुक्तमन्यदिति चेद्, भवतापि किञ्चिदुक्तमिति भवानप्यन्यद्वदतीति दोषो भवत एव। यदि भवतो वाक्यं नान्यत्, तर्हि ममापि वचनं नान्यदिति यद् भवतोक्तमहमन्यद्वदामीति तदयुक्तम्। अथ भवद्वचनं मिथ्यैव। शेषं पूर्ववत्। यद् (भवतो)क्तं मम वचनमसिद्धमिति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। यदि वचनमसिद्धं, तदा तदेव वचनमसिद्धम्। यदि वचनस्यासिद्धत्वं, तदा वचनमेव न प्राप्तम्। अथ वचनं न प्राप्तं, कथं भवतोच्यते मया यदुक्तं तदसिद्धमिति। अथ वचनं प्राप्तं तत्सिद्धमेव स्यात्। यदि मदुक्तमसिद्धमिति भवतोच्यते तदयुक्तम्। यदि सर्वं वचनमसिद्धं, तर्हि भवदुक्तं मम खण्डनमप्यसिद्धम्। यदि भवदुक्तं खण्डनमसिद्धं न स्यात्, तर्हि मम वचनमपि नैवासिद्धम्। यदि (भवतो)च्यते मदुक्तमसिद्धं तदयुक्तम्। यदसिद्धं तत्स्वत एव सिद्धम्। तस्मान्नास्त्यसिद्धम्। यद्यसिद्धं न स्वतः सिद्धं, तदासिद्धं न स्यात्। यदि सिद्धं, नास्त्यसिद्धं, ततो यद् (भवतो)क्तं मदुक्तमसिद्धमिति तन्निरवकाशम्। यदि भवतोच्यते मम खण्डनमननुभाषणमेव तदा न मम मतस्योपलब्धिः।

अथ नोपलभ्यते मम मतं, ततो मम खण्डनं कर्तुं न शक्यते। तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। यदि भवान् मत्खण्डनं नानुभाषते, तदा भवान् खण्डनं वक्तुं न शक्नोति। किं पुनर्मन्यते भवान् खण्डनमननुभाष्य खण्डनं शक्यं, अथवा खण्डनमनुभाष्य खण्डनं शक्यम्। यदि तावद् (भवान्) अननुभाष्य (खण्डनं वक्तुं शक्नोति), अहमप्यननुभाष्य खण्डनं वक्तुं शक्नुयाम्। अथवा खण्डनमनुभाष्य खण्डनं वक्तुं शक्यं, तदा सदैव खण्डनानुभाषणम् स्यात्। कुतः? खण्डनात्पुनः खण्डनस्योत्पन्नत्वात्। तदा खण्डनानवस्था। न च स कालो विद्यते यत्र न खण्डनानुभाषणम्। [अतः] यत्र खण्डनं वक्तुं शक्यते स कालो नास्ति।

अपरञ्च खण्डनमिति खण्डनान्नाम। यदि तत्खण्डनानुभाषणान्नाम खण्डनमिति वक्तुं शक्यते, अननुभाष्य तु खण्डनमिति वक्तुं न शक्यते। ततः पूर्वखण्डनस्य नाम पश्चादनुभाषणं प्राप्तम्। परवर्तिखण्डनं नाम न तावदनुभाषणं प्राप्नोति। तृतीयन्तु द्वितीयस्य खण्डनस्य नामानुभाषणं प्राप्तम्। चतुर्थं तृतीयस्य खण्डनस्य नामानुभाषणं प्राप्तम्। इति सदानुभाषणादनवस्था। अननुभाष्य खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यमिति चेद्, अननुभाष्यापि ततः प्रथमं खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यम्। प्रथमं खण्डनं नामाननुभाष्य खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यमिति चेत्, द्वितीयमपि खण्डनं नामाननुभाष्य खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यते। द्वितीयं खण्डनं नामाननुभाष्य खण्डनमिति वक्तुं शक्यत इति चेत्, प्रथमं खण्डनं

नामाप्यननुभाष्य खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्येत। किन्तु प्रथमं खण्डनं नामावश्यमनुभाष्यम्। तस्मात्खण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यते। अथ द्वितीयं खण्डनं नामाप्यवश्यमनुभाष्यं, तदा खंण्डनं नाम वक्तुं शक्यते नत्वननुभाष्य वक्तव्यम्। यदि पुनः खण्डनमननुभाष्य वदेत्, खण्डनस्य निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः। यदि भवान् स्वखण्डनं नानुभाषते, ततो भवदुक्तखण्डनस्य निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः। यदि भवान् खण्डनमननुभाष्य खण्डनं वदेत्, खण्डनं वदंश्च निग्रहस्थाने न पतेत्, तदाहमपि खण्डनमननुभाष्य खण्डनं वदन्न निग्राह्यः। किञ्च यदा भवद्वचनं मम [मतं] खण्डयति, तदाऽहमनुभाषे। यदा त्वहं भवन्मतं खण्डयामि तदा भवानप्यनुभाषते। अथ परस्परानुभाषणं, न तदा खण्डनप्रतिष्ठापनम्। यदि परस्परानुभाषणं, तदा सम्यगर्थहानिः। यथा पोतावन्योन्यसम्बद्धौ समुद्रवेलासमये परस्परसंघर्षेण दोलायमानौ।

अपरञ्च। सर्वे शब्दा यदा मुखान्निर्गतास्तदा नष्टा एवेति कथं मद्वचनानुभाषणम्?। अथ शब्दो विनाशधर्मा। अपुनरागमनात्पुनर्भाषणमशक्यम्। अथ शब्दः स्थितिशीलस्तदानुभाषणमशक्यं, नित्यत्वात्। नष्ट इति चेन्, न किञ्चिदनुभाषितव्यं तदभावात्। शब्दो नष्ट इति चेत्, त्वदनुभाषणायैतन्मे वचनमिति यद्भवान् ब्रवीति स कुतर्क एव।

यद् (भवतो)क्तं मद्वचनं पूर्वं, [भवत्]खण्डनं तु पश्चादिति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। यदि मद्वचनं पूर्वं, खण्डनन्तु पश्चादिति तन्न्याय्यम्। कुत इति

चेन्, मद्वचनं पूर्वं भवद्वचनं तु पश्चादिति । यद्यस्मद्वचनं परवर्तिवचनं खण्डयति, ततोऽस्मदर्थो विशिष्यते भवद्वचनस्य तु हानिः । किञ्च यद्युच्यते भवता सर्वाणि वचनानि पूर्ववर्तीनि खण्डनन्तु परवर्तीति, तदा भवानपि पूर्वमेव वचनं वदतीति पश्चात्खण्डनं भवेत् । यदि भवद्वचनस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वेऽपि पश्चात्खण्डनं नास्ति, तर्हि मद्वचनस्य पूर्ववर्तित्वेऽपि, पश्चात्खण्डनं न स्यात् । यच्च खण्डनं पूर्वस्य परवर्तीति स्वभावतः पूर्वस्य खण्डनं न पश्चादस्ति । यदि स्वभावत एव पूर्वस्य खण्डनं पश्चात् स्यात्, तदा पूर्वं पश्चादित्युभे न स्याताम् । तस्माद्यद्भवतोक्तं पूर्वस्य खण्डनं परभावीति तदयुक्तम् । यदि स्वभावतः पूर्वस्य खण्डनं न पश्चात् । हेत्वभावात् । तदा पूर्वस्यापि खण्डनं परभावि न भवेत् । यद्भवतोक्तं मद्वचनं पूर्वं, खण्डनं तु परभावि तन्मिथ्या ।

यदभिहितं भवता, मया हेत्वन्तरमुक्तमिति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते । यदि पूर्वहेतुं परित्यज्य हेत्वन्तरप्रतिष्ठापनान्निग्रहस्थानमापद्यते, तदा भवान् निग्रहस्थानमापन्नः । कथमिति चेद्, भवता पूर्वहेतुं परित्यज्य हेत्वन्तरप्रतिष्ठापनात् । यदि हेत्वन्तरप्रतिष्ठापनाद्भवतो न निग्रहस्थानत्वापत्तिस्तदा ममापि तथा । किञ्च मदुक्तहेतुतो भवदुक्तहेतोर्भेदः । यद्यन्यं हेतुं वदामि तन्मम न्याय्यम् । यद्यन्यं हेतुं न वदेयं, ततो भवद्धेतुं वदेयम् । ततो न प्रतिपक्षतया विरोधोऽपि त्वावयोस्तुल्यवचनतैव । यदि सदृश एव हेतुरावाभ्यां प्रतिष्ठापितः, तदा भवानस्मद्धेतुं खण्डयतीति स्वहेतुमेव खण्डयति ।

अपि च यदि सर्वाणि वचनानि हेत्वन्तराणि स्युस्तदा भवदुक्तानि वचनान्यपि हेत्वन्तराणि भवेयुः। ततश्च भवतो निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः। अथ वचनान्युच्चारयन्नपि न भवान् निग्राह्यस्तर्हि यद्भवतोक्तं हेतुं प्रतिष्ठापयन्नहं निग्राह्य इति तदयुक्तम्।

यद्भवतोक्तमर्थान्तरं वदामीति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। अन्या मे प्रतिज्ञा, अन्या च भवत इति यत्तन्न्याय्यमेव। अथाहं भवतः प्रतिपक्षतया विरोधीत्यर्थान्तरं ब्रवीमि। यदि मतमस्मदर्थो भवदर्था-दनन्यस्तदाऽस्मदर्थो भवदर्थप्रतिपक्षतया न विरुद्धो। यदि भवानस्मदर्थं खण्डयति, तर्हि भवतः स्वार्थस्यैव खण्डनं भवेत्। यदर्थान्तरं न तत्स्वयमर्थान्तरम्। तस्मा-न्नास्त्यर्थान्तरम्। यदि त्वर्थान्तरं स्वयमेवार्थान्तरं, न तदार्थान्तरम्। तस्माद्यद्भवतोक्तमहमर्थान्तरं वदामीति न युक्तम्। अपरञ्च यदुक्तं सर्वं तदर्थान्तरञ्चेत्तदा भवदुक्तमप्यर्थान्तरं भवेत्। यदि भवदुक्तमर्थान्तरं न भवेत्तदा यद्भवता प्रतिज्ञातं सर्वमर्थान्तरमिति तदयुक्तम्।

यद् (भवतो)क्तमहं पूर्ववचनादनन्यद्वचनं वदामीति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। अस्मत्प्र-तिज्ञा भवत्प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रतिपक्षभावेन विरुद्धा। यदस्म-त्प्रतिज्ञा भवत्प्रतिज्ञायाः प्रतिपक्षभावेन विरुद्धा, तन्न्या-य्यम्। कुत इति चेत्। सर्वञ्चाहं भवदर्थखण्डनार्थं वदामि, तस्मादस्मद्वचनमनन्यत्। यदि मयार्थान्तरमुक्तं, तर्हि भवत्प्रतिज्ञाऽस्मदर्थादन्या। यद्यहमर्थान्तरं वदामि तदा

भवदर्थं वदामि। एवन्तावन्नाहं भवद्विरुद्धो। ततश्च यदि भवान् मां खण्डयति, तर्हि स्वार्थस्यैव खण्डनम्।

अन्यच्च। यथा मया पूर्वमुक्तमनित्यः शब्द इति। एतानि वचनानि विनाशस्वभावानि क्षयस्वभावानि च। इदानीमन्यद्वचनमुच्चर्यते। ततश्च यद्भवतोक्तं भवान् पूर्ववचनं वदतीति तन्मिथ्या।

अपरञ्च। यद्भवतोक्तं मदुक्तमनन्यदिति। तच्च यद्यह-मन्यद्वदामि तदा तदन्यत्। यद्यहमनन्यद्वदामि तदनन्यत्। यद्यहं तद्वदंस्तन्न साधयितुं शक्नोमि, तदा यद्भवतोक्तमन-न्यदिति तदयुक्तम्। यच्च (भवतो)क्तं मया सर्वमुक्तं नानु-ज्ञायत इति तदिदानीं (भवता सार्धं) विचार्य निर्धार्यते। सर्वं नानुज्ञायत इति यदुक्तं भवता एतद्वचनं सर्व-स्मिन्नन्तर्भवति न वा?। यदि तावत्सर्वस्मिन्नन्तर्भवति तदा भवान् स्वयं स्वोक्तं नानुजानाति। यदि स्वयं नानुजानात्यस्मदर्थः स्वत एव सिद्धो भवेद्भवद्वचनस्य तु हानिः स्यात्। अथ सर्वस्मिन्नान्तर्भवति तदा तस्य सर्वत्वमेव न स्यात्। यदि सर्वत्वमेव न भवेत्, तदा भवता यदननुज्ञातं तत्सर्वम्। यदि सर्वमननुज्ञातं तदा-ऽस्मदर्थो भवता नैवाननुज्ञातः। अस्मदर्थः सिद्धो भवतस्तु सर्वस्य प्रतिषेधः।

इति प्रथमं प्रकरणम्।

अथ द्वितीयं प्रकरणम्।

(शास्त्रमाह) खण्डनस्य त्रिविधदोषापत्तिः। विपरीतखण्डनमसत्खण्डनं विरुद्धखण्डनञ्चेति। यदि खण्डनमेतत्त्रिविधदोषोपेतं तदा निग्रहस्थानम्।

[तत्र] विपरीतखण्डनम्। यदि प्रतिष्ठापितं खण्डनं सम्यगर्थेन न संयुक्तं स्यात्तदा तद्विपरीतखण्डनमित्युच्यते। विपरीतखण्डनं दशविधम्। (१) साधर्म्यखण्डनम् (२) वैधर्म्यखण्डनम् (३) विकल्पखण्डनम् (४) अविशेषखण्डनम् (५) प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिखण्डनम् (६) अहेतुखण्डनम् (७) उपलब्धिखण्डनम् (८) संशयखण्डनम् (९) अनुक्तिखण्डनम् (१०) कार्यभेदखण्डनम्।

१. [तत्र] साधर्म्यखण्डनम्। वस्तुसाधर्म्यप्रत्यवस्थानं साधर्म्यखण्डनमित्युच्यते।

(शास्त्रमाह) शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रयत्नोत्पन्नत्वाद्यथा घटः प्रयत्नोत्पन्नः। उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टः। शब्दोऽपि तथेति शब्दो ऽनित्य इति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि घटसाधर्म्याच्छब्दोऽनित्यस्तदाकाशसाधर्म्याच्छब्दो नित्यः स्यात्। ततश्चाकाशवच्छब्दो नित्य इति। [अत्र] साधर्म्यममूर्तत्वम्।

(शास्त्रं पुनराह) शब्दो ऽनित्यः प्रयत्नोत्पन्नत्वात्। यन्नित्यं न तत्प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नं यथाकाशं नित्यं न प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नम्। शब्दस्तु न तथा। तस्माच्छब्दो ऽनित्य इति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि (शब्दस्य) नित्याकाशवैधर्म्याच्छब्दोऽनित्य इति, तदा किं प्राप्तम्?। यद्याकाश-

साधर्म्यं ततो नित्य एव शब्द इति। साधर्म्यं चामूर्तत्वं तस्मान्नित्यः।

(शास्त्रमाह) एते खण्डने विपरीते ऽसिद्धे च (खण्डने)। कुत इति चेत्। ऐकान्तिकैकरसधर्मस्थापनं हि हेतुरिति मन्यते। सर्वधर्माणां प्रयत्नोत्पन्नत्वेनानित्यतावर्णनात्। सोऽनित्यतावर्णकहेतुरैकान्तिकैकरसस्तस्मादनित्यताऽनपसरणीयैव। तत्सामानजातीयं चिख्यापयिषतया घटाद्युदाहरणमुक्तम्।

प्रतिवादी त्वनैकान्तिकैकरसार्थप्रत्यवस्थानेन खण्डनं भाषते यथा यदि भवान् साधर्म्येण शब्दस्यानित्यतां स्थापयति तदाहमपि वैधर्म्येण शब्दस्य नित्यतां प्रतिष्ठापयामि। यदि च भवदर्थः सिद्धो ममाप्यर्थः सिद्धो भवेदिति।

(शास्त्रमाह) भवतः खण्डनमयुक्तम्। कुत इति चेत्। भवत्प्रयुक्तस्य हेतोरनैकान्तिकनित्यत्वानित्यत्वव्याप्तिवर्णनात्। अस्माभिस्त्रिलक्षणो हेतुः स्थापितः। तद्यथा पक्षधर्म्मः सपक्षसत्वं विपक्षव्यावृत्तिश्च। तस्माद्धेतुसिद्धिरनपसरणीया। भवद्धेतुस्तु न तथा। तस्माद्भवत्खण्डनं विपरीतम्। यदि भवता प्रतिष्ठापितो हेतुरस्मद्धेतुतुल्यो भवेत्तदा सम्यक्खण्डनं सिध्येत्। यद्यनित्यताप्रतिज्ञा नित्यतां खण्डयति तदा [नित्यता-] खण्डनसिद्धिः। कुत इति चेत्। नित्यतास्थापकहेतुनानित्यतास्थापकहेतुः खण्ड्यते चेत्, तदानित्यताविपर्यासदोषो व्यक्तीकर्तुं न शक्यत इति प्रसिद्धम्। नित्यताहेतोरनैकान्तिकैकरसत्वादनित्यताहेतोरैकान्तिकैकरसत्वाच्च।

२. वैधर्म्यखण्डनम्। वस्तुवैधर्म्यप्रत्यवस्थानं वैधर्म्यखण्डनमित्युच्यते।

(शास्त्रमाह) अनित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्? कृतकत्वात्। यत् कृतकं तदनित्यम्। यथाकाशं नित्यमकृतकत्वात्। शब्दस्य तथात्वाभावाच्छब्दोऽनित्यः।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि शब्दो नित्याकाशवैधर्म्यादनित्य इति, तदा किं प्राप्तम्। यदि घटवैधर्म्यं शब्दस्य, तदा स नित्य इति। तद्वैधर्म्यममूर्तत्वम्। घटो मूर्तस्तस्माद्घटोऽनित्यः शब्दस्तु नित्यः।

(शास्त्रमाह) शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात्। यथा घटोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वात्, तथा शब्दोऽपि।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि घटसाधर्म्याच्छब्दस्यानित्यता भवता स्थापिता, तदा किं प्राप्तम्?। शब्दो नित्य एव घटवैधर्म्याद्वैधर्म्यममूर्तत्वम्। घटस्तु मूर्तः।

(शास्त्रमाह) विपरीत एते खण्डने। कुत इति चेत्। अस्मत्स्थापितानित्यताहेतोरैकान्तिकैकरसत्वात्। भवत्प्रतिष्ठापितनित्यताहेतोस्त्वनैकान्तिकैकरसत्वान्नित्यत्वानित्यत्वव्याप्तिवर्णनात्। तस्मादनिश्चितहेतुरैकान्तिकहेतुं खण्डयितुं न शक्नोति। योऽस्माभिः स्थापितो हेतुः कृतकत्वाच्छब्दोऽनित्य इति तस्य (हेतोः) पक्षधर्मः सपक्षसत्त्वं विपक्षव्यावृत्तिश्च। त्रयलक्षणसम्पन्नत्वात् सोऽनपसरणीयः। यः पुनर्भवत्प्रतिष्ठापितो हेतुः शब्दो नित्योऽमूर्तत्वादिति तस्य पक्षधर्मः सपक्षे विपक्षे च वर्तत इत्यसिद्धो हेतुः।

३. विकल्पखण्डनम्। साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यप्रत्यवस्थानं विकल्पखण्डनमुच्यते।

(शास्त्रमाह) शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नत्वाद्घटवदिति शब्दस्यानित्यता।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। भवाञ्छब्दस्य प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नत्वाद्घट-साधर्म्यं स्थापयति। अस्ति पुनस्तद्वैधर्म्यम्। पक्कत्वम-पक्कत्वं, चाक्षुषत्वमचाक्षुषत्वमित्यादि। एवं घटशब्दयोः प्रत्येकं विशेषः। शब्दः प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नत्वान्नित्यः घटस्तु प्रयत्नेनोत्पन्नोऽप्यनित्यः। तस्माच्छब्दो नित्यः।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। अस्मत्स्थापित-हेतुरनित्यताऽव्यावृत्तो नित्यताव्यावृत्तः। एतद्धेतुस्थापन-मनित्यतानुमानार्थम्। यथाग्न्यनुमानार्थं धूमः प्रयुज्यते। धूमो ह्यग्न्यव्यावृत्तः। तस्मादस्मत्स्थापितहेतुः सिद्धो-ऽनपसरणीयश्च।

भवता शब्दस्यापक्क इति विशेषणं प्रयुज्यते। ततश्च नित्य इति। तदिच्छाद्वेषदुःखसुखवाय्वादीन्यपक्कानि न पुनरेतानि नित्यानि। तस्मादपक्कत्वं नित्यताहेतुत्वेन न प्रतिष्ठापयितव्यम्। न चाचाक्षुषत्वमपि नित्यताहेतुत्वेन प्रतिष्ठापयितव्यम्। कुत इति चेत्। इच्छाद्वेषदुःखसुख-वाय्वादीन्यचाक्षुषाणि न पुनर्नित्यानि। भवद्धेतुः सपक्षे विपक्षे च वर्तते तस्मादसाधकः। भवद्धेतुर्मम(हेतो)स्तुल्यो मत्प्रतिज्ञायाश्च खण्डनासमर्थ इति चेत्। अस्मत्स्थापनं त्रिविधहेतुसमाश्रितं तस्मादतुल्यम्। यदतुल्यं तुल्यमिति भवतोक्तं तस्माद्भवतः खण्डनं विपरीतम्।

४. अविशेषखण्डनम्। एकसाधर्म्यस्थापनात्सर्वस्या-विशेषेण प्रत्यवस्थानमविशेषखण्डनमुच्यते।

शब्दोऽनित्यः कारणभेदेन शब्दस्य भेदाद्दीपवत्।

यदि वर्तिका महती ज्योतिर्महत्। यदि वर्तिका क्षुद्रा ज्योतिरपि क्षुद्रम्, इति स्थापिते। प्रतिवादी प्राह यदि साधर्म्याद्यथा घटाद्यनित्यं शब्दोऽपि तथा स्यात्तदा सर्वस्य सर्वेणाविशेषप्रसङ्गः। कुत इति चेत्। सर्वस्य सर्वेण साधर्म्यात्। साधर्म्यं किं पुनश्चेत्। सत्तैकत्वं प्रमेयत्वमित्येतत् साधर्म्यमुच्यते। सधर्माण्यपि सर्वाणि वस्तूनि विशिष्टवस्तुभ्यो भिन्नानीति चेच्छब्दोऽपि तथा। घटादिसधर्माऽपि शब्दो नित्यो घटस्त्वनित्यः। कुत इति चेत्। सत्त्वादिसाधर्म्येऽपि स्वभावविशेषसम्भवात्। यथा दीपः शब्दो मनुष्योऽश्व इत्यादि। इति साधर्म्यसमाश्रितमनुमानमसिद्धम्।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनं कुत इति चेत्। सर्वेषां न मया सत्त्वादिसाधर्म्यं प्रतिषिद्धमपि तु तेषां विशेष एवावधार्यते। साधर्म्यसम्पत्तिर्वैविध्यमनित्यतां स्थापयति। तच्चास्माभिरनित्यतासाधनायोच्यते न तु साधर्म्यमात्रमुपादीयते। न खल्वस्ति सा काऽपि युक्तिर्या नैवं विचार्यते। कस्मादिति चेत्। नैकमपि विद्यते तादृशं यदन्यवस्तुनो न सदृशं न च विशिष्टं स्यात्। तस्माद्यदि साधर्म्यमस्ति तदा तत्सपक्षवर्ति सर्वविपक्षव्यावृत्तम्। यदि तदुपादानेन हेतुस्थापनं, सिद्धो हेतुरेष। साधर्म्यमात्रेण हेतुप्रतिष्ठापनं त्वसिद्धम् तस्माद्विपरीतम्।

पुनश्चानित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्घटवत्। तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्यः।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। हेतुः प्रतिज्ञा चाभावान्न भिद्येते। को नामार्थो हेतुसमुत्पादस्य। हेत्वसंयोगे शब्दस्यानुत्पाद

इति। अनुत्पन्नत्वादभाव एवेत्येतस्यार्थः। कथं नाम शब्दोऽनित्य इति। अनुत्पन्नः शब्द उत्पत्तिमुपलभत उत्पन्नो विनश्यति। विनाशश्चाभाव एवेत्येतस्यार्थः। इति हेतुः प्रतिज्ञा चाभाववत्।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। अस्मत्प्रतिज्ञाया अभावः प्रध्वंसाभावात्मकः। अस्मत्स्थापितहेतोरभावः प्रागभावः। प्रागभावः सर्वलोकप्रसिद्धत्वात्सिद्धोऽनित्यताहेतुत्वेन स्थापितः। प्रध्वंसाभावः सांख्याद्यप्रसिद्धत्वादसिद्धः। अर्थो हि सिद्धेन हेतुना स्थाप्यते।

यदि सिद्धा प्रतिज्ञोपादीयतेऽसिद्धस्तु हेतुर्भवतः खण्डनस्य विपर्यासोऽधिकतरो भवेत्। सर्वेषां वस्तूनां पूर्वमभूत्वा पश्चादभाव इति मयोक्तम्। तस्माच्छब्दः पूर्वमसंश्चेत् पश्चादप्यसन्। यदि पूर्वमसत्त्वं भवतोऽननुज्ञातं तदैतद्भवता चिन्त्यताम्। यदि पूर्वं शब्दः सन्नेव न चास्ति प्रतिबन्धस्तदा कस्माच्छ्रोत्रेण नोपलभ्यते। तस्मात्पूर्वमसत्त्वं नागपदवदिति ज्ञायते। यदि कश्चिद्विशिष्टबुद्धिरभिमतमर्थं साधयितुं न शक्नोति, इष्टसाधनं च न युक्तिसम्पन्नं सोऽर्थो निरसनीयः।

५. प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिखण्डनम्। हेतुः साध्यं प्राप्नोति न वा?। यदि तावत् साध्यं प्राप्नोति तदासाधकः। अथ हेतुः साध्यं न प्राप्नोति तदाप्यसाधकः। एतत्प्राप्त्यप्राप्तिखण्डनमुच्यते।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि हेतुः साध्यं प्राप्नोति तदा साध्येन संसर्गात्साध्यं न साधयति। यथा नदीवारि समुद्रवारिप्रविष्टं न पुनर्नदीवारि, हेतुस्तद्वदसाधकः।

यदि साध्यमसिद्धं, तदा हेतुरप्रापकः। यदि तु प्रापकस्तदा किं सिद्धस्य[ार्थस्य] हेतुना। तस्माद्धेतुरसिद्धः। अथ न प्राप्नोति तदा सोऽन्यवस्तुवदसाधकं, तस्माद्धेतुरसिद्धः। यदि हेतुरप्रापकस्तदाऽसमर्थः। यथाग्निरप्राप्य दहनासमर्थो ऽसिश्चाप्राप्य छेदनासमर्थः।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनं। द्विविधो हेतुः। उत्पत्तिहेतुर्व्यञ्जनहेतुश्च। यदि भवतः खण्डनमुत्पत्तिहेतुसमाश्रितं तदा सिद्धं खण्डनम्। यदि व्यञ्जनहेतुसमाश्रितं तदा विपरीतम्। कस्मादिति चेत्। उक्तं मया यद्धेतुः साध्यं नोत्पादयत्यपि तु परप्रतिपादनार्थं साध्यं व्यनक्त्यव्यावृत्तत्वात्। साध्यसत्त्वेऽपि साध्यस्य यथार्थज्ञानं न जायते। कुत इति चेत्। मोहात्। तस्माद्व्यञ्जनहेतुरित्युच्यते। यथा रूपसत्त्वेऽपि प्रदीपप्रयोजनं तद्व्यञ्जनार्थं न तु तदुत्पत्त्यर्थम्। तस्माद्व्यञ्जनहेतावुत्पत्तिखण्डनं विपरीतखण्डनम्।

६. अहेतुखण्डनं। त्रैकाल्ये हेतोरसम्भव इत्यहेतुखण्डनमुच्यते।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। किं हेतुः साध्यात्पूर्वं पश्चाद्युगपद्वा। यदि तावद्धेतुः प्राक् साध्यञ्च पश्चात्तदासति साध्ये, हेतुः कस्य साधकः?। अथ पश्चात्, साध्यञ्च प्राक्, तदा सिद्धे साध्ये किं हेतुना?। अथ युगपत्तदाहेतुः। यथा युगपत्सद्भावाद्गोः शृङ्गे दक्षिणं वामं वा परस्परोत्पादके इत्ययुक्तम्। तस्माद्यौगपद्यञ्चेत्तदा हेतुत्वासम्भवः।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। यत्पूर्वं समुत्पन्नं

तदेव हेतुना व्यज्यते यथा दीपः विद्यमानान्येव वस्तूनि व्यनक्ति न त्वविद्यमानानि वस्तून्युत्पादयति। भवान् पुनरुत्पत्तिहेतुना मे व्यञ्जकहेतुं खण्डयति तस्माद्विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनं, न तु सिद्धम्।

अथ मन्यसे यद्येष हेतुर्व्यञ्जकहेतुर्भवति ज्ञानाभावे स कस्य हेतुः। तस्माद्व्यञ्जकहेतुरसिद्ध इति कृते खण्डने, तदा प्राप्तिक्रियाऽसम्भवे हेतुर्नाम नोपपद्यते क्रियासद्भावे तु हेतुर्नामोपपद्यते। यदा व्यञ्जनक्रिया तदैव हेतुर्नामोपपद्यते। तदुक्तं भवति पूर्वं हेतुर्नाम नोपपद्यते पश्चात्तु हेतुर्नामोपपद्यते। यच्चाभिहितं हेतुः प्राक् क्रिया तु पश्चादिति तददोषम्। अथैवं सति, क्रियाया हेतुतोऽनुत्पत्तिरिति चेदेतत् खण्डनमसिद्धम्। कस्मादिति चेत्। एतत्प्रागेव [सद्] वस्तु पश्चाद्धेतुर्नामोपपद्यते। वस्तुनि विनष्टे पश्चात् क्रियोत्पत्तिरिति चेत्, तदैतत्खण्डनं सिध्यति न त्वेवमुच्यते, पूर्वं भावेऽपि [हेतोरिति] नामानुपपत्तिः पश्चात्तु नामोपपत्तिः। तस्मात्फलस्य हेतुत उत्पत्तिः।

७. उपलब्धिखण्डनम्। विशिष्टहेतुनानित्यतावर्णनाद्देषोऽहेतुरिति उपलब्धिखण्डनमुच्यते।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि प्रयत्न[ानन्तरीयक]त्वाच्छब्दोऽनित्यस्तदा यत्र प्रयत्नो न विद्यते तत्र नित्यताप्रसङ्गः। यथा विद्युद्वाय्वादीन्यप्रयत्न[ानन्तरीयक]ाण्यनित्येषु चान्तर्भूतानि तस्मादनित्यत्वे साध्ये न प्रयत्नमात्रं समाश्रयणीयं प्रयत्नस्यासाधनत्वात्। साधनञ्चेद्यत्र यत्र प्रयत्नो नास्ति तत्र तत्र नित्यतायाः सम्भवः। यथाग्निं विना न धूमस्थितिः। धूमोऽग्नेः सद्धेतुर्धूमाग्न्योरव्यतिरेकात्।

प्रयत्नस्तु न तथा, तस्मादसिद्धो हेतुः। किञ्च प्रयत्नो नानित्यतास्थापनासमर्थः। कुत इति चेत्। व्याप्त्यभावात्। व्याप्तिसम्भवे ह्यनित्यतास्थापनोपपत्तिः। व्याप्त्यसम्भवे त्वनित्यतास्थापनानुपपत्तिः। यथा कस्यचित्प्रतिज्ञा स्यात् सर्वे तरवो दिव्यचेतना इति। कस्मादिति चेत्। तरूणां निद्रासम्भवाच्छिरीषवत्। तच्चाह खण्डयिता। तरूणां दिव्यचेतनासिद्धा। कस्मात्? हेतोर्व्याप्त्यभावात्। शिरीष एव स्वपिति न त्वपरे तरवः। स स्वप्नो न सर्वांस्तरून् व्याप्नोति तस्मात्सर्वेषां तरूणां दिव्यचेतनत्वप्रतिष्ठापने स्वप्नोऽसमर्थः। प्रयत्नोऽपि तथा सर्वेषामनित्यानामव्यापकत्वादनित्यतास्थापनेऽसमर्थः॥

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। मयैवं नोक्तम्। नैतदुच्यते मया यत्प्रयत्नः सर्वानित्यतास्थापने समर्थो हेतुरन्ये तु हेतवो ऽसमर्थाः। यद्यन्योऽनित्यतास्थापने समर्थो हेतुर्विद्यते तदाहं सुखी। अस्मदर्थसिद्धेः। अस्मत्स्थापितो हेतुः स्थापनसमर्थः, अन्यो ऽपि हेतुः स्थापनसमर्थः। तस्मात्प्रतिज्ञा सिद्धा। यथा धूमेनाग्निरनुमितः। यदि कश्चिद्दीप्तप्रभयाग्निरपि सिद्धो ऽस्मदर्थेऽपि तथासम्भवः। प्रयत्नोत्पत्तिरनित्यतास्थापनसमर्था। यद्यन्ये ऽपि हेतवो ऽनित्यतास्थापनसमर्था, अनित्यतापि सिद्धा। तस्माद्विपरीतं खण्डनं भवतः। अस्मन्मताखण्डनात्। यद्यहं ब्रवीमि यद्यदनित्यं तत्तत्सर्वं प्रयत्नसमुत्पन्नमिति तदा प्रयत्नोत्पत्तिहेतोरव्यापित्वादसिद्धत्वमिति भवता खण्डनं वक्तव्यम्। तदैतच्च खण्डनं विशिष्यते। यदाहं ब्रवीमि शब्दादिकमनित्यं प्रयत्नसमुत्पन्नत्वात्तदा यत्सर्वमनित्यं

तत्प्रयत्नसमुत्पन्नमिति नोच्यते। तस्माद्विपरीतं खण्डनं भवतः।

८. संशयखण्डनम्। विपक्षसाधर्म्यात्संशयवादेन खण्डनम्।

अनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्नसमुत्पन्नत्वात्। यद्यत्प्रयत्नसमुत्पन्नं तत्तदनित्यं घटवत्। इति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह। यत्समुत्पन्नं तत्प्रयत्नेन व्यक्तं यथा मूलकीलकोदकं प्रयत्नेन व्यक्तं न तु प्रयत्नेन समुत्पन्नम्। शब्दोऽपि तथा। तस्मात्प्रयत्नद्वारा हेतुस्थापनमनियतमनुत्पन्न उत्पन्ने च भावात्। तस्मात् तं हेतुमाश्रित्य शब्दे संशयोत्पत्तिः। कथं च शब्दोऽवधार्यते? किं घटवदसमुत्पन्नः समुत्पद्यते, मूलकीलोदकवत्समुत्पन्नो वा व्यज्यते? तस्मादनैकान्तिकता। तस्मादुत्पत्तिहेतोः संशयोत्पादकत्वादसाधकत्वमिति ज्ञेयम्। कस्मात्। उत्पादकत्वाद्व्यक्तीकरणाच्च।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। नोक्तमस्माभिर्यच्छब्दः प्रयत्नेन व्यक्तः। अपि तु यतः प्रयत्नेन समुत्पन्नस्तस्माच्छब्दो ऽनित्य इति। पुनर्भवता किं खण्ड्यते। यदि (भवतो)च्यते प्रयत्नकार्यं द्विविधमुत्पत्तिरभिव्यक्तिश्च। उत्पत्तिर्घटादिवदभिव्यक्तिर्मूलकीलोदकादिवत्। शब्दो ऽपि प्रयत्नकार्यः। तस्मात्तस्मिन् नित्यताऽनित्यतासंशयोत्पत्तिरिति। तदयुक्तम्। कुत इति चेत्। मूलकीलोदकादेरप्रयत्नकार्यत्वात्। मूलकीलोदकाभिव्यक्तिः प्रयत्नकार्य्येति चेत्। एतदस्मन्मतं न खण्डयति। अभिव्यक्तिरनुत्पन्ना प्रयत्नेनोत्पत्तिं लभते। तस्मात्प्रयत्नकार्यमेकविधं सदैवानित्यत्वादिति भवत्खण्डन-

मयुक्तम्। अथ मन्यसे यत्प्रयत्न-[कार्यं] तद्द्विविधम्। अनित्यं नित्यञ्च। घटोत्पत्तिरनित्या घटध्वंसो नित्यः। शब्दोऽपि तथेति। एष संशयोऽयुक्तः। कस्मात्?। असिद्धत्वात्। यदि भवतो घटध्वंसस्य ध्वंसे सद्भावस्ततः सद्भावाद्ध्वंसाभावः स्यात्। यदि ध्वंसेऽभावस्तदा ध्वंसोऽभाव एव। कुत इति चेत्। भावाभावात्। अन्धकारवत्। अन्धकारे ज्योतिषोऽभावः तस्मादन्धकारः। ध्वंसोऽपि तथा। ध्वंसे भावाभावः तस्माद्ध्वंसभाव इति चेत्। तदयुक्तं खपुष्पबन्ध्यापुत्रशशविषाणेषु भावाभावात्तेषामपि सद्भावप्रसङ्गः। यदि खपुष्पादीनां सद्भावो भवता नानुज्ञायते, तदा घटध्वंसस्यापि तथात्वम्। तस्मात्सद्भाव इति न वक्तव्यम्। तस्मात्प्रयत्नकार्यमेकविधं सदैवानित्यत्वात्। तस्मादयुक्तो भवतः संशयः। अप्रतिपत्तिश्चेद्भवतः प्रतिपादनार्थमहं व्यञ्जनहेतुं वदामि। अनित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। प्राग्व्यवधानाभावात्प्रयत्नेनोत्पत्तिनिष्पत्तिः। तस्मादनित्यः शब्दो घटवदिति ज्ञातम्। यत्प्रयत्नेनोपलभ्यते यच्च प्रयत्नेन क्रियते तदुभयं भिन्नमिति भवता प्रतिष्ठापितम्। तदयुक्तम्। कोऽयमर्थो यत्प्रयत्नेनोपलभ्यते तदनित्यमिति। कस्मात्। यस्मादनुत्पन्नं समुत्पद्यते समुत्पन्नञ्च विनश्यति। तस्मान्मूलकीलोदकादेस्तथाप्यनित्यतासम्भवः। यच्चोच्यते यदभिव्यक्तं नित्यमिति तस्य किं प्रयोजनम्।

९. अनुक्तिखण्डनम्। पूर्वमनुक्तत्वादनित्यताऽभाव एतदनुक्तिखण्डनम्।

प्रतिज्ञा पूर्ववत्। प्रतिवादी प्राह। प्रयत्न इति वचनं शब्दस्यानित्यताहेतुरिति चेत्तदा किं प्राप्यते?।

प्रयत्न इत्यनुक्ते तदा शब्दो नित्यः। एतदेव प्राप्यते, पूर्वकाले नित्ये सति कथमधुनानित्यः स्यात्।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्। अस्माभिः स्थापितो हेतुरभिव्यक्त्यर्थो नोत्पत्त्यर्थो न वा विनाशार्थः। यद्यस्मत्स्थापितस्य हेतोर्विनाशः स्यात्तदा भवत्खण्डनं विशिष्येत। यदा हेतुर्मयानुक्तस्तदा शब्दस्यानित्यतानभिव्यक्तेति चेद्भवत्खण्डनम्। एतत्खण्डनाभास एव। यदि विनाशहेतुना माम् खण्डयति भवान् तद्विपरीतखण्डनं स्यात्।

१०. कार्यभेदखण्डनम्—कार्य्यभेदाद्घटवच्छब्द इति न वक्तव्यम्। एतत् कार्यभेदखण्डनमुच्यते।

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वाद्घटवदिति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह घटशब्दयोः कार्यभेदः। कार्यभेदात्तुल्यानित्यतानुपपत्तिः।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्!। अनित्यः शब्दो घटसमानकार्यत्वादिति नोक्तं मया। अपि तु सर्वाणि वस्तूनि तुल्येन न्यायेन कृतकत्वादनित्यानीत्येवमुक्तम्। न तु समानकार्यापेक्षत्वाद्घटवच्छब्दोऽनित्य इति। धूमो भिन्नोऽप्यग्निव्यञ्जकः। घटोऽपि तथा शब्दस्यानित्यताव्यञ्जकः।

अन्यच्च परेणोक्तं कार्यविशेषखण्डनम्। अन्यदस्ति येनोच्यते नित्यः शब्द आकाशसमाश्रितत्वात्। आकाशो नित्यः। यत्किञ्चिदाकाशसमाश्रितं तन्नित्यम्। यथा परमाणोः पारिमाण्डल्यम्। परमाणुर्नित्यः पारिमाण्डल्यञ्च परमाणुसमाश्रितं, तस्मात्पारिमाण्डल्यं नित्यम्। शब्दोऽपि तद्वदाकाशसमाश्रितत्वान्नित्यः। अन्यच्च। नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। श्रावणत्वात्। यथा शब्दत्वं

श्रवणग्राह्यं नित्यञ्च, तथा शब्दो ऽपि तस्मान्नित्यः। एतत्प्रतिज्ञान्तरम् ।

वैशेषिक आह। यदि नित्यं हेतुना स्थाप्यते, ततो हेतुक्रियत्वादनित्यम्। तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्यः।

विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्? न मयोक्तं हेतुना नित्यतोत्पन्नेति, अपि तु हेतुरनित्यतां व्यनक्ति। परस्याज्ञानात्परस्य प्रतिपादनार्थमस्मत्स्थापितहेतुर्व्यञ्जनहेतुर्न त्वुत्पत्तिहेतुः। भवत्खण्डनमुत्पत्तिहेतोरेव। तस्माद्विपरीतम्।

किञ्च प्रतिज्ञाखण्डने भवदुक्ते न मयानुज्ञाते। कुत इति चेत्। नास्माभिरनित्यतेष्टा प्रतीता वा। तस्मादुक्तो मयैषो ऽर्थः।

एतद्दशविधं विपरीतखण्डनमुच्यते। विपर्ययेण तद्दोषस्थापनात्। यदि खण्डनं तत्तुल्यं भवेत्तदा विपरीतखण्डनापत्तिः।

अपरमसत्खण्डनम्। मिथ्यावचनादसत्। मिथ्यावचनं त्वयथार्थमनर्थकञ्च। एतदुच्यते ऽसत्खण्डनम्। असत्खण्डनं त्रिविधमवर्ण्य(व्यञ्जक)खण्डनमर्थापत्ति(व्यञ्जक)खण्डनं, प्रतिदृष्ट(ार्थव्यञ्जक)खण्डनञ्च।

१. अवर्ण्य(व्यञ्जक)खण्डनम्। प्रत्यक्षविषये यद्धेत्वन्वेषणं तदवर्ण्यखण्डनमुच्यते।

अनित्यः शब्दः। कुत इति चेत्। कृत्रिमत्वाद्घटवदिति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह। अस्माभिर्दृष्टं यद्घटः कृत्रिमः। केन हेतुना तदनित्यतानुमीयते। यदि हेतुं विना

घटस्य नित्यता स्थापिता शब्दोऽपि नित्यताहेतुमन्तरेण नित्यो भवेत् ।

असत्तत्खण्डनम् । कस्मात् ?। यत्[पूर्वमेव]प्रतीतं न तस्य हेतुना साधनम् । यदि प्रतीयते यद्घटः सहेतुकोऽनित्यश्चेति किमनित्यताहेत्वन्वेषणेन । तस्मादसदेतत्खण्डनम् ।

२. अर्थापत्ति(व्यञ्जक)खण्डनम् । विपक्षेऽर्थापत्तिरेतदर्थापत्तिखण्डनम् ।

आत्मा न विद्यते । कुत इति चेत् । अनभिव्यक्तत्वाद्वन्ध्यापुत्रवदिति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह । तदेतदर्थादापत्तिर्यद्यभिव्यक्तं सदनभिव्यक्तं त्वसदिति । अथाभिव्यक्तं कदाचित्सत्कदाचिदसत् । अनभिव्यक्तं तद्वत् । अलातचक्रमरीचिगन्धर्वनगरवत् । तदभिव्यक्तम् । तत्सद्भावस्थापनं त्वशक्यम् । यद्यभिव्यक्तस्य सद्भावस्थापनमशक्यं तदानभिव्यक्तस्यासद्भावप्रतिष्ठापनं [सुतराम]शक्यम् ।

असत्तत्खण्डनम् । कोऽसौ न्यायो येनैतदर्थादापत्तिर्भवेत् । यदनभिव्यक्तं तदत्यन्तमसदिति नैतदर्थादापद्यते । अभिव्यक्तं द्विविधमनर्थापत्तिरर्थापत्तिश्च । यदि वृष्टिर्भवति तदा मेघेनापि भवितव्यम् । मेघे सत्यपि तु कदाचिद्वृष्टिर्भवति कदाचिन्न भवतीत्यनैकान्तिकता । धूमेनाग्नेरनुमानम् । नाचार्थादापत्तिः । धूमे दृष्टे सत्यग्निरनुमीयते धूमे त्वसति अग्नेरभावः । अनर्थापत्तिरियम् । कस्मादिति चेत् । तप्तायःपिण्डे लोहिताङ्गारे च धूमाभावेऽप्यग्नेः सद्भावः । तस्मादभिव्यक्तेष्वर्थापत्तिखण्डनमभूतम् ।

अन्यच्च । रूपमेवालातचक्रमरीचिगन्धर्वनगराणीति प्रतिभातीन्द्रियभ्रमाच्चित्तविपर्यासेन । तच्च वर्तमान एव

सदनागते त्वसत्। रूपमात्रमिन्द्रियभ्रमाच्चित्तविपर्यासेन कदाचित् सद्[वस्त्वीव]प्रकाशते। यदुक्तं भवताभिव्यक्तस्य सत्त्वमनैकान्तिकं तदयुक्तम्। किञ्च बन्ध्यापुत्रदृष्टान्तेनायमेवार्थो मया निश्चीयते। यदभिव्यक्तिस्थानान्न प्रभ्रंशते तद्वस्त्वभाव एव। बन्ध्यापुत्रवत्। यच्चानभिव्यक्तिस्थानात्प्रभ्रंशते नैषो मे दृष्टान्तः। अथवाकाशादिषु तु कदाचिदभिव्यक्तिः कदाचिदनभिव्यक्तिः। भवदर्थापत्तिं प्रति मयार्थापत्तिरुक्ता यदभिव्यक्तिस्थानादेकान्तेन न प्रभ्रंशते तद्वस्तु सदेव। अलातचक्रादिषु चक्रमेवानैकान्तिकम्। तच्च चक्रस्यानैकान्तिकता यत् प्रवर्तनकाले सत्, स्थितिकाले चासत्। तस्मात् नेयमर्थापत्तिः। अनर्थापत्तावर्थापत्तिखण्डनं चेदेतत् खण्डनमसत्। पुनरन्यथाप्यर्थापत्तिखण्डनं वदन्ति। यदि घटसाधर्म्यादनित्यः शब्द इत्यर्थादापन्नं तदासाधर्म्यान्नित्यः। असाधर्म्यं यच्छब्दः श्रवणग्राह्योऽमूर्तश्च घटस्तु चक्षुर्ग्राह्यो मूर्तश्च। असाधर्म्याच्छब्दो नित्यः।

एवंविधखण्डनं साधर्म्यखण्डनतो ऽर्थापत्तिखण्डनाविशेषान्न मयानुज्ञातम्।

३. प्रतिदृष्टान्तखण्डनम्। प्रतिदृष्टान्तबलात् साधनम्। एतदुच्यते प्रतिदृष्टान्त(व्यञ्जक)खण्डनम्।

अनित्यः शब्दोऽनित्यघटसाधर्म्यादिति चेत्। तदाहमपि तस्य नित्यतां व्यक्तीकरोमि। यथा नित्याकाशसाधर्म्यान्नित्यः शब्दः। यदि नित्यतासाधर्म्यान्नित्यताऽप्राप्तिस्तदाऽनित्यतासाधर्म्यात्कथमनित्यता।

असत्त्वखण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। अभावमात्रं वस्त्वा-

काशमुच्यते। यदि सतो नित्यत्वं सिद्धस्तदा दृष्टान्तः सच खण्डनम्। किन्त्वत्रासतो नित्यता। आकाशमसद्वस्त्वेव नैतन्नित्यमनित्यं वा वक्तुं शक्यते। असिद्धो दृष्टान्त एतस्य खण्डनस्य। अदृष्टान्ते दृष्टान्तताकल्पनात्। तस्मादसद्देत-त्खण्डनम्। यदि कश्चिन्मन्यते सद्वस्त्वेवाकाशो नित्यश्च। एतद्विपरीतखण्डनं न तु सत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्!। अमूर्त-त्वस्यानैकान्तिकत्वात्। आकाशोऽमूर्तो नित्यश्च चित्तसुख-दुःखेच्छादिकन्त्वमूर्तमनित्यम्। अमूर्तः शब्दः किमाकाश-वन्नित्यो भवेच्चित्तसुखादिवदनित्यो वा। अमूर्तत्वम-नैकान्तिकत्वादसिद्धो हेतुः। तस्माद्विपरीतमेतत्खण्डनम्। अपरं च सहेतुकत्वाच्छब्दोऽनित्यः। वस्तु सहेतुकञ्चेत् तदाऽनित्यमिति ज्ञेयं घटादिवदिति स्थापिते। प्रतिवादी प्राह। अस्मिन्नर्थे संशयः। कस्मादिति चेत्। घटोत्पादः सहेतुकोऽनित्यः। घटध्वंसस्तु सहेतुको नित्यः। शब्दस्य सहेतुकत्वाच्छब्दे संशयोत्पत्तिः। सहेतुकघटोत्पादवद-नित्यः सहेतुकघटध्वंसवन्नित्यो वा।

असद्देतत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्! यद्यसद्द्रव्यं नित्यमुच्यते दण्डाघातविनष्टवस्तूनामपि नित्यतापत्तिः।

किञ्च शब्दोऽनित्यः। कुतः। ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्। घटादिव-दिति स्थापिते। प्रतिवादी प्राह। अत्रापि संशयसम्भवः। यद्यैन्द्रियकः सामान्यवत्तदा नित्यतापत्तिः। यदि शब्द ऐन्द्रियकस्तदा सामान्यवन्नित्यः। यदि सामान्यवन्न नित्यो भवेत्, तदा घटदृष्टान्तेनानित्यो न भवेत्।

असद्देतत्खण्डनम्। कस्मात्। यदि गवादिसामान्यं गवादिव्यतिरिक्तं स्यात्तदा पृथक्त्वेन ग्राह्यं द्रष्टव्यञ्च

सामान्यन्तु गवादिव्यतिरिक्तं पृथक्त्वेन न गृह्यते न च दृश्यते। तस्मादनित्यमिति ज्ञेयम्।

अन्यच्च। आत्मा न विद्यते। कुत इति चेत्। अनभिव्यक्तत्वात् सर्पश्रवणवत्। इति स्थापिते प्रतिवादी प्राह। समुद्रबिन्दुपरिमाणं हिमालयगुरुत्वञ्च सदेव किन्त्वनभिव्यक्ते। आत्मनोऽपि तथात्वसम्भवः। सन्नेव किन्त्वनभिव्यक्तः। तस्मादनभिव्यक्तिहेतुर्नात्माभावं स्थापयितुं समर्थः।

सङ्ख्यापरिमाणस्य सञ्चितादपृथक्त्वम्। तत्परिमेयसञ्चितमनुक्रमेणैयदितीयदिति च प्रदर्श्यते। तत्सङ्ख्यापरिमाणं स्मृतिधारणार्थं, एकं, दश, सहस्रं नियुतमित्याद्युच्यते। समुद्रबिन्दुपरिमाणस्य हिमालयगुरुत्वस्य चापृथक्त्वेन सत्वाभावात्। यद्यपरखण्डनं तत्खण्डनसदृशं तद्दोषस्थापनादसत्खण्डनमित्युच्यते।

विरुद्धखण्डनम्। अर्थविसंवादकं विरुद्धमित्युच्यते, यथा प्रभान्धकारौ स्थितिगती विसंवादके। तद्विरुद्धखण्डनमित्युच्यते।

विरुद्धखण्डनं त्रिविधम्। अनुत्पत्तिखण्डनं, नित्यताखण्डनं, स्वार्थविरुद्धखण्डनञ्च।

१. अथानुत्पत्तिखण्डनम्। प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रयत्ननिरपेक्षत्वान्नित्य इत्यनुत्पत्तिखण्डनम्।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। यद्यनित्यः शब्दः प्रयत्न[ानन्तरीयक]त्वात्तदा प्रागुत्पत्तेरप्रयत्न[ानन्तरीयक]त्वान्नित्यः।

विरुद्धं तत्खण्डनम्। कुत इति चेत्। उत्पत्तेः पूर्वं शब्दोऽसन्नेव। असंश्चेत्, कथं नित्यः। यदि कश्चिद्वदे-

वन्ध्यापुत्रः कृष्णो वन्ध्यापुत्रः श्वेत इति तदपि सिद्धम् भवेत्। यद्यसन्नित्यतानुपपत्तिः। यदि नित्योऽसत्तानुपपत्तिः। असन्नित्यमिति स्वतो विरुद्धम्। एतदसत्खण्डनेऽप्यर्थापत्तिसमम्। कस्मात्। असत्खण्डनात्। शब्दोऽनित्यः प्रयत्न[ानन्तरीयकत्वा]दिति स्थापित एतदर्थादापद्यते। अप्रयत्न[ानन्तरीय]कत्वान्नित्य इति तदसत्। कुतः। प्रयत्न[ानन्तरीय]कं त्रिविधम्, नित्यमनित्यमसच्च। नित्यमाकाशवत्। अनित्यं विद्युदादिवत्। असदाकाशकुसुमादिवत्। एतत्त्रितयमप्रयत्न[ानन्तरीय]कं भवता त्वेकेन प्रकारेण नित्यमिति मन्यते। तस्मादसत्।

२. नित्यताखण्डनम्। नित्यमनित्यभावान्नित्यः शब्दः। एतन्नित्यताखण्डनमुच्यते।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। अनित्ये नित्यमनित्यता, सर्वधर्माणां स्वभावानिरासात्। अनित्ये नित्यमनित्यत्वभावान्नित्यता सिद्धा।

विरुद्धमेतत्। कस्मात्। यद्यनित्यं नित्यतालाभः कथम्। यदि कश्चिद्वदेदन्धकारे प्रभास्तीति तद्वचनमपि सिद्धं भवेत्। तन्नैवेति चेत्ततो भवत्खण्डनमपि विरुद्धमसच्च। कस्मादिति चेत्। अनित्यतेति पृथग्धर्मोऽनित्येन न सम्बद्धः यो नित्यो मन्तव्यः। अनित्यता नैव पृथग्भावः। यद्यनुत्पन्नं वस्तूत्पत्तिं लभत उत्पन्नन्तु विनश्यति ततोऽनित्यमित्युच्यते। अनित्यमसदिति चेद्यदनित्येन नित्यं स्थापितं तस्याप्यसत्ताप्रसङ्गः।

३. स्वार्थविरुद्धम्। यदि परार्थखण्डने स्वार्थहानिस्तदा तत्स्वार्थविरुद्धखण्डनमुच्यते।

अनित्यः शब्दः कृतकत्वादङ्कुरादिवदिति स्थापिते। प्रतिवादी प्राह। यदि हेतुरनित्यतां प्राप्नोति तदाऽनित्यतातुल्यः। यद्यनित्यतां न प्राप्नोति तदानित्यतासाधनासमर्थः। तस्मादसिद्धो हेतुरिति।

यदि तावत्तव खण्डनं मत्प्रतिज्ञां प्राप्नोति, मत्प्रतिज्ञातुल्यत्वेऽस्मदर्थखण्डनासमर्थम्। अथ न मत्प्रतिज्ञां प्राप्नोति तथाप्यस्मदर्थखण्डनासमर्थम्। तस्माद्भवत्खण्डने भवदर्थहानिः।

प्रतिवादी पुनराह। यदि हेतुः पूर्वं प्रतिज्ञा तु पश्चात्, तदा प्रतिज्ञाऽभावे स कस्य हेतुः। अथ प्रतिज्ञा पूर्वं हेतुस्तु पश्चात्तदा, सिद्धायां प्रतिज्ञायां किं हेतुनेत्येषोऽप्यसिद्धो हेतुः।

यदि भवत्खण्डनं पूर्वमस्मत्प्रतिज्ञा तु पश्चादस्मदर्थाभावे किं भवता खण्ड्यते। यद्यस्मत्प्रतिज्ञा पूर्वं भवत्खण्डनं तु पश्चात्तदास्मत्प्रतिज्ञायां स्थापितायां किं भवत्खण्डनेन। भवानस्मत्खण्डनानुज्ञानादस्मत्खण्डनोपादानेन मां खण्डयतीति चेत्तदयुक्तम्। कस्मादिति चेत्। मया प्रकटितं यद्भवत्खण्डनं भवदर्थमेव प्रतिषेधति न तु भवत्खण्डनमवलम्ब्यास्मदर्थो प्रतिष्ठापितः। अपरखण्डने तत्खण्डनतुल्ये सति तद्दोषप्रतिष्ठापनं विरुद्धखण्डनमुच्यते।

सम्यक्खण्डनं पञ्चविधम्। दृष्टार्थदूषणम्, अनिष्टार्थव्यक्तिः, प्रसङ्गव्यक्तिः, विषमार्थव्यक्तिः, सर्वान्यायसिद्धिलाभव्यक्तिः।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। अस्त्यात्मा संघातस्य परार्थत्वात्।

यथा शयनासनादिसंघातः परार्थः। चक्षुरादीन्द्रियसंघातो ऽपि परार्थः। परस्त्वात्मा। तस्मादस्त्यात्मेति ज्ञातम्।

नास्त्यात्मा। कुत इति चेत्। एकान्तानभिव्यक्तत्वात्। यदेकान्तानभिव्यक्तं तदसदेव। यथानीश्वरपुरुषस्य द्वितीयो मूर्धा। द्वितीयो मूर्धा रूपगन्धादिमूर्धाकारतो न पृथक् मन्तव्यः। तस्मादसन्। आत्मनोऽपि तथात्वसम्भवः। चक्षुरादीन्द्रियेषु न हि स पृथगभिव्यक्तः। तस्मादसन्। अस्त्यात्मेति चेत्तदयुक्तम्। तदिष्टदूषणमुच्यते।

यदि पुनर्भवान् वदति यदात्मलक्षणमविशेष्यं, स तु सन्निति तदा द्वितीयो मूर्धाविशेष्योऽपि सन्नेव भवेत्। द्वितीयो मूर्धा सन्निति भवता चेन्न प्रतिपाद्यते तदात्मन्यपि तथा प्रतिपत्तव्यम्। इयमुच्यते ऽनिष्टार्थव्यक्तिः।

यदि भवन्मते उभौ तुल्यमेवाविशेष्यौ। न्याया-समाश्रयाच्चात्मा सन्न पुनर्द्वितीयो मूर्धा। तदाहमपि न्यायासमाश्रयात्सन्नेव द्वितीयो मूर्धा न त्वात्मेति चेद्वदेयमेषोऽर्थः सिद्धो भवेत्। अथास्मदर्थो न सिद्धो भवदर्थोऽपि न सिद्ध इत्युच्यते प्रसङ्गव्यक्तिः।

अन्यच्च। आत्मा द्वितीय इव मूर्धाविशेष्यः न त्वसन्निति चेत्तदा वैषम्यदोषो भवन्मूर्ध्न्यापतेत्। यदि कश्चिद्वदे-द्वन्ध्यापुत्रः सालङ्कारो वन्ध्यापुत्रो निरलङ्कार इति तदपि सिद्धं भवेत्। यदि कश्चिदेवं वदेत्तदा वैषम्यदोषापत्तिः। भवतोऽपि तथात्वसम्भवः। इयं वैषम्यदोषव्यक्तिः। अथो-च्यते न्यायासमाश्रयान्नियतमेवास्त्यात्मा, न्यायासमा-श्रयान्नियतमेव नास्ति द्वितीयो मूर्धेति सिद्धं च तद्वचन-

मिति तदा मूर्खबालान्यायवचनान्यपि सिध्येयुर्यथाकाशो दृश्यः, शीतलोऽग्निः, ग्राह्योः वायुरित्यादि मूर्खवचनानि न्यायासमाश्रितान्यपि भवत्साध्यवत् सिद्धानि भवेयुः। असिद्धानि चेद्भवदर्थोऽप्येवं स्यात्। इयमुच्यते सर्वान्याय-सिद्धिलाभव्यक्तिः॥

इति द्वितीयं प्रकरणम्।

अथ तृतीयं प्रकरणम्।

द्वाविंशतिविधा निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः। १ प्रतिज्ञाहानिः, २ प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्, ३ प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः, ४ प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः, ५ हेत्वन्तरम्, ६ अर्थान्तरम्, ७ निरर्थकम्, ८ अविज्ञातार्थम्, ९ अपार्थकम्, १० अप्राप्तकालं, ११ न्यूनम्, १२ अधिकम्, १३ पुनरुक्तम्, १४ अननुभाषणम्, १५ अज्ञानम्, १६ अप्रतिभा, १७ विक्षेपः (व्याजैर्दूषणपरिहारः), १८ मतानुज्ञा (परदूषणानुज्ञा), १९ पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम् (निग्रहस्थानप्राप्तस्य निग्रहस्थानापत्त्युपेक्षणम्), २० निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः (अस्थाने निग्रहस्थानाभियोगः); २१ अपसिद्धान्तः, २२ हेत्वाभासाश्चेति द्वाविंशतिविधानि निग्रहस्थानानि। यदि कस्यचिन्निग्रहस्थानापत्तिर्भवेत्, न पुनस्तेन सह वादः कर्तव्यः।

१. प्रतिज्ञाहानिः। स्वप्रतिज्ञायां प्रतिपक्षाभ्यनुज्ञेति प्रतिज्ञाहानिः।

नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। अमूर्तत्वात्। आकाशवत्। इति स्थापिते ऽपरः प्राह। शब्द आकाशसाधर्म्यान्नित्य इति चेत्ततो यदि वैधर्म्यं स्यात्, तदाऽनित्यः। वैधर्म्यञ्च शब्दस्य सहेतुकत्वमाकाशस्य त्वहेतुकत्वमिति। शब्द ऐन्द्रियक आकाशस्त्वनैन्द्रियकः। तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्य इति प्रत्यवस्थित इदमाह। साधर्म्यं वैधर्म्यं वा न मया समालोच्यते। नित्यसाधर्म्यं तु मयोक्तम्। यदि नित्यसधर्मा तदा नित्य इति।

अत्रापरः। नित्यसाधर्म्यमनैकान्तिकम्। अमूर्तान्यनित्यान्यपि वस्तूनि विद्यन्ते। यथा सुखदुःखादीनि। तस्मादसिद्धो हेतुः। वैधर्म्यं तु सर्वमनित्यं नित्यव्यतिरिक्तमिति निश्चितं व्यनक्ति। तस्मादनित्यतासाधने समर्थमित्युक्ते ब्रूयात्। अनित्यं सहेतुकम्। नित्यं त्वहेतुकमिति मयापि प्रतिपादितम्। इति प्रतिज्ञाहानिनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिः।

२. प्रतिज्ञान्तरम्। प्रतिज्ञातार्थप्रतिषेधे परेण कृते धर्मान्तरविकल्पादर्थनिर्देशः प्रतिज्ञान्तरमुच्यते।

नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। अस्पर्शत्वात्। आकाशवदिति स्थापिते। अपरः प्राह। अस्पर्शत्वहेतुना नित्यः शब्द इति भवता स्थापितम्। अस्पर्शत्वहेतुश्चानैकान्तिकः। चित्तेच्छाक्रोधाद्यस्पर्शमप्यनित्यम्। शब्दो ऽप्यस्पर्शस्तस्मादनैकान्तिकता। आकाशादिवन्नित्यश्चित्तादिवदनित्यो वेत्यस्पर्शत्वमनैकान्तिकमेव। तस्माद्भवद्धेतुरसिद्धः। यदि हेतुरसिद्धस्तदा प्रतिज्ञाप्यसिद्धेति प्रसिद्धमिति प्रत्यवस्थित इदमाह। शब्दो नित्यता चेति न मम प्रतिज्ञा। अपि तु नित्यता शब्देन संबद्धा, शब्दश्च नित्यतया सम्बद्ध इत्यस्मत्प्रतिज्ञा। यो मया निर्दिष्टः शब्दः स रूपादिनिषेधार्थः।

या च मया निर्दिष्टा नित्यता, सा नित्यतानिषेधार्था। नित्यता शब्दान्न व्यतिरिच्यते रूपादिभ्यस्तु व्यतिरिच्यते। शब्दो नित्यताया न व्यतिरिच्यते श्रोत्रग्राह्यादिकात्तु व्यतिरिच्यते। यद्यस्मान्न व्यतिरिच्यते, तत्तेन सम्बद्धम्, एषाऽस्मत्प्रतिज्ञा। मया न शब्दो न च नित्यता स्थाप्यते। भवान् पुनः शब्दञ्च नित्यताञ्च खण्डयति न

तु मम प्रतिज्ञां खण्डयति। इयमुच्यते प्रतिज्ञान्तरनिग्रह-स्थानापत्तिः।

३. प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः। हेतुप्रतिज्ञयोर्विरोधः प्रतिज्ञा-विरोध इत्युच्यते।

प्रतिवादी प्राह। नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। सर्वस्या-नित्यत्वात्। आकाशवत्। इति स्थापिते ऽपरः प्राह भवतोक्तं सर्वमनित्यं तस्मान्नित्यः शब्द इति। अथ शब्दः सर्वस्मिन्नन्तर्भवति न वा। सर्वस्मिन्नन्तर्भवति चेत्। सर्वस्या-नित्यत्वाच्छब्दोऽप्यनित्यः। सर्वस्मिन्नान्तर्भवति चेत्तदा सर्वमित्यसिद्धम्। कुत इति चेत्। शब्दस्यासङ्ग्रहात्। हेतुवचने प्रतिज्ञाहानिः। प्रतिज्ञावचने च हेतुहानिः। तस्माद्भवतोऽर्थोऽसिद्धः। इयं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधनिग्रहस्थाना-पत्तिरुच्यते।

४. प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः। परेण स्वप्रतिज्ञाप्रतिषेधे कृते संन्यासोऽसमर्थनेति प्रतिज्ञासंन्यासः।

नित्यः शब्दः। कुतः। ऐन्द्रियकत्वात्। यथा सामान्य-मैन्द्रियकं नित्यञ्च। शब्दोऽप्यैन्द्रियकत्वान्नित्यः। इति स्थापितेऽपरः प्राह नित्यः शब्द ऐन्द्रियकत्वादिति भव-तोक्तम्। अथ यदैन्द्रियकं तदनित्यलक्षणाक्रान्तं घटादि-वत्। घटो ह्यैन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यः। तस्माच्छब्दोप्यनित्य इति। यद्भवतोक्तं सामान्यवन्नित्यमिति तदयुक्तम्। तथा हि गवादिसामान्यं गवादेरभिन्नं भिन्नं वा। अभिन्नञ्चेद्, गौरेव सन् सामान्यं त्वसत्। भिन्नञ्चेद्, गोर्व्यतिरिक्तं सामान्यं प्रकाशेत न तु गोर्व्यतिरिक्तं सामान्यं प्रकाशते तस्माद्दृष्टान्तो न नित्यतासाधकः। प्रतिज्ञा चासिद्धा।

इति दूषणे कृते प्रतिवादी प्राह केनैतत्स्थापितम्। इयं प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिरित्युच्यते।

५. हेत्वन्तरम्। अविशेषहेतौ स्थापिते पश्चाद्धेत्वन्तरोक्तिरिति हेत्वन्तरम्।

नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। द्विरनभिव्यक्तत्वात्। यन्नित्यं तत्सर्वं सकृदभिव्यक्तमाकाशवत्। शब्दस्यापि तथात्वम्। इति स्थापितेऽपरः प्राह। नित्यः शब्दो द्विरनभिव्यक्तत्वात्। आकाशवदिति न त्वेष हेतुर्युक्तः। कुत इति चेद्द्विरनभिव्यक्तस्य नित्यतानैकान्तिकत्वात्। यथा वायोः स्पर्शस्य च सकृदेवाभिवक्तावपि वायुरनित्यः। शब्दोऽपि तथेति प्रत्यवस्थित इदमाह। शब्दो वायुविलक्षणः। वायुर्हि त्वगिन्द्रियग्राह्यः। शब्दस्तु श्रवणग्राह्यः। तस्माच्छब्दो वायुविलक्षण इति।

अत्रापरः प्राह। पूर्वमुक्तं भवता शब्दो नित्यो द्विरनभिव्यक्तत्वादित्यधुना तूच्यते शब्दो वायुविलक्षणः पृथगिन्द्रियग्राह्यत्वादिति प्रथमहेतुत्यागेन भवता हेत्वन्तरं प्रतिष्ठापितम्। तस्माद्भवतो हेतुरसिद्धः। इयं हेत्वन्तरनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिरुच्यते।

६. अर्थान्तरम्। प्रकृतार्थाप्रतिसम्बद्धार्थाभिधानमर्थान्तरम्।

नित्यः शब्दः। कस्मात्। रूपादिपञ्चस्कन्धा दशहेतुप्रत्ययाः। एतदुच्यते अर्थान्तरम्।

७. निरर्थकम्। यदा वाद इष्टस्तदा मन्त्रभाषणमिति निरर्थकम्।

८. अविज्ञातार्थम्। परिषत्प्रतिवादिभ्यां त्रिरभिहित-मप्यविज्ञातमित्यविज्ञातार्थम्।

यदि कश्चिद्धर्मं वक्ति परिषत्तु प्रतिवादी च जिज्ञासावपि त्रिरभिहितं ज्ञातुमसमर्थौ। यथा (कश्चिद्वदेद्) अणुरमूर्तः सुखोत्पादकः दुःखोत्पादकोऽप्राप्तो सापकर्षोत्कर्षः शमितोऽसन्न्यासो न विनाशः। शब्दो नित्यः कस्मात्। अनित्यस्य नित्यत्वात्। इयमविज्ञातार्थनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिरुच्यते।

९. अपार्थकम्। पौर्वापर्य्यासम्बन्धोऽपार्थकम्। यथा कश्चिद्वदेत्। दशविधं फलं त्रिविधः कंबल एकविधं पानभोजनमेतदपार्थकमुच्यते।

१०. अप्राप्तकालम्। प्रतिज्ञायां दृष्टायां पश्चाद्धेतुस्थापनमप्राप्तकालम्।

नित्यः शब्दः। यथा पारिमाण्डल्याश्रयस्य परमाणोर्नित्यत्वात्पारिमाण्डल्यं नित्यं शब्दस्यापि तथात्वसम्भव इति कृतेऽपरः प्राह। भवता नित्यतास्थापने हेतुर्नोक्तः, पञ्चावयवन्यूनवचनस्थापनाद्भवदर्थोऽसिद्ध इति दूषित इदं प्राह। अस्ति मे हेतुर्नाम्ना तु नोक्तः। कोऽयं हेतुरिति चेत्। नित्याकाशाश्रयत्वमिति।

अत्रापरः। यथा गृहे दग्धे तत्परित्राणायोदकान्वेषणं तथाऽनवसरेऽर्थरक्षणाय हेतुस्थापनम्। एतदप्राप्तकालमुच्यते।

११. न्यूनम्। पञ्चावयवा अन्यतमेन हीना इति न्यूनम्। प्रतिज्ञा हेतुरुदाहरणमुपनयनं निगमनमिति पञ्चावयवाः।

यथा (कश्चिद्वदत्य)नित्यः शब्द इत्ययं प्रथमोऽवयवः। कृतकत्वादिति द्वितीयोऽवयवः। यद्वस्तु कृतकं तदनित्यं यथा घटः कृतकोऽनित्यश्चेति तृतीयोऽवयवः। शब्दोऽपि तथेति चतुर्थोऽवयवः। तस्माच्छब्दोऽनित्य इति पञ्चमोऽवयवः। पञ्चावयवानामन्यतमेन न्यूनता न्यूननिग्रहस्थानापत्तिरित्युच्यते।

१२. अधिकम्। बहुहेतूदाहरणोक्तिरधिकम्। यथा (कश्चिद्वदे)च्छब्दोऽनित्यः। कस्मात्?। प्रयत्नानन्तरीयकत्वादमूर्तत्वादैन्द्रियकत्वादुत्पादविनाशाभ्यां वाच्यत्वाच्चैतद्धेतुबाहुल्यमित्युच्यते। अपि च शब्दोऽनित्यः कृतकत्वाद्घटवत्पटवद्गृहवत्कर्म्मवत्। एतद्दृष्टान्तबाहुल्यमित्युच्यते।

वादी प्राह। भवता हेतूदाहरणबाहुल्यमुक्तम्। यद्येको हेतुः साधनासमर्थस्तदा कथमेकहेतुप्रयोगः। अथ साधनसमर्थस्तदा किं हेतुबाहुल्येन। उदाहरणबाहुल्येऽपि तथात्वसम्भवः। तद्बाहुल्योक्तेरप्रयोजनत्वात्।

१३. पुनरुक्तम्। पुनरुक्तं त्रिविधं, शब्दपुनरुक्तं, अर्थपुनरुक्तं, अर्थापत्तिपुनरुक्तञ्च। शब्दपुनरुक्तं यथा (कश्चिद्वदे)च्छक्रः शक्रः। अर्थपुनरुक्तं यथा (कश्चिद्वदेत्) चक्षुरक्षि। अर्थापत्तिपुनरुक्तं यथा (कश्चिद्वदेत्) सत्यं संसारो दुःखः सत्यं निर्वाणं सुखम्। प्रथममेव वचनं वक्तव्यं द्वितीयं त्वप्रयोजनम्। कस्मात्। पूर्ववचनस्य स्पष्टार्थत्वात्। पूर्ववचनस्यार्थः स्पष्टश्चेद्, द्वितीयवचनेन किं स्पष्टं भवेत्। यदि न किञ्चित् प्रकटयितव्यं तदा तदप्रयोजनम्। एतत्पुनरुक्तमित्युच्यते।

१४. अननुभाषणम्। परिषदा विज्ञातायाः प्रति-

ज्ञायास्त्रिरभिहिताया अपि यदि कश्चित्प्रत्युच्चारणा-समर्थस्तदाननुभाषणम्।

१५. अज्ञानम्। परिषदा विज्ञाताया अपि प्रतिज्ञायाः केनचिदविज्ञानमज्ञानमुच्यते।

१६. अप्रतिभा। यदि परस्य प्रतिज्ञां न्यायवदीक्षते दूषणे चासमर्थस्तदाऽप्रतिभा।

अपरे तु वदन्ति। अज्ञानेऽप्रतिभायाञ्चोभयत्रानिग्रह-स्थानापत्तिः। कस्मात्!। यदि कश्चिदर्थं न विजानाति दूषणे चासमर्थस्तेन सह वादो न कर्त्तव्य इति।

एते त्वतिमन्दे निग्रहस्थाने। अन्येषु निग्रहस्थानेषु, सदोषस्य वचनस्य विविधेनोपायेनोद्धरणं शक्यम्। अत्र तूभयत्र न कश्चिदुपाय उद्धरणसमर्थः। एष मनुष्यः पूर्वं पाण्डित्यगौरवं स्थापयति, पश्चात्तु पाण्डित्यं प्रकट-यितुमशक्तः।

१७. विक्षेपः। स्वप्रतिज्ञाया दोषं ज्ञात्वा व्याजैः परि-हारः कार्यान्तरकथनम्। यथाहं स्वयं रोगी, अहं परं रोगिनं द्रष्टुमिच्छामि। तदा तु यदि नापक्रामति परदूषणनिराकरणं न कल्पयति। कस्मात्। बन्धुस्नेहाप-गमभयात्। इति विक्षेपनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिरुच्यते।

१८. मतानुज्ञा। परदूषणे स्वपक्षदोषाभ्युपगम इति मतानुज्ञा। यदि कश्चित् परेण दूषणे कृते, स्वपक्षदोष-मनुजानाति, यथा मम दोष एवं भवतोऽपीत्यभ्युपगच्छन्। इयं मतानुज्ञोच्यते।

१९. पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्। यदि कश्चिन्निग्रहस्थानं प्राप्नुयात्, तस्य निग्रहापत्त्यनुद्भावनं तद्दूषणेच्छया तु

दूषणस्थापनम्। तदर्थे च हीने किं प्रयोजनं दूषणेन। असिद्धमेतद्दूषणम्। एतदुच्यते पर्यनुयोज्योपेक्षणम्।

२०. निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः। कस्यचिदनिग्राह्यत्वेऽपि निग्रहस्थानाभियोगो निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः। अन्यच्च। प्रतिवादिनि स्वप्रतिज्ञाहान्यापन्ने स्वपक्षभिन्नार्थोपादानेनास्थाने परनिग्रहस्थानद्योतनम्। अयमपि निरनुयोज्यानुयोगः।

२१. अपसिद्धान्तः। पूर्वं चतुर्विधे सिद्धान्ते स्वयमङ्गीकृतेऽपि पश्चाच्चेद्यथासिद्धान्तं न ब्रूयादयमपसिद्धान्तः।

२२. हेत्वाभासाः। यथा पूर्वमुक्तास्त्रिविधाः। असिद्धोऽनैकान्तिको विरुद्धश्चेति हेत्वाभासाः।

असिद्धः। यथा कश्चित् स्थापयेदश्व आगच्छति। कस्मात्। शृङ्गदर्शनात्। अश्वो ऽशृङ्ग इति शृङ्गहेतुरसिद्धो ऽश्वागमनस्थापनासमर्थः।

अनैकान्तिकः। यथा कश्चित् स्थापयेद्गौरागच्छति। कस्मात्। शृङ्गदर्शनात्। यः सशृङ्गः स गौरित्यनैकान्तिकः छागरुर्वादीनां सशृङ्गत्वात्। शृङ्गहेतुरनैकान्तिकः। तस्माद्गवागमनस्थापनासमर्थः।

विरुद्धः। यथा कश्चित् स्थापयेत्प्रभाते रात्रिः। कस्मात्। अरुणोदयात्। अरुणोदयो रात्र्या विरुद्धः। अरुणोदयहेतू रात्रिस्थापनासमर्थः। यदि केनचिदेष हेतुः प्रयुज्यते तदा हेत्वाभासनिग्रहस्थानापत्तिः।

इति तृतीयं प्रकरणम्।

समाप्तश्चायं ग्रन्थः।

उपायहृदयम् ।

[*Retranslated into Sanskrit.*]

उपायहृदयम् ।

अथ प्रथमं प्रकरणम् ।

एतद्वादावबोधेन वादधर्मावबोधनम् ।
विस्तरेण च गम्भीरोऽयमर्थोऽत्राभिधीयते ॥

वादो न कर्तव्यः । कस्मात् ? प्रायेण हि वादकारकाणां सञ्जातविपुलक्रोधमदमत्तानां स्वयं विभ्रान्तचित्तानां मनसोऽनतिमृदुता परपापप्रकाशकत्वं स्वपाण्डित्यानुमोदकत्वञ्चेत्यादयो दोषा बुधैर्निर्भर्त्सिताः । तस्मादार्यजना असंख्येयोपायैर्विवादच्छेदकास्तत्परिहारप्रीताश्च विषभाजनपरित्यागादिव । वादकारकाणाञ्चान्तरं वस्तुतो मृद्वपि परं बहिर्बहुदोषं दृश्यते । तस्मात्स्वहितपरहिताभिलाषिणैते विवादधर्माः प्रहेयाः ।

अत्रोच्यते । मैवं, नैष वादप्रारम्भः परिभवलाभख्यात्यर्थोऽपि तु सुलक्षणदुर्लक्षणोपदेशेच्छयैव वादस्य प्रारम्भः ।

यदीह लोके वादो न भवेत्, मुग्धानां बाहुल्यं स्यात् । ततश्च लौकिकमिथ्याज्ञानकुशलतासहचरभ्रान्तिसमुद्भूतकुकर्मभिः संसारदुर्गतिः सदर्थहानिश्च ।

वादावगमे तु स्वयं सुलक्षणदुर्लक्षणशून्यलक्षणपरिज्ञानत्वात् सर्वे मारास्तीर्थिका मिथ्यादृष्टिमनुष्याश्च विहे-

ठनासमर्था अप्रतिबन्धकाराश्च। तस्मात्सत्त्वहितेच्छयेह लोके सद्धर्मस्य प्रचारेच्छया च मयैष सम्यग्वाद आरभ्यते ।

यथाम्रफलपरिपुष्टिकामेन तत्(फल)परिरक्षणार्थं बहिर्बहुतीक्ष्णकण्टकनिकरविन्यासः क्रियते ।

वादारम्भोऽपि तथैवाधुना सद्धर्मरक्षणेच्छया न तु ख्यातिलाभाय। यदुक्तं (भवता) पूर्वं [एष वादो] विवादप्रवर्धक इति। तदयुक्तम्। धर्मरक्षणार्थमेव हि वाद आरब्धव्यः ।

आह। यदुक्तं पूर्वं भवता यद्येतं वादं जानीयाद्वादधर्मानवगच्छेदिति वक्तव्यमेतस्य लक्षणम् ।

अत्रोच्यते। तस्य वादस्याष्टविधो भेदः। तदर्थगतिप्रज्ञानसामर्थ्ये परवादावगमः, यथा धान्यमुप्ता सिक्ता चोदकेन तस्य पुष्टिः समृद्धिश्च साध्यते। तृणाद्यनुत्सारणे तूत्कृष्टाङ्कुरा न जायन्ते। यदि कश्चिदेतमष्टविधं [वादं] शृणुयादर्थन्तु तस्य नावगच्छेत्तदा [तस्य] सर्वेषु वादेषु संशयो भवेत्। यदि कश्चिदेतमष्टविधमर्थं परिजानीयान्नियतमेव सर्ववादधर्मावगमे समर्थो भवेत् ।

आह। एतद्वादपरिज्ञानादेव वादधर्मा नियतमवगम्यन्त इति (भवतो)क्तम्। अथ तीर्थिकानां वादधर्माः सन्ति न वा। अत्रोच्यते सन्त्येव। यथा वैशेषिकाणां षट् पदार्थाः। द्रव्यं गुणः सामान्यं विशेषः कर्म समवायश्चेत्यादिकवादधर्मेषु स्ववगतेष्वपि परसूत्रशास्त्राणामप्रतीतिः ।

अतो वादनयप्रतिपादनार्थं प्रपञ्चोच्छेदनार्थञ्चैतेऽष्टविधा गम्भीराः सद्वादधर्माः संक्षेपतो मया कथ्यन्ते ।

दृष्टान्तः सिद्धान्तो वाक्यप्रशंसा वाक्यदोषः प्रमाणं प्राप्तकालवाक्यं हेत्वाभासो वाक्छलम्।

दृष्टान्तो द्विविधः। संपूर्णदृष्टान्त आंशिकदृष्टान्तश्च। सिद्धान्तो निश्चितार्थ इति। वाक्यप्रशंसा वाक्यस्यार्थानुगमः। वाक्यदोषो वाक्यस्य युक्तिव्यत्ययः। प्रमाणं द्विविधज्ञापकहेतुरुत्पत्तिहेतुर्व्यञ्जनहेतुश्च। प्राप्तकाल वाक्यम्। यथा यदि पूर्वं धात्वायतनानि वदेत्। पश्चात्तु पञ्चस्कन्धान् तदैतदप्राप्तकालमित्युच्यते। प्राप्तकालवाक्यं तु वाक्यक्रमावगमे। हेत्वाभासो यथा मरीचावुदकाभासः, न तु वस्तुत उदकम्। यदि वादी स्वलङ्कृतैर्वाक्यैरुदकमिति वदेत्तदा स हेत्वाभासः। वाक्छलं यथा। नवकम्बल इत्युक्ते तद्दूषयन् वदेत्। वस्त्रं न कालः कथं नव इत्युच्यते। इति छलम्। एवं समासतोऽष्टविधोऽर्थः समाख्यातः। इदानीं क्रमेण तल्लक्षणानि विस्तरेण व्याख्यास्यामः।

आह। उक्तो भवता पूर्वं दृष्टान्तः। कस्तावदुपायो दृष्टान्तस्य स्थापने। अत्रोच्यते। दृष्टान्तवचनं हि यत्र पृथग्जनानामार्याणाञ्च बुद्धिसाम्यं तदा वक्तव्यम्। यथा चित्तं चञ्चलं द्रुतवायुवत्। सर्वेषां जनानां वायुचाञ्चल्यस्य प्रतीतेः। तदा चित्तास्थिरताया निश्चयः। अप्रतीतौ दृष्टान्तालाभः। आह। कस्मात्सदर्थ एव नोच्यतेऽपि तु दृष्टान्तः। अत्रोच्यते। दृष्टान्तवचनं हि सदर्थद्योतनार्थम्।

आह। भवता पूर्वमुक्तम् पृथग्जनानामार्याणाञ्च बुद्धिसाम्याद्दृष्टान्तलाभ इति। किं साम्यं को वा विशेषः। अत्रोच्यते। पूर्ववत्। वायुदृष्टान्तस्य साम्यमित्युच्यते।

आर्याणां निर्वाणप्राप्तिः पृथग्जनानां त्वप्राप्तिरयं विशेष इत्युच्यते।

आह। उक्तं दृष्टान्तलक्षणम्। किं पुनः सिद्धान्तलक्षणम्। अत्रोच्यते। साध्यस्य हेतुभिर्विस्तरेण स्थापनं निर्णयश्च। एतत्सिद्धान्तलक्षणम्।

आह। सिद्धान्तधर्माः कियन्तः। अत्रोच्यते। चत्वारः। सर्वसमः सर्वभिन्न आदौ समः पश्चाद्भिन्न आदौ भिन्नः पश्चात्समश्च। आह। अधुना भवतैतानि चत्वारि लक्षणानि व्याख्यातव्यानि।

अत्रोच्यते। अर्थस्थापनमिच्छता चतुर्विधं ज्ञानमाश्रयितव्यम्। किं तच्चतुर्विधम्। प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमुपमानमागमश्च।

सर्वसमो यथा, (वादी वदेद-)त्मात्मीयञ्च न विद्येते, प्रतिवाद्यपि वदेदात्मात्मीयञ्च न विद्येत इत्ययं सर्वसमः। सर्वभिन्नो यथा, (वादी वदेत्) पृथगिति प्रतिवादी तु वदेदेकमित्ययं सर्वभिन्नः। आदौ समः पश्चाद्भिन्नो यथा, (वादी वदेत्) सर्वं दृष्टधर्मं सत्। आत्मा पुनरप्रत्यक्षोऽपि सन्। प्रतिवादी वदेद्यत्प्रत्यक्षधर्मकं तदेव सदिति वक्तव्यम्। आत्मा चेदप्रत्यक्षः कथं सन्। अनुमानेन चेदात्मा सन्निति तर्हि प्रत्यक्षपूर्वकमनुमानमिति। अप्रत्यक्षधर्मक आत्मा कथमनुमीयते। यदि पुनरुपमानेनात्मा सन्निति, अथ साधर्म्यपूर्वकमुपमानमित्यात्मा केनोपमीयते। यदि त्वागमेनात्मा सिद्ध इत्युच्यते तदयुक्तम्। दुर्बोधं हि सूत्रम्। कुत्रचित्सन्निति कुत्रचिदसन्निति कथं तत्प्रतीतिरित्ययमादौ समः पश्चाद्भिन्नः। आदौ भिन्नः

पश्चात्समो यथा, (वादी वदेद)त्मात्मीयञ्च न विद्येते। प्रतिवादी तु वदेदस्त्यात्मा, अस्ति पुरुषः। निर्वाणाभ्युपगमस्तूभयोर्वादिनोः। अयमुच्यत आदौ भिन्नः पश्चात्समः।

अपि चापरिमितानि लक्षणानि सिद्धान्तस्य, तद्यथा द्वादश निदानानि, दुःखं, समुदयः, निरोधः, मार्गः सप्तत्रिंशत्पक्षाः, चत्वारि श्रामण्यफलानीत्यादयो धर्मा बुद्धस्य सम्यगर्था इत्युच्यन्ते।

सन्ध्यापूजा, बलिदानं, धूपदीपनं, तैलदीपनिवेदनमिति चतुर्विधा याज्ञिकतीर्थिकानां क्रिया।

त्रिपष्ट्यक्षराणां चतुर्णां च पदानामर्थ इति शाब्दिकास्तीर्थिकाः।

ओषधिविद्या षड्विधा। ओषधिनाम, ओषधिगुणः, ओषधिरसः, ओषधिवीर्यं, सन्निपातः, विपाकश्चेति भैषज्यधर्माः।

षट्पदार्था वैशेषिकाणाम्॥

प्रधानस्यैक्यं पुरुषा बहवः। [तेषां च] विमुक्तिरिति सांख्याः।

अष्टौ सूक्ष्माणि यथा। चत्वारि महाभूतानि बुद्धिराकाशो, विद्या, अविद्या, अष्टैश्वर्याणि [तद्यथा] अणिमा, महिमा, लघिमा, प्राप्तिः, प्राकाम्यं, कायविभागः, ईशित्वं तिरोभावश्च। इति योगतीर्थिकाः।

जीवोऽजीवः पापं पुण्यमास्रवः, निर्जरा, सम्वरः, बन्धः, मोक्षः। पञ्चज्ञानानि [तद्यथा] श्रुतज्ञानं, मतिज्ञानं, अवधिज्ञानं, मनःपर्यायज्ञानं, केवलज्ञानम्। षडावरणानि,

दर्शनावरणं, दुःखवेदनीयावरणं, मोहावरणमायुरावरणं, गोत्रावरणं, नामावरणञ्च। चत्वारः कषायाः [तद्यथा] क्रोधः, मानः, लोभः, माया चेति निर्ग्रन्थधर्माः।

अपरेऽपि सन्ति ये वदन्ति सर्वमेकं सद्भावाज्ज्ञेयम्। सर्वधर्माणां च गुणवत्त्वादैक्यम्, किञ्च प्रधानात् समुत्पन्नं सर्वमेकं ज्ञेयमेकमूलत्वात्। इत्येवमेकवादिनस्तीर्थिकाः।

अपरे वदन्ति। सर्वं पृथक्। कुत इति चेत्। यथा शिरःपदादि कायात्पृथक्। अपि च लक्षणपृथक्त्वं यथा वृषभोऽश्वविलक्षणः। तस्मात्सर्वं पृथगिति ज्ञेयम्। इति पृथग्वादिनस्तीर्थिकाः।

अथ कथं सर्वमेकं सद्भावादिति। यतः सद्धि द्वेधा चेतनमचेतनञ्च। तत्कथमेकं हेतुवैषम्यादिति। एवं धर्माणां समासतो दूषणम्।

यदि पुनः कश्चिद्वदेद्दुःखसमुदयनिरोधमार्गद्वादश-निदानसंस्कृतादिधर्माणामेकत्वं पृथक्त्वं वेति सर्वमेतद-सद्धेतुकम्। कस्मात्। यद्येकत्वं तदा दुःखान्तवादापत्तिः। यदि पृथक्त्वं तदा सुखान्तवादापत्तिः। तस्मादुक्तं [एकत्वे पृथक्त्वे वा]न्तद्वयवादापत्तिः। नैष बुद्धधर्मस्यार्थ इति।

अपि च यथा केचिद्वदन्ति निर्वाणभावः न दुःखं न च सुखम्। कथं ज्ञातमिति चेत्। सर्वे हि धर्माश्चेतनाः सदुःखसुखा निर्वाणं त्वचेतनं कथं सुखं स्यात्।

अपि च केचिद्वादिनः सुखं वदन्ति। कुत इति चेत्। सुखं त्रिविधम्। सुखवेदनासुखं, अनुपघातः, अनाकाङ्क्षा च। निर्वाण आकाङ्क्षाभावान्निर्वाणं सुखम्।

अपि च निर्वाणं नित्यमिति मया पूर्वं ज्ञातम्। इदानीन्तु [वक्तव्यं] संस्कारेभ्यस्तत् पृथक् न वेति केचित्। अत्रोच्यते। निर्वाणं नित्यमिति पूर्वं ज्ञातं किमुच्यते संस्कारैस्तत्तुल्यम्। संस्काराणां स्वभावः परिणामः प्रध्वंसश्च। निर्वाणभावस्य तु नित्यता सुखत्वञ्च। कथं विद्वांस्तत्संस्कारैस्तुल्यं वदेत्।

अन्यच्च केचिदाहुः। आत्मभावस्य रूपवत्त्वे नित्योऽनित्यो वायमिति न निश्चीयते।

अत्रोच्यते। सर्वं मूर्तमनित्यमेव यथा मूर्तो घटो विनाशी। आत्मापि तद्वदिति चेत्तदाऽनित्य एव। आत्मनो मूर्तत्वन्तु सूत्रैर्न समर्थितं, युक्तिहीनञ्चैतत्। यथा रत्नबुद्ध्या सिकतोपलादानं तथा भवतो वचनमतीव मिथ्या। अथ कस्मादात्माऽमूर्त इति चेन्मया पूर्वमुक्तं घटो मूर्तत्वाद्विनाशीति। यद्यात्मैवं स्यात्, तदा सोऽपि विनाशी भवेत्। कथमिदानीं भवता पृच्छ्यते "कस्मादात्माऽमूर्त" इति।

अपरञ्च। अनियतसिद्धान्तलक्षणम्, यथा कश्चित् पृच्छेत्। किं शब्दो वस्तु[भूतो] नित्योऽनित्यो वा। अत्रोच्यते। यद्विभागनिष्पन्नं तदनित्यमेव। शब्दोऽपि विभागनिष्पन्नः कथं नित्यो भवेत्।

अथ किं नाम शब्दो वस्तु[भूतः]। अत्रोच्यते। अनिश्चये कथं प्रश्नः।

अथ किं केवल एवात्मानागतेऽध्वनि सुखदुःखे वेदयते सशरीरो वा।

अत्रोच्यते। एतस्मिञ्छरीरे विनष्ट आत्मनोऽपरस्मिञ्छरीरे वेदनम्।

ननु क एष आत्मा योऽनागतेऽध्वनि सुखदुःखे वेदयते। अत्रोच्यते। 'आत्मा, इति पूर्वमुक्तं भवता। कथं पुनः सन्नसन् वात्मा' इति पृच्छ्यते। अयुक्तमेतत्।

अथ सिद्धान्तार्थ उक्तः। किं पुनर्वाक्यप्रशंसालक्षणम्। अत्रोच्यते। युक्त्यविरुद्धमनधिकमन्यूनमधिगतपदार्थं वचनधर्मनिबद्धं प्रसिद्धदृष्टान्ताविरुद्धमननुयोज्यञ्च। एभिर्हेतुभिर्वाक्यप्रशंसेत्युच्यते।

ननु किं नाम युक्त्यविरुद्धम्। अत्रोच्यते। विज्ञानमेवात्मेति केचिन्मन्यन्ते सर्वसंस्काराणां शून्यत्वादनात्मत्वाच्च। न हि सर्वे संस्कारा विज्ञानमिति तदयुक्तम्। संस्कारा हि विज्ञानस्य हेतवः। हेतूनां चानात्मत्वात्, कथं विज्ञानमात्मा।

अथ सर्वे धर्मा अनित्याः शब्दस्तु नैव सर्वं, तस्माच्छब्दो नित्य इति। अत्रोच्यते। भवता सर्वमित्युक्तं, कोऽर्थः पुनः शब्दस्य, यो नैव सर्वम्। एतदहेतुकमयुक्तञ्च।

अन्यच्च। सर्वे कृतकधर्मा अनित्या एव। अग्निसन्तानवत्। शब्दोऽपि तथा। तस्मादनित्यः। एतदविरुद्धलक्षणम्।

अथ किमनधिकमन्यूनञ्च। अत्रोच्यते। अधिकन्यूनत्वयोर्लक्षणं पूर्वमुक्तम्। न्यूनत्वं त्रिविधम् हेतुन्यूनत्वं वाक्यन्यूनत्वं दृष्टान्तन्यूनत्वञ्च। यदि कश्चिद्वदेत्। षड्विज्ञानान्यनित्यानि घटवत्। कारणन्तु न वदेत्तदा तद्धेतुन्यूनत्वमित्युच्यते। यदि कश्चिद्वदेद्देहोऽयमनात्मा सकारणत्वात्। शब्दोऽप्यनात्मा सकारणत्वादेतद्दृष्टान्तन्यूनत्वम्।

यदि कश्चिद्वदेदनित्यानि चत्वारि महाभूतानि घटवत्कृतकानि। एतद्वाक्यन्यूनत्वम्। एतद्विपरीतं तु सम्पन्नमित्युच्यते।

सम्पन्नञ्च यथा। आत्मवाद्येवं प्रष्टव्यः। यदुक्तं भवतात्मेति स नित्योऽनित्यो वा। यद्यनित्यस्तदा संस्कारवद्विनाशधर्मा। नित्य इति चेत्तर्हि कथं निर्वाणस्पृहा। एतत् सम्पन्नलक्षणम्।

अथ किं नामाधिकम्। अत्रोच्यते। अधिकं त्रिविधम्, हेत्वधिकं, दृष्टान्ताधिकं, वाक्याधिकञ्च। यदि कश्चिद्वदेच्छब्दोऽनित्यः संयोगजः। यथा घटः कृतकोऽनित्यश्च। पुनरपि वदेच्छब्द आकाशस्य गुणः। आकाशोऽमूर्तः शब्दस्तु रूपधर्मा कथमन्योन्यसमाश्रयः। एतद्धेत्वधिकम्। यद्युच्यते पञ्चेन्द्रियाण्यनित्यानि प्रतिध्वनिवत्कृतकत्वात्। शब्दोऽपि तथा। कथं तज्ज्ञायते। ओष्ठमुखादिसमुद्भवत्वात्। तद्दृष्टान्ताधिकम्। यद्युच्यतेऽणुः सूक्ष्म आकाशस्तु व्यापी। उभावपि नित्यौ। शब्दस्तु न तथा तस्मादनित्य एतद्दृष्टान्ताधिकम्। अपि च शब्दोऽनित्यः सकारणत्वात्। नित्य इति चेत्, तदयुक्तम्। कस्मात्! द्वाभ्यां हेतुभ्याम्। मूर्तोद्भवत्वादैन्द्रियकत्वाच्च। कथं नित्य इति यच्च समानधर्मकं तत्सर्वमनित्यम्। एतद्वाक्याधिकमुच्यते।

अत्राह। कीदृशं वाक्यं लौकिकानां प्रतिपादनाय समर्थम्। उच्यते। यदि मूर्खाय गम्भीरार्थं वदेद्यथा सर्वे धर्मा शून्याः शान्ता निरात्मानो निष्पुद्गला मायावत् निर्माणवत्तत्त्वरहिता इत्यादि तदा तं गम्भीरार्थं विद्वानेव ज्ञातुं शक्नोति पृथग्जनस्तु श्रुत्वा भ्रान्त्यापन्नो भवेत्।

एतदप्राप्तकालम्। अथोच्यते। अस्ति धर्माणां कर्म, अस्ति विपाकोऽस्ति च बन्धमोक्षादिः। यः करोति सोऽनुभुङ्क्ते इत्यल्पबुद्धयोऽपि श्रुत्वावगच्छन्ति यथा वेधकारणिसंयोगेनाग्नेरुत्पत्तिः। यदभिधीयते तद्यदि सत्त्वोपयोगि भवेत्, तदा सर्वेषां [तच्च] प्रतीति-रनुमोदनञ्च। एतत् प्राप्तकालम्।

अथ किं प्रतिपत्तिः। उच्यते। अभिहितस्य बाहुल्येऽपि स्मरणसामर्थ्यम्, अर्थानां गाम्भीर्येऽपि तल्लक्षणोपलब्धिः, जनप्रीतिकरश्च साध्यसारः। यथा कश्चिद्वदेत् सर्वे धर्माः शून्या अनीश्वराः सर्ववस्तूनां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वादिति प्रतिपत्तिः।

अथ के वाक्यदोषाः। अत्रोच्यते। पूर्वोक्तविपरीता वाक्यदोषाः। वाक्यदोषाः पुनर्द्विविधाः। किञ्च तद्द्वैविध्यम्। अर्थस्याभेदे पुनरुक्तिः। वाक्यस्य चाभेदे पुनरुक्तिरिति। का नामैकार्थपुनरुक्तिः। यथा कौशिक इत्युक्त्वा पुनर्वदे-द्देवेन्द्रः शक्रः पुरन्दरो वेति। इयमुच्यत एकस्यैवार्थस्य नामान्तरपुनरुक्तिः।

नामार्थतुल्यता यथा। इन्द्र इत्युक्त्वा पुनरपीन्द्र इति वदेत्। इयं नामार्थाभेदे पुनरुक्तिः।

यदलङ्कृतमसङ्गतं वोक्तं स सर्वो वाक्यदोष इत्युच्यते। अपरञ्च यद्युक्तिसमुपेतमप्यक्रमम् एषोऽपि वाक्यदोष इति।

यथा गाथयोक्तम्।

यथा कश्चिद्देवानामिन्द्रस्य शक्रस्य भार्यां प्रशंसयन् सुवर्णरूपिणीम्॥

कोमलपादहस्तां पश्चाच्च शक्रो देवानामिन्द्रो ऽसुरत्रिपुरविनाशीति तु वदन्नित्यक्रमं वचनमुक्तम् ।

अथ कतिविधं प्रमाणम् । चतुर्विधं प्रमाणम् । प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमुपमानमागमश्चेति । चतुर्षु प्रमाणेषु प्रत्यक्षं श्रेष्ठम् । कुतः पुनः प्रत्यक्षं श्रेष्ठमिति चेदपरेषां त्रयाणां प्रमाणानां प्रत्यक्षोपजीवकत्वाच्छ्रेष्ठम् । यथा दृष्टे धूमवत्यग्नौ पश्चाद्धूमदर्शनादग्नेरनुमानम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षं विशिष्यते । यथा च मरीचिदर्शनेनोदकोपमानम् । तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षे पूर्वं ज्ञाते पश्चादुपमानलाभः । ...पश्चात्प्रत्यक्षकाले पूर्वज्ञानं सत्यम् ।

ततश्च प्रत्यक्षादेव [प्रमाण]त्रयं ज्ञानमिति ज्ञातम् । इदानीन्तु तत्प्रत्यक्षं कथं सदिति । अत्रोच्यते । पञ्चेन्द्रियज्ञानं कदाचिन्मिथ्या । यत्तु साध्यवसायं सम्यग्धर्मावबोधकं तत्परमम् । ग्रीष्मे मरीचीनामलातचक्रगन्धर्वनगराणां च प्रत्यक्षेऽपि तदसत् ।

अपरञ्च । लक्षणास्पष्टत्वाद्दर्शनभ्रमः । यथा रात्रौ स्थाणुं दृष्ट्वा मनुष्य एष इत्युच्यते । अङ्गुल्या चक्षुःपीडनाच्च द्विचन्द्रदर्शनम् । शून्यताज्ञाने प्राप्ते सम्यग्दृष्टिरुच्यते । ज्ञातं प्रत्यक्षं तावत् । अथ किमनुमानलक्षणम् । उच्यते । तत्पूर्वमुद्दिष्टम् । अधुना व्याख्यायते । अनुमानं त्रिविधं पूर्ववत्, शेषवत्, सामान्यतो [दृष्टं] च । यथा षडङ्गुलिं सपिडकमूर्धानं बालं दृष्ट्वा पश्चाद्वृद्धं बहुश्रुतं देवदत्तं दृष्ट्वा षडङ्गुलिस्मरणात् सोऽयमिति पूर्ववत् ।

शेषवत् यथा, सागरसलिलं पीत्वा तल्लवणरसमनुभूय

शेषमपि सलिलं तुल्यमेव लवणमिति। एतच्छेषवदनु-
मानम्।

सामान्यतो दृष्टं यथा। कश्चिद्गच्छंस्तं देशं प्राप्नोति गगनेऽपि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ पूर्वस्यां दिश्युदितौ पश्चिमायाश्चास्तं गतौ। तच्चेष्टायामदृष्टायामपि तद्गमनमनुमीयते एतत्सामान्यतो दृष्टम्। ननु का श्रुतिः। अत्रोच्यते, सत्य-प्राचीनवृद्धबुद्धबोधिसत्त्वदर्शनादार्यसूत्रधर्मश्रवणग्रहणयोर्ज्ञानदर्शनोत्पादसामर्थ्यमेषा श्रुतिरित्युच्यते। यथा सुवैद्यको भेषजकुशलो मैत्रचित्तेन शिक्षकः सुश्रुत इत्युच्यते।

एवमपि यत् कृतसर्वधर्मसाक्षात्कारैर्महाज्ञानैरार्यैः श्रुतं तत् सुश्रुतमुच्यते।

अथ किमुपमानलक्षणम्। अत्रोच्यते। यथा सर्वे धर्माः शून्याः शान्ता मायावत् निर्माणवत्। संज्ञाऽदान्ताश्ववत्, संस्काराः कदलीवत्, कामलक्षणं पिडकवत् विषवत्। एतदुपमानमुच्यते। एवं चत्वारो हेतवः। तदवगमनं हेतुज्ञानमित्युक्तम्।

अथ के हेत्वाभासाः। अत्रोच्यते। हेत्वाभासा एतेषु वादधर्मेषु महादोषा एव ज्ञेयाः। शीघ्रञ्चापहर्तव्याः। अथेदानीं हेत्वाभासा व्याख्यास्यन्ते। हेत्वाभासानां लक्षणान्यपरिमितानि संक्षेपतस्त्वष्टावेव। वाक्छलं, सामान्यछलं, संशयसमः, कालातीतः, प्रकरणसमः, वर्ण्यसमः, सव्यभिचारः, विरुद्धः।

नन्वेतेऽष्टौ धर्मा विस्तरेण विवेक्तव्याः। उच्यते। नव इति चतुर्विधम्। नवः, नव, न वः, नव इति।

यथा कश्चिदाह। यो मया परिहितः स नवकम्बलः। अत्र दूषणं (वदेत्) यद्भवता परिहितं तदेकमेव वस्त्रं कथं नवेति। अत्र प्रतिवदेन्मया नव इत्युक्तं तथाच नवः कम्बलः नतु नवेति। अत्र दूषयेत्कथं नव! नवलोमभि-र्निर्मितत्वान्नव इत्युक्ते प्रतिवादी वदेत् तत्त्वतोऽपरि-मितानि लोमानि कथं नवलोमानीत्युच्यते।

अत्राह। नव इति मया पूर्वमुक्तं न तु नवसंख्या। अत्र दूषणम्। तद्वस्त्रं युष्माकमेवेति ज्ञातं कस्मादेतन्न वः कथ्यते। अत्रोत्तरम्। मया नव इत्युक्तं किन्तु न व इति नोक्तम्। अत्र दूषणम्। भवतः कायं कम्बलो वस्त्र इति प्रत्यक्षमेतत्। कथमुच्यते न वःकम्बलः। अयं हेत्वाभास इत्युच्यते वाक्छलं च।

अपरञ्च वाक्छलम्। यथा गिरिर्दह्यत इत्युक्ते, दूषणम्। तत्त्वतस्तृणतरवो दह्यन्ते कथं गिरिर्दह्यत इत्युक्तम्। एतद्वाक्छलमित्युच्यते।

अपि च छलं द्विविधं। पूर्ववत् सामान्यञ्चेति। यथा। संस्कृता धर्माः शून्याः शान्ता आकाशवदित्युक्ते, दूषणम्। यद्येवं, उभयोरपि शून्यत्वमभावश्च, तदा निःस्वभावा धर्मा आकाशतुल्या इति सामान्यछलम्।

का तावदुत्पत्तिरिति। अत्रोच्यते। सत उत्पत्तिरिति। यथा मृदो घटत्ववत्त्वाद्घटोत्पादकत्वम्। यदि मृदो घटत्ववत्त्वं तदा मृदेव घटः स्यात्। तदा तदुत्पत्तये कृतं कुम्भकाररज्जुचक्रसंयोगेन। यदि मृदः सद्भावेन घटोत्पादकत्वं, तदोदकस्यापि सद्भावेन घटोत्पादकत्वं

स्यात् । यद्युदकस्य सद्भावेन घटानुत्पादकत्वं कथं तर्हि मृदो घटोत्पादकत्वम् । इति सामान्यछलम् ।

किं नाम संशयहेत्वाभासलक्षणम् । उच्यते । स्थाणोर्मनुष्यसादृश्यात्, रात्रौ तं दृष्ट्वा, एष स्थाणुः पुरुषो वेति विमर्शः । अयं संशयहेत्वाभास इति ।

कः पुनः कालातीतहेत्वाभासः । उच्यते । यथा कश्चिद्वदेन्नित्यः शब्दः । शब्दमयत्वाद्वेदोऽपि नित्य इति । अत्र दूषणम् । इदानीं भवता शब्दस्य नित्यताकारणमप्रतिष्ठाप्य कथं वेदो नित्य इत्युच्यते ।

अत्र वदेद्यथाकाशमरूपत्वान्नित्यं तथा शब्दोऽप्यरूपत्वान्नित्यः । तद्वचने पश्चादप्युक्ते सोऽर्थः सिध्यति । अत्र दूषणं कालातीतमेतद्वचनम् । यथा गृहे दग्ध उदकान्वेषणं भवतोप्येवमिति कालातीतः ।

अथ को नाम प्रकरणसमः ? (आत्मनः) शरीरभिन्नत्वादात्मा नित्यः । यथा (घटस्य) आकाशभिन्नत्वाद्घटोऽनित्यः । अयं प्रकरणसम इत्युच्यते ।

अत्र दूषणम् । यद्यात्मा शरीरभिन्नत्वान्नित्य इति तदा (घटस्य) शरीरभिन्नत्वाद्घटोऽपि नित्यः स्यात् शरीरभिन्नत्वेऽपि घटोऽनित्य इति चेत्, तर्ह्यात्मापि शरीरभिन्नत्वात् कथं नित्यः । इति प्रकरणसमः ।

को नाम वर्ण्यसमः । उच्यते । यथा नित्यमाकाशमस्पर्शत्वात् । मनोविज्ञानमपि तथा । अयं वर्ण्यसम इत्युच्यते ।

कः सव्यभिचारः । उच्यते । यथा पञ्चविषया अनि

न्द्रियग्राह्यत्वात्। चत्वारि महाभूतान्यपि तथा तस्मादनित्यानि।

अत्र दूषणम्। कूर्मरोम लवणगन्धश्च निराभासमात्रं मनोविज्ञानोपलभ्यत्वात्किमनित्यमिति सव्यभिचारः।

अथ को नाम विरुद्धः। उच्यते। विरुद्धो द्विविधः। दृष्टान्तविरुद्धो युक्तिविरुद्धश्च। यथात्मा नित्योऽमूर्तत्वात्, वृषभवत्। अयं दृष्टान्तविरुद्धः।

युक्तिविरुद्धो यथा, ब्राह्मणस्य क्षत्रकर्मानुपालनं मृगयादिशिक्षा च, क्षत्रियस्य ध्यानसमापत्तिरिति युक्तिविरुद्धः। एवम्भूतौ धर्मावज्ञा अबुद्ध्वैव सत्यं मन्यन्ते।

ननु किमविरुद्धम्। अत्रोच्यते। एतद्भिन्नमविरुद्धमित्यभिधीयते।

इति हेत्वाभासाः।

॥ इति प्रथमं प्रकरणम् ॥

अथ द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् ।

पूर्वमष्टविधा वादधर्मा उक्ताः । अथ निग्रह[स्थान]-धर्मान् वक्ष्यामः ।

ननु कतमे वादधर्माः । (अत्रोच्यते) यथा चत्वारि महाभूतानि प्रज्ञप्तिरेव । कस्मात् । रूपादिधर्मत्वादेव । अपरः पुनराह । चत्वारि महाभूतानि तत्त्वतः सन्ति । कथमेतज्ज्ञातम् । काठिन्यं पृथिवीधर्मो यावच्चलत्वं वायुधर्मः । तत्सदिति ज्ञेयम् । एतच्च प्रतिविरुद्धम् । तस्माद्विवादः । यथा वा । पृथिवी शरीरकारणमेव । अपराणि महाभूतान्यपि तथा । अत्र दूषणम् । पृथिव्यादि सर्ववस्तुसाधनसमर्थं सत्, कथं शरीरमात्रं साधयेदिति नात्र विवादः । यद्येवं न स्यात्तदा वाद इत्युच्यते ।

ननु कानि निग्रहस्थानानि । (अत्रोच्यते) यथा शब्दो नित्योऽमूर्तत्वादाकाशवत् ।

अत्र दूषणम् । यद्यपि शब्दोऽमूर्तः । तथाप्यैन्द्रियकः, सप्रतिघः, घटवत्कृतकः । अपि त्वाकाशे ऽकृतके कथं तद्दृष्टान्तलाभः । एतन्निग्रहस्थानमित्युच्यते ।

अथ घटो मूर्त इत्यनित्यः शब्दस्य त्वमूर्तत्वात् कथं तद्दृष्टान्तलाभः ।

अत्र दूषणम् । शब्दो घटभिन्नोऽप्यैन्द्रियकः श्रावणत्वात् । तस्मादनित्यः ।

ननु कस्यार्थस्यानिग्रहस्थानत्वापत्तिः । संस्कारा विज्ञा-

नश्च कृतकत्वादनित्यम्। निर्वाणमकृतकत्वान्नित्यम्। एतद्वाक्यं सम्यक्पदरसम्। एतदुच्यते ऽनिग्रहस्थानम्।

ननु किं वचनं दूषयितव्यम्। उच्यते। वाक्यवैपरीत्यं, असद्धेतुस्थापनं, उदाहरणवैषम्यञ्चैतद्दूषयितव्यम्।

यथा संज्ञा संयोजनोच्छेदिका, इत्युक्ते कश्चित् पृच्छेत्। कथं संज्ञा संयोजनोच्छेदिका। ज्ञानस्य संज्ञात उत्पादं पूर्वमनुक्त्वा संज्ञामात्रकथनाद्वाक्यवैपरीत्यमितीदं दूषणीयम्।

ननु कथं पुनरेतद्वाक्यमुच्यते। असिद्धस्थापनान्निग्रहस्थानापत्तिज्ञापनार्थमुक्तम्।

अपरञ्च। अनुयोज्याननुयोगः। प्रतिवक्तव्ये ऽप्रतिवक्तव्यता। त्रिरभिहितस्य परैरविज्ञातम्। त्रिरभिहितस्य स्वयमविज्ञानम्। एतानि निग्रहस्थानानि।

अन्यच्च। परेण विवदमानस्तद्विकलतां नावगच्छति। अन्यस्तु वदति। एषोऽर्थः मिथ्यैव, किं भवान्नोपलभते। तदा निग्रहस्थानम्।

अन्यच्च। परस्य सम्यगर्थे दोषसमारोपेऽपि निग्रहस्थानम्।

अन्यच्च। वादिनोक्तं सर्वैर्विज्ञातमप्यसावेव (प्रतिवादी) नावगच्छति चेत्तदपि निग्रहस्थानम्। प्रश्नोऽपि तद्वत्। एतानि निग्रहस्थानानि वादस्य महाकण्टकानि गम्भीरदुःखानि ज्ञेयानि, द्रुतञ्च हेयानि।

ननु प्रश्नाः कतिविधाः। उच्यते। त्रिविधाः। यथा वचनसमः, अर्थसमः, हेतुसमश्च। यदि वादिनस्तैस्त्रिभिः

प्रश्नोत्तराणि न कुर्वन्ति तद्विभ्रान्तम् । यद्येतेषां त्रयाणामुत्तराणामन्यतमं न्यूनं स्यात्तदसम्पन्नम् ।

यदि वदेदहमेवम्प्रकारान् त्रीन् प्रश्नान्नावगच्छामि मम यथाज्ञानमन्योन्यं प्रष्टव्यं, तदाऽदोषः ।

वाक्यसमः यथा । आत्मा नास्तीत्युक्ते तद्वाक्याश्रयेण प्रश्नः । अयं वाक्यसम इत्युच्यते ।

अर्थसमः । तन्मतोपादानमेवायमर्थसम इत्युच्यते ।

हेतुसमः । परमनोगतेरुत्पादकस्य हेतोर्ज्ञानमयं हेतुसम इत्युच्यते ।

एवं सामर्थ्ये सत्यनिग्रहस्थानमित्युच्यते ।

यद्यतिद्रुतं वदेच्छ्रोतारश्च नावगच्छेयुस्तदपि निग्रहस्थानम् ।

अथैतावन्मात्रमपराणि वा सन्ति । अत्रोच्यते । सन्त्येव यथा न्यूनं, अधिकम् निरर्थकं, अप्राप्तकालं, पुनरुक्तं प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यास इत्यादीनि निग्रहस्थानानीत्युच्यन्ते ।

यद्येवमादि पूर्वपक्षी वदेत्, तदा निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः ।

अथ प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः । यथा विज्ञानं नित्यम् । कस्मात् । विज्ञानस्य हि द्वैविध्यम् । विज्ञानोत्पत्तिर्विज्ञानक्रिया च ।

घटस्यापि द्वैविध्यम्, घटोत्पत्तिर्घटक्रिया च । एवं विज्ञानमुत्पाद्यमानमेव सक्रियं तस्मान्नित्यम् । घटस्य तूत्पत्त्यनन्तरं सक्रियत्वम्, तस्मादनित्यत्वम् ।

अत्र दूषणम् । उत्पत्तावेव सक्रियत्वान्नित्यमिति चेद्दीपस्याप्युत्पत्तावेव सक्रियत्वान्नित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः । अथ दीपश्चक्षुषा दृष्टः स्यात्, शब्दश्च श्रवणेन श्रूयत इति कथं दृष्टान्तोपपत्तिः । एतत्प्रतिज्ञासन्न्यासनिग्रहस्थानम् ।

अपरञ्च। केचिद्वदन्त्यात्मा नित्य इति। कथं ज्ञातम्। अनैन्द्रियकत्वात्। यथा आकाशोऽनैन्द्रियकत्वान्नित्यः।

अत्र दूषणम्। परमाणवोऽनैन्द्रियका अपि त्वनित्याः।

अत्रोच्यते। आत्माऽकृतकत्वान्नित्यः परमाणवस्तु कृतकत्वादनित्याः।

अत्र दूषणम्। अनुपलब्धेरिति भवता पूर्वमुक्तम्। अधुना चाकृतकत्वादित्युच्यते। अयं प्रतिज्ञाविरोधः।

ननूच्यते ऽहं विरोधीति चेद्भवांस्तु मम वचनं प्रतिकूलयन् कथम् विरोधी न स्यात्।

किञ्च कथमेतद्युक्तिसहम्। यद्वि विरुद्धमित्युच्यते मया, सा भवत एव वचनस्य पूर्वोक्तेनार्थेन प्रतिकूलता। तस्माद्विरुद्धमित्युक्तम्।

अन्यच्च। भवता पूर्वमुक्तमस्पष्टत्वान्मे संशय उत्पन्न इति। नाहं भवद्विरोधीत्येवं संशयेन विरोधः। एतदपि निग्रहस्थानमिति।

॥ इति द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् ॥

अथ तृतीयं प्रकरणम् ।

वादी प्राह । यदि कश्चिद्वदेदस्ति सत्त्वो यावत्सन्ति प्राणा अस्ति जीव इत्यादि । कथं ज्ञातम् । ऐन्द्रियकत्वात् । यथा निरुपधिशेषनिर्वाणस्येन्द्रियैरनुपलब्धेरभावः सत्त्वानान्तु न तथा । तस्मात्सन्त्येव इति ज्ञातम् ।

आत्मा नित्यः । यथार्हत्त्वफलं कस्मिंश्चिदेव काले विद्यमानमपि पूर्वं पश्चाच्चाविद्यमानत्वादभाव इति ज्ञायते । यथा च द्वितीयो मूर्धा तृतीयो हस्तश्च । अभूत्वा भावात् प्रागभावः । भूत्वा तु विनाशात्प्रध्वंसाभाव इति ज्ञायते । आत्मा तु न तथा तस्मान्नित्यः ।

अत्र दूषणम् । यथा मूल[कील]ोदकान्यदृश्यत्वान्न सदित्युक्तम् । अर्हत्त्व-[फलस्यापि] तथात्वमेव न त्वभावः । एतत्तु न भवता साक्षात्क्रियते ।

ननु मैवम् । उदकस्य पृथिव्यावरणाददृश्यत्वम् । अर्हत्त्व-[फलस्य तु] केनावरणेनादृश्यत्वम् । तस्मात्तदसदिति ज्ञायते ।

अत्र दूषणम् । यद्भवतोक्तं [यथा] द्वितीयस्य मूर्ध्नस्तृतीयस्य हस्तस्य चादृश्यत्वाद-[भावः] अर्हत्त्व-[फलस्याप्य]भावः इति स्पष्टम् । तदयुक्तम् । द्वितीयस्य मूर्ध्नो नास्तित्वेऽपि तर्हि न प्रथमस्य नास्तित्वम् । अर्हत्त्व-[फलं] तु नास्त्येवेति तस्यैवात्यन्ताभावः । कथं दृष्टान्ततोपपत्तिः । यच्च भवतोक्तमनुपलब्धेर्निर्वाणाभावः सिद्ध इति तदप्ययुक्तम् । किं नाम (महा)सागरोदकस्य बिन्दुपरिमाणस्याशक्यज्ञानत्वात्तदस-

दिति वक्तुं शक्यते। यद्यपि बिन्दुपरिमाणं न ज्ञायते तथाप्यस्त्येव सागरः। निर्वाणस्यापि तथात्वम्। अनुपलब्धावपि तत्तत्त्वतः सदेव। असदिति चेद्वक्तव्यम् तस्य कारणम्। यदि न शक्यते वक्तुं तदा भवत एवार्थहानिः। अयमुच्यते यथाधर्मवादः।

अन्यच्च यद्यनुपलब्धेर्निर्वाणस्यासत्त्वं, तदा परस्य संशयः। यथा रात्रौ तरुं दृष्ट्वा चित्ते संशयः। एष स्थाणुर्वा मनुष्यो वेति। न खलु तरुः स्थाणोः पुरुषस्य वो[पलब्धौ] नियतो हेतुः। अनुपलब्धिरेव निर्वाणस्याभावे नियतो हेतुरिति चेन्नात्र संशयसम्भवः।

अन्यच्च कर्मविपाकाविनाशात्, सदेव निर्वाणम्। कुत इति चेत्। यथा दवेन गिरेस्तरुदाहे ऽग्निस्तद्विनाशहेतुः। कः पुनस्तस्य कर्मविपाकस्य विनाशहेतुर्येन तद्विनश्यते। निर्वाणलाभे तदा प्रहानिः।

अत्रोच्यते। अस्ति तत्त्वतो विनाशहेतुः। आवरणात्त्वनुपलब्धः।

अत्र दूषणम्। निर्वाणमपि सदावरणात्त्वनुपलब्धम्।

किञ्च यदि विपाकस्य विनाशहेतुर्वर्तत इति चेन्नोच्यते। तदा भवतोऽर्थहानिः। यद्यभावाद्विनाशहेतुरनुक्तस्तदावरणाभावोऽपि कथमुक्तः। एवं कारणैर्कर्माणामविनाशो ज्ञायते।

एष यथाधर्मवाद इत्युच्यते।

पूर्वपक्षी वदति। यदि सागरोदकसद्भावान्निर्वाणसद्भावः सिद्धस्तदा किं द्वितीयस्यापि मूर्ध्नः सद्भावो न सिध्यति। द्वितीयस्यापि मूर्ध्नः सद्भावो न सिद्ध इति चेत्

कथं निर्वाणस्य सद्भावः। तस्माद्भवतोक्तः सागरोदक-दृष्टान्तः निर्वाणसद्भावं साधयितुं न समर्थः। किं द्वितीयस्य मूर्ध्नः सद्भावं साधयेत् ।

अत्र दूषणम्। किं निर्वाणमसदिति भवदभिप्रेतम्। असतः सत्ता वाऽसतोऽसत्ता वा। असतोऽसत्तेति चेत् कथं निर्वाणमसदिति प्रतिज्ञायते। यदि त्वसतः सत्ता कथं भवताऽसत्तोच्यते ।

यद्यसतो निर्वाणस्य सत्ता तदा स्वतोऽसतोऽसत्त्वमपि सदिति चेत्, कथं न निर्वाणसद्भावलाभ इत्यत्र हेतुर्वक्तव्यः। यदि वक्तुं न शक्यते, तदा निश्चितमेव निर्वाणं सदिति ज्ञेयम्। एतदपि यथाधर्मवाद इत्युच्यते ।

नन्वात्मा नित्योऽनित्यो वा। आत्मा ऽकृतकत्वान्नित्यः, घटादिस्तु कृतकत्वादनित्यः ।

अत्र दूषणम्। अकृतकत्वादात्मा नित्य इति चेत्तद-युक्तम्। कस्मात्। पुरुषाणां संशयजनकत्वात्। यद्यकृत-कत्वान्नित्य एवात्मेति तदा नित्योऽनित्य वेति संशयस्या-सम्भवः। संशयजनकत्वाद्दोषः ।

वादी। इयं दोषापत्तिर्न ममैवापि तु सर्वेषामेव वादिनां यथा शब्दो नित्यो ऽमूर्तत्वात्। अतीतः कायोऽस्त्येव पूर्वनिवासानुस्मरणादित्यादिप्रतिज्ञा पूर्ववत्संशयमुत्पा-दयतीति। तस्मात्सर्वत्रैव दोषापत्तिः ।

अत्र दूषणम्। दृष्टान्त एव संशयं निर्धारयति। भवतां तूदाहृतो दृष्टान्तो मम संशयमुत्पादयति तस्मादसिद्धोऽयं दृष्टान्तः। दृष्टान्तेऽसिद्धेऽर्थहानिः। तदेव निग्रहस्थानम्।

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तं सर्वेषामेव दोषापत्तिर्न तु ममैवेत्येष

स्वदोष एव न तु परदोषः। कुत इति चेत्। यथा कश्चिदभियुक्त आत्मानमप्रकाश्य सर्व एव तस्करा इति वदेत्तदासौ पुरुष आत्मानमपि तस्करं मन्यत इति ज्ञेयम्। भवानपि तथा तस्मान्निग्राह्यः।

इदानीं यदि भवानात्मानं प्रकाशयितुमिच्छु पूर्व-युक्तिमतिक्रम्य पुनर्वक्तुमिच्छेन्नूनं बहुदोषापत्तिः स्यात्। भवतः प्रथमः पक्षो द्वितीयेन [पक्षेण] दूषितः। तृतीय-श्चार्थो मया दूषितः। पञ्चमेन दोषावधिमिच्छन् पूर्वं नातिक्रामेदतः भवतोऽन्त्यः पक्षः पुनरुक्तं भवेत्। पुनरुक्तं च निग्रहस्थानम्।

नन्वनुयोज्यः षष्ठोऽपि?

अत्रोच्यते। सिद्धस्तावत्पञ्चमस्य दोषः। तत्कथं षष्ठो-ऽनुयोज्यः। अस्मिन् हि प्रत्युक्ते पूर्वदोषतुल्यता। अनुयोक्तुः सदोषत्वे प्रतिपक्षेण तूष्णीम्भवितव्यम्।

अपरञ्च। षष्ठस्य दोषः पञ्चमेनापर्यनुयोज्यः। कुत इति चेत्। पञ्चमेनैव ह्येष षष्ठोऽनुयुक्तः। अतोऽयं स्वयमेव सदोषः कथं तं दूषयेत्। एवं सद्धर्मवादः।

॥ इति तृतीयं प्रकरणम् ॥

अथ चतुर्थं प्रकरणम्।

ननु भवता व्याख्यातो यथाधर्मसद्वादः। कः पुनः सम्बन्धः।

अत्रोच्यते। प्रश्नोत्तरसम्बन्धो विंशतिविधः। यदि कश्चित्तेन विंशतिविधेनार्थेन सम्यग्न्यायमारभते स सद्वादस्य ज्ञातेत्युच्यते। यदि नैवं तदा नायं विवादधर्मावगन्ता। एषां विंशतिविधानां सारो द्विविधः। वैधर्म्यं साधर्म्यञ्च। सजातीयत्वात्साधर्म्यं विजातीयत्वाद्वैधर्म्यम्। अर्थस्य हि तत्समाश्रयत्वात्ते विंशतिधर्मान् व्याप्नुवतः।

किं साधर्म्यम्। यथा क्लेशक्षयो निराभास एव, आकाशभावोऽपि निराभास इति साधर्म्यम्।

किं वैधर्म्यम्। यथा निर्वाणमकृतकत्वान्नित्यं तथा सर्वे संस्काराः कृतकत्वादनित्याः। इति वैधर्म्यम्।

ननु साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां कथं दूषणम्।

अत्रोच्यते। साधर्म्यदूषणमिच्छता एवं वक्तव्यम्। रूपं चक्षुषा दृष्टं, शब्दस्तु श्रवणेन श्रुत इति, कथं तयोः साधर्म्यम्। यदि रूपाद्भिन्नः शब्दस्तदा रूपस्यानित्यत्वाच्छब्दो नित्यो भवेत्।

वैधर्म्यदूषणम्। यथा रूपस्यैन्द्रियकत्वादनित्यता आत्मनोऽनैन्द्रियकत्वान्नित्यता।

घटस्यात्मनश्च सद्भावः। सद्भावस्साधर्म्ये घटस्या नित्यत्वादात्मनोऽपि तथात्वापत्तिः। घटसद्भाव आत्म-

सद्भावाद्भिन्नस्ततश्चात्मा नित्यो घटस्त्वनित्य इति चेत्। नित्यतासाधर्म्याद[प्य]ात्मना नित्येन भवितव्यम्।

एवं दूषणं विंशतिविधं यथा १ उत्कर्ष[सम]म्, २ अपकर्ष[सम]म्, ३ भेदाभेद[सम]म्, ४ प्रश्नबाहुल्यमुत्तराल्पता, ५ प्रश्नाल्पतोत्तरबाहुल्यम्, ६ हेतुसमम्, ७ कार्यसमम्, ८ व्याप्तिसमम्, ९ अव्याप्तिसमम्, १० कालसमम्, ११ प्राप्तिसमम्, १२ अप्राप्तिसमम्, १३ विरुद्धम्, १४ अविरुद्धम्, १५ संशय[सम]म्, १६ असंशय[सम]म्, १७ प्रतिदृष्टान्त[सम]म्, १८ श्रुतिसमम्, १९ श्रुतिभिन्नम्, २० अनुपपत्ति[सम]ञ्चेति प्रश्नोत्तरधर्मा विंशतिधा।

१. उत्कर्ष[सम]म्। यथा (कश्चिद्वदेद्), आत्मा नित्य इन्द्रियानुपलब्धेः। आकाशो ह्यनुपलब्धेर्नित्यः। सर्वमनुपलभ्यं नित्यमेव। आत्माप्यनुपलभ्यः कथं तदनित्यताप्राप्तिः।

अत्र दूषणम्। आकाशोऽचेतनत्वान्नित्यः। आत्मा तु चेतनः कथं नित्यः। आकाशश्चेतन इत्यन्याय्यम्। यद्यात्माऽचेतनस्तदैवाकाशेन सधर्मा। एवं विद्वांसः सोऽनित्य इति मन्यन्ते। एतदुत्कर्ष[सम]म्।

२. अपकर्ष[सम]म्। यथाकाशोऽचेतन आत्मा तु चेतनः। कथमाकाश आत्मनो दृष्टान्तः। एतदपकर्ष[सम]म्।

३. भेदाभेद[सम]म्। यथात्मनित्यतास्थापन आकाश उदाहरणम्। [अत्र दूषणं] आत्मा आकाशश्चाभिन्नौ इति चेदैकधर्म्यात् कथमाकाशस्यात्मनो दृष्टान्तता।

भिन्नौ इति चेदन्यान्यसाधर्म्याप्राप्तिः। एतदुच्यते भेदाभेद[सम]म्।

४. अन्यच्च। आत्मा नित्योऽनैन्द्रियकत्वात्। यथाकाशोऽनैन्द्रियकत्वान्नित्य इति भवतः स्थापना।

अथ यदनैन्द्रियकं तन्नावश्यं नित्यम्। तत्कथं सिद्धम्। एतदुच्यते प्रश्नबाहुल्यमुत्तराल्पता च।

५. अन्यच्च। आत्मा नित्योऽनैन्द्रियकत्वादिति भवत्स्थापना। अनैन्द्रियकस्य द्वैविध्यम्। यथा परमाणवोऽनुपलभ्या अनित्याः। आकाशस्त्विन्द्रियानुपलभ्यो नित्यश्च। कथं भवतोच्यते यदनुपलभ्यत्वान्नित्य इत्युच्यते प्रश्नाल्पतोत्तरबाहुल्यञ्च।

६. अन्यच्च। अनुपलब्धिहेतुनात्मा नित्य इति भवता प्रतिज्ञातम्। आकाशश्चात्मा च भिन्नौ कथमुभयोरनुपलभ्यत्वं हेतुर्भवेत्। इति हेतुसमम्।

७. अन्यच्च। यत्पञ्चमहाभूतमयं तदनित्यम्। आकाश आत्मा च पञ्चमहाभूतमयौ कथं नित्यावुक्तौ। इति कार्यसमम्।

८. अन्यच्च। अनुपलभ्यत्वान्नित्य आकाश इति भवतः स्थापना। आकाशश्च सर्वव्यापी [ततश्च] किं सर्वाणि वस्तून्यनुपलभ्यानि। एतद्व्याप्तिसमम्।

९. अन्यच्च। परमाणुरव्याप्यनैन्द्रियकोऽप्यनित्यः। आत्मा त्वनैन्द्रियकः कथं नित्यः। इति अव्याप्तिसमम्।

१०. अन्यच्च। आत्मा नित्योऽनैन्द्रियकत्वादिति भवत्स्थापना। सोऽयं[हेतु]र्वर्तमानेऽतीतेऽनागते वा। अतीत इति चेदतीतत्वान्नष्टः। अनागत इति चेदभावः। वर्तमान

इति चेत्तदाऽहेतुः। यथा शृङ्गे युगपदेव जातत्वान्नान्योन्यहेतुके। इति कालसमम्।

११. अन्यच्च। आत्मा नित्योऽनैन्द्रियकत्वादिति भवत्स्थापना। अथ प्राप्याप्राप्य वा हेतुरिति। अप्राप्य चेदसिद्धो हेतुः। यथाग्निरप्राप्य दहनासमर्थः, असिश्चाप्राप्य छेदनासमर्थः। आत्मानमप्राप्य कथं हेतुर्भवेत्। इत्यप्राप्ति[समम्]।

१२. अन्यच्च। प्राप्य इति चेत्, प्राप्तेरहेतुत्वम्। इति प्राप्तिसमम्।

१३. अन्यच्च। सर्वमनित्यम्। न त्वात्मा सर्वं, ततो नित्य इति भवत्प्रतिज्ञा। आत्मा च तद्भावादनित्य इति वक्तव्यः, किञ्चिद्दग्धो हि कम्बलः प्रायेणादग्धत्वाददग्ध इत्युच्यते। एतद्विरुद्धम्।

१४. अन्यच्च। आत्माऽनैन्द्रियकत्वादाकाशतुल्य इति भवत्स्थापना। आकाशस्यानुपलब्धिरात्मनोऽपि तथात्वम्। आत्मन उपलब्धिरिति चेत्तदाकाशोऽपि सुखदुःखादिकमुपलभेत। आत्मन आकाशस्य चाभिन्नत्वात्। एतदविरुद्धम्।

१५. अन्यच्च। आत्मनः सद्भाववन्नित्यताऽनियता। लौकिकानां संशयसम्भवो नित्यो ऽनित्यो वेति। एतत् संशयसमम्।

१६. अन्यच्च। अस्त्यात्माऽनैन्द्रियकत्वादिति भवद्वचनम्। अथ विमर्शः केनावरणेनानुपलब्धिः। कारणमत्र वक्तव्यम्। यदि कारणं न विद्यत आत्मार्थस्य हानिः। इत्यसंशयसमम्।

१७. अन्यच्च। आत्मानैन्द्रियकत्वान्नित्य इति भवता प्रतिज्ञातम्। अथ मूलकीलोदकान्यनैन्द्रियकान्यप्यनित्यान्यात्मा तु कथं नित्यः। इति प्रतिदृष्टान्त[सम]म्।

१८. अन्यच्च। सूत्रेषु आत्मनोऽनुपलब्धिरुक्ता तस्मात्तस्य नित्यता ज्ञातेति भवतः [स्थापना]। (परन्तु) नास्त्यात्मा नास्त्यात्मीयमित्यपि सूत्रेषूक्तम्। निर्ग्रन्थधर्मे चात्मानित्यतोक्ता। आत्मनित्यत्वे नियते सति सूत्राणां वैषम्यानुपपत्तिः। इति श्रुतिसमम्।

१९. अन्यच्च। यदि भवता एकमेव सूत्रमधिगच्छतात्मा नित्य इति मन्यते। अथान्येषामपि सूत्राणां प्रतीतेरात्मानित्यो मन्तव्यः। उभयथा प्रतीतिरिति चेदेकस्यैवात्मनो नित्यत्वानित्यत्वप्रसङ्गः। इति श्रुतिभिन्नम्।

२०. अन्यच्च। यदि सद्भावादिति हेतुनात्मास्तीति। अथ शालस्य सद्भावात्ताल उत्पद्यते। यद्यभावान्नास्तीति तदा तालबीजेषु वृक्षाकाराभावात्तदुत्पत्त्यप्राप्तिः। सद्भावेऽनुत्पत्तिः। अभावेऽप्यनुत्पत्तिः। आत्मनोऽपि तथात्वम्।

यदि किंचित्सदेव न तदानैन्द्रियकत्वं हेतुत्वेन प्रयोक्तव्यम्। यदि च सदेव तदा नानैन्द्रियकत्वेन तस्य सत्ता साध्या। इत्यनुत्पत्तिसमम्।

यदि पुनः कश्चिच्छब्दनित्यतां स्थापयेत्, तदैवंविधैरुक्तपूर्वैर्विंशतिधर्मैस्तद्वदेव दूषयेत्।

नन्वात्मसद्भावादेव भवानात्मानं दूषयति। आत्मनोऽभावे किं भवता दूषणीयम्। दूषणाद्ध्यस्ति दूषयितव्यम्।

अत्र दूषणम्। युक्तितो नास्त्यात्मा। भवता तु

तत्सद्भावस्य विकल्पान्मया भवतो दूषणं कृतम्। यद्भवतोक्तं दूषयितव्यभावादस्त्यात्मेति। ततो दूषणान्नास्त्यात्मेति ज्ञातम्। भवत आत्मपरिग्रह आत्माभावद्योतनार्थमिति चेत्तदयुक्तम्। भवदर्थाप्रयोगात्। इदानीन्तु स्वयं भवता मम सिद्धान्तः प्रयुक्तः।

ननु कथं भवता ज्ञातं यन्मया भवदर्थः परिगृहीतः। अत्र कारणं वक्तव्यमिति चेन्मया खलु पूर्वमुक्तम् यत्स्वार्थमपरिगृह्णता भवता परस्थापना परिगृहीता कथमिदानीं पुनरिदं पृच्छ्यते। कथं ज्ञातं यद्भवतोऽर्थो मया परिगृहीत इति। यतो भवद्वचनं विरुद्धं तस्मान्निग्रहस्थानापत्तिः।

अन्यच्च। अनैन्द्रियकत्वात्सन्नेवात्मेति भवता पूर्वं प्रतिज्ञातं पश्चात्तु धर्मबाहुल्येन साधितम्। स्थापितहेतोरनियतत्वात्प्रतिज्ञाविरोधाच्च निग्रहस्थानम्। तस्माद्भवदर्थहानौ यदि पुनरहं किंचिद्ब्रवीमि, [यन्मया] पूर्वमुक्तं तस्मादेतन्न भिद्यते। तदा वचनस्य बहुदोषप्रसङ्गः। पक्षप्रतिपक्षयोः प्रतिपक्षमर्यादा पञ्चमे। तदतिक्रम्योक्तं वचनं दोषः। यदि विद्वान् गम्भीरं न्यायं भावयत्युक्तेन दृष्टान्तेनार्थावगमसमर्थश्च स्यात्तदा तस्य वाद एवंविधं धर्मं नातिक्रामति।

वादी प्राह। एवमुक्तो वादधर्माणां सारः। एष वादसारः सर्ववादानां मूलम्। एतस्माद्वादात्पक्षप्रतिपक्षयोः परमोत्कर्षज्ञानं जायते। यथा बीजे सुक्षेत्र उप्ते मूलाङ्कुराः समृद्धाः। कुक्षेत्रे तूप्ते फलाभाव एव। एतस्य धर्मस्यापि तथात्वम्।

यदि विद्वान् कश्चित् प्रमाणविचारकुशलस्तदा वादानुत्पादयति। मूर्खस्त्वल्पबुद्धिरेतद्वादाभ्यासेनापि तदवगमासमर्थस्तत्त्वतो विद्वान् नोच्यते। तस्माद्ये ये सज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिं शुभाशुभविवेकञ्चेच्छन्ति तैस्तैरेव सद्धर्मवाद आश्रयितव्यः।

॥ इति चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् ॥

समाप्तश्चायं ग्रन्थः।

VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ

BY

NĀGĀRJUNA.

TRANSLATION FROM THE CHINESE AND TIBETAN TEXT.

For the Tibetan I have used both the Narthang edition (Shānti-niketan and Asiatic Society of Bengal copies) and the Peking edition. (Berlin; photos of which were kindly sent me by Prof. Walleser).

VK.—Vigrahavyāvartanī-kārikā, Narth. ed.

VK.B id., Peking ed.

VV. Vyāv. vṛtti. Narth. ed.

VV.B. id., Peking ed.

PART I.

I. If all [*dharmas*] are without essence, *svabhāva*, as words are included in the totality [of the *dharmas*], words must be devoid of essence. How, then, is it possible to refute the essence [of those *dharmas*, since words do not exist ?]

What is the meaning expounded in this stanza ? [Your thesis is the following :] "if every *dharma* is born from causes and conditions, (*hetu—pratyaya*) then, whether they are [derived from] causes and conditions or from the combination of these causes and conditions or from something other than these causes and conditions, in all these cases, they have no essence at all. If it be so, all the *dharmas* are completely void. For example, the sprout does exist neither in the seed, nor in water, nor in heat, nor in wind, nor in space, nor in any other cause and condition. It exists neither in a single cause and condition, nor in the combination of the causes and conditions, nor separately in a condition other than that represented by the causes and the conditions or the combination of the causes and conditions. If in all these cases [the sprout] is absolutely non-existent, it is possible to maintain that the sprout has no essence. If therefore it has no essence at all, then it is possible to say that it is void." [Now] if all *dharmas* are absolutely void, then, words also are non-existent. If words are non-existent, then it is impossible to refute any dharma. If you mean to say that words are not void, but the *dharmas* expressed by words are void, this argument is not valid. What for ? You maintain that all dharmas are void; then, words also must be void. What for ? They do not exist in the cause ; they do not exist in the four material elements, they do not exist in any one of them, or in their combination. They do not exist in any way either in the causes and conditions, or in their combination or in their non-combination. Therefore words are non-existent in the exophagus; nor are they existent in any

Rgya.gar.skad.du. | vi.gra ha. vya.va.rta.ni. vri.tti. |
Bod.skad.du. | rtsod.pa.bzlog.pai. ạgrel.pa.[1] |

gal.te. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyi. |
raṅ.bžin. kun.la. yod.min. na. ||
k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. kyaṅ. raṅ.bžin. med. |
raṅ.bzin. bzlog.par. mi.nus.so. || 1.

gal.te. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. rgyu. daṅ. rkyen. daṅ. | rgyu. daṅ. rkyen.ts'ogs.pa. daṅ. t'a.dad.pa. kun.la. yod. pa.ma.yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. myu. gu. ni. rgyu. sa.bon.du. gyur.pa.la. yaṅ.med. | rkyen. žes. bya.ba. sa. daṅ. c'u. daṅ. me. daṅ. rluṅ. la.sogs.pa. re.re.la. yaṅ. med. | rkyen. ạdus.pa.dag.la. yaṅ. med. | rgyu. daṅ. rkyen.ts'ogs.pa.dag.la. yaṅ.med. | rgyu. daṅ. rkyen.ts'ogs.pa.la. ma.gtogs.pa. t'a.dad.pa.la. yaṅ. med.do. | gaṅ.gi.p'yir. raṅ. bžin. ạdi. de. t'ams.cad.la. yaṅ. med.pa. dei.p'yir. myu.gui. raṅ.bžin. med.do. | de.bas. na. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | ji.ltar. myu.gu. raṅ.bžin.med. | raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.yin. pa. de.bžin.du. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. kyaṅ. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. že.na. | gal.te. de.lta. yin.na.ni. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. | žes.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin.pai. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | de.yaṅ. rgyu. ạbyuṅ.ba. c'en.po.rnams. daṅ. mts'uṅs.par.ldan. pa.rnams. daṅ.ldan.pa.ma.yin.pa.rnams.la. yaṅ. med. | rkyen. braṅ. daṅ. lkog.ma. daṅ. mc'u.daṅ. lce.daṅ. soi.brun. daṅ. rkan. daṅ. sna. daṅ. spyi.bo.la.sogs.pa. daṅ. | ạbad.pa.rnams. la. yaṅ.med. | gñi.ga. ts'ogs.pa.la. ma.gtogs.pa. t'a.dad.pa. yaṅ. med.do. | gaṅ.gi.p'yir. ạdi. t'ams.cad.la. med.pai.p'yir. ạdi. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.yin.te. | raṅ.bžin.med.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | de.lta.bas.na. ạdis. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. bzlog.par.byed. mi.nus.so. | me.med.pas. kyaṅ. sreg.par. mi.nus.la. mts'on. c'a.med.pas. kyaṅ. cad.par. mi.nus.šiṅ. c'u.med.pas. kyaṅ. baṅs.par. mi.nus.pa. | de.bžin.du. ts'ig.med.pas. kyaṅ. dṅos.

[1] Before the beginning of the text, there is the usual invocation to Mañjuśrī Kumārabhūta: ạjam.dpal. gžon.nur.gyur.pa.la. p'yag.ạts'al.lo.

one of the following parts: the lips, the tongue, the root of the teeth, the gum, the nose, the top of the head and so on. They do not exist in the combination of any of the above mentioned parts; they do not exist in two places together. They are only [derived from] causes and conditions and combinations of causes and conditions. Apart from causes and conditions and their combination there is no other dharma. If this be the case, all words have no essence. If, therefore, the essence of words is non-existent, then it is possible to say that **all** *dharmas* have no essence.

But if all words have no essence, then, there is only the mere name of the refutation of the *dharmas*; but as a matter of fact it is impossible to refute the *dharmas*, just as if there be no fire it is impossible to burn, if there be no sword it is impossible to cut, and again if there be no water it is impossible to become moist.

Therefore, if words are non-existent, how is it possible to refute the essence of the dharmas? When it is impossible to refute the essence of the dharmas, if someone is of the opinion that it is possible to refute the essence of the dharmas, the argument of such an opponent is not right.

Again there is another argument. The stanza says:

II. If words have an essence [of their own], then, the proposition (*pratijñā*) which has been before established is annulled; thus there is a logical error (*i.e.*, *pratijñāhāni*). Then it is necessary to expound a different reason.

If [in order to avoid this objection] you affirm that words have an essence of their own, then the proposition that you have before established, is thereby annulled. Then this is a logical error; and, if this be the case, it is necessary to expound a different reason. If, in your opinion, words possess an essence of their own, but all the other *dharmas* are void, then, the proposition "**all** *dharmas are void*," contains a contradiction. Your thesis is also annulled.

Again there is another argument; *viz.*, words are not excluded from the totality of the dharmas. If therefore all

pas. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. bzlog.par.byed. mi.nus.pas. | de. la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. bkag.go. žes. smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. |

'on.te. ts'ig. de. raṅ.bžin. bcas. |
k'yod.kyi. dam.bcas. sṅa.ma. ñams. ||
mi. ạdra. ñid. de.de. yin. na. |
gtan.ts'igs. k'yad.par. brjod.par. byos. ||[1] 2.

'on.te. skyon. der. gyur.na. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. sñam.nas ṅai.ts'ig. de. ni. raṅ.bžin. daṅ. bcas.pa.yin.te. | dei.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.ma. yin.no. de.bas.na. ạdis. ni. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. bkag.go. sñam.du.sems.na. | 'on.de.ltar. yin.na.ni. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. žes. sṅar.dam.bcas.pa. gaṅ. yin.par. ñams.pa.yin.no. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. | t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. ni. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. kyaṅ. ạdus.pa.yin. na. | cii.p'yir. že.na.[2] | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin. bžin.du. ạdi.ltar. stoṅ.pa. ñid. ma.yin.pai.p'yir. des. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. bkag.go. žes.bya.bai. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. stoṅ. pa. ma.yin.par.ạgyur. | de.lta.na.ni. smras.pa. mu.drug.tu. t'al.bar. ạgyur.ro. | de.yaṅ. ji.lta.bu. že.na. | 'on. kyaṅ. gal.te. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. že.na. | k'yod.kyi. ts'igs. kyaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. | t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. ạdus. pai.p'yir.la. | stoṅ.pai. p'yir. des.ni. dgag.pa.mi.ạt'ad.pas. de.la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | žes.dgag.pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ạt'ad.pa.ma yin.no. | gal.te. ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.no. že.na. | dṅos. po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. žes.bkag.pas. des. na. k'yod. kyi. ts'ig. kyaṅ. stoṅ. pa.yin.la. | stoṅ.pa.ñid. yin.pai.[3]p'yir. des. ạgog.pa. mi.ạt'ad.do. | gal.te. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa. yin.na. | gaṅ.gi. ạgog.par.byed.pa. | k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. ni. stoṅ.pa. ma.yin.no. že.na. | des.na. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. ma.bsdus.pa.yin.te. | de.la. ạgal.bai. dper.ạgyur.ro. | gal.te. t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. bsdus.so. že.na. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin.pas. des.na. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. | dei.p'yir. ạdis ạgog.pa.med.do. | gal.te. stoṅ.pa.yin. yaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes. ạdis. ạgog.pa. yod. do. že.na. des.na. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa. yin. yaṅ. bya.ba.byed. nus.par. ạgyur.te. | de.ni. ạdod.

[1] VK. *d*) k'yad.par. gtan.ts'igs. brjod.par.gyis.
[2] VV.B : že.na *deest.*
[3] VV : dei.

dharmas, [as you say], are void, words also are void, [because words are included in the totality of the dharmas]. Now if words are void, they cannot refute any dharma. If this be so, then, we may contest the validity of [your] argument in six ways. Which are, then, these wrong points maintained by you? You affirm that all dharmas are void; then words also are void. What for? Because words also are included in the totality of dharmas. But if words are void, they cannot refute the dharmas. If that [opponent, who believes in the void,] refutes [the essence of the dharmas], and says that all dharmas are void, then his [argument] is not valid. Again, if it is true that the essence of all dharmas can be refuted by words, it follows that all dharmas are void, but words are not void. If words are not void [your] refutation of **all** dharmas is not valid. If dharmas are void, but words are not void, what [object] can be refuted by words? Again if words are included in all [things], the example is not in accordance [with your thesis]. If, [in fact], you affirm that words [are included in] all [things], words also must be void, as all [things] are void. If words are void, then, they cannot refute. If words are void, and dharmas also are void, and it is possible to refute the [essence of the] dharmas with void (words), in order to show that they are void, thus the void also would become a cause. But this is absurd. If you are afraid that the example is not in accordance [with your thesis], [and so you maintain that] the void of dharmas can[not] become a cause, if it be so, words, being void, cannot refute the essence of anything. Again there is a further argument, that is there is the error of considering only a part of the *dharmas*; because there would be some dharmas void and some dharmas non-void. If there is such an error, it is necessary to expound a different reason. If the dharmas are partly void and partly non-void, then, when you say that all dharmas are void and without an essence of their own, the argument is not valid. Again there is another argument.

III. If you say: "[we employ words to refute the essence of the dharmas, just as a man says to another man:] do not make any sound," then, this argument is not valid. If sound is itself existent, it can prevent

pa.ma.yin.no. | gal.te. ạgal.bai. dper.gyur.nas. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | sñam.nas. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. | bya. ba.byed. mi.nus.so. že.na. | k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. stoṅ.pas. kyaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyi. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.par. mi.ạt'ad.do. | ji.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. | de.skad. zer.na. ni. k'a.cig.ni.stoṅ.k'a.cig.ni. mi.stoṅ. ṅo.žes mi.ạdra.ba.ñid.du. t'al.bar.ạgyur.ro. | mi.ạdra.ba. ñid.yin.na. ni. gaṅ.gis. na.k'a. cig. ni. stoṅ. k'a.cig. ni. mi. stoṅ par. gyur.pai. gtan.ts'igs.kyi. k'yad.par. yaṅ. smros. šig. | gtan.ts'igs. de. yaṅ. mi.bstan.pas. de.la. dṅos.po.t'ams. cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.'o. | žes.smras. pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de.mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

de. sgra. ma.ạbyin. lta.bu.'o. žes. |
k'yod. blo.sems. na. de. mi.ạt'ad. ||
ạdi.la. sgra.ni. yod. pa.yis. |
ạbyuṅ.bar. ạgyur.ba. de. bzlog.yin. || 3

dper.na. k'a.cig. na. re. sgra. ma.ạbyin. cig. ces. bdag.ñid. sgra.ạbyin.pa. na. sgra.des. sgra.de. bzlog.par. byed.do. | de.bžin.du. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa. žes. stoṅ.pai. raṅ.bžin.gyi. ts'ig.gis. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. bzlog.par.byed.do. | ạdir. smras.pa. | de.yaṅ. ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.te. | ạdi.la. sgra. yod.pas. sgra. ạbyuṅ.bar. ạgyur.ba. ạgog. par. byed.pa.yin.gyi. | ạdir. k'yod. kyi. yod.pai. ts'ig.gis. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.par. mi.byed.do. | k'yed.kyi. lugs.kyi. ts'ig. kyaṅ. yod.pa.ma.yin. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. kyi. raṅ.bžin. ' yaṅ. yod.pa.ma.yin.pas. dei. p'yir. sgra. ma.ạbyin. žes.pa.lta.bu'.o. žes.bya.ba. ạdi. ni. mi.mt'un.par. smras.pa.yin.no. |

ạgog.pai. ạgog.pa.'ṅ. de.lta. žes. |
ạdod.na. de. yaṅ. bzaṅ.min.te. ||
de.lta.na. yaṅ. k'yod. dam.bcas. |
mts'an.ñid. skyon. yod. ṅed. la. med. || [1] 4

k'yod.kyi. blo.la. rnam.pa. ạdi.ñid.kyis. ạgog. pai. agog.pa. yaṅ. mi.ạt'ad.do. | de.la. k'yod.kyis. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.pai. ts'ig. ạgog.par.byed.pai.ts'ig. gaṅ. yin. pa.de. yaṅ. mi.ạt'ad.do. sñam.du.sems.na. | ạdir. smra.bar.

[1] VK. *c* and *d*: k'yod.kyi. dam.bca'i. mts'an.ñid. las. | de.ltar. skyon. yod. ṅed.la. med.

another sound, [from being uttered]; if sound is non-existent, how can it prevent another sound [from being uttered]?

Your system states that sound can prevent [litt. refutes] sound, [from being uttered]. *E.g.*, when a man says to another man: "do not make any sound," he himself makes a sound, and at the same time he prevents (litt. refutes) [that particular] sound from being uttered; just in the same way, words also, although void, can refute the existence of the dharmas which are equally void. Now I say that this argument also is not valid. What for? If sound is existent, it can prevent (litt. refute) another sound, [from being uttered]; but, according to you, words are non-existent, and so they cannot refute the essence of the dharmas. In fact, according to your thesis, words are non-existent and dharmas also are non-existent. If this be the case, when you say: "*E.g.*, if a man says to another man: 'do not make any sound,' etc.," these words contain a mistake.

IV. If you say: "the refutation of the refutation (as expounded by you), is not valid, then, if it be so, your thesis is self-contradictory, but no mistake is in my [words]."

If you say: "it is wrong to say a refutation of the refutation is of such a nature as it has been described by you; because, if you say that my words can refute the essence of the dharmas, this [affirmation] is not exact." [In reply to this] I say: "this argument is not valid. What for? Because it is evident that these peculiar aspects of your thesis represent your own error, but not mine. [Now] you say that all dharmas are void; thus the previous thesis, in which you have stated your view is wrong; while no error can be found in my words. Therefore if you say that the refutation of the refutation [as expounded by me] is not exact, such an argument is not valid. Again there is another argument:

V. If direct perception is existent [in itself] how would it be possible for you to argue against [th

bya.ste. | de.yaṅ. bzaṅ.po. ma.yin.te. | de.cii. p'yir. že.na. | k'yod.la. ni. dam.bcas.pai. mts.'an.ñid.kyis. ạt'ob.kyi. | med.la. ni. med.pas. de.la. de.lta. yin.na. ni. ạgog.pai. ạgog.pa.yaṅ. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin. no. | žes. smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi. ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

re.žig. dṅos.rnams. mṅon.sum.gyis. |
dmigs.nas. bzlog.par. byed.yin. na. ||
gaṅ.gis. dṅos.rnams. dmigs.ạgyur.ba. |
mṅon.sum. de.ni. med.pa.yin. ||[1] 5

gal.te. k'yod. kyis. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. mṅon.sum.gyis. dmigs.nas. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes. bzlog. par.byed. na. ni. ruṅ.ṅo. | de. yaṅ. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.te. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. mṅon.[2] sum. gyi. ts'ad. ma. yaṅ.ạdus.pai. p'yir. stoṅ.pa. yin.la. | dṅos.po.la. dmigs.par.byed. pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin. | dei. p'yir. ts'ad.mas. dmigs.pa.med. do. | mi.dmigs.pa. ạgog.pa. yaṅ. mi.ạt'ad.pas. de.la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ạt'ad. pa.ma.yin.no. | 'on.te. k'yod.kyi. blo.la. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. luṅ. daṅ. dpes.ạjal.bas. dmigs.nas. dṅos. po. ạdi. t'ams.cad. bzlog.par.byed.do. sñam.du. sems.na. ạdir. smra. bar.bya.ste. |

rjes.dpag. luṅ. daṅ. dpes.ạjal. daṅ. |
rjes.dpag. luṅ.gi. sgrub.bya. daṅ. ||
dpes. sgrub.bya.bai. don. gaṅ.yin. |
mṅon.sum.gyis. ni. lan.btab.pa. ||[3] 6

rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes.ạjal.ba. daṅ. | luṅ yaṅ. mṅon.sum. gyi. ts'ad.mas. lan.btab.pa.yin.te. | ạdi.ltar. mṅon.sum. gyi. ts'ad.ma. ni. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.

[1] In *b*) xyl. has: byed.min.na. but afterwards, p. 37, it has: yin.
VK. *a*,*b*) re.žig. gal.te. mṅon. sum.gyi. |
dṅos. rnams. dmigs. nas. bzlog. byed. pa. ||
[2] VV. B. mi. mṅon.
[3] VK.
(*a*) ñer.ạjal.daṅ.
(*b*) luṅ.gis.bsgrub.
(*c*) dṅos.bsgrub.bya.bai. don.gaṅ.yin.

essence of the dharmas]? If, [on the other hand], direct perception also is non-existent, how, then, is it possible to take up the refutation?

If the *dharmas* were perceived through direct perception, you could argue against me [and maintain] that all dharmas are void. But as a matter of fact it is not so. How do I know this? That means of knowledge, which is called direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), is included in the totality of the dharmas and therefore, according to your assumption, must be void. If you suppose that the inference (*anumāna*) is based upon the direct perception, then direct perception, as well as inference must be void, so that in fact there is neither direct perception nor inference. How, then, is it possible to perceive or to infer? But if these two means of knowledge are non-existent, how is it possible to refute? Therefore, when you say all dharmas are void, your argument [based upon the logical pramāṇas, is self-contradictory and therefore] invalid. Suppose now that you say: "the dharmas are proved either by inference or analogy or authority and therefore the dharmas have an essence [attributed to them]; thus we can argue against this [theory, and show that these dharmas are non-existent]," to such an argument I now reply.

VI. It is taught that the four means of knowledge are: (*a*) direct perception, (*b*) inference, (*c*) authority, (*d*) analogy. If direct perception, inference and authority prove, analogy also can prove.

Inference, analogy, authority and direct perception are the four pramāṇas. If direct perception can prove, then inference and authority also can prove. But as all dharmas are absolutely void, so direct perception also must be void, [because the four pramāṇas are included in the totality of dharmas which, as you maintain, are void]. Inference and analogy also must be void, [as they depend upon direct perception]: [moreover] the dharmas which are proved by these means of knowledge (*prameya*) are void. Since the pramāṇas are also included in the totality of all things, what dharma can

ñid.yin.pai.p'yir.ro. | de.bžin.du. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. | dpes. ạjal.ba. daṅ. | luṅ. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. | dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.ñid.yin.pai.p'yir.ro. rjes.su.dpag.pas. bsgrub.par.bya. bai. don. daṅ. | luṅ.gyis. bsgrub.par.bya.ba. daṅ. | dpes. bsgrub.par.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin.pa. de.dag. kyaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.te. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir.ro. | rjes.su.dpag. pa. daṅ. luṅ.daṅ. dpes.ạjal.ba.dag.gis. dṅos.po.rnams.la. dmigs. par.byed.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.ñid.yin.te. | dei. p'yir. dṅos.po.rnams. dmigs.pa.med.do. | mi.dmigs.pai. raṅ. bžin.ạgog.pa.mi.ạt'ad.pas. de.la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ. pa.'o. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

skye.bo.c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs.mk'as. |
dge.ba.dag.gi. c'os.rnams.la. ||
dge.bai. raṅ.bžin. yin.par.ni. |
sems.šiṅ. lhag. ma. rnams.[1] la. yaṅ. || 7

ạdi.la. skye.[2] bo. c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs.la. mk'as.pa. rnams. ni. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.la. brgya.rtsa.bcu. dgu.sems.te. | ạdi. lta.ste. | rnam.par.šes.pa.daṅ. ts'or.ba.daṅ. ạdu.šes.daṅ. sems. dpa'. daṅ. reg.pa. daṅ. yid.la.byed.pa.daṅ. ạdun.pa. daṅ. mos.pa. daṅ. brtson.ạgrus. daṅ. dran.pa. daṅ. tiṅ.ṅe.ạdsin. daṅ. šes.rab.daṅ. gtaṅ.sñoms. daṅ. sbyor.ba. daṅ. yaṅ.dag.par. sbyor.ba. daṅ. t'ob.pa. daṅ. lhag.pai.bsam.pa.daṅ. k'oṅ.k'ro. ba. med. pa. daṅ, dga'.ba. daṅ. ạbad.pa. daṅ. rtsol.ba. daṅ. rmoṅs.ạbrel. daṅ. spros.pa.daṅ. gnod.pa.med.pa. daṅ. dbaṅ. daṅ..ldan.pa. daṅ. k'oṅ.k'ro. daṅ. yid.la.gcags.pa.med.pa. daṅ. ạdsin.pa. daṅ. mi.ạdsin.pa. daṅ. dran.pa.daṅ. brtan.pa. daṅ. lhag.par. žen.pa. daṅ. rmoṅs.pa.med.pa. daṅ. mi.rtsol.ba. daṅ. spro.ba.med.pa. daṅ. don.du. gñer.pa. daṅ. smon.lam. daṅ. rgyags.pa. daṅ. yul.daṅ.mi.ldan.pa. daṅ. ṅes.par.ạbyin.pa. ma.yin.pa. daṅ. skye.ba. daṅ. gnas.pa. daṅ. mi.rtag.pa. daṅ. dga'.ba. daṅ. ldan.pa. daṅ. yoṅs.su.gduṅ ba. daṅ. mi.dga.' pa. daṅ. rtog.pa. daṅ. sdug.pa. daṅ. daṅ.ba. daṅ. ạdod.pa. mi.mt'un pa. daṅ. mt'un.par.ạdsin.pa. daṅ. rjes.su.mi.mt'un. par.gzuṅ.ba. daṅ. mi.ạjigs.pa. daṅ. že.sa. daṅ. ri.mor.byed.pa. daṅ dad.pa. daṅ. ma.dad.pa. daṅ. bsgo.ba.bžin.byed.pa. daṅ.

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[1] VK.B: daṅ. [2] VV. skyes. bo.

they reach? If you maintain that inference proves, then you must admit that analogy and authority also prove. But the dharmas that they prove are void, because, according to you, the dharmas which are knowable through the three pramāṇas: inference, analogy, and authority, are void. If it be so, the dharmas cannot be demonstrated and the knowable as well as the means of knowledge must be non-existent; therefore no refutation is possible. Thus, if you say that all dharmas are void, the argument is not valid. Again there is another argument:

VII. The wise man who knows the dharmas says that the good dharmas have an essence; the man of the world also knows that they have an essence. As regards other dharmas, the same thing must be understood.

The Master of the law has explained the good dharmas. The good dharmas are 119 and they have mind (*citta*) as their own characteristic (they are:) (1) sensation, (2) ideation, (3) intelligence, (4) contact, (5) enquiry, (6) desire, (7) faith in liberation, (8) energy, (9) memory, (10) concentration (*samādhi*) (11) knowledge, (12) unattachment, (13) cultivation, (14) combined cultivation, (15) practice, (16) attainment, (17) perfection (18) talent, (19) agreement, (20) diligence, (21) cogitation, (22) search, (23) power, (24) absence of jealousy, (25) self-control, (26) good talent, (27) absence of regret, (28) regret, (29) limited desires, (30) unlimited desires, (31) attachment, (32) non-cogitation (33) non-search, (34) non-wish, (35) pleasant speech, (36) unattachment to objects, (37) inaction, (38) birth, (39) duration (40) destruction, (41) combination, (42) old age, (43) affliction (44) depression, (45) doubt, (46) reflective ponderation, (47) affection, (48) faith, (49) happiness, (50) indocility, (51) docile acceptance, (52) fearlessness before a great assembly, (53) respectfulness, (54) performance of the supreme law, (55) reverence, (56) irreverence, (57) adoration (litt. offerings), (58) non-adoration (59) durable docility, (60) slumber, (61) excitement, (62) unhappiness (63) covering, (64) unsteadiness, (65) sadness, (66) to search and not to obtain, (67) bewilderment, (68) negligence, (69) anxiety, (70) search for purity, (71) inner faith, (72) fear, (73) faith, (74) shamefulness, (75) sincerity of nature, (76) undeceitful

gus. pa. daṅ. ma.gus.pa. daṅ. rgol.ba.daṅ. šin.tu.sbyaṅs. pa. daṅ. ṅag. daṅ. mgul.pa.daṅ. grub.pa. daṅ. ma.dad.pa.daṅ. šin.tu. ma.sbyaṅs.pa.daṅ. rnam.par.byed.pa.daṅ. brtan.pa. daṅ. ṅes. pa. daṅ. yid.la.gcags.pa.daṅ. mya.ṅan. daṅ. ạk'rug.pa. daṅ. rgyags.pa. daṅ. mi.mt'un.par.ạdsin.pa. daṅ. t'e.ts'om. daṅ. sdom. pa. yoṅs.su.dag.pa. daṅ. naṅ.legs. par. daṅ.pa. daṅ. ạjigs.pai. p'yogs.gcig.daṅ. dad.pa. daṅ. ṅo.ts'a.šes.pa. daṅ. gnam.pa. daṅ. mi.ạdrid.pa. daṅ. ñe.bar.ži.ba. daṅ. rtags.bag. ma.yin.pa. daṅ. bag.yod.pa. daṅ. byams.par.lta.ba. daṅ. so.sor.brtags.pa. daṅ. yid.byuṅ.ba. daṅ. yoṅs.su.gduṅ.ba.med.pa. daṅ. rgyags. pa.med.pa. daṅ. c'ags.pa.med.pa. daṅ. že.sdaṅ.med.pa. daṅ. gti. mug.med.pa. daṅ. t'ams.cad. šes. pa.ñid. daṅ. mi.gtoṅ ba. daṅ. ạbyor.pa.daṅ. k'rel.yod.pa. daṅ. mi.ạc'ab.pa. daṅ. sñiṅ.rje. daṅ. sems.pa.mi.gtoṅ.ba. daṅ. byams.pa. daṅ. žum.pa.med.pa. daṅ. dgra.bral.ba. daṅ. rdsu.ạp'rul. daṅ. k'on.du.mi.ạdsin.pa. daṅ. p'rag.dog.med.pa. daṅ. sems.yoṅs.su.gtugs.pa.med.pa. daṅ. bzod.pa. daṅ. rnam.par.spoṅ.ba. daṅ. ṅes.pa.ma.yin.pa. daṅ. yoṅs.su.loṅs.spyod.pai.rjes.su.mt'un.pa. daṅ. bsod.nams.daṅ. ạdu.šes.pai. sñoms par.ạjug.pa. daṅ. ṅes.par.ạbyuṅ.ba.ñid. daṅ. t'ams.cad. mi.šes.pa. ñid.daṅ. ạdus.ma.byas.pai.c'os. so.žes.de. ltar. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.la.dge.bai. raṅ.bžin.brgya.rtsa.bcu. dgu. daṅ. de.bžin.du.mi.dge.bai. c'os.rnams.la. mi. dge.bai. raṅ. bžin.daṅ. bsgribs.la.luṅ.du. ma.bstan.pa.rnams.la. bsgribs.la. luṅ.du.ma. bstan.pai. raṅ.bžin.daṅ. ma.bsgribs. la. luṅ.du. ma. bstan. pa.rnams.la. ma.bsgribs.la. luṅ.du. ma.bstan. pai. raṅ.bžin. daṅ. ạdod.par.gsuṅs.pa.rnams.la. ạdod.par. gsuṅs.pa. daṅ .gzugs. su.gsuṅs.pa.rnams.la. gzugs.su.gsuṅs.pa. daṅ. gzugs.med.par-gsuṅs.pa.rnams.la gzugs.med.par.gsuṅs.pa. daṅ. zag.pa.med. pa.rnams.la.zag.pa.med.pa. daṅ. sdug.bsṅal. daṅ. kun. ạbyuṅ. ba. daṅ. ạgog.pa. daṅ. lam.žes.bya.ba. rnams.la. sdug. bsṅal. daṅ. kun.ạbyuṅ.ba. daṅ. ạgog.pa. daṅ. lam.žes.bya. bai.raṅ. bžin. daṅ. bsgom.pas. spaṅ.bar.bya.ba.rnams.la. bsgom. pas.spaṅ.bar. bya.ba. daṅ. spaṅ.bar.bya.ba. ma.yin.pa.rnams.la. spaṅ.bar.bya.ba.ma.yin. pai. raṅ, bžin.du. sems.te. | dei.p'yir. de.ltar.na.rnam.pa.du.mai. c'os. kyi. raṅ.bžin. mt'oṅ.bas. de.bas. na. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ste. | raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ñid. yiṅ. pai.p'yir.stoṅ.pa.'o žes.smras. pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

ness, (77) quiescence, (78) fearlessness, (79) avoidance of mistake, (80) mildness, (81) understanding, (82) want of suspicion, (83) burning, (84) quietness, (85) uncovetousness, (86) absence of anger, (87) absence of foolishness, (88) incomplete knowledge, (89) liberality, (90) non-existence, (91) sense of shame, (92) non-denial of one's own wickedness, (93) compassion, (94) joy, (95) unattachment, (96) divine penetration, (97) unacceptance, (98) absence of envy, (99) purity of heart, (100) tolerance of insults, (101) profit, (102) usefulness, (103) merit, (104) unsteadiness of ideas, (105) incomplete knowledge, (106) meditation on the impermanence, (107)...

Thus there are 119 good dharmas. In the same way there are the bad dharmas (*a-kuśala*) and there is the essence of the bad dharmas, the undefined dharmas (*a-vyākṛta*) and [the essence of the] undefined dharmas, the undefined dharmas in their own nature, and [the essence of the] dharmas undefined in their own nature, the *kāmaloka* and [the essence of the] *kāmaloka*, the *rūpaloka* and [the essence of the] *rūpaloka* the *arūpaloka*, and [the essence of the] *arūpaloka*, the undefiled (*anāśrava*) dharmas and [the essence of the] undefiled dharmas, sorrow, origin of sorrow, destruction of sorrow, path and [the essence of] sorrow, origin of sorrow, destruction of sorrow, origin of sorrow, and path, mystic practices, and [the essence] of mystic practices. Thus it is evident that there is an infinite number of dharmas which have their own essence. Therefore, when you maintain that all dharmas are without any essence of their own, and that this absence of any essence can be called voidness, this argument of yours is not valid.

VIII. This is the teaching of the holy man: the *nairyāṇika* dharmas, [and] the essence of the *nairyāṇika* dharmas; thus also [as regards] the *anairyāṇika* dharmas [and] the essence of the *anairyāṇika* dharmas.

Just as it has been taught that the nairyāṇika dharmas and the essence of the nairyāṇika dharmas [exist], so it has also been taught that the anairyāṇika dharmas and the essence of the anairyāṇika dharmas [exist]; the same must also be understood as regards the other dharmas, such as the bodhyaṅgas and the es-

ṅes.ạbyin.la. sogs. rnams.kyi.c'os. |
gnas.skabs.gsuṅs.pa. de. rṅams.la. ||
ṅes.ạbyin. raṅ.bžin.c'os.rnams. daṅ. |
ṅes.abyin.min. gaṅ. ts'ul. de. bžin. ||[1] 8.

ạdi.la. ṅes.par.ạbyin.pai. c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs. gsuṅs.pa. rnams. la. ṅes.par.ạbyin.pai. raṅ.bžin. daṅ. ṅes.par.ạbyin.pa. ma.yin.pa.rnams.la. ṅes.par.ạbyin.pa.ma.yin.pai. raṅ.bžin. daṅ. | byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. yan.lag. daṅ.ldan.pa.rnams. la. byaṅ. c'ub.kyi. yan.lag.daṅ. ldan.pa. daṅ. | byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. yan.lag.daṅ. mi.ldan.pa.rnams.la. byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. yan.lag.daṅ.mi.ldan.pa. daṅ. | byaṅ.c'ub. kyi.p'yogs.daṅ.ldan.pa.rnams.la. byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. p'yogs.daṅ.ldan.pa. daṅ | byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. p'yogs. daṅ.mi. ldan.pa.rnams.la. byaṅ.c'ub.kyi. p'yogs.daṅ.mi.ldan.pa.rnams.la byaṅ.c'ub.kyi.p'yogs. daṅ.mi.ldan. pa. daṅ. | lhag.ma.rnams. la. yaṅ. de.bžin.te. | dei.p'yir. de.ltar rnam.pa.du.mai. c'os. rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. mt'oṅ.ba. | dei.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ste. | de.bas. na. stoṅ.pa. 'o. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

gal.te. c'os.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med. |
raṅ.bžin.med. ces.bya.bai. miṅ. ||
miṅ. yaṅ. de. bžin.med. ạgyur.ñid. |
gži.med. miṅ. ni. med.p'yir.ro. ||[2] 9

gal.te. c'os. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. yin.na. de.la. yaṅ. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. yin.no. | de.la. raṅ.bžin.med.do. | žes.bya.bai. miṅ. yaṅ. de.bžin.du. med.par.ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | gži.med.pai. miṅ. ni. ạga'.yaṅ.med.pai.p'yir.ro. | de.bas. na. miṅ srid.[3] pai.p'yir. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin.yod.do. | raṅ.bžin.yod.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.ma.yin.no. | de.bas. c'os. t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin. |

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[1] VK:

gaṅ.dag. ṅes.par. ạbyin.pai. c'os. |
c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs. gsuṅs.de rnams. ||
ṅes.par.ạbyin.pai. raṅ.bžin.ñid. |
raṅ.bžin. ṅes.ạbyin. min.la.sogs. ||

[2] VK.B: in *a*) c'os. rnams. raṅ. *b*) VV. has: bya.bai.miṅ.; but VK. has: bya.ba.yi. which seems to be the right reading.

c) VK. ạgyur.te.

[3] VV. mi.srid. which is evidently a mistake.

sence of the bodhyaṅgas, the bodhipakṣas and the essence of the bodhipakṣas, the abodhipakṣas and the essence of the abodhipakṣas. If it be so, it is evident that the infinite variety of all dharmas have an essence. Thus if you maintain that all the dharmas have no essence and therefore, since they have no essence, they are called void, this view is not valid. Again there is another argument:

IX. If the dharmashave no essence, then, whatever is without essence cannot have a name, since only that which has an essence has a name. How can a mere name be named?

If all dharmas have no essence, then, when we say: 'non-essence, these words also must be non-existent. What for? Because when the object exists, the name [that specifies it] also exists; when [on the other hand], the object is non-existent, no name exists [to specify it]. But since all dharmas have a name, we must acknowledge that all dharmas have an essence. Therefore, since the dharmas have an essence, it is not possible to say that all dharmas are void. Thus when you say that all dharmas have no essence, the argument is not valid.

X. If the name exists separately from the dharma, [then] it does not exist in that dharma. [If somebody] says that the name exists separately from the dharma, the arguments of that man must be refuted.

If you mean to say "the dharma is existent, and the name [also] is existent, and the name exists separately from the dharma; [but since] it is demonstrated that all dharmas are void and without essence, [then] our theory is that there is no name without an object, but (only) if there is an object there is the name." If it be so, who can say that a name or a letter can exist separately from the essence of the dharmas? If the name exists [as separated from the *dharma*], and the dharma exists separately [from the name] then the first cannot express [the notion of that dharma] and the second cannot be expressed [by the name]. Thus when you imagine within your mind that the dharmas are separated

med.pa.ste. | raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.'o. | žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. rigs.pa.ma.yin.no. |

'on.te. ạdi.ltar. raṅ.bžin.yod. |
de.ni. c'os.la. med. ce. na. ||
c'os.rnams. med.pai. raṅ.bžin.te. |
gaṅ.gi. yin.pa. de. bstan.rigs. || [1] 10

'on.te. gži.med.pai. miṅ.du. gyur.na. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | sñam.nas. raṅ.bžin. ni. yod.la. | de. yaṅ. c'os. t'ams.cad.la ni. mi.srid.do | de.ltar. na. c'os.rnams.la. raṅ.bžin.med.pai.p'yir. c'os.ni. stoṅ.par.ạgrub.par. ạgyur.la. | miṅ. gži.med.pa. yaṅ. ma.yin.no. sñam.du. sems.na. | ạdir. smra.bar.bya.ste. | de.lta. yin.na. raṅ.bžin. de. c'os.la. ma.gtogs.pai.don. gaṅ.yin.pai. don.de. bstan.pai.rigs.so. | de. yaṅ. ma.bstan.pas. dei.p'yir. raṅ.bžin.ni. yod.la. | de. yaṅ. c'os.rnams. ni. med.do. | žes.rtog.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ñams.so. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

gaṅ.p'yir. k'yim.na. bum.pa.de. |
med. ces. yod.pa.ñid.la. ạgog. ||
mt'oṅ.ste. dei. p'yir. k'yod. kyis.ạdi. |
yod.pai. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.pa.yin. || [2] 11

ạdi.la. don.yod.pa.la. ạgog.par.byed.kyi. | med.pa.la. ni. ma.yin.te. | dper.na. k'yim. na. bum.pa.med. ces.bya.ba. lta.bu.ste. | bum.pa. yod.pa.la. ạgog.pa.yin.gyi. | med.pa.la. ni. ma.yin.no. | de.bžin.du. c'os.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.do žes.bya.ba. yaṅ. raṅ.bžin.yod.pa.la. ạgog.par. ạgyur.ba. yin.gyi. med.pa.la. ni. ma.yin.pas. | de.la. c'os. t'ams.cad. kyi. raṅ bžin.med.do. žes.smras.pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. | ạgog.pa.yod.pa.ñid.kyi.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin.rab.tu.grub.pa.yin.no. |

ji.ltar. raṅ.[3] bžin. de. med.na. |
k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. des. ci.žig. dgag. ||

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[1] VK. 'on.te. raṅ.bžin. yod.med.kyi. |
de. ni. c'os.rnams.la. med.na. ||
dei.p'yir. c'os.rnams. spaṅs. pa.yi. |
raṅ.bžin. gaṅ. de. bstan.par.rigs. ||
But at.pag., 63 xyl.reads in *c*) med.par. in *d*.) yin.par.de.

[2] VK. *a*) bum.pa.med. *b*) ces.byai. ạgog.pa. yod.ñid.la. *c*) mt'oṅ.ba. de. p'yir. k'yod.kyi.yaṅ. *d*) ạgog.ạdi. yod.la. de.bžin. yin. VK.B. *d*) raṅ.bžin. yin.

[3] VV.B. de.

[from the name] and the name is separated [from the dharmas] this argument is not valid. Again there is another argument.

XI. If the dharmas have an essence, it is possible to argue against [the existence] of the dharmas. If the dharmas have no essence, what is there to be argued against? *E.g.* if there is a pot and clay it is possible to argue against [the essence] of the pot and clay. In fact, when we perceive that an object is existent we can argue against [its existence]. But if we do not perceive any object, we cannot argue against [its existence].

Objects that are existent can be argued against; non-existent objects cannot be argued against. *E.g.* if a pot or clay were non-existent, then it would be impossible to argue against their existence. If the pot is existent, it is possible to argue against it; but, if the pot is non-existent, it is not possible to argue against it. Just in the same way, if the dharmas have no essence, they cannot be argued against; but only if the dharmas have an essence, it is possible to argue against them. How can a non-existent object be refuted? If you maintain that all dharmas are without essence, and yet they can be refuted, then your words: "all dharmas have no essence," contain a mistake. What in fact would you have to refute If the refutation has any essence [in itself], [only then], you can refute the essence of all dharmas.

XII. If the dharmas have no essence, what can be refuted by [your] words? If there is no dharma that possible to refute, [then] even without words [one] could refute.

If you, maintain that the dharmas have no essence, th words also must be without essence; then how could you arg against [the essence of the dharmas] and say that all dharm are without essence? If such a refutation [is valid], then would be possible also to refute the essence of the dharm without uttering a word. But if it be so, you should comm the same mistake [of one who maintains that] fire is co water is solid, etc. Again there is another argument:

med.pa.yin.na. ts'ig.med.par. |
ạgog.par. rab.tu.grub.pa. yin. || [1] 12

ji.ste. raṅ.bžin. de. med.pa.ñid.yin.na. | dṅos. po.t'ams. cad. med.do. žes.bya.bai. ts'ig.ạdis. k'yod.kyi. ci.žig. ạgog.par.byed. | ạdi.ltar. med.pa.la. ni. t'sig.med.par. yaṅ. ạgog.pa. ạgrub.ste. | ji.ltar. me.la. graṅ.ba.ñid. daṅ. c'u.la. ts'a.ba. ñid. lta.bu.'o. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

byis.pa. rnams.ni. smig.rgyu.la. |
ji.ltar. log.par. c'ur.ạdsin.ltar. ||
de.bžin. k'yod.kyis. log.par. ạdsin. |
yod.pa.min.la. ạgog.par.bya. || [2] 13

k'yod.kyi. blo.la. ji.ltar. byis.pa.rnams. smig. rgyu.la. log.par. c'ur.ạdsin.pa. na.[3] de.ni. skyes.bu. mk'as.pai. raṅ.bžin. can.gyis. ạdsin.pa. de. bzlog.pai.p'yir. de. na. c'u.med.kyi. | de. ni. smig.rgyu.'o. žes.zer.ba. de.bžin.du. raṅ.bžin.pa.med. pa.rnams.la. sems.can.rnams.kyis. raṅ.bžin.du. ạdsin.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. bzlog.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.'o. | žes.bya.'o. sñam.du. sems.na. | ạdir. smra.bar. bya.ste. |

de.lta.na. ni. ạdsin.pa. daṅ. |
gzuṅ. daṅ. ạdsin.pa.po. de. daṅ. ||
ạgog.daṅ. dgag.bya. ạgog.pa.po. |
de. drug. yod.pa. ma.yin. nam. || [4] 14

gal.te. de.lta.na. ni. re.žig. sems.can.rnams.kyi. ạdsin.pa. yaṅ. yod.pa. daṅ. | gzuṅ.ba.yod.pa. daṅ. | de. ạdsin.pa.po. yod.pa. daṅ. log.par. ạdsin.pa. de. ạgog.pa. yaṅ. yod.pa. daṅ. | dgag. par.bya.ba. log.par .ạdsin.pa. de. yaṅ. yod.pa. daṅ. k'yod.la.sogs.pa. ạdsin.pa. de. ạgog. pa.po. yaṅ. yod. de. drug.tu. grub.pa.[5] ma.yin. nam. | de. drug.tu. gyur.na.

[1] VK. ci.ste. raṅ.bžin. de. med.na. |
k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. ạdis. ci.žig. dgag. ||
ts'ig. med.pa. yaṅ.med.pa.yi. |
ạgog.pa. rab.tu. grub.pa. yin. ||
Cfr.pag. 69 where the reading is: *a*) ci.ste. *d*) ạgog.par. rab.tu.ạgrub.
VK.B. *a*) ci.de. *c*) med. par°.

[2] VK. *a*) rnams.kyis.° *b*) ji.ltar. c'u.žes. log.ạdsin. ltar. *c*) de.bžin. k'yod.kyi. yod.min. la. *d*) log.par. ạdsin.pa. ạgog.byed.na.

[3] VV. *d*) ni.

[4] VK. *b*) °de.yi. dsin.po. daṅ. | VK.B. °ạdsin.po.

[5] VK.B. grub. ma.

XIII. [If you object:] "Suppose that a fool wrongly perceives a mirage as water, and that you argue against that wrong perception. This fact [*viz.* your arguing against the existence of water in the mirage] is just the same as that [*viz.* our arguing against the essence of the dharmas]."

If you mean to say: "Suppose that a fool wrongly perceives a mirage as water, that is he wrongly perceives water in a place where there is no water. If there happens to be an intelligent man, he will try to argue against that misconception and will speak in this way; 'your perception of water is false.' Just in the same way [the world] falsely perceives an essence of the dharmas in the dharmas which are in fact without any essence. In order to argue against this misconception of men, we say that all dharmas have no essence." I reply to this argument with the following stanza.

XIV. Perception, perceived, perceiver; refutation, refuted, refuter; all these six things are existent dharmas.

Only if there is a man, perception, perceived, and perceiver, it is possible to say that there is the refutation of a misconception, a [notion] refuted, etc. Thus those six notions already referred to will be demonstrated. But if these six notions are demonstrated and yet you say that all dharmas are void; then this argument, [stated by you], is not valid.

XV. If there is neither the perception, nor the perceived, and the perceiver also is non-existent, then there is neither the refutation, nor the refuted and the refuter also does not exist.

If you mean to say, that, such a mistake, [as pointed out by me], cannot be found in your system, since there is neither the perception, nor the perceived nor the perceiver then, if you argue against the misconception [concerning the essence of the dharmas and affirm] that all dharmas have no essence, the refutation must be non-existent, as well as the refuted and the refuter.

ni. | ma.bkag.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi. ruṅ.ṅo. |

ci.ste. ạdsin.pa. yod.min. žiṅ. |
gzuṅ.med. ạdsin.pa.po.med. na. ||
'o.na. ạgog. daṅ. dgag.bya. daṅ. |
ạgog.pa.po. yaṅ. yod.min.te. || [1] 15

ci.ste. skyon.der. gyur.na. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. sñam.nas. ạdsin. pa.yaṅ.med. | gzuṅ.ba. yaṅ.med. | ạdsin.pa.po. yaṅ. med.do. že.na. de.lta.na. ni. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med.do. žes.bya.ba. ạdsin.pa. ạgog.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. yaṅ. med.la. | dgag.par.bya.ba. yaṅ. med. | ạgog.pa.po. yaṅ. med.par.ạgyur. te. |

gal.te. ạgog. daṅ. dgag.bya. daṅ. |
ạgog.pa.po. yaṅ. yod.min.na. ||
dṅos.po. kun. daṅ. de. rnams.kyi. |
raṅ.bžin. ñid. kyaṅ. grub.yin.na. || [2] 16

gal.te. ạgog.pa. yaṅ. med. | dgag.par.bya.ba. yaṅ. med. | ạgog.pa.po. yaṅ. med.na. ni. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyaṅ. ma.bkag.par.yod.la. | dṅos. po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. yaṅ. yod.do. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

k'yod.la. gtan.ts'igs. ma.grub.ste. |
raṅ.bžin.med.p'yir. k'yod.gtan.ts'igs. ||
gaṅ la. yod.de. k'yod.don. de. ||
gtan.ts'igs. med.p'yir. grub.mi.ạt'ad.|| [3] 17.

dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med.do. žes.bya.bai. don. ạdi.la. k'yod.kyi. [4] gtan.ts'igs. ma.grub.ste. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med. pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. yin. pas. dei.p'yir. gtan.ts'igs. ga.la. yod. | gtan. ts'igs. med.na. ni. gtan.ts'igs. med.par. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes.bya.bai. don. ga.la. grub.pas. de.la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ.

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[1] VK. *a*) yod. mod.žiṅ.; *d*) yaṅ.yod.ma.yin. VK.B. yod.min.la.

[2] VK. *d*) grub.pa.yin.

[3] VK. *a*) mi.ạgrub.ste. *b*) k'yod.kyi.rtags. VK.B. *a*) k'yed la. *c*) ga.la. VV. at page 71 reads: *c*) ga.la. ; *d*) med.par.ạgrub.mi.ạt' ad. and this is also the reading of VV.B.

[4] VV. kyis.

XVI. But, if [in consequence of what we said in the preceding stanza], there is neither the refutation nor the refuted and the refuter is also non-existent, then all dharmas are proved and the essence of these [dharmas] is also proved.

If there is neither the refutation, nor the refuted, nor the refuter, then, since there is no refutation of the dharmas, all dharmas must have an essence.

XVII. Your reason is therefore not valid (*asiddha*); what in fact can be the reason [in a doctrine, which maintains] the non-essence [of everything]? If a doctrine (*dharma*) has no reason [by which it is supported], how is it possible to say that it is valid?

If the dharmas are void, and without any essence, then, the reason that is given for this argument, is [also] invalid. What for? If all dharmas are void and without any essence, where would be the place for reason? But, if [this] doctrine [of yours] is not [supported by any] reason, then by what reason can you prove that the dharmas are void? Therefore, if you say that all dharmas are void and without essence, this argument [of yours] is not valid.

XVIII. If you maintain that without any reason you can prove the refutation of [the essence of] the dharmas, then, I will also prove the essence of the dharmas, without [supporting my thesis] by any reason.

If you mean to say: "we can prove that the dharmas have no essence, without having recourse to any reason" and if you refute the essence of the dharmas, just in this way, [that is, without the support of] any reason, then, the essence of the dharmas [which is postulated] by me can be equally [well] proved without having recourse to any reason.

XIX. If you maintain that the reason is existent, but the essence of the dharmas is non-existent, this argument is illogical. In this world a dharma that has no essence, cannot be called existent.

k'yod.la. gtan.ts'igs. med.par. yaṅ. |
raṅ.bžin. bzlog.par. grub.yin.na. ||
ṅa.la.'ṅ. gtan.ts'igs med.par.ni. |
raṅ.bžin. ñid. ni. yod.par. ạgrub. [1] || 18.

ci.ste. de.la. gtan.ts'igs. med.par. yaṅ. dṅos.po. rnams. kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.par. ạgrub.po. sñam.du. sems.na. ji.ltar k'yod.la. gtan.ts'igs. med.pa. raṅ.bžin.bzlog.pa. grub.pa. de.bžin.du. ṅa.la. yaṅ. gtan.ts'igs. med.par. dṅos.poi. raṅ. bžin.yod.par. ạgrub.po. | ṅa.la. yaṅ. žes.bya.ba. ni. ṅed.la. yod.do. |

gal.te. gtan.ts'igs. yod.na. dṅos. |
raṅ.bžin.med. ces.bya. mi.ạt'ad. ||
ạjig.rten.na. ni. raṅ.bžin.med. |
dṅos.po. ạga'. yaṅ. yod.min.no. [2] || 19.

gal.te. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.kyi. gtan. ts'igs. yod.pa. k'o.na.'o. sñam.du.sems.na. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin.med.do. žes.bya.ba. mi.ạt'ad.do. | cii.p'yir.že.na. | ạjig.rten.na. raṅ.bžin.med.pai. dṅos.po.ạga'. yaṅ. yod.pa. ma.yin.no. |

ạdi.ltar. raṅ.bžin yod.min.na. |
gal.te. ạgog.sṅa. dgag. ạp'yi. žes. ||
žer.na. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.la. |
dgag.par.bya.ba. yod.pa.ma.yin.na. ci.žig. la. ạgog. par.byed. |
ạp'yi. žiṅ. cig.car. mi.at'ad.do. || [3] 20.

raṅ.bžin.med.pa. žes.bya.ba. ạdir. gal.te. ạgog.pa. ni. sṅa.la. dgag.par.bya.ba. ni. ạp'yi.'o. že.na. | ạt'ad.pa.ma. yin.te. | dgag.par. bya.ba. yod.pa.ma.yin.na. gaṅ.gi. ạgog. pa.yin.par.ạgyur. | 'on.te. ạgog.pa.ni. ạp'yi.la. dgag.par.bya. ba. sṅa.'o. že.na. ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.te. | dgag.par.bya.ba.

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[1] VK. *b*) bzlog.pa. ma.yin.na., which is evidently a mistake. VK.B. bzlog. pa.grub.yin.na. VK. *d*) raṅ.bžin. yod.pa.ñid.du. ạgrub.

[2] VK. *a*) ci.ste. gtan.ts'igs. yod.na. dṅos. |
c) srid.na. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.yi. |
d) dṅos. ạga'. yod.pa.ma.yin.no. |

[3] VK. gaṅ.las. raṅ.bžin. yod.min.pai. |
ạgog.pa. gal.te. sṅar. ạgyur. žin. ||
dgag.bya.la.p'yi. žes. ạt'ad. min.la. |
p'yis. daṅ. cig.car. yaṅ. mi.ạt'ad. ||
In *d*) the xyl. has: ạc'i. instead of ap'yi but this is a mistake; cfr.pag. 73 VK.B. *b*): sṅa. ạgyur.žiṅ.

If you mean to say "according to us there is a reason which is a valid reason, but there is no essence [of a dharma whatsoever]," then, your thesis that there is no essence at all is not valid. What for? Because, in this world, whatever has no essence cannot be called existent.

XX. If you maintain that the refutation comes first, and the refuted comes after [it], such an argument is illogical. If [you state that] the refutation comes after and the refuted first or that the refutation and the refuted are co-existent, then you [implicitly] acknowledge that there is an essence.

If the refutation comes first and the refuted comes after it, the argument is illogical. In fact if the notion to be refuted does not exist, what could be refuted by the refutation? And it is not logical also [to state that the object] refuted comes first and the refutation comes after it. If, in fact, the object to be refuted is already proved, how can the refutation refute? If, [on the other hand you suppose] that the refutation and the refuted are co-existent, then, they are no longer reciprocally conditioned. The refutation is not dependent on the refuted and the refuted is not dependent on the refutation, since each has an essence of its own. Then it is impossible to say any refutation, just as two horns coming out at the same time cannot be considered as interdependent. The right horn is not dependent on the left one, nor the left one is dependent on the right one. Therefore if you say that the dharmas have no essence, the argument is not valid.

PART II.

These are the arguments stated by you. Now I shall reply to you. You said: [stanza I]. This is your stanza.

Now I reply.

XXI. If my words do not exist either in the causes and conditions, or in their combination or in something different, then, the thesis of the voidness [of everything] is proved, and the *dharmas* have no essence.

grub.ziṅ.na. ci.žig. ạgog.par.byed. | 'on.te. ạgog.pa. daṅ. dgag.par. bya.ba. mgo.mñam.mo. že.na. | de.lta.na. yaṅ. ạgog.pa.ni. dgag.par.bya.bai. don.gyi. rgyu. ma.yin.la. | dgag.par.bya.ba. yaṅ. ạgog.pai.ma.yin.te. | dper.na. ri.boṅ.gi. rva. gyas.gyon. gñis. mgo mñam.du.skyes.pa. lta.bu.ste. | rva.gyas.pa.yaṅ. gyon.pai. rgyu.ma.yin.pa. | gyon.pa. yaṅ. gyas.pai. rgyu.ma.yin.pa. lta.bu.yin.pas. de.la. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin. med.do. žes.smras. pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. |

ạdir.bšad.pa. re.žig.k'yod.kyis. |

(I) gal.te. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. |
raṅ.bžin. kun.la'ṅ. yod.min.na. ||
k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. kyaṅ.raṅ.bžin.med. |
raṅ.bžin. bzlog.par. mi.nus.so. ||

žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de.la. bšad.par.bya. ste. |
gal.te. ṅai.ts'ig. rgyu.rkyen. daṅ. |
ts'ogs. daṅ. t'a.dad.la. yaṅ. med. ||
'o.na. dṅos.rnams. stoṅ. ạgrub.ste. |
raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid.p'yir.ro. || [1] 21

gal.te. ṅai.ts'ig. rgyu. ạbyuṅ.ba. c'en.po.rnams. daṅ. mts'uṅs.par. ldan.pa. rnams. daṅ.ldan. pa.ma.yin.pa.rnams.la. yaṅ.med. | rkyen. braṅ. daṅ. lkog.ma. daṅ. mc'u. daṅ. lce. daṅ. soi.brun. daṅ. rkan. daṅ. sna. daṅ. spyi.bo.la.sogs.pa. daṅ. ạbad. pa.rnams.la. yaṅ. med. | gñi.ga. ts'ogs.pa.la. yaṅ. med. | rgyu. daṅ. rkyen. ts'ogs.pa.la. ma.gtogs.pa. t'a.dad. pa. yaṅ. med .do. | dei.p'yir. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.yin.te. | raṅ.bžin. med.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. že.na. | 'o.na.ni. ṅai.ts'ig.ste. stoṅ.par.grub.ste. | raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid.yin.pai.p'yir.ro. | ji. ltar. ṅai.ts'ig. de. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ. pa.yin.pa. de.bžin.du. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyaṅ. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.yin.pas. na. de.la. k'yod.kyis. c'os.kyi. ts'ig. stoṅ.pa.yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa. ñid.du. mi.ạt'ad.do. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

[1] VK. *a*) ṅa.yi. ts'ig. ni. rgyu. rkyen.daṅ. |
b) ts'ogs. daṅ. so.so.la. yaṅ. med.
c) grub. ste.

If those words do not exist either in their cause, or in the material elements, or in the combination of these, and if they do not exist in these things separately taken, that is in the throat, lips, tongue, root of the teeth, top of the head, etc., each of which has its own function, and if they do not exist in the combination of two organs, such as those referred to, and if there is no other dharma distinct from these causes and conditions and their union, then they have no essence. Since they have no essence, when I say that everything is without essence, the thesis of the voidness of things is demonstrated. Thus words have no essence and are void; just in the same way dharmas also have no essence and are void. Therefore when you say: "since your words are void, they cannot state the voidness of things" such an argument [of yours] is not valid. Again there is another argument:

XXII. Every dharma which is born from causes and conditions (*pratītyasamutpanna*) is void; now I explain the meaning of this [statement]. Whatever is born from causes and conditions, is without any essence, [since] it is born from causes and conditions.

You cannot understand how all dharmas are void. But if you do not know the meaning of this voidness, how can you maintain that my argument is wrong? As regards the objection that you said before, that is: "according to you, words are void, [since] words have no essence. As they have no essence, they cannot refute the existence of the dharmas." [I reply:] these dharmas are born from causes and conditions. Because they are born, it is possible to say that all dharmas are void, and it is [also] possible to say that they are without essence. What is the argument by which we know that the dharmas, being born from causes and conditions, have no essence? If all dharmas are born from causes and conditions, then, all dharmas have no essence. If dharmas have no essence, they must depend on causes and conditions. [In fact] if they had an essence, what would be the use of the causes and conditions [that are necessary for the production of a dharma?]. Without causes and conditions the dharmas are

dṅos.rnams. brten. nas. ạbyuṅ.ba. gaṅ. |
de. ni. stoṅ.ñid. ces.bya. daṅ. ||
gaṅ.žig. brten.nas. ạbyuṅ. ba. de. |
raṅ. bžin.ñid. med.yin.par. smra. || [1] 22

k'yod.kyis. ni. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. stoṅ.pa.ñid.kyi. don. k'oṅ.du.ma.ts'ud.par. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. yin. pai.p'yir. | dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.pa. mi.ạt'ad.do. žes. klan.ka. ts'ol.ba. smra.bar.byed.do. | ạdir. ni. dṅos.po. rnams. brten.nas. ạbyuṅ.ba. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ni. stoṅ.pa. ñid.yin.no. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. ro. | dṅos.po. gaṅ.dag. rten.ciṅ. ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. de.dag. ni. raṅ.bžin. daṅ. bcas.pa.ma.yin.te. | raṅ.bžin.med.pai.p'yir.ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | rgyu. [2] daṅ. rkyen.la. bltos. pa. daṅ. bcas.pai.p'yir.ro. | gal.te. dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.gyis. yod.na. ni. rgyu. daṅ. rkyen.med.kyaṅ. yod.par. ạgyur.ba. žig.na. | de.ltar. yaṅ. ma.yin.pas. dei.p'yir. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.yin.te. | des.na. stoṅ.pa.'o. | žes.bya.bar. ạt'ad.do. | de.bžin.du. ṅai. ts'ig. kyaṅ. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. yin. | dei.p'yir. raṅ.bžin.med.do. | raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid.yin.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. žes.bya.bar. ạt'ad.pa. yin.no. | ji.ltar. bum.pa. daṅ. snam.bu. la.sogs.pa. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. raṅ.bžin. stoṅ.pa.yin.yaṅ. sbraṅ.rtsi. daṅ. c'u. daṅ. 'o.t'ug. ạdsin.pa. daṅ. len.pa. daṅ. graṅ.ba. daṅ. rluṅ. daṅ. ñi. ma. yoṅs.su.skyob. par.nus.pa.[3] | de. bžin. du. ṅai.ts'ig. kyaṅ. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba.yin.pai.p'yir. raṅ. bžin.med.pa.yin. yaṅ. dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.med.par. rab.tu.bsgrub.par. nus.pa.yin.pas. | de.la. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ạgog.pa. ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.no.[4] | žes.smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

sprul.pa.yis. ni. sprul.pa. daṅ. |
sgyu.ma.yi. ni. skyes.bu.yis. ||
sgyu.mas. p'yuṅ.la. ạgog.byed.ltar. |
ạgog.pa. de. yaṅ. de.bžin. ạgyur. || [5] 23

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[1] VK. brten.nas. ạbyuṅ.bai. dṅos.rnams. gaṅ. |
de. ni. stoṅ.ñid. ces.brjod. de. ||
gaṅ. žig. brten.nas. ạbyuṅ.ba.de. |
raṅ.bžin. med.pa.ñid. yin.no. ||

[2] xyl. brgyu. [3] VV. B. pa. deest.

[4] xyl. ạt'ad.pa.yin.no. which is evidently a mistake.

[5] VK. *d*) ạdi. yaṅ. VK. B. *b*) °yis. ni. skyes bu. yi.

non-existent. But if they are born from causes and conditions, then they have no essence. Since they have no essence, it is possible to say that they are void. Just in the same way, our words are also born from causes and conditions. If they are born from causes and conditions, they have no essence. Since they have no essence, it is possible to say that they are void. Because all dharmas are born from causes and conditions, their real nature is voidness. *E.g.* [if we take] objects like a car, a pot, a cloth, etc., each of these dharmas, has its own causes and conditions [from which it is born.] In this world objects like those mentioned above, which are made of wood, herbs, earth, are things possessing some function, *e.g.*, they can carry or contain water, honey, milk, and also protect from cold, heat, wind. Since they are born from causes and conditions, they have no essence. Just in the same way, our words are born from the combination of causes and conditions and therefore it is possible to say that they have no essence. If they have no essence, then it is possible to say [that my thesis, stating] the non essence of things, is proved. Thus also words, although void, have in this world a function. Therefore your objection, that is : "if there is no essence, your words also must be void ; thus, they cannot refute the essence of dharmas" contains a statement that is not valid. Again there is another argument.

XXIII. Suppose that one man created by magic [prevents] another man created by magics or that one *māyā-puruṣa* [prevents] another *māyā-puruṣa* [from doing something]. The relation (litt. the meaning) of the refutation and of the refuted is just like this.

Suppose that a man created by magic, sees the various actions, such as that of going and coming done by another man, equally created by magic, and then, prevents him from doing [those actions], or suppose that a *māyā-puruṣa* sees the various actions, such as that of going and coming done made by another *māyā-puruṣa* and then prevents him from doing those actions. In these cases, the man created by magic and who can prevent the other [from doing that action], is void and if that man

ji.ltar. sprul.pai. skyes.bus. sprul.pai.skyes.bu. žig. don. ąga'.žig.gi.p'yir. 'oṅ.bar.byed.pa.la. ągog.pa.byed.pa. daṅ sgyu.ma.mk'an.[1]gyis. p'yuṅ.bai. sgyu.mai.skyes.bus. sgyu. mai skyes.bu. gžan. [2]žig. don. ąga'.žig.gi. p'yir. 'oṅ.bar.byed pa.la. ągog.par.byed.pa. bžin.te. de.la. sprul.pai. skyes.bu. dgag.par.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin. pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin. | ągog. par.byed.pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin. | sgyu.mai.skyes.bu. dgag.par.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin. ągog.par. byed.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.pa. | de.bžin.du ṅai.ts'ig. stoṅ.pas. kyaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pas. kyaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ągog.pa. ąt'ad.pa. ni. | de.la. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. stoṅ.pa. ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams. cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. ągog.pa. ąt'ad.pa.ma.yin.no. | žes.smras pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ruṅ.ba.ma. yin.no. | de.la. k'yod.kyis. mu. drug.tu. smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. yaṅ. de. ñid. kyis. bkag.pa. yin.te. | de.lta.yin.na. t'ams.cad.kyi. naṅ.du. ṅai. ts'ig. kyaṅ. ma.ądus.pa. yin. žiṅ. mi.stoṅ.pa.'o. ma.yin.la. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyaṅ. mi.stoṅ.pa. ma.yin.no. | yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. |

(II) 'on.te. ts'ig. de. raṅ.bžin.bcas. |
k'yod.kyi. dam.bcas. sṅa.ma. ñams. ||
mi.ądra.ñid. de. de. yin.na. |
gtan.ts'igs. k'yad.par. brjod.par.byos. ||

žes.smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. ądi.la. bšad.par.byas.te. |
ṅa.yi. ts'ig. de. raṅ.bžin.med. |
de.p'yir. smras.pa. ma.ñams.la. ||
mi.ądra.ñid. kyaṅ. med.pas. na. |
gtan.ts'igs. k'yad.par. bśad. mi.bya. || [3] 24

re.žig. ṅai.ts'ig. de. ni. rten.ciṅ.ąbrel.bar.ąbyuṅ.ba. yin. pai.p'yir. raṅ.bžin.ąt'ad. pa.ma.yin.te. | ji.skad.du. sṅar raṅ.bžin. | ąt'ad.pa.ma.yin.pai.py'ir. stoṅ.pa.yin.no.žes bšad.pa. lta.bu.'o. | gaṅ.gi.p'yir. | ṅai.ts'ig. de. yaṅ. stoṅ. pa.yin. | dṅos.po. lhag.ma. rnams. kyaṅ. stoṅ.pa.yin.pa. dei.p'yir. mi.ądra.ba. ñid.med. do. | gal.te. ṅa. na. re.ts'ig. de. ni. stoṅ.pa.ma.yin.la. dṅos.po. lhag.ma.t'ams.cad. ni.

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[1] VV. sgyu. mk'an. [2] VV. B. gžan. na.
[3]. VK. *a*) ts'ig. ni. de.bžin. med. *b*) de.p'yir. ṅai. p'yogs. ma.ñams.la. c) med.pa.na : VK. B. *d*) brjod.mi.bya. |

created by magic who prevents [the other man also created by magics from doing his actions] is void, then the man created by magic who is prevented [by the other] is also void. If the man who is prevented [from doing his actions] is void, the man [created by magic] who prevents [him from doing his actions] is also void.

The *māyā-puruṣa* who prevents the other *māyā-puruṣa* [from his actions] is void. If that *māyā-puruṣa* who can prevent [the other from doing his actions] is void, then the *māyā-puruṣa* who is prevented [from doing his actions] is also void. If the man who is prevented [from doing his actions] is void, the man who prevents [him from doing his actions] must also be void. Just in the same way, my words are void, like everything which is created by magic or illusion. Words, therefore, although void, can refute the essence of all dharmas. Therefore, the statement contained in your objection: "since your words are void, they cannot refute the essence of all dharmas," is not valid. The six-fold objection that has been expounded by you is refuted in this way. Thus my words are not [included] in the totality of dharmas. But my words are void, as well as dharmas. So, it is not possible to say that all dharmas are not void. Again there is a stanza of yours which says: [stanza II.]

This is the stanza; now I shall reply:

XXIV. Words have no essence. Whatever is expressed [by them], is also without essence. Thus there is no mistake in my statement, so that I do not need to say a different reason.

According to me words have no essence, since they are born from causes and conditions and I said above that whatever has an essence, is not born; so it is possible to say that words, being born, are void. Thus it is [also] possible to state that these words are void and all other dharmas are absolutely void. Therefore since words, as well as dharmas, are void, there is no mistake in my argument. Were I to say that words are not void, but all other dharmas are absolutely void, then there would be a mistake in my argument. But since

stoṅ.pa.yin.no. žes. ạc'ad.na. ni. des.na. mi.ạdra.ba.ñid.du. yaṅ. ạgyur.na. | de. ni. de.lta. ma.yin.pas. dei. p'yir.mi.ạdra. ba. ñid. med. do. | gaṅ.gi.p'yir.ts'ig.de.ni. stoṅ.pa.ma. yin. la. dṅos.po. lhag.ma. t'ams. cad. ni. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. žes. mi. ạdra.ba.ñid. mi.srid. pa.dei.p'yir. k'o.bos. gtan.ts'igs. des.na. ts'ig.de. ni. stoṅ.pa.ma.yin.la. | dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. ni. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | žes. gtan.ts'igs.kyi. k'yad.par. bšad.par.mi.bya.ste. | de.la. k'yed.kyis. smras.pa. yaṅ. ñams.la. | mi.ạdra.ba.ñid. kyaṅ. yin.pas. k'yod.kyis. gtan.ts'igs.kyi. k'yad.par. yaṅ. brjod.par. byos.šig. ces. smras.pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi. ruṅ.ṅo. | yaṅ. |

III. de. sgra. ma.ạbyin. lta.bu.'o. žes. |
k'yod. blo.sems.na. de. mi.ạt'ad. ||
ạdi.la. sgra. ni. yod.pa.yis. |
ạbyuṅ.bar.ạgyur.ba. de. bzlog.yin. ||

žes. smras.pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par. bya.ste. |

sgra. ma.ạbyin. žes.bya. bžin.žes. |
k'yod.kyi. gaṅ. brtsam. dpe. ạdi. min. ||
de. ni. sgra.yis. sgra.bzlog.pas. |
ạdi. ni. de.lta. ma.yin.no. || [1] 25.

ạdi. ni. ṅed.kyi. dpe. ma.yin.te. | ji.ltar. ạga'.žig.na. re. sgra. ma.ạbyin. žes. de.skad. zer.ba. na. sgra. ñid. ạbyin. ciṅ. sgra. bzlog.par. byed.pa. ltar. ts'ig. stoṅ.pa. des.ni. stoṅ.pa. ñid. ạgog.par. mi.byed.do. | cii.p'yir.že. na. | ạdi.la. dper.[2]sgras. sgra. bzlog.par.byed.pa. de.ltar. ạdi ni. ma.yin. te. | ṅed.ni. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.yin.te. raṅ. bžin.med.pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.yin.no. žes. ạc'ad.do. | cii.p'yir. že.na. |

gal.te. raṅ.bžin. med.ñid. kyis. |
ji.ste. raṅ.bžin.med.la. bzlog. ||
raṅ. bžin.med. pa. ñid. log.na. |
raṅ.bžin.ñid. du. rab.grub.ạgyur. || [3] 26.

ji.ltar. sgra. ma. ạbyin. ces.bya.ba. lta.bu. sgras. sgra. bzlog. par. byed.pa. de.bžin.du. | gal.te.ts'ig.raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.kyis.

[1] VK. *a*) sgra. mi.ạbyin.bya. bžin. že.na.
b) k'yod.kyis. gaṅ.brtsams. dpe. ạdi. min.
d) ạdir.ni.

[2] VV. B. dpe.

[3] VK. *b*) ci.ste. raṅ.bžin. med.pa. bzlog.

I do not state anything of this kind, so I am not wrong. According to logic it is not possible to say that words are not void, but that all the other dharmas are void. Therefore I do not need to say a different reason. Were I to say that words are not void, but that all the other dharmas are void, then I must state the difference of the reason. Therefore the statement contained in your objection: "when you are arguing, you contradict your words and therefore you commit a logical mistake; so that you must say a different reason," is not valid.

Again there is another argument advanced by you. Your stanza says: [stanza III.] This is your stanza. Now I shall reply.

XXV. If you say [that my refutation of the essence of the dharmas] is just like [the prevention of one person by another from uttering a sound, saying] "do not utter any sound" then my reply is that such an example is not mine, since I do not maintain that I can refute that sound by this sound.

Such an example [as formulated by you] is not mine, [viz. that my words can refute the essence of dharmas] just as somebody [prevents another from uttering a sound] saying [to him] "do not utter any sound"; thus making himself a sound, he annuls with a sound the existence of a sound. For me sound is not non-void and therefore I cannot say a thing like that. [On the other hand my view is that] words are void and that dharmas refuted by words are void as well. Thus I cannot admit such a thing as stated in your example, viz. that sound can annul the existence of this sound. [On the other hand] I maintain that every dharma has no essence; since it has no essence, it is possible to state that all dharmas are void. What for? < XXVI. If words, being without essence, could refute non-essence, then this would [implicitly] prove that all dharmas have an essence. > This means that if somebody objects to my argument, saying that just as the sentence "do not utter any sound" annuls the existence of a [future] sound, so also words, although without essence, can refute non-essence, then [I say that] if one could refute the non-essence in

dṅos. po.raṅ.bžin.med.pa.rnams.la.bzlog.par.byed.na. ni. des. na. dpe.ạt'ad.par. ạgyur.ba. žig.na. | ạdir.ni.ts'ig.raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ñid.kyis.dṅos.po.rnams.kyi.raṅ.bžin.ạgog.par.byed.do.|gal.te. ts'ig.raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ñid.kyis.dṅos.po.rnams.kyi.raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ñid.ạgog.par.byed.na. ni. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.bkag. pa. ñid.kyi.p'yir. dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.daṅ. bcas.par.ạgyur.la. | raṅ.bžin. daṅ.bcas. pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa.ma.yin.par. ạgyur. ro. | k'o.bo.cag.ni dṅos.po.rnams.stoṅ.pa.ñid.du.smrai. stoṅ.pa. ñid.ma.yin.par.ni.smra.ba.ma.yin.pas.dpe.ạdi. ma.yin.pa. ñid. do. |

yaṅ. na. k'a.cig. sprul. pa. yis. |
bud.med.la. ni. bud. med. sñam. ||
log.ạdsin. ạgyur.la. sprul.pa.yis. |
ạgog.byed. ạdi. ni. de. lta. yin. ||[1] 27.

yaṅ. na.ji.ltar. skyes.bu. k'a.cig. sprul.pai. bud.med. raṅ.bžin.gyis. stoṅ.pa.yin.pa.la. don.dam.par. bud.med.do. sñam.du. log.par. ạdsin.par.ạgyur. ro. | dei.p'yir. de.log. par. ạdsin.pa. des.ạdod. c'ags. bskyed.pa.la. de.bžin.gšegs.pa. ạm. | de.bžin. gšegs.pai. ñan.t'os.kyis. sprul.pa.žig. sprul.la. | des. dei.[2]log.par.ạdsin.pa. de.bzlog.par.byed.do. | de.bžin. du. ṅai. ts'ig.stoṅ.pa. sprul.pa.lta. bus. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. sprul.pai. bud.med. daṅ. ạdra.ba. dag.la. raṅ.bžin. yod.par. ạdsin.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. bzlog.par. byed. do. | de.bas.na. ạdir. stoṅ.pa. ñid.du. rab.tu. bsgrub. pa. la. dpe.ạdi. ạt'ad.pa.yin.gyi. cig.šos. ni. ma.yin.no. |

yaṅ.na. gaṅ. p'yir. bsgrub.bya. daṅ. |
gtan.ts'igs. ạdi. mts'uṅs. sgra.yod. min. ||
t'a.sñad. k'as. ni. ma. blaṅs.par. |
ṅed. cag. c'ad.par. mi. byed. do. ||[3] 28.

bsgrub.par.bya.ba. daṅ. sgra. ma.ạbyin. žes.bya. ba. lta. bu'o. | žes.bya.bai. gtan.ts'igs. ạdi. mts'uṅs.pa. k'o.na. yin. no. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ni. raṅ.bžin.med. pa.ñid. du. k'yad.par. med.pa.ñid.kyi.p'yir. sgra. de. ni. rten.

[1] VK. *c*) sprul.pa.yi.
d) de.ni. de.lta. yin.

[2] VV. sprul. pa. ạdra. (doubtful.)

[3] VK *a*) yaṅ.na. rtags.ạdi. bsgrub.bya. daṅ. |
b) mts'uṅs. te. gaṅ. p'yir. sgra. yod. min.|
VK.B. *a*) gaṅ. na.

such a way, the result would be that the essence of all dharmas would be proved. Then if they have an essence they must absolutely be non-void. But my thesis is that all dharmas are void, not that they are non-void. Your example implies such a consequence.

XXVII. Suppose that a man perceiving the body of a woman created by magic as really existent, feels desire for her; the same is the case with your argument.

Suppose that there is a woman created by magic; her body is really void, so far as its essence is concerned. But suppose that there is a man who thinks the body of that lady created by magic to be really existent and he feels desire for her; the same must be said as regards the dharmas which are perceived [as real] only owing to a misconception. In order to dispel those misconceptions, the Tathāgatas, the sons of the Bodhisattvas and the auditors (*śrāvakas*) do actions and create man that are the effect of the miraculous power of the Tathāgatas or of the miraculous power of the sons of the Tathāgatas and of the auditors.

Just in the same way words are void, like the creations of magic, *e.g.* a woman created by magic who, having no essence is void. Dharmas, thus, are void. Therefore if somebody takes the dharmas as having an essence, one can refute this essence and argue against it. Thus with this comparison of the void, we can prove our argument of the voidness [of things]; therefore my thesis is valid, but not yours.

XXVIII. This reason is analogous to the *probandum* and therefore is not valid, since the reason (as resident) in "sound," is non-existent. I say such a thing because I base myself upon the conventional truth.

If you say [that my argument is just like that of a man who says to another man :] "do not make any sound," then, the reason is analogous to the *probandum*. What for? Because the reason is not different from the non-essence of all dharmas. But it is not that that sound has an essence. In fact it has no essence, since it is derived from causes and con-

ṅiṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba.ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. daṅ. raṅ.bžin.yod.pa. ma.yin.no. | de.lta.bas. na. raṅ.bžin.yod.pa.ma.yin.pa. ñid.kyi. p'yir. | ạdi.la. sgra. ni. yod.pa.yis. | ạbyuṅ.bar. ạgyur.ba. de. bzlog.yin. | žes. smras. pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. bzlog.pa. yin.no. | gžan. yaṅ. t'a. sñad. kyi. bden.pa. k'as.ma. blaṅs.šiṅ. ma. brten.par. dṅos.po. t'ams. cad. stoṅ.pa.'o. žes. mi.ạc'ad.do. | t'a.sñad. kyi. bden.pa. k'as.ma.blaṅs.par. ni. c'os.bstan.par. mi.nus.te. | ji. skad.du. |

t'a.sñad.la. ni. ma.brten.par. |
dam.pai. don. ni. mi.ston.la. ||
dam.pai. don.la. ma.brten.par. |
mya.ṅan.ạdas.pa. mi.rtogs.so. ||

žes.gsuṅs.pa.lta.bu.'o. | de.bas.na. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.du. gñi.ga. ạt'ad.pa. na. ṅai.ts'ig. bžin. du. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | yaṅ. k'yod.kyis.

IV. ạgog.pai. ạgog.pa'ṅ. de.lta. žes. |
ạdod.na. de. yaṅ. bzaṅ.min.te. ||
de.lta. na. yaṅ. k'yod. dam.bcas. |
mts'an. ñid. skyon. yod. ṅed. la. med.||

ces. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. |
gal.te. ṅas. dam.bcas. ạga'. yod. |
des.na. ṅa.la. skyon.de. yod. ||
ṅa.la. dam.bcas. med.pa.na. |
ṅa.la. skyon.med. k'o.na. yin. ||[1] 29.

gal.te. dam.bcas.pa. ạga'.žig.yod. na. ni. des.na. k'yod. kyis. ji.skad. smras.pa. bžin.du. ṅa.la. dam.bcas. pai.mts'an. ñid. k'as.blaṅs.pa. sṅon.du. soṅ.bai.skyon.yod.pa. žig. na. ṅa.la. ni. dam.bcas. pa.[2]ạga'. yaṅ. med.do. | dei.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams. cad. stoṅ.pa. gtan.tu. ñe.bar. ži.ba. raṅ.bžin.gyis. dben.pa. dag.la. dam. bcas.pa. ạdi.[3] ga.la. yod. | dam.bcas.pai. mts'an. ñid. kyaṅ. ga.la. yod. | dam. bcas.pai. mts'an.ñid.las. byuṅ. bai. skyon. yaṅ. ga.la. yod.de. | de.la. k'yod.la. dam.bcas. pai. mts'an.ñid.kyis. t'ob.pai.p'yir. k'yod. ñid.la. skyon.yod. do. žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. yaṅ. med.do. | yaṅ. k'yod. kyis.

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[1] VK. a) dam.bca.'
c) med.pas.na.

[2] VV. B. la. for pa.

[3] VV. B. 'ṅ.

ditions. If it has no essence and yet you state that sound is existent and therefore it can annul another sound, then your argument is self-contradictory. Moreover, what I affirm is not contrary to the conventional truth, nor does it disregard the conventional truth. Since I base myself upon the conventional truth, I can affirm that the essence of all dharmas is void. Apart from the conventional truth, the dharmas are inexpressible. The Buddha said this stanza :

"If we do not base ourselves on the conventional truth, we cannot realize the absolute truth. But if we do not realise the absolute truth, it is impossible for us to attain Nirvāṇa." Thus these two views : "The dharmas are not non-void," and "All dharmas have no essence" are not different.

Again you say a stanza : [stanza IV]. This is your stanza. Now I reply.

XXIX. If my thesis be existent, then I should be wrong. But since my thesis is not a real thing such a mistake is impossible.

If my thesis be existent then, it should have the characteristic of a thesis. If a thesis and the characteristic of a thesis were existent for me, then I would commit the fallacy pointed out by you. But my thesis is not like that, because all dharmas are really in a state of absolute quiescence and because their original nature is voidness. Where, then, can there be a thesis? And so, as regards the characteristic of a thesis, where can this characteristic of a thesis be found? Since for me there is not such a thing as the characteristic of a thesis, how can you blame me? Therefore when you say: "you admit that the characteristic of a thesis is existent and therefore you must be blamed for committing this fallacy," the argument is not valid. Again you say these stanzas : [stanzas V—VI].

These are your stanzas. Now I reply.

XXX. If I were to admit the [possibility of] affirming or denying, then I should have recourse to direct perception etc. If I were to accept [the possibility] of affirming or denying, then I would be wrong; but if I do not think so, what mistake (shall I commit)?

V. re.žig. dnós.rnams. mṅon.sum.gyis. |
dmigs.nas. bzlog.par.byed. yin.na. ||
gaṅ.gis. dṅos.rnams. dmigs.ạgyur.ba. |
mnón.sum. de. ni. med.pa.yin. ||

VI. rjes.dpag. luṅ. daṅ. dpes.gžal. daṅ. |
rjes.dpag. luṅ.gi. bsgrub.bya. daṅ. ||
dpes.bsgrub. bya.bai. doṅ. gaṅ. yin. |
mṅon.sum.gyis. ni. lan. btab.po. ||

žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bžad.par.bya.ste. |
gal.te. mṅon.sum. la.sogs.pai. |
don.gyis. ạga'.žig. dmigs.na. ni. ||
bsgrub.pa.'m. bzlog.par.bya na. de. |
med.p'yir. ṅa.la. klan.ka. med.|| 30.

gal.te. ṅas. mṅon.sum. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes. ạjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ.rnams.kyis. sam. | ts'ad.ma. bži.rnams.las. gaṅ. yaṅ. ruṅ.ba. žig.gis. dmigs.na. ni. dei.p'yir. sgrub.par. byad. pa. 'm. | don.bzlog. par. bya.na.ṅas. don. ji.ltar. yaṅ. ma.dmigs.pas. dei.p'yir. bsgrub.par. yaṅ. mi.bya. | bzlog.par. yaṅ. mi.bya. de.ltar. gyur.daṅ. de.la. k'yod.kyis. gal.te. mṅon.sum.la.sogs.pa.rnams.las. ts'ad. ma. gaṅ. yaṅ.ruṅ.ba. žig.gis. dṅos.po.rnams. dmigs.nas. bzlog.par.byed.pa.yin.na. ts'ad.ma. de.dag. kyaṅ.med. | de.dag.gis. k'oṅ.du. c'ud.par. bya.bai.don. yaṅ. med.pas. žes.klan.ka. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin. pai. klan.ka. de. ṅa.la. mi.ạgyur.ro.[1] | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

gal.te. k'yod.kyi. doṅ.de.rnams. |
ts'ad.ma.ñid.kyis. rab.sgrub.na. ||
k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. de. rnams.kyaṅ. |
ji.ltar. rab.tu. ạgrub.par.ạgyur. ||[2] 31.

gal.te. ạjal.bar.byed.pa.rnams.kyis. gžal.bar.bya.ba.dag. bžin.du. k'yod.kyi. don. gžal.bya.ba. de.rnams. ts'ad.ma. ñid.kyis. rab.tu.ạgrub.pa.yin.par. sems.na. | 'o.na. de. ts'ad. ma. rnam.pa. bži.po. mṅon.sum. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. | dpes.ạjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ. de. rnams. gaṅ.gis. rab.tu.ạgrub. gal te. re.žig. ts'ad.ma. de.rnams. ni. ts'ad.ma. gžan.rnams.

[1] VV.B. ạbyuṅ.ṅo.
[2] VK. *b*) kyi.rab.bsgrub.na.
d) ạgrub.pa. smros.

If I were to admit, at least, some dharmas and objects, then there would be the four pramāṇas, such as direct perception, authority, inference, analogy; if the four pramāṇas be existent, and I were to accept [the possibility] of affirming or denying then I would be wrong. But I do not maintain that a dharma can be affirmed or denied. If, therefore, according to me, there is neither affirmation nor negation, so your statement that I am wrong, is not valid. If there be pramāṇas such as direct perception and so on, then again there must be other pramāṇas in order to prove these pramāṇas. Thus there would be *regressus in infinitum.* Therefore such a statement as made by you cannot refute my thesis. Again there is another argument.

XXXI. If you maintain that a pramāṇa can demonstrate the existence of the dharmas and those dharmas are proved, when there is a pramāṇa, then you must say where we can find such a pramāṇa which is able to demonstrate these pramāṇas.

If you mean to say that a pramāṇa can demonstrate the existence of the objects, which are to be known by the pramāṇas, then, as regards the four pramāṇas, *viz.* direct perception, inference, authority, analogy, by which pramāṇas can these pramāṇas be demonstrated? If these four pramāṇas are demonstrated without having recourse to another pramāṇa, then the pramāṇas themselves are not demonstrated. If the pramāṇas themselves are not demonstrated, and yet they can prove the objects, then your thesis is self-contradictory. < XXXII. If, on the other hand, the pramāṇas are demonstrated by another pramāṇa, then, as regards the pramāṇas there is *regressus in infinitum.* But if there is *regressus in infinitum*, neither the beginning is demonstrated, nor the middle, nor the end are demonstrated. > What for? If the pramāṇa can prove the objects to be proved and that pramāṇa needs again another pramāṇa which must prove it, since [that pramāṇa] is again proved by another pramāṇa, there is no beginning. If there is no beginning, there is no middle. If there is no middle, where will there be an end? So if you maintain that that pramāṇa

kyis. yaṅ. par.[1]ągrub.la. | don.rnams. ni. ts'ad.mas. rab.tu.-ągrub.pa.yin.no. že.na. | dam.bcas.pa. ñams.par.ągyur.ro. | 'on.te. yaṅ. |

gal.te. ts'ad.ma. gžan.rnams. kyis. |
ts'ad.ma. ągrub.na. t'ug.pa.med. || [2]

gal.te. ądi.sñam.du. gžal.bar.bya.ba. ni. ts'ad.ma.rnams. kyis.ągrub.la. | ts'ad.ma. de.rnams. kyaṅ. ts'ad.ma. gžan. rnams.kyis. ągrub.par. sems.na. | de.ltar[3]. t'ug.pa.med.par. ągyur.ro. | de.la. t'ug.pa.med.par.gyur.na. ñes.pa. ci.yod.ce. na. | de.la. ądi.ltar. bšad.par.bya.ste. |

de.la. daṅ.po. ągrub.min.na. |
bar.ma. min. žiṅ. t'a.ma'ṅ.min. || [4] 32.

t'ug.par.med.par.gyur.na. daṅ.po. ągrub.par. mi.ągyur. ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | ts'ad.ma. de.rnams. kyaṅ. ts'ad.ma. gžan.rnams.kyis. rab.tu.ągrub.pa.yin.la. | [5]de.rnams. kyaṅ. gžan.rnams. kyis. yin. žiṅ. | [5]de.rnams. kyaṅ. gžan. rnams.kyi. yin.pas. ądi.la. daṅ.po.med.do. | daṅ.po.med.pai.p'yir. bar.ma. yaṅ. ga.la.yod. | t'a.ma. yaṅ. ga.la.yod. de. dei.p'yir. ts'ad. ma.de.rnams. ni. ts'ad.ma. gžan.rnams.kyis. rab.tu. ągrub. bo. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. mi.ąt'ad.do. |

'on.te. ts'ad.ma. med.par. yaṅ. |
de.rnams. ągrub.na. smra.ba. ñams.||
mi.ądra.ñid. de. de.yin.na. |
gtan.ts'igs. k'yad.par. smra.bar.gyis. || [6] 33.

'on.te. ts'ad.ma. rnams. med.par. yaṅ. ts'ad.ma. de. rnams. ągrub.pa.yin.la. gžal.ba.bya.bai. don.rnams. ni. ts'ad. ma.rnams.kyis. rab.tu.ągrub.pa.yin.no. sñam.du.sems.na. de. lta. na. ni. k'yod.kyis. ts'ad.ma.rnams.kyis. don.rnams. ągrub.bo. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. des. ñams.par. ągyur.la. don. k'a.cig. ni. ts'ad.ma.rnams.kyis. rab.tu.ągrub.pa.yin. | k'a.cig. ni. ma.yin.no. žes. mi.ądra.ba. ñid.du. yaṅ ągyur.ro. de.lta.na. ni. gtan.ts'igs. gaṅ.gis. na. don.k'a.cig. ni. ts'ad. ma.rnams.kyis. rab.tu.ągrub.pa.yin.la. | k'a.cig. ni. ma.yin. no. | žes. gtan.ts'igs.kyi. k'yad.par. yaṅ. smra.bar.bya.ba.yin.

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[1] sic. xyl.; but it is necessary to read ma. VV.B. yod. par.
[2] VK. *b*) grub.pa. sñam.na. t'ug. pa.med.
[3] VV.B. de.lta.na.
[4] VK. *a*) de.yaṅ... ..min.la.
[5,5] VV. *deest.*
[6] VK. *b*) sgrub.na.

is proved again by another pramâṇa, the argument is not valid.

XXXIII. If a pramāṇa is demonstrated without a pramāṇa, the meaning of your controversy is lost. So there is a mistake [viz. that of maintaining a different thesis] in your assumption and you must therefore say a different reason.

If you mean to say that a pramāṇa is proved without a pramāṇa, and the things to be known are proved by the pramāṇa, then by arguing that the pramāṇa proves the knowable, you commit a logical fallacy, as you [implicitly] maintain that there are things which are proved by the pramāṇas and there are things [such as the pramāṇas themselves] which are not proved by the pramāṇas. If it be so you must say a different reason. If you say a different reason, then it is possible to know what you mean and to understand what is proved by the pramāṇas and what is not proved. But if you cannot show this difference, your argument is not valid. Now I say this: suppose that there is a man who mantains [such a thesis: "The pramāṇa explained by me can prove itself and other objects" and he says this [following] stanza:

XXXIV. Just as fire, which can illuminate itself and also illuminates other objects by its light, the same is the case as regards the pramāṇa, which can prove, at the same time, itself and the other notions.

Fire illuminates itself but can also illuminate other things; the same happens so far as the pramāṇas are concerned. They in fact are self-proved and prove also other notions. To this argument now I reply:

XXXV. Your words contain a mistake: this fire does not illuminate itself and therefore [your example] is not valid; [it is the same case as with] the vision of a pot in darkness.

Your objection that the pramāna, just like fire, can prove itself as well as other notions, is not valid. What for?

na. | de. yaṅ. ma.bstan.pas. dei.p'yir. rtog.pa. ni. yaṅ. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.no. | ạdir. smra.pa. | ji.skad.du. |

ji.ltar. me.yis. gžan.bdag.ñid. |
gsal.byed. de.bžin. rañ.ñid. ltar. ||
de.bžin. ts'ad.ma.rnams. kyaṅ. ni. |
raṅ.gžan.bdag.ñid. ạgrub. ce.na. ||[1] 34.

žes. bstan.pa.lta.bur. ts'ad.ma.rnams. ni. raṅ.gi. bdag. ñid. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. rab.tu. sgrub.par.byed.pa.yin. te. | ji.ltar. mes. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gsal.bar.byed.pa. de.bžin.du. ts'ad.ma.rnams. kyaṅ. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. rab.tu. sgrub.par.byed. pa.yin.no. že.na. | ạdir. bšad.pa. |

smras.pa. de. ni. mi.mt'un.te. |
mun.k'oṅ.gi. ni. rdsa.ma. ltar. ||
de.la. mi. dmigs. ma.mt'oṅ.bas. |
me. ni. raṅ.la. gsal.byed.min. ||[2] 35.

me. daṅ.ạdra.bar. ts'ad.ma.rnams. raṅ. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gñis. | rab.tu.sgrub.par.byed.pa.yin.no. | žes.smras. pa. de. ni. mi.mt'un.pa.ñid.yin.te. | me. ni. raṅ.la. gsal.bar. byed.pa.ma.yin.te. | ji.ltar. me. ma.ạbar.byed.pai.[3] sṅa.rol. mun.k'uṅ. na. bum.pa. mi.dmigs.la. | mes. gsal.bar.byas. nas. p'yis. dmigs.pa. de.bžin.du. | gal.te. gsal.bar.ma.byas.pai. sṅa.rol.tu. me. mun.k'uṅ.na. yod.la. | p'yis.mes. gsal.bar. ạgyur.na. ni. dei.p'yir. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid. gsal.bar.byed.pa. yin.no. | de. yaṅ. de. lta. ma.yin.pas. rtog.pa. ạdi. yaṅ. ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.no. | ạdi. ltar. gžaṅ.yaṅ. |

gal.te. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig.gis. ni. |
me.ạdi. raṅ.bdag. gsal.byed. na. ||
'o.na. me.yis. gžan.bžin.du. |
raṅ.la. sreg.pa.'ṅ. byed.par. ạgyur. ||[4] 36.

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[1] VK. b) raṅ. bdag. ltar.
d) raṅ.bžin.bdag. sgrub.ce.na.

[2] VK. b) mun.k'uṅ. naṅ.gi. bum.pa. bžin.
d) me. ni. raṅ.ñid.

[3] VV.B. ạbar. bai.
VK.B. c) °dmigs. mt'oṅ.bas.na.

[4] VK. b) me.yis.
d) raṅ.ñid.

Because it is not true that fire illuminates itself. In fact, in the beginning, when there is not yet light, objects such as a pot, and so on, cannot be seen in darkness; but they can be seen when they have been illuminated by fire. So, if fire is self-illuminating, then, in the beginning fire must be darkness, and only afterwards it becomes illuminating. Only in this way it is possible to affirm that fire can illuminate itself. If fire were luminous from the very beginning, then it would be impossible to say that fire can illuminate itself. Therefore, when you imagine that fire illuminates itself and the other object, such a thesis is not valid. Again there is another argument :

XXXVI. Again, if you maintain that fire can illuminate itself and other objects, then since fire can burn other objects, how is it that it does not burn itself ?

If you maintain that, since fire illuminates itself and also can illuminate others, so, it is self-illuminating, as well as illuminating other objects, then, since it can burn other objects, it must also burn itself. But, as a matter of fact, we do not see that such a thing happens. Therefore when you maintain that fire can illuminate itself as well as other objects, the argument is not valid. Again there is another argument.

XXXVII. Again if you maintain that fire can illuminate itself, as well as other objects, the same ought to be as regards darkness. [This also in fact] must cover itself as well as other objects.

If you say, "fire can illuminate itself as well as other objects, since it can dispel darkness," how, then, darkness does not cover itself as well as other objects ? But we do not see that such a thing really happens. Therefore when you say that fire etc. such an argument is not valid. Again there is another argument.

XXXVIII. In fire there is no darkness. In what place can [fire] itself and another [viz. darkness] stay [at the same time ?] If darkness can destroy light, how can fire possess light ?

gal.te. k'yod. zer.ba. ji.ltar. me. gžan.gyi. raṅ.bžin. gsal.bar.byed.pa. de.bžin.du. raṅ.gi.bdag.ñid.la. yaṅ. gsal. bar.byed.do. že.na. | 'o.na. ni. ji.ltar. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. sreg.par.byed.pa. de.bžin.du. raṅ.gi.bdag.ñid.la. yaṅ. sreg. par.ạgyur.ba.žig.na. de.de.ltar. yaṅ. ma.yin.pas. de.la. me. ni. gžan.gyi.bdag.ñid. bžin.du. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid.la. yaṅ. gsal.bar. byed.do. | žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

gal.te. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig.gis. ni. |
me.yis. raṅ.gžan. bdag. gsal.byed. ||
me. bžin.du. ni. mun.pa. yaṅ. |
raṅ.gžan. bdag.la. sgrib.par.ạgyur. ||[1] 37.

gal.te. k'yod.kyi.· lugs.kyis. ni. me. ni. raṅ daṅ. gžan. gyi. bdag.ñid.gñis. gsal.bar.byed.pa.yin.na. | 'o.na. ni. de. gñen.por. gyur.pa. yaṅ. raṅ. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gñis. sgrib.par. ạgyur.ba. žig.na. | de. de.ltar. yaṅ. ma.yin.pas. de.la. me. ni. raṅ. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gñis. gsal. bar.byed. pa. yin.no. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ruṅ.ba. ma.yin.no. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

gsal.byed. de. ni. mun. sel.te. |
me. daṅ. gaṅ. na. me.gnas.pa. ||
gžan. na.'ṅ. mun.pa. yod.min.na. |
ji.ltar. gsal.bar.byed.pa. yin. ||[2] 38.

ạdir. me.la. yaṅ mun.pa. med.la. | gaṅ.na. me.[3] yod.pa. de. yaṅ. mun.pa.med.do. | gsal.bar.byed.pa. žes.bya.ba. ni. mun. pa. sel.ba.yin.pas. dei.p'yir. me.la. yaṅ. mun.pa.med.la. | gaṅ.na. me. yod.pa. de.na. yaṅ. mun.pa.med.na. | mes. gaṅ. žig. sel.bas. raṅ. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gñis. gsal.bar.byed.pai. mes. mun.pa. gaṅ.žig. sel.bar.byed. | ạdir . smras.pa. | 'o.na. gaṅ.gi.p'yir. me.la. yaṅ. mun.pa.med. | me. gaṅ.na. yod.pa. de. na. yaṅ. mun.pa.med.pa.ñid. kyi.p'yir. me. ni. raṅ. daṅ.

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[1] VK.
b) raṅ. gžan. gsal.byed.na.
d) ñid.sgrib.

[2] VK. ạbar.byed. daṅ. ni. gaṅ. gžan. na. |
me. ạdug.pa. na. mun.pa. med. ||
gsal.byed. de. ni. mun. sel.na. |
ji.ltar. gsal.bar.byed.pa. yin. ||

[3] VV.B. me. *deest.*

In fire there is no darkness; wherever there is fire there is no darkness. How is it possible to say that light can destroy darkness? If, therefore, in fire there is no darkness; where is there such darkness which can be destroyed by fire? If there is no darkness which can be destroyed by fire, how then is it possible to say that fire can illuminate itself as well as other objects? Now [you] may say this: "if it be so, since neither in fire there is darkness, nor there is darkness in a place possessing fire, then, fire can [not] illuminate itself, as well as other objects. But when fire is produced, just at that time, it can dispel darkness; thus in fire there is no darkness, nor is there any darkness in a place where there is fire. Therefore when fire arises it can illuminate itself and others."

This is what now I say, [in order to reply to this objection].

XXXIX. [If you say:] "Thus, when fire is produced, [just then], in the very moment in which it is being produced, it can illuminate," to this I reply: "To affirm that when fire is being produced, just then, it reaches darkness, is not a valid argument."

If you maintain that, when fire is being born it can illuminate itself and other objects, the argument is not valid. How is it possible to know this? If it is so, in the very beginning, fire cannot reach darkness. How shall we know this? If fire does not reach darkness, it cannot dispel darkness. If it does not dispel darkness, it is not possible to say that it is shining.

XL. If [you maintain that] fire does not reach darkness and still can dispel darkness, then you are compelled to admit that a fire burning (*litt.*, staying) in this place, must dispel the darkness of all places.

If you mean to say that fire does not reach darkness and still can destroy darkness, then a fire which is [burning] in this place, must have the power of dispelling the darkness of all places in the world. What for? Because in this case also it does not reach that. But as a matter of fact, we do not see that such a thing exists. If it does not reach that [darkness], how is it that it can destroy the darkness of this place, but it

gžaṅ.gyi. bdag.ñid.gñis. gsal.bar.byed.pa.ma.yin.nam. | me. ạbyuṅ.ba. ñid.na. me. des. mun.pa. gsal.ba.yin.te. | de.la. yaṅ. muṅ.pa. de.med. me. gaṅ.na. yod.pa. de.na. yaṅ. mun. pa.med.de. dei.p'yir. me.ạbyuṅ.ba. k'o.na. raṅ.gi. bdag. ñid. daṅ. | gžan.gi. bdag.ñid. gñi. ga[1]. gsal.bar. byed.pa.yin. no. že.na. | ạdir. smras.pa. |

me. ạbyuṅ.ba.na. gsal.byed.la. |
yaṅ.dag.min.par. smra.ba.ste. ||
me. ạbyuṅ.ba.na. mun.pa.daṅ. |
p'rad.pa. med.pa. k'o.na. yin. ||[2] 39.

me. de. ni. ạbyuṅ.ba k'o.na. na. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gsal.bar.byed.do. | žes. smra.ba. de. ni. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.no. | cii.p'yir. že.na. |

me.ạbyuṅ. ba. na. mun.pa. daṅ. |
p'rad.pa. med.pa. k'o.na. yin. ||

me. de. ni. ạbyuṅ.ba. k'o.na.na. raṅ.gi. bdag.ñid. daṅ. gžan.gyi. bdag.ñid. gsal.bar.byed.do. žes.smra.ba.[3] de. ni. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.no. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | me. ạbyuṅ.ba.ñid.na. mun.pa. daṅ. p'rad.pa. med.pa.yin.te. | ma.p'rad.pai.p'yir. de. sel.bar. mi.byed.do. | mun.pa. ma.bsal.bai.p'yir. gsal.bar. yaṅ. mi.byed.do. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

yaṅ.na. me. daṅ. ma.p'rad. kyaṅ. |
mun.pa. sel.bar. byed.na. ni. ||
ạdi.na. yod.pa. gaṅ.yin.pas. ||
ạjig.rten. k'ams.kun. mun. sel.ạgyur.[4] 40.

'on.te. me. ni. mun.pa. daṅ. ma.p'rad.par. yaṅ. sel. bar.byed.do. sñam.du.sems.na. | 'o. na. ni. de. ma.p'rad.par. ạdra.bas. ạdi.na. gnas.pai. mes. ạjig.rten.gyi. k'ams.t'ams. cad. na. gnas.pai. mun.pa sel.bar.ạgyur.ba. žig.na. | de. ni. de.ltar. yaṅ. ma.yin.pas. dei.p'yir. me. ñi. p'rad.pa.[5] daṅ. ma.p'rad.par. sel.bar.byed.par. ạdod.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

gal.te. raṅ.las. ts'ad.ma. grub. |
gžal.bya rnams.la. ma.ltos.par. ||

[1] VV.B. gñi gsal.
[2] VK. *a*) me. ạbyuṅ.ñid.na. gsal.byed.pa.
c) °ạbyuṅ.ñid.
[3] VV.B. smras. pa.
[4] VK. *d*) ạjig.rten. kun.kyi. mun.
[5] P'rad. pa. *deest.* in VV.B.

does not dispel the darkness of all places in the world ? Therefore if you mean to say that fire does not reach darkness, but still can dispel darkness, this argument is not valid.

XLI. If a pramāṇa is self-proved, but it is not proved in relation to the notion to be apprehended, then a pramāṇa, being self-proved, can prove without relation to another [notion].

If you mean to say that the pramāṇa and the notion to be proved are proved just like fire, then the pramāṇa being self-proved would have no relation with the notion to be proved. What for ? If it is self-proved, it has no relation with anything else. But if it has relation with other things, then it is not self-proved. This is what I say now. If it has no relation with other things, why is it not self-proved ? If [on the other hand] it has some relation with other things, then it is not self-proved. You may object : " If the pramāṇa has no relation with the object to be known, which is the mistake [implied in such an argument] ? " This is what I say now :

XLII. If the pramāṇa, maintained by you, can prove without any relation with the object to be proved, then, nobody could use the pramāṇa in order to apprehend the *dharmas*.

If you mean to say that the pramāṇa can prove without any relation with the object to be proved, then nobody would use a pramāṇa, in order to apprehend the dharma. This is the mistake that you will commit. [If this theory be true], if somebody were to use a pramāṇa, [any notion] with no relation whatever with the things to be proved, could be taken as a pramāṇa. If [you ask] what is the mistake [that one commits in maintaining] that the pramāṇa has no relation with the [things already] proved, I reply that, if it be so, all dharmas would be without relation with the pramāṇas. < You may ask : XLIII : > If all the dharmas are proved inasmuch as they have some relation with the pramāṇas, which will be the mistake in affirming this ? [I reply] whatever is [already] proved can be called a proof ; whatever is not proved how

k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. ạgrub.ạgyur.ạdi |
gžan.la. mi.ltos. raṅ.ạgrub.ạgyur. ||[1] 41.

gal.te. me.bžin.du. raṅ.las. ts'ad.ma. grub.bo. sñam.du. sems.na. gžal.bar.bya.bai. don.rnams. la. ma.ltos.par. yaṅ. ts'ad.ma.rnams. rab.tu.ạgrub.ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | raṅ. las. grub.pa. ni.gžan.la. bltos.pa. ma.yin.no. | 'on.te. bltos. na. ni. raṅ.las. grub.pa.ma.yin.no. | ạdir. smras.pa. | gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams. gzal.bar. bya.ba. don.rnams.la. mi.bltos. na. skyon. cir.ạgyur.že.na. | ạdir.bšad.pa. |

gal.te. gžal.bya. don.rnams.la. |
ma.bltos. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma.ạgrub ||
ts'ad.ma. ạdi.rnams. k'o.na. ni. |
gaṅ.gi. yin.par.mi.ạgyur.ro. | [2] 42.

gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams. gžal.bar.bya.ba. don.rnams.la. mi.bltos.par. rab.tu. ạgrub.pa. yin.no. | že.na. | de.lta. ni. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. ạdi.rnams. gaṅ.gi.p'yir. ts'ad.ma. yaṅ. ma.yin.pai. skyon. de. lta.bur. ạgyur.ro. | 'on.te. ts'ad. ma.rnams. don. ạga'.žig.gi. yin.no. že.na | de.gžal.bar.bya. bai.don.rnams.la. mi.bltos.par. tsa'd.ma.rnams.su. ạgyur.pa. ma.yin.no. |

'on.te. bltos.nas. de.rnams. ạgrub. |
ạdod.na. de.la. skyon. cir.ạgyur. ||
ma.grub. gžan.la. mi. bltos.pas. |
grub.pa. sgrub.par.byed.pa. yin. || 43.

'on.te. gsal.bar.bya.bai. don.rnams.la. bltos.nas. ts'ad. ma.rnams.ạgrub.pa. yin.par. ạdod.do. že.na. | de.lta.na. ni. don. ma.grub.pa. ni. bltos.pa.med. pa.yin.te. | lhas.byin. ma.grub.pa. ni. don.ạga'.la. yaṅ. bltos.par.ma.yin.pas. k'yed.kyi. ts'ad.ma. bži. grub.pas. sgrub.par.byed.pa.yin.no. | grub.pa. sgrub.par.byed.pa. yaṅ. ạdod.pa.ma.yin.te. | byas.pa byed.par. mi.ạt'ad.pai.p'yir.ro. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

gal.te. yoṅ.ye. gžal.bya. las. |
bltos.nas. ts'ad.ma. grub.yin.na. ||

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[1] VK. *b*) rnams.las.
d) raṅ. grub. gžan.las. bltos. ma. yin.

[2] VK. *a*) gsal.byai.
b) ma.grub.
c) de.ltar. ts'ad.ma. ạdi.rnams. ni.

can be called a proof? In fact it is not related to anything else.]

If you again object: "The pramāṇa can prove in so far as it is related to the things to be proved", then the four pramāṇas are dependent on something which is already proved. What for? If things are not yet proved, how can they be reciprocally related? If, on the other hand, things are already proved, there is no necessity of assuming a reciprocal relation among them. When [the individual] Devadatta is not yet proved as existent, he has no relation with things. If he is already proved as existent, then he is independent of the proof, just as a thing which is already made does not need another efficient cause for its existence. Again there is another argument:

XLIV. If the things which are to be apprehended are proved on account of their relation with the pramāṇa, then the things to be apprehended are subsequently proved in relation to the pramāṇa.

If the things which are to be apprehended are proved on account of their relation with the pramāṇa, this implies that those things to be apprehended are proved by the pramāṇa. What for? Because what is to be proved is not proved, but the pramāṇa can prove the things to be apprehended. Again there is another argument:

XLV. If things are proved without a pramāṇa, then they have no relation with the pramāṇa. Why, then, do you use a pramāṇa in order to prove them? What in fact could be proved by that pramāṇa?

If you mean to say that the knowable is proved without any relation to the pramāṇa, what will be the use of your search after a pramāṇa in order to prove? What for? That pramāṇa, in fact, why should be sought for? If the objects to be apprehended are proved without a pramāṇa, what is, then, the use of that pramāṇa? Again there is another argument:

XLVI. If you maintain that the validity of the pramāṇa is proved as having relation to the notion

ts'ad.ma.rnams.las. ma.bltos.par. |
gžal.bar.bya.ba. ạgrub.par.ạgyur.||[1] 44.

gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams. ni. gžal.bar.bya. ba. rnams.la. bltos. nas. so. že.na. | de. ts'ad.ma.rnams.la. bltos.nas. gžal.bar.bya. ba. ạgrub.par. mi.ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | bsgrub.par. bya.ba. ni. sgrub.par.byed.pa. sgrub.par.mi.byed.la. | ts'ad. ma.rnams. kyi. sgrub.par.byed.pa. yaṅ. gžal.bya.rnams. yin. žes. grag.go. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams.la. ni. |
ma.bltos.par. yaṅ. gžal.bya. ạgrub. ||
gaṅ.p'yir. k'yod.kyi. de. grags.pa. |
ts'ad.ma. grub.pas. ci.žig.bya. ||[2] 45.

gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams.la. ma.bltos.par. gžal.bar.bya. ba.rnams. la. ạgrub.bo. sñam.du.sems.na. | ci.da. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. grub.par. yoṅs.su.brtags.pas. ci.žig. bya. | cii.p'yir že.na. | gaṅ.gi. don.du. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. de.rnams. yoṅs. su.brtags.pai. gžal.bar.byai. don. ni. ts'ad.ma.rnams. med. par. yaṅ. grub.pa. yin.pas. de.la. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. rnams.kyis. ci.žig.bya. |

ci.ste. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma.rnams. |
gžal.bya.rnams.la. bltos.nas. ạgrub. ||
de.ltar. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma.rnams. |
gžal.bya. ṅes.par. bzlog.par. ạgyur. ||[3] 46.

ci.ste. sṅar. smras.pai. skyon.du. ạgyur.ba. na. mi. ruṅ.ṅo. sñam.nas. ts'ad.ma.rnams. ni. gžal.bar.bya.bai. don.rnams.la. bltos.pa.yin.no. sñam.du.sems.na. de.lta. na. ni. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. daṅ. gžal.bar.bya.ba. rnams. bzlog.par.ạgyur.te. | k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma.rnams. kyaṅ. gžal. bar.bya.bar. ạgyur.te. | gžal.bar.bya.ba.rnams.kyis. rab. tu. bsgrub.pai.p'yir.ro. | gžal.bar.bya.ba.dag. kyaṅ. ts'ad. ma.rnams.su. ạgyur.te. | ts'ad.ma.rnams. sgrub.par.byed.pa. yin. pai.p'yir.ro. |

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[1] *a*) VK. yoṅs.ye. gžal.bya.

[2] VK. *c*) gan.p'yir. de.dag. de. ạgrub.na.
d) k'yod.kyi. t'sad.ma. grub.pas. ci.

[3] VV.B. *c*) de lta. VK. *c*) ts'ad.ma.daṅ.

to be ascertained, then, the pramāṇa as well as the notion which must be ascertained by it, would not be reciprocally differentiated.

If, being afraid of the mistake indicated above, you mean to say that there is a pramāṇa as having relation to the things which must be ascertained; then, according to you, the pramāṇa and the things which must be ascertained by it, must be one; it would be impossible, therefore, to distinguish between them. If you hold such a view, then the pramāṇa would be just the notion to be ascertained. How do we know that? If the notion to be ascertained proves the pramāṇa, then the notion to be proved is the pramāṇa itself; if the pramāṇa proves the notion to be proved, then the pramāṇa and the notions to be proved are one and the same thing.

XLVII. [You can say] that the pramāṇa proves the knowable and that the knowable proves the pramāṇa. But if you maintain such [a thesis], both the things remain unproved.

If you mean to say that the pramāṇa proves the knowable, because it is evident that [the latter] is related to the pramāṇa, or that the knowable proves the pramāṇa, because it is evident that [the latter] is related to the knowable, then if you maintain such a view, both are unproved. What for?

XLVIII. [If the argument, stated by you, is like this, *viz.* if] the pramāṇa can prove the knowable, and the knowable can prove the pramāṇa, then, how can they prove each other?

If you maintain that the pramāṇa proves the objects to be known, and that those objects to be known can prove the pramāṇa, then, since the pramāṇa is not self proved, the cause of knowledge being unproved, how can it prove the object to be known? Again there is another argument:

XLIX. If you maintain that the knowable can prove the pramāṇa, and that the pramāṇa can prove the

'on.te. k'yod.kyi. ts'ad. grub.pas. |
gžal.bar.bya.ba. ạgrub.ạgyur.la. ||
gžal.bya.grub.pas. ts'ad.grub.na. |
k'yod.kyi. gñi.ga.'ṅ. ạgrub.mi. ạgyur. ||[1] 47.

'on.te. ts'ad.ma. grub.pas. gžal.bar.bya.ba. ạgrub.par. ạgyur.te. | ts'ad.ma.la. bltos.pai.p'yir.ro. | gžal.bar.bya.ba. ạgrub. pas. kyaṅ. ts'ad.ma. ạgrub.par. ạgyur.te. | gžal.bar. bya.la. bltos.pai.p'yir.ro. sñam.du.sems.na. de.lta.na. ni. k'yod.kyi. gñi.ga. yaṅ. ạgrub.par.mi. ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir. że.na. |

gal.te. ts'ad.mas. gžal.bya.ạgrub. |
gžal.bya. de.dag. rnams.kyis. kyaṅ ||
de.dag. sgrub.par.bya. yin.na. |
de.dag. ji.ltar. sgrub.par. ạgyur. ||[2] 48.

gal.te. ts'ad.ma.rnams.kyis. ni. gžal.bar.bya.ba. rnams. ạgrub.par.byed.la. | gžal.bar.bya.ba. de.dag.rnams.kyis. kyaṅ. ts'ad.ma. de.dag. bsgrub.par.bya.ba. yin.no. że.na. | 'o.na. gžal.bar.bya.ba. ma.grub.pa.rnams.kyi. rgyu. rab.tu.ma. grub.pai.p'yir. gžal.bar.bya.ba. ma.grub.pa. dag. ji.ltar.sgrub. par.ạgyur. |

gal.te. gžal.byas. ts'ad.ma. ạgrub. |
ts'ad.ma. de.dag.rnams.kyis. kyaṅ. ||
de.dag. sgrub.par.bya. yin.na |
de.dag. ji.ltar. sgrub.par.ạgyur. ||[3] 49.

gal.te. yaṅ.[4] gžal.bar.bya.ba.rnams. ạgrub.par. ạgyur.la. | ts'ad.ma. de.rnams.kyis. kyaṅ. gžal.bar.bya. ba. de.dag. bsgrub.par.bya.ba. yin.no. że.na. | 'o.na. ts'ad.ma. ma.grub.rnams. kyi. rgyu. rab.tu. ma.grub.pai.p'yir. ts'ad. ma. ma.grub.pa.dag. ji.ltar. sgrub.par.ạgyur. |

gal.te. p'a.yis. bu. bskyed.bya. |
gal.te. bu. de. ñid.kyis. kyaṅ. ||
ci.ste. p'a. de. bskyed.byas. na. |
de.ni. gaṅ.gis. gaṅ. bskyed.smros. ||[5] 50.

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[1] VK. *d*) k'yod.kyis.gñis.ka.'n. [2] VK. *c*) bsgrub.par.
[3] VK. B. *b*) ts'ad.ma. de. rnams. sgrub. kyis. kyaṅ.
[4] Sic.xyl.: but I suppose that we must read: gal.te. yaṅ.gžal.bar. bya.ba.rnams.kyis. ts'ad.ma.rnams. ạgrub.par. ạgyur.la.
[5] VK. B. *a*) p'a.yi.
c) ci.de. bya.na.
d) des.na. VV.B. bskyod.

knowable, then (if the argument stated by you is like this,) how can they prove each other?

If the knowable can prove that pramāṇa and if that pramāṇa can prove the objects to be known, as the knowable is not yet proved, the cause, being itself unproved, how can it prove the pramāṇa?

L. [One can suppose] either that this father gives birth to a son or that this son gives birth to a father [but if it be so], who is it that gives birth and who is that is born?

Suppose that there is a man who states "father[hood] can give birth to son[ship], and, this son[ship] also gives birth to father[hood]"; will you then explain who can give birth and who is born?

You say just in the same way: "The pramāṇa proves the knowable and the knowable proves the pramāṇa." Will you now explain what can prove and what is proved? Again there is another argument:

LI. Who is the father and who is the son? Such double characteristic, [*viz.*] that of "the father" and that of "the son" as explained by you is subject to doubt.

You said before that there are two kinds [of individuals], that is the father and the son. Now I ask: who is the father and who is the son? If the two characteristics of father[hood] and son[ship] are interrelated, then it can be doubted "who is the father and who is the son?" In the same way as regards the arguments stated by you concerning the pramāṇa and the knowable, I may ask: "what is the pramāṇa and what is the knowable"? These [notions] are of two kinds; if they can prove the objects, they can be called pramāṇa. Objects to be proved, are called the knowable. Then it can be doubted: "what is the pramāṇa, and what is the knowable?" So whatever can prove may be called a pramāṇa, and whatever can be proved may be called knowable. Then it can be doubted: "which is the pramāṇa and which is the knowable?"

ji.ltar. ąga.'žig. na. re. p'as. bu. bskyed.par.bya.ba. yin.la. | p'a.de. yaṅ. bu. de. ñid.kyis. bskyed.par.bya.ba. yin.no. žes. zer.na. | de.na. gaṅ.gis. gaṅ.bskyed.par. smros. šig. ces.bya.ba. de.bžin.du. k'yod.na. re. ts'ad.ma.rnams.kyis. gsal.bar. bya.ba.dag. bsgrub.par.bya.ba. yin.la. | ts'ad.ma. de.dag. ñid. kyaṅ. gžal.bar.bya. de.dag. ñid. kyis. sgrub. par.bya.ba. yin.no. žes. zer.ba. na.de.na. k'yod.kyi. gaṅ.dag. gis. gaṅ.dag. rab.tu.bsgrub.par.bya.ba.yin. |

de.dag. gñi.ga.'ṅ. p'a. daṅ. bui. |
mts'an.ñid. ądsin.pas. de.yi.p'yir. ||
de.la. k'o.bo. t'e.ts'om. gyur. |
de.na. p'a. gaṅ. bu. gaṅ. smros. ||[1] 51.

p'a. daṅ. bu. sṅar.bstan.pa. de. gñis.las. | bu. ni. gaṅ. p'a. ni. gaṅ. de. gñi.ga. yaṅ. skyed.par.byed. pa. yin.pai. p'yir. p'ai. mts'an.ñid. ądsin.par. byed.pa.yin.la. | bskyed. par.bya.ba. yin.pai.p'yir. bui.mts'an.ñid.ądsin.pa.yin.pas. ądi.la. k'o.bo. t'e.ts'om.du. gyur.na. de.la. p'a. ni. gaṅ. bu. ni. gaṅ. žes. bya. ba. de. bžin. du. k'yod. kyi ts'ad. ma. daṅ. gžal. bar. bya. ba. daṅ. gaṅ.dag. yin.pa. de.dag. kyaṅ. de.na. ts'ad.ma. dag. ni. gaṅ.yin. | gžal.bar.bya.ba.dag. ni. gaṅ. yin. | ądi.dag. gñi.ga. yaṅ. rab.tu.bsgrub.par.byed.pa.yin.pai.p'yir. ts'ad.ma. dag. yin.la. | bsgrub.par.bya.ba.dag. yin.pai.p'yir. gžal.bar. bya.ba.yin.pas. ądi.la. k'o.bo. t'e.ts'om.du. ągyur.na. ts'ad. ma.dag. ni. gaṅ. yin. | gžal.bar.bya.ba.dag. ni. gaṅ.yin. |

ts'ad.ma.rnams. ni. raṅ.ñid.kyis. |
ągrub.min. p'an. ts'un.gyis. min. pa.'m. ||
ts'ad.ma. gžan.gyis. ma.yin.la. |
gžal.byas. ma.yin.rgyu. med.min. ||[2] 52.

raṅ.gis. te. mṅon.sum. ni.[3] mṅon.sum. de. ñid.kyis. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. ni. rjes.su.dpag.pa. de. ñid. kyis. daṅ. luṅ. ni. luṅ. de.ñid.kyis. daṅ. dpes.gžal.ba. ni. dpes.ąjal.ba. de.ñid.kyis. rab.tu.mi.ągrub.la. | p'an.ts'un.gyis. te. | mṅon.sum. ni. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes.ąjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ.rnams.kyis. daṅ. | rjes.dpag.pa. ni. mṅon.sum. daṅ.

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[1] VK. *a*) gñis.ka'ṅ. *d*) de.las.
VK. B. *b*) dei.p'yir.
c) ągyur.

[2] VK. *a*) rnams. kyi. xyl. has *b*) yin. *d*) med. yin. I have corrected according to VK.

[3] ni, *deest* in VV.B.

LII. A pramāṇa cannot prove itself, nor is it prove by its own nature nor by another [thing]. It is no proved by a different pramāṇa, nor is it proved without cause.

Thus a pramāṇa is not proved by itself; direct perceptio is not proved by direct perception; inference is not proved b inference; analogy is not proved by analogy; authorit al is not proved by authority; nor are they proved one anothe Perception is not proved by inference and authority. Infer ence is not proved by direct perception, analogy and autho rity. Analogy is not proved by direct perception, inferen and authority. Authority is not proved by direct percep tion, inference and analogy. Nor is there another direct per ception or inference or analogy or authority which a differen pramāṇa, such as direct perception, inference, analogy an authority comes to prove. The pramāṇa is not proved by th combination of its own parts, nor is it proved by the combina tion of its own objects nor by the objects of something els nor is it proved without a cause, nor is it proved by a co comitance; the reason of this is like that which has bee already explained; 20, 30 or 40, 50, 60, 20, 30, 40, 50; o 60. As to what you state *viz.* that since there is a pramāṇ it is possible to say that there is a knowable and that becaus there is a pramāṇa and a knowable, we can realise that all dharmas have an essence, I maintain that this argument is not valid.

Again you say these stanzas: [VII.]

These are your stanzas. Now I reply:

LIII. If the good dharmas, taught by the Master of the law, had an essence, the law should separately explain the essence of these good dharmas.

If the Master of the law had affirmed that those good dharmas have an essence, then one could separately explain this good essence: "these are the good dharmas, such is that good mind; the essence of good mind is like this." But we do not

dpes.ạjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ.rnams.kyis. daṅ. | dpes.ạjal.ba ni. mṅon.sum. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. luṅ.rnams. kyis daṅ. | luṅ. ni. mṅon.sum. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes.ạjal.bas. kyaṅ. ma. yin.la. | raṅ.gi. ji.lta.ba. bžin.du. | mṅon.sum.daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes.ạjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ.rnams.[1] ni. mṅon.sum. daṅ. rjes.su.dpag.pa. daṅ. dpes.ạjal.ba. daṅ. luṅ. gžan.rnams.kyis. kyaṅ. ma.yin.la. | gžal.bar.bya.ba. raṅ. daṅ. gžan.gyi. yul.gyi. bsdus.pa. mt'a. dag. daṅ. | re.res. kyaṅ. ma.yin.la. | rgyu.med.pas. kyaṅ. ma.yin.la. | kun.bsdus.pas. kyaṅ. ma.yin.na'o. gtan.ts'igs. sṅar. bstan.pa. de.dag. ni. ñi. šu.'m. sum.cu. 'm. bži.bcu.'m. sum.bcu.rtsa. drug.gis. mi.grub.na. | de.la. gaṅ. k'yod.kyis. gžal.bar.bya.bai. dṅos.po.rnams. ni. ts'ad.mas. k'oṅ.du.c'ud.par.bya.ba. yin.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. gžal.bar.bya.ba. de.dag. kyaṅ. yod.la. | k'yod.kyi. ts'ad.ma. gaṅ.dag.gis. dṅos.po. gžal.bar.bya.dag. yaṅ. dag.par. k'oṅ.du.c'ud.pai. ts'ad. ma. de.dag. kyaṅ. yod.do. žes.smras.pa.gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | gžan. yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. |

VII skye.bo. c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs. mk'as. |
dge.ba.dag.gi. c'os.rnams.la. ||
dge.bai. raṅ.bžin. yin.par.ni. |
sems.šin. lhag.ma.rnams. daṅ. yaṅ. ||

žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. |
c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs. rab.mk'as.pa. |
dge.ba.yi. ni. c'os.rnams.kyi. ||
dge.bai. raṅ.bžin. smra.ba. gaṅ. |
de.ltar. rab.p'ye. brjod.bya.yin. ||[2] 53.

c'os.kyi. gnas.skabs.la. mk'as.pa.dag. dge.bai. c'os.kyi. dge.bai. raṅ.gi.ṅo.bo. sems.pa. na. de. yaṅ. k'yod.kyi. rab.tu.p'ye.ste. | ạdi. ni. dge.bai. ṅo.bo. yin. | ạdi.dag. ni. dge.bai. c'os. de.dag. yin.te. | ạdi. ni. dge.ba. de.rnam.par. šes.pa. yin. | ạdi. ni. dge.bai.rnam.par. šes.pai. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. yin. | de.bžin.du. t'ams.cad.la. bstan.par.bya.ba.yin.na. | de.yaṅ. ma.bstan.pas. dei.p'yir. raṅ. ji.lta.ba. bžin.du.

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[1] here the xyl. has kyis. which is evidently out of place.

[2] VK. b) dge.ba.yis...rnams.kyis.
c) raṅ.bžin. c'os.rnams.gaṅ.

see that all dharmas are like that. Therefore, if in such a way you explain the essence of the dharmas also, your argument is not valid.

Again there is another argument:

LIV. If the essence of the good dharmas is produced by causes and conditions, then, the good dharmas would be dependent on others. How could they have an essence ?

If the essence of the good dharmas is produced by the combination of causes and conditions, then, they would be dependent on others. How, then, would it be possible to state that the good dharmas have an essence ? For the other dharmas also we must say the same [argument], as that stated concerning the good dharmas. Therefore, if you maintain that for the bad dharmas and the essence of the bad dharmas we must understand the same thing as for the good dharmas and the essence of the good dharmas, the argument is not valid.

Again there is another argument :

LV. If you maintain that there are at least some good dharmas, which do not arise from causes and conditions, then, if the good dharmas were like that, it would be impossible [for all] to remain in the condition of purity.

If you mean to say that there are some good dharmas which do not arise from causes and conditions and that the same is the case as regards the bad dharmas and the essence of the bad dharmas, the undefined dharmas and the essence of the undefined dharmas, then, if it be so, it would be impossible [for all] to remain in the condition of purity. What for? If you hold such a view as that referred to, then, you reject the law of the twelve causes and conditions. If you reject the law of the twelve causes and conditions, then, you refuse to see the law of the twelve causes and conditions. If it be so, there is no more, [for you], the law of twelve causes and conditions

c'os.rnams. kyi. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo.bstan.to. | žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

gal.te. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.kyis. |
dge.bai. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. de. ||
brten.nas. skye.na. de.lta. na. |
gžan. dṅos. raṅ.ṅor. ji.ltar.ạgyur. || 54.

gal.te. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.kyi. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. ni. rgyu. daṅ. rkyen. ts'ogs.pa.la. brten.nas. skye.'o. že.na. | de. gžan.gyi. dṅos.po.la. brten.nas. skyes.pa.yin.na. | dge.bai. c'os.rnams. kyi. raṅ.gyi. ṅo.bo. ji.ltar.ạgyur. | mi.dge.ba.la. sogs.pa. dag. la. yaṅ. de.bžin.du. sbyar.ro. | de.la. gaṅ.gi.p'yir. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.kyi. dge.bai. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. yaṅ. bstan.la. | de. bžin.du. mi.dge. ba.la.sogs.pa.dag. ni. yaṅ. mi.dge.ba.la.sogs. pai. raṅ.bžin. yaṅ. bstan.pa.yin.no. | žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin. pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

'on.te. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.kyi. |
raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. de. ạga'la.'ṅ. ||
ma.brten. skye.na. de.lta.na. |
ts'aṅs.par. spyod.pa. gnas. mi.ạgyur. ||[2] 55.

'on.te. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.kyi. dge.bai. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. ni. ạga'.la.'ṅ. ma.brten.par.skye.la. | mi.dge.ba.la.sogs.pa.dag. gi. yaṅ. de.lta. bu.yin.no. | sñam.du.sems.na. | de.lta. na. ni. ts'aṅs.par.spyod.pa.la. gnas.par.mi.ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir.že. na. | de.lta.yin.na. ni. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạgyur.ba. btaṅ.ba. yin.no. | rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar.ạbyuṅ.ba. btaṅ.bai.p'yir. | rten.ciṅ. ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. mt'oṅ.ba. btaṅ.ba.yin.te. | rten.ciṅ.ạbrel. bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. yod.pa.ma.yin.pa. ni. mt'oṅ.ba.ste. | dmigs. par.ạt'ad.pa.ma.yin.no. | rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. mt'oṅ. ba. med.na. c'os.mt'oṅ. ba.med.pa.yin.no. | bcom.ldan.ạdas.kyis ni. dge.sloṅ. sus. la. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. mt'oṅ.ba. des. c'os.mt'oṅ.ṅo. | žes.gsuṅs.so. | c'os.mt'oṅ.ba. med.pai.p'yir. ts'aṅs.par. spyod.pa.la. gnas.med.pa.yin.no. | yaṅ. na. rten. ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. btaṅ.bas. sdug.bsṅal. kun.ạbyuṅ.

[1] VK. *a*) °kyi.
b) raṅ.bžin.ạga'.žig. brten.skye.ba.
c) de. ni. gžan. lta. de.lta.na.
d) raṅ.gi. ṅo.bor. ji.ltar.ạgyur.

[2] VK. c) de.lta.na. 'ṅ.
d). V.V.B. spyod. pa. la.

nor is the vision of this law of the causes and conditions any longer possible. But if there is no vision of the law of the twelve causes and conditions, then it is not possible to have a vision of the real essence of dharmas.. The Blessed one said: "If a monk can see the law of the twelve causes and conditions, then, he sees the dharma." If he does not see the dharma he cannot remain in the condition of purity. If he rejects the law of the twelve causes and conditions, then, he rejects the truth of the origin of misery, since the twelve causes and conditions represent the origin of misery. But if he rejects the truth of the origin of misery, then, he rejects also the truth of the existence of misery. In fact, if there is no origin of misery, how can there be the existence of misery ?

If misery does not exist, how, then, would it be possible to extinguish misery ? But if there is no extinction [of it], how would it be possible to follow the path leading to the extinction of misery? Therefore, if such a view, [as maintained by you, were true], the fourfold holy truth would be non-existent.

If the fourfold holy truth be non-existent, then, there would be no fruit derived from the cultivation of the path of the auditors. But if one sees the fourfold holy truth, in the way as explained by me, then he realises the fruit which is derived from the cultivation of the path of the auditors. If no fruit is derived from the cultivation of the path of the auditors, then one cannot remain in a condition of purity. Again there is another argument:

LVI. [According to this theory nothing is existent neither a dharma, nor a non-dharma, nor the dharmas generally accepted by the world. If there be an essence of dharmas, this would be necessarily eternal. And therefore there would be neither causes nor conditions, [so that all dharmas would be eternal].

[If you maintain such a view, *viz.*,] that dharmas arise without the combination of causes and conditions, then you commit many mistakes. What for? Because it would be impossible to prove either a dharma or a non-dharma, and

ba. btaṅ.ba. yin.te. | sdug.bsṅal. kun.ạbyuṅ.ba. ni. rten. ciṅ. ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba.yin. pas.so. | sdug.bsṅal. kun.ạbyuṅ. ba. btaṅ.bas. sdug.bsṅal. btaṅ.ba.yin.te. | kun.ạbyuṅ.med.na. gaṅ.las. sdug. bsṅal. kun.ạbyuṅ.bar.ạgyur. | sdug.bsṅal. btaṅ bai.p'yir. daṅ. kun.ạbyuṅ.ba. btaṅ.bai.p'yir. | sdug.bsṅal. ạgog.pa. btaṅ.ba. yin.te. | sdug.bsṅal. daṅ. kun.ạbyuṅ.ba. gñis. med.na. gaṅ.žig. spaṅs. pas. ạgog.par.ạgyur.bas.so. | sdug. bsṅal. ạgog.pa. med.na. gaṅ.žig. t'ob.par.bya.bai.p'yir sdug.bsṅal. ạgog.par. ạgyur.bai. lam.du. ạgyur. | des.na. ạp'ags.pai. bden.pa. bži.dag. med.par.ạgyur.te. | de.med.pai. p'yir. dge.sbyoṅ. ts'ul.gyi. ạbras.bu.med.par.ạgyur.te. | bden. pa. mt'oṅ.ba.las. dge.sbyoṅ. gi.ts'ul.gyi. ạbras.bu.rnams. yaṅ. dag.par. ạt'ob.pas.so. | dge.sbyoṅ.gi.[1] ts'ul.gyi. ạbras.bu. rnams. med.pas.[2] ts'aṅs.par. spyod.pa.la. | gnas.par. mi.ạgyur. ro. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

rgyu. mi. ldan. pa. rtag.pai.p'yir. |
c'os.rnams. t'ams.cad. rtag.par. ạgyur. ||
c'os.sam. c'os.ma. yin. med.ciṅ. |
ạjig.rten.pa.yi. t'a.sñad.med. ||[3] 56.

de.lta. yin.na. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar.ạbyuṅ.ba. gtoṅ.ba. k'yod.la. skyon.du. ạgyur. že.na. | c'os.med.pa. daṅ. c'os. ma.yin.pa. med.pa. daṅ. ạjig.rten.pa.yi. t'a.sñad.rnams. med.par.ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir.že.na. | ạdi. t'ams.cad. ni. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba.yin.na. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.[4] ba. de. med.na. gaṅ.las. ạbyuṅ.bar.ạgyur. | gžan. yaṅ. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. daṅ.bcas.pa. daṅ. rteṅ.ciṅ.ạbrel.par.ạgyur.[5]ba. ma.yin.pa. daṅ. rgyu.med.pa.las. byuṅ.ba. daṅ. rtag.par. ạgyur.te. | rgyu.med.par.rnams. ni. rtag.pa. ñid. yin.pai. p'yir. daṅ. de.la. ts'aṅs.par.spyod.pa. gnas.pa.ma.yin.pa. de. ñid.du. ạgyur.ro. | ạgrub.pai. mt'a.' daṅ. [6]ạgal.te. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | bcom.ldan.ạdas.kyis. ạdu.byed. t'ams.cad. ni. mi.rtag.pa.'o. | žes.bšad. pa.yin.no. | de.dag. ni. raṅ.gi. ṅo. bo.ñid. daṅ.bcas.pai. rtag.pa.ñid.kyis. rtag.pa.yin.no. |

[1] VV.B. dge. sloṅ. gi.
[2] VV.B. med. pai.
[3] VK. b) brtag.par.ạgyur.
c) c'os.daṅ.
[4] VV.B. ạgyur.
[5] VV.B. ạbyuṅ.
[6] VV.B. daṅ. yaṅ. ạgal.te.

because all the dharmas of this world would be unproved. What for? The combination of causes and conditions produces all dharmas. Since all dharmas are produced by the combination of causes and conditions, if they were not produced by the combination of causes and conditions, it would be impossible to prove any dharma. Moreover, whatever has an essence of its own, is not produced by the combination of causes and conditions. Since it has neither a cause nor a condition, so it is an eternal dharma. What for? Because any dharma which has neither a cause nor a condition is eternal. If it be so, it would be impossible to remain in a condition of purity. Moreover your thesis *viz.*, that dharmas are self-existent, is wrong. What for? Because the Blessed One said: "Whatever is a product, is non eternal." But how is it possible to maintain that what has a nature of its own is non-eternal?

LVII. The good dharmas, the bad [dharmas], the undefined [dharmas], viz., all the *saṃskṛta* dharmas, according to your explanation, would be eternal. Such is the mistake that you commit.

If you maintain that the good dharmas have the essence of the good dharmas, and just the same you say as regards the bad dharmas and the undefined dharmas, then, you maintain that all the *saṃskṛta* dharmas are eternal. What for? If the dharmas have no cause, then, they have neither birth nor duration nor destruction. If they have no birth, no duration, no destruction, they are not *saṃskṛta* dharmas. Thus, the consequence would be that all dharmas are *asaṃskṛta*. If you say that all the good dharmas, such as good ones, etc. have their own nature, then all dharmas must be absolutely non-void. But this argument is not valid. Again you say this stanza: [IX]

This is the stanza. Now I reply.

LVIII. If there is a man who says that "name is existent and that words have an essence of their

mi.dge.ba. daṅ. luṅ.ma.bstan. |
ṅes.ạbyin. sogs.la.'ṅ. skyon.de.bžin. ||
de.bas. k'yod.kyi. ạdus.byas.kun. |
ạdus.ma.byas.pa. ñid.du. ạgyur. || 57.

de. dge.bai. c'os.rnams.la. rtag.pa. de. bstan.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de.ñid. mi.dge.ba.rnams. daṅ. luṅ.du. ma.bstan.pa. rnams.la. yaṅ. yod. | de.ñid. ṅes.par. ạbyin.pa.la.sogs.pa.la. yaṅ. yod.do. | de.bas.na. k'yod.kyi. ạdus.byas. ạdi. t'ams.cad. ạdus.ma.byas.su. ạgyur.ro. | cii.p'yir. že.na. | rgyu.med. na. skye.ba. daṅ. gnas.pa. daṅ. ạjig.pa.dag. med.pai.p'yir. de.med.na. ạdus.byas.kyi. mts'an.ñid.med.pai.p'yir. t'ams. cad. ạdus.ma.byas.su. ạgyur.ro. | de.la. dge.ba.la.sogs.pa. dag.gi. dṅos.po. dag.gi. raṅ.gi. ṅo.bo. yod.pai.p'yir. dṅos. po.t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa.ma.yin.no. žes.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | gžan.yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. |

IX. gal.te. c'os.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med. |
raṅ.bžin.med. ces.bya.bai. miṅ. ||
de. yaṅ. de.bžin. med.ạgyur.te. |
gži.med. miṅ.ni. med.pas.so. ||

žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya-ste. |
gaṅ.žig. raṅ.bžin.bcas.pa. žes. |
miṅ. ni. yod.par. smra.ba.la. ||
de.ltar. k'yod.kyis. lan.btab.kyis. |
ṅa.yi. miṅ. yod. mi. smra.'o. ||[1] 58.

gaṅ.žig. miṅ. ạdir. raṅ.bžin. daṅ.bcas.pa.yin.na. | žes. miṅ. yod.par. smra.ba. de.la. k'yod.kyis. lan.gdab.par.bya. ba.yin.gyi. | gal.te. miṅ.can.gyi. raṅ.bžin de. med.na. | dei. p'yir. miṅ. de. yaṅ. raṅ.bžin. yod.pa.ma.yin.par. bya. dgos.te. | yod.pa. ma.yin.pa.la. ni. miṅ.gi. raṅ.bžin.yod. par. mi. ạgyur.bas. ṅed.cag. yaṅ. miṅ.gi.raṅ.bžin. yod.par. mi.smra.'o. | de.bas. na. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. yaṅ. med.pai.p'yir miṅ.gi. raṅ.bžin. yaṅ. med.pa.yin.no. | dei.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. yin.no. | stoṅ.pa. ñid. yin.pai.p'yir. yod.pa.ma.yin.pas.de.la. k'yod.kyis. miṅ.yod.pai. p'yir. raṅ.gi.ṅo.bo. yod.do. | žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | ạdi.ltar. gžan. yaṅ. |

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[1] VV. c) de.ltar. miṅ. gis. d) ṅa.yi.

own, that man could be refuted by you. But for me words and names are unreal.

If there is a man who says that names have a nature of their own, then, you could refute [the assumption] of that man. That man says that if there is an essence there is a name; if there is no essence, there is no name. But I do not teach this, viz. that there is any essence of the name. How is it possible to know this? All dharmas have no essence of their own; if they have no essence of their own, then, it is possible to call them void. If they are void, it is possible to state that they are unreal. Therefore if you maintain that there is a name and there is an essence corresponding to it, this argument is not valid. Again there is another argument:

LIX. [The proposition:] 'this name is non-existent,' is either existent or non-existent. If you say that it is existent or that it is non-existent, your thesis is involved in a double mistake. [The proposition:] 'this name is existent,' is either non-existent or existent. If you say that it is non-existent or that it is existent, your discussion is involved in a double mistake.

[You say:] 'If this name is non-existent, then your thesis is wrong and therefore your discussion is wrong.' But my thesis is not involved in such a mistake: "objects which are existent have a name; objects which are non-existent have no name." Thus if you maintain that all dharmas have a nature of their own, this argument is wrong. Again there is another argument.

LX. Thus I said before that all dharmas are void. The thesis in which I explain my arg ment is equally [void], and therefore it is not possible [for me] to commit any mistake.

I have already said that all dharmas are void. And I also said that names are void. But you take these void names

med.la. miṅ. med. ces. gaṅ. ḁdi. |
ci.de. yod.pa'm. med.pa.yin. ||
gal.te. yod.pa.'m. med.pa. yin. |
k'yod.kyis. smras.pa. gñi.ga.'ṅ. ñams. ||[1] 59.

med.pas.[2] miṅ. med.do. žes.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin.pa. ḁdi. ci. miṅ. med.pa. de. yod.pa.yin. nam. | 'oṅ.te. med.pa.yin. | gal.te. miṅ. de. yod.pa. žig.gi. yin.nam. | gal.te. med.pa. žig.gi. yin.na. dam.bcas.pa. gñi.ga. yaṅ. ñams.par. ḁgyur.te. | de.la. gal.te. re.žig. miṅ.med.pa. žes.bya.ba. yod.pai. yin. no. že.na. | miṅ.med.do. žes. dam.bcas.pa. ñams.par.ḁgyur.te. | de. ni. med.pa.ma.yin.te. | de. ni. de. yod.pas.so. ci.ste. miṅ. med.pa. žes.bya.ba. med.pai. yin.no. | že.na. | med.pa.la. ni. miṅ. med.do. | de.bas. na. miṅ.gi. raṅ.bžin. yod.do. žes. k'yod.kyis. dam.bcas.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. ñams.pa.yin.no. | ḁdi.ltar. gžan.yaṅ. |

dṅos.po. dag. ni. t'ams.cad.kyi. |
stoṅ.pa. ñid. ni. sṅar. bstan.pas. ||
de.p'yir. dam.bcas. med.par. yaṅ. |
klan.ka. gaṅ. yin. de. ts'ol.byed. ||[3] 60.

ḁdir. ṅed.cag.gis. sṅar. dṅos. po. t'ams.cad.kyi. stoṅ. pa.ñid. rgya.c'er. bstan.pas. der. miṅ. yaṅ. stoṅ.pa.ñid.du. bstan.pa.yin.no. | dei.p'yir. dam.bcas.pa. yod.[4]par. yaṅ. k'yod. klan.ka. ḁdi. ts'ol.bar.byed.kyi. | ṅed. miṅ. yod.do. žes. mi.smra'o | gžan.yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. |

X. 'on.te. ḁdi.ltar. raṅ.bžin.yod. |
de. ni. c'os.la. med. ce.na. ||
c'os.rnams. med.par. raṅ.bžin.te. |
gaṅ.gi. yin.par. de. bstan.rigs. ||

žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ḁdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. |
'on.te. raṅ.bžin. žig. yod.la. |
de. ni. c'os.la. med.do.žes. ||
dogs.pa. bsu.ba. smra.ba. ḁdi. |
dogs.pa. gaṅ.yin.de.med.do. ||[5] 61.

[1] VK. *a)* min.med. ces.bya. gaṅ. yin. ḁdi.
c) gal.te. yod. dam. med. kyaṅ. ruṅ.
d) °gñis.ka'ṅ.

[2] VV.B. med. pa. la. [3] In. a. xyl. has: kyis. [4] VK.B. med.

[5] VV.B. *c)* dog.
VK. *c)* dogs. ḁdi. rigs.pa. ma.yin. mod.
d) dogs.pa. de.ni. k'yod.kyis. byas.

as if they could express something. But [it is evident that] if all dharmas have no essence of their own, names also must be without essence of their own. Therefore I have said that the thesis in which I explain my argument is not involved in any mistake, since I do not state that names have an essence of their own.

Again you say this stanza : [X]

This is your stanza. Now I reply :

LXI. [As regards] your supposition [against my view, viz. :] If this essence is existent as separated from the dharmas, it does not reside in the dharmas, [I reply] that such supposition cannot [be formulated.]

You refute my [opinion] wrongly. I do not refute the essence of the dharmas, [because I do not admit that there is any essence whatever]. For me there is nothing that can be perceived as distinct from the dharmas. Who can perceive the dharmas ? That man [*i.e.*, my opponent] must rather think that, since I do not admit the perception of a dharma whatever, I cannot refute the dharmas. How is it possible to find a mistake in this kind of argument ?

If I were to affirm that dharmas have an essence, then you might refute me and say : "You are not right." But I do not hold such a view and therefore your refutation is inopportune and absolutely invalid.

Again you say these stanzas : [XI].

These are the stanzas. Now I reply. :

LXII. If [you say that] the refutation is possible if there is an essence, then it is possible to say that the void is proved. If there is no essence, and there is no void, how could the refutation be proved ?

"If dharmas are existent, then it is possible to refute them ; if they are non-existent, then, it is impossible to refute them." [In this way] you refute my thesis that all dharmas have no

de. ni. c'os.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. yaṅ. ągog.par. ma. byas.la.[1] c'os.la. ma.gtogs.pa. don. ąga'žig.gi. raṅ.bžin. yin.par.[2] yaṅ. k'as. mi.len.no. | de.lta. yin.na. 'on.te. c'os. rnams. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.yin.na. raṅ.bžin. te. c'os.la. ma. gtogs.pa. don. gžan. gaṅ.žig.gi. yin.pa. de. bstan.pai. rigs.so. žes.bya.bai. k'yod.kyi. klan.ka. de. t'ag.bsriṅs.pa. yin.pas. klan.kar. mi.ągyur.ba.ma.yin. nam. | gžan. yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. |

XI. gaṅ.p'yir. k'yim.na. bum.pa. de. |
med.ces. yod.pa. ñid.la. ągog. ||
mt'oṅ.ste. de.p'yir. k'yod.kyis.ni. |
yod.pai. raṅ.bžin. ągog.pa. yin. ||[3]

žes. smras.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. ądi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. |
gal.te. yod.la. ągog.yin.na. |
'o.na. stoṅ.ñid. rab.ągrub.ste. ||
dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.med.ñid.la. |
k'yod. ni. ągog.par.byed.pas.so. ||[4] 62.

gal.te. yod.pa. k'o.na. la. ągog.par.byed.pa.yin.gyi. | med.pa. k'o.na.[5] | ma.yin.no. | k'yod. kyaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams. cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid. ągog.par.byed.pa.yin.pas. 'o.na. dṅos. po.t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. ñid. rab. tu.grub.pa.ma.yin.nam. | k'yod.kyi. bstan.ts'igs. ągog.par.byed. pa.yod.pai.p'yir. daṅ. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. med. pa.ñid. ągog.[6] pai.p'yir. stoṅ.pa. ñid. rab.tu.grub.pa.yin.no. |

stoṅ.ñid. gaṅ.la. k'yod. ągog.pai. |
stoṅ.ñid. de. yaṅ. med.yin.na. ||
'o.na. yod.la. ągog.yin.žes. |
smras.pa. de. ñams. pa.yin.nam. || 63.

ci.ste. k'yod. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad.kyi. raṅ.bžin. med.pa. ñid.de. stoṅ.pa.ñid. ągog.par.byed.pa. stoṅ.pa de. yaṅ. med. pa.yin.na. 'o.na. yod.pa.la. ągog.par.byed.kyi. med.pa.la. ni. ma.yin.no. | žes. k'yod.kyis. dam.bcas.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. ñams.pa. yin.no. | ądi.ltar.gžan.yaṅ.

[1] VV.B. mi. byed. la. [2] VK.B. pa.
[3] xyl. yin.no. which gives a syllable more.
[4] VK. a) yod. ñid. ągog.
[5] VV.B. med.pa.la.ni.
[6] VV.B. bkag.

essence. As a matter of fact all dharmas, as you say, have no essence. How do we know that? Because your refutation of the non-essence of the dharmas is proved. If the refutation of the non-essence of the dharmas is proved, then it is possible to say that all dharmas are void.

LXIII. According to you, what is to be refuted? That which is refuted by you is the void. But if the dharmas are void and still there is a refutation, then your argument is vitiated by a mistake.

If it is argued against the essence of the dharmas, then, if [these] are without essence, it is possible to state that they are void. The void also must be void. Therefore when you maintain that it is possible to refute things if they are existent, but it is not possible to refute things if they are non-existent, your argument is not valid. Again there is another argument:

LXIV. According to me there is no dharma whatsoever and therefore according to me there is no refutation. Therefore your arguing is illogical, wrong, and difficult to be proved.

If I were to admit the refutation of a dharma whatsoever, then, you could object my thesis. But according to me there is no refutation of any object. In fact since there are no objects, there is nothing which can be refuted by me. Thus there is no refutation and all dharmas are void. So that there are neither the refutation of objects nor the thing to be refuted. Thus, if you object to my words and ask what is that which can be refuted, such an argument is illogical.

Again you say this stanza: [XII.]

This is the stanza. Now I reply:

LXV. You say that dharmas and words are distinct. So far as this argument is concerned, my answer is

dgag. bya. ci. yaṅ. med.pas.na. |
de.ni. ci. yaṅ. ·mi.ạgog.go. ||
dei.p'yir. ạgog.par.byed. do. žes. |
bkur.ba. de. ni. k'yod.kyis. btab. ||[1] 64.

gal.te. ṅas. ci.žig. ạgog.par.byed.na. ni. dei.p'yir. k'yod.kyis. de.dag. kyaṅ. smra.bai. rigs.na. gaṅ.gi.p'yir. dgag.par.bya.ba. ci. yaṅ. med.pas. ṅa. ni. cuṅ.zad. kyaṅ. ạgog.par. mi. byed. do. | dei.p'yir. dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. stoṅ. pa.yin.te. | dgag.par.bya.ba. daṅ. ạgog.par.byed.pa. yod.pa. ma.yin.pa.las. ạgog.par.byed.do. žes. k'yod.kyis. bkur pa. t'og.tu. mi.bab.pa.de. btab.bo. | gžan. yaṅ. k'yod.k'yis. |

XII. ci.ste. raṅ.bžin. de. med.na. |
k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. des. ci.žig. dgag. ||
med.pa. yin.na. ts'ig.med.par. |
ạgog.pa. rab.tu.ạgrub.pa.yin. ||

žes. smras.pa. gan.yin.pa. de. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. |
ts'ig. med.pa. yaṅ. med.pa.yi. |
ạgog.pa. ạgrub.par. ạgyur. žes.na. ||
de.la. ts'ig. ni. med. ces.par. |
go.bar. byed.kyi. skyes. sel.med. ||[2] 65.

k'yod.kyi. ts'ig.dag. med.par. yaṅ. ste. | ts'ig. ma gtogs.par. yaṅ. med.pai. ạgog.pa. ạgrub.na. | de.la. ci dṅos.po.t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. yin.na. žes. smras.pai. k'yod.kyi. ts'ig. des. ci.žig. byed. ces. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste. | dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin. med.pa.'o. žes.bya.bai. ts'ig. ạdi. ni. dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.ñid.du. byed.pa.ma.yin.kyi. | 'on.kyaṅ. raṅ. bžin.med.pa.la. dṅos.po.rnams. raṅ.bžin.med.pa.'o. | žes. go. bar.byed.pa. yin.no. | dper.na. ạga'.žig.na.re. lhas.byin. k'yim.na. med.bžin.du. lhas.byin. k'yim.na. yod.do. žes. zer.ba. daṅ. de. ni. de.la. k'a.cig. na. de. med.do. žes.zer.ba. na. | ts'ig. des. lhas.byin. med.par.mi. byed.kyi. lhas.byin. k'yim.na. mi.srid.par. ston.pa. ạba'.žig.tu. zad.do. | de.bžin.

[1] VK. B. *a*) ạgog. pa.
VK. *d*) yaṅ.dag. min. te. k'yod.kyis. smras.

[2] VK. *b*) ạgog. ts'ig. mi.ạgrub. min. že.na.
d) 'sel.min. (so also VV.B.)

that there is no dharma which can be expressed by words and therefore I do not commit any mistake [as pointed by you].

If you say that the refutation is also proved without words, which law do you follow? [Suppose that your question is "your thesis is:] 'All those dharmas have no essence.' When one utters [this sentence]: 'Those dharmas have no essence' [what is produced by these words?]" Now I reply to this. If one says this sentence: "Dharmas have no essence," these words are not the cause of the non-essence of dharmas. Again there is another argument. Since there is no essence of dharmas we realize that dharmas are without essence; since there is an essence of the dharmas, we realize that dharmas possess an essence. *E.g.* suppose that Devadatta is not really in the house; and that there is a man who asks: "Is Devadatta in or not? One replies that he is in. On the other hand there is somebody else who says that he is not in. The words of the man who replies, saying that Devadatta is not in, are not the cause of the non-existence of Devadatta in the house. But only they make us know that the house is void, since Devadatta is not there. In the same way, if one says that all dharmas have no essence, these words cannot be the cause of non-essence of the dharmas. [The statement concerning] the non-existence makes us realize that the essence of the dharmas is non-essence. Therefore, if you say that if there are no objects, then, it is impossible to affirm the non-essence of the dharmas, your argument is not valid, since by the mere sentence; "non-essence" it is impossible to prove the non-essence of the dharmas.

Moreover you say these stanzas: [XIII—XVI].

These are the four stanzas. Now I reply to you:

LXVI. In order to make your great argument manifest, you formulate the example of the mirage. But do listen to me. I can reply [and show] how your example is valid.

du. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin.med.do. žes.bya.bai. ts'ig. de. yaṅ. dṅos.po.rnams.kyi. raṅ bžin.med.pa.ñid.du. byed.pa. ma.yin.gyi. | 'on. kyaṅ. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. raṅ.bžin.med.pa. sgyu.mai. skyes.bu. daṅ. ạdra.bar. skyes.bu. yaṅ.dag.pai. ṅo.bo. daṅ. bral.ba.rnams.la. rmoṅs.pai.p'yir. byis.pai. skye. bo. ma.rig.pas. rmoṅs.pa. rnams.kyi. raṅ.bžin. daṅ.bcas.pa. ñid.du.. sgro. btags.pa.rnams.la. raṅ.bžin. yod.pa.ma.yin.par. go.bar.byed.pa. yin.pas. de.la. raṅ.bžin. yod.pa.ma.yin.na. ts'ig.med.par. yaṅ. ts'ig.ma.gtogs.par. yaṅ. raṅ.bžin. yod.pa.ma.yin.par. rab.tu.grub.pa.yin.no. | raṅ.bžin. med.do. žes.bya.bai. ts'ig. des. ci. žig. byed.ces. k'yod.kyis. smras. pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. rigs.pa. ma.yin.no. | gžan.yaṅ. |

XIII. byis.pa.rnams. ni. smig. rgyu. la. |
ji.ltar. log.par. c'ur. ạdsin.ltar. ||
de.bžin. k'yod.kyis. log.par. ạdsin. |
yod.pa.min.la. dgag.par.bya.[1] ||

žes. bšad.pa. la.sogs.pa. yaṅ. k'yod.kyis. ts'igs.su. bcad.pa. bži.smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ste.

smig.rgyui. dpe.la. k'yod.kyis. kyaṅ. |
ạgro.ba. c'en.po. smras.pa. gaṅ. ||
der. yaṅ. ci.nas. dpe.de. ạt'ad. |
gtan.la. dbab.pa. ñan.par.gyis. ||[2] 66.

k'yod.kyis. smig.rgyui. dpe. de.la. ạgro.ba. c'en.pe. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. der. yaṅ. dpe.de. ci.nas. kyaṅ. ạt'ad. pa. gtan.la. dbab.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. ñon.cig.

gal.te. ạdsin. de. raṅ. bžin.yod. |
brten.nas. ạbyuṅ.bar. mi.ạgyur.ro. ||
ạdsin.pa. gaṅ.žig. brten.nas.ạgyur. |
de. ñid. stoṅ.ñid. ma.yin.nam. ||[3] 67.

gal.te. smig.rgyu.la. c'u.'o. lta.bu. ạdsin.pa. raṅ.bžin. gyis. yod.pa. žig. | yin.na. | rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba.yin. par. mi.ạgyur.ba. žig.na.[4] | gan.gi.p'yir. smig.rgyu.la. yaṅ. brten. | p'yin.ci.log.gi. lta.ba.daṅ. ts'ul.bžin. ma.yin.pai. yid.la. byed. pa.la. yaṅ.brten.nas. byuṅ.ba. yin.no. | gan.gi.p'yir. rten.

[1] VV. *d*) yod. pa. yin. la.
[2] VK. *b*) rtsod.pa. *d*) pa. mñam. (A and B.)
[3] VV.B. *b*) rten. nas. : VK. *c*) brten. ạgyur. ba. ; VK.B. ạbyuṅ.ba.
[4] Something is perhaps missing here.

If you formulate this example of the mirage in order to make manifest your great argument, then do listen to my reply [which will show] how your argument is valid!

LXVII. If that mirage has an essence, it cannot be born from causes and conditions. But if depends on causes and conditions, then, it is possible to say that it is void.

If the false perception of the nature of water in a mirage were not derived from causes and conditions, your example would be valid. The causes and the conditions of this mirage are represented by the erroneous vision and this erroneous vision is produced by those causes and conditions represented by non-discrimination; thus it is possible to say that it is derived from causes and conditions. But if it is derived from causes and conditions, then its nature must be void. Such an argument must be [understood] as explained before. Again there is another argument:

LXVIII. If the perception had a real essence, who could argue against it? The same is the case as regards the other examples and therefore there is no fault in the argument maintained by me.

If the wrong perception of water in a mirage were real, who could argue against it? If there is an essence, this cannot be argued against, *e.g.*, it is not possible to argue against the heat, as a propriety of fire or against fluidity as a propriety of water, or against incorporeity as a propriety of ether. But we see that this perception can be argued against. So this perception is void in its essence. Thus, the meaning of the other dharmas must be known to be like this. Just as here the perception is not real, the same must be understood as regards the other five dharmas. If you maintain that these six dharmas are existent and that, therefore, it is possible to state that all dharmas are not void, the argument is not valid.

Again you say these stanzas: [XXVII-XIX].

These are the stanzas. Now I reply:

ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. yin. pa. dei.p'yir. raṅ.bžin. stoṅ.pa. yin.te. | sṅár. ji.skad. bstan.pa. de. ạdra'o. | ạdi.ltar.gžan. yaṅ. |

gal.te. ạdsin.pa. raṅ.bžin. yod. |
ạdsin.pa. de.la. su.žig.bzlog. ||
lhag.ma.rnams.la.'ṅ. ts.'ul. de. yin. |
de.p'yir. klan.ka. de. med.do. ||[1] 68.

gal.te. smig.rgyu.la. c'ur.ạdsin.pa. ạdi. raṅ.bžin.gyis. yod.pa. žig. yin.na. | de.la. sus. kyaṅ. zlog.par. mi.ạgyur. te. | ji.ltar. mei. ts'a.ba. ñid. daṅ. c'ui. gšer.ba.ñid. daṅ. nam.mk'a'. mi.bsgrib.pa.ñid. bžin.du. raṅ.bžin. ni. bzlog. par. mi. nus. pa. yin.na. de. ni. bzlog.par. yaṅ. mt'oṅ. ṅo. | dei.p'yir. ạdsin.pa. de. raṅ.bžin.gyis. med.pa. yin.no. | ạdi. ji.lta.ba. bžin.na. bzuṅ.ba. la.sogs.pa. c'os. lhag.ma. lṅa.po. rnams.la. yaṅ. ts'ul de.lta. bur. rtog.par.bya.ba. yin.pas. de. drug. ts'an. yod.pai.p'yir. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. stoṅ.pa. ma.yin.no. žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. de. mi.ruṅ.ṅo. | gžan yaṅ. |

XVII. k'yod.la. gtan.ts'igs. ma.grub.ste. |
raṅ.bžin. med.p'yir. k'yod. gtan.ts'igs. ||
ga.la. yod.de. k'yod. don. de. |
gtan.ts'igs. med.par. ạgrub. mi.ạt'ad. ||

ces.bya.ba. ạdir bšad.par.bya.ste.

ạdi.la. sṅa.mas. gtan.ts'igs. med. |
lan.btab.po. sgrub.byar. mts'uṅs.p'yir. ||
sṅa.ma. smig.rgyui. dpes. bzlog.pa. |
bsgrub.ts'e. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa.'o. ||[2] 69.

da.ltar.gyi. ạgro.ba. ạdi.dag. daṅ. sṅar. bstan.pas. gtan. ts'igs.med.pai. yaṅ.lan. btab.par.rig.par.bya.ste. | sṅar. gtan. ts'igs. bstan.pa. drug. ts'an. ạgog.par.byed.pai. ạgro.ba gaṅ. yin.pa. de. ñid. ạdir. yaṅ. ạgro.bar.bya.ba yin.no. | gžan. yaṅ. |

[1] VK. *b*) su.yis.bzlog. *d*) ts'ul. de.bžin.

[2] VK. smig. rgyui. dpes. bzlog. bsgrub.pai. ts'e. |
sṅar.smras. gaṅ. yin. de. daṅ. ni. ||
sṅa. mas. gtan.ts'ig. med.pa.yi. |
lan.btab.gyur. te. mts'uṅs.p'yir.ro. ||

VV.B. *b*) lan. btab. bsgrub... p'yir.ro.

LXIX. As regards your statement that in this [thesis of mine] there is no reason [at all], this has been already explained [by me]. We must say [here] the same [arguments] as those [expounded] concerning the explanation of the reason in all the three times.

Such a great argument has been explained before. As to the words: "no reason", these must be understood in the same way. The meaning of the discussion is such [as follows]: the 'reason,' has been previously explained, during [my] refutation of your sixfold objection. The sense of that previous discussion must be expounded here also.

Again you say this stanza: [XX.]

This is your stanza. Now I reply:

LXX. If you say [here] the [doctrine] of three times of the reason, [the reply] given before is like that which must be repeated here. Thus the doctrine of the three times of the reason is quite in accordance with the doctrine of the voidness [of things].

If you argue against [my doctrine] having recourse to the theory of the three times of the reason, such an argument has been answered before. It must be understood in that same way. What for? Because the reason [is void] the same [as the *probandum*]. As regards [your objection concerning] the three times of the refutation [I state that it] is not valid, because those words also are included among the things to be refuted by the refutation. If you mean to say that though [in my system] there can be neither the refutation nor the refuted, [yet in fact] the refutation is equally admitted, [I reply that] I have already refuted this assumption. The [theory of the] reason as existent in all the three times is in accordance with the words of a man who maintains the [doctrine of] the void. And, again, what for? This has been already explained. In fact it has been said in a previous stanza. [stanza LXIV.]

If, again, you say: "The refutation [based on the doctrine] of the three times [of the reason] is proved, since we see the cause in the preceding time, we see the cause in the posterior time

XX. ạdi.ltar. raṅ.bžin. yod.min.na. |
gal.te. ạgog. sṅa.dgag. ạp'yi. žes. ||
zer.na. ạt'ad.pa. ma.yin.na. |
ạp'yi. daṅ. cig.car. mi.ạt'ad.do. ||

žes. smras.pa. gaṅ.yin.pa. ạdi.la. bšad.par.bya.ba.ste. |
dus.gsum. gtan. ts'igs. gaṅ. yod.sṅar. |
lan.btab. de. daṅ. mt'uṅs.p'yir.ro. ||
dus.gsum. med. kyis. gtan.ts'igs. ni. |
stoṅ.ñid. smra.ba. rnams.la. ruṅ. ||[1]. 70.

gtan.ts'igs. dus.gsum. ạgog.par.byed.pa. žes.bya.ba. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. ni. lan.btab. zin.te. | gaṅ.gi.p'yir. bsgrub. par.bya.ba. daṅ. mts'uṅs.pai..p'yir.ro. | ạdi.ltar. k'yod.kyi ts'ig.gis. ạgog.pa. dus.gsum.du. yaṅ. mi.ạt'ad.par. ạgyur bai. ạgog.pa. bžin.du. dgag.par.bya.ba. yaṅ. de. yin.no. dei.p'yir. ạgog.pa. daṅ. dgag.par.bya.ba.med.na. ạgog.pa. bkag.go. sñam.du. k'yod.sems.pa. gaṅ. yin.pa. de. mi. ruṅ.ṅo. | ạgog.pa. dus.gsum.la. žes. bya.bai. gtaṅ.ts'igs. dus. gsum. ạgog.par.byed.pa. žes.bya.ba. gaṅ.yin,pa. de. ñid. ni. dṅos.po. t'ams.cad. ạgog. par.byed.pa. žes.bya.ba. gaṅ. yin.pai. p'yir. stoṅ.pa.ñid. smra.ba.rnams. la. yod.pa. ñid.yin.gyi. k'yed.la. ni. med.do. | yaṅ.na. ạdi. ji.ltar. lan. btab.pa. yin. že.na. |

dgag.bya. ci. yaṅ. med.pas.na. |
de.ni. ci. yaṅ. mi.ạgog.go. ||
dei.p'yir. ạgog.par. byed.do. žes. |
skur.ba. de. ni. k'yod.kyis. btab.[2] || (=64)

ces. lan.btab.pa. yin.no. | 'on.te. dus.gsum. c'ar.du. yaṅ. ạgog.pa. grub.pa.yin. te. | sṅon.gyi. dus.kyi. rgyu. daṅ. p'yi.mai. dus.kyi. rgyu. daṅ. cig.car. gyi. dus.kyi. rgyu. yaṅ. mt'oṅ.bas.so. | de.la. sṅon.gyi. dus. kyi. rgyu. ni. ji.ltar. bui. p'a bžin.no. | p'yi.mai. dus. ni. ji.ltar. slob.dpon.gyi. slob.ma.bžin.no. | cig.car.gyi. dus.kyi. ni. ji.ltar. sṅan.bai. sgron.ma. bžin. no. sñam.du.sems.na. de. ni. de.lta. ma.yin.par. ts'ul. ạdi.la. skyon. sṅar. bstan.

[1] VK. *a*) gaṅ yin. stan. VK.B. yin.pa. |
b) lan.btab. ñid. de. mts'uṅs. p'yir.ro.
VK.B. *c*) dus.gsum. p'yed.

[2] VV. btag.

and we see the cause co-existent [with the effect]. Cause in a former time *e.g.* father in relation to son: cause in a posterior time: *e.g.* master in relation to disciple, cause co-existent: e.g. lamp in relation to light". This is what now I say [in reply to this objection.] This [argumentation] is not like the threefold argumentation as explained before. Each of the three argumentations has three kinds of mistakes. This I already stated. Your thesis is therefore vitiated by a mistake; and so my refutation of the essence [of things] is proved.

LXXI. If a man believes in the void, that man believes in everything. If a man does not believe in the void, he does not believe in anything.

If a man believes in the void, that man believes in all dharmas belonging to this world as well as transcendental. What for? If a man believes in the doctrine of the void, then he believes in the doctrine of the production of dharmas from the combination of causes and conditions. If a man believes in the production of dharmas from the combination of causes and conditions he believes in the four holy truths. If he believes in the four truths, that man believes in complete liberation. If that man believes in complete liberation, then he believes in the three jewels, that is to say the Buddha, the law, and the community. If that man believes in the production of dharmas from the combination of causes and conditions, then, that man believes in the cause of dharmas and in the fruit of dharmas. If that man believes in the causes of dharmas and in the fruit of dharmas, then, that man believes in the cause and in the fruit of sin. If a man believes in the cause of dharmas and in the fruit of dharmas, and he believes in the cause of sin and in the fruit of the sin, then, he believes in the defilement, in the combination of the defilement and in the defiled dharmas. Thus that man possesses a complete faith and so it has been said, that such a man believes in the practice of the good and in the practice of the evil. If a man believes in the practice of the good and in the practice of the evil, then, that man believes in the law which explains the practice of the good and

zin.no. | gžan. yaṅ. gal.te. de.lta. yin.na. dgag.pa. srid.par. k'yod.kyis. k'as. blaṅs.la. | de. ni. ma.grub.pas. k'yod.kyis. dam.bcas.pa. yaṅ. ñams.pa.yin.no. | ts'ul. ạdis. raṅ.bžin ạgog.pa. yaṅ. grub.pa. yin.no. |

gaṅ.la. stoṅ.pa. ñid. srid.pa. |
de.la. don.rnams. t'ams.cad. srid. ||
gaṅ.la. stoṅ.ñid. mi.srid.pa. |
de.la. ci. yaṅ. mi.srid.do. || 71.

gaṅ.la. stoṅ.ñid. ạdi. srid.pa. de.la. ạjig.rten.pa. daṅ. ạgig.rten.las.ạdas.pai. don.t'ams.cad. srid.pa.yin.no. | ciip'yir. že.na. | gaṅ.la. stoṅ.pa.ñid. srid.pa. de.la. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ. ba. daṅ. ạp'ags.pai.bden.pa. bži. daṅ. dge.sloṅ.gyi. ạbrạs.bu. daṅ. k'yad.par.du. rtog.pa. t'ams.cad. srid.do. | gaṅ.la. k'yad.par.du. rtogs.pa.t'ams.cad. srid.pa. de.la. dkon. mc'og. gsum.po. | saṅs.rgyas. daṅ. c'os. daṅ. dge.ạdun. srid.do. | gaṅ.la. rten.ciṅ.ạbrel.bar. ạbyuṅ.ba. srid.pa. de.la. c'os. daṅ. c'os.kyi. rgyu. daṅ. c'os.kyi. ạbras.bu. daṅ. c'os. ma.yin.pa. daṅ. c'os.ma. yin.pai.rgyu. c'os.ma. yin.pai. ạbras.bu. srid.do. | gaṅ.la. c'os. daṅ. c'os.ma.yin.pa daṅ. rgyu. daṅ. ạbras.bu. srid.pa. de.la. ñon.moṅs.pa. daṅ ñon. moṅs.pa. kun.ạbyuṅ.ba daṅ. ṅon.moṅs.pai. gži.rnams. srid. do. | gaṅ.la. sṅar.bstan.pa. de. t'ams.cad. srid.pa. de.la. bde.ạgro. daṅ. ṅan.ạgro. rnam.par.bžag.[1]pa. daṅ. bde. ạgro. daṅ. ṅan.ạgror. ạgro.ba. daṅ. bde. ạgro. daṅ. ṅan.ạgror ạgro.bai. sems.can. daṅ. bde.ạgro. daṅ ṅan.ạgro.las. ạda.'ba. daṅ. bde. ạgro. daṅ. ṅan. ạgro. las. ạda'.bai.t'abs. daṅ. ạjig.rten.pai. t'a.sñad. t'ams.cad. rnams.par.bžag.pa. yin.te | ts'ig. gis. ji.sñed. g'ig. bstan.par. nus.pas.p'yogs. ạdis. raṅ.gi. rtogs.par.bya.'o. | ạdir. yaṅ. |

gaṅ.žig. stoṅ daṅ. rten.ạbyuṅ. dag. |
dbu.mai. lam.du. don. gcig.par. ||
gsuṅ.mc'og. mts'uṅs.pa. med.pa.yi. |
saṅs.rgyas. de.la. p'yag.ạts'al.lo. || 72.

rtsod.pa. bzlog.pai. rab.tu. byed.pai. ạgrel.pas. daṅ.po rab.tu. dga'.ba.la. bžugs.pa. slob.dpon. nā.gā. rdsu. nas. mdsad.pa. rdsogs.so.

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[1] VV.B. gžag.

the evil. If a man can believe in the dharma which explains the practice of the good and the evil, then, he knows the means in order to overstep the three bad destinies. Thus that man believes in all dharmas of this world which are numberless so that it is impossible to enunciate them completely.

LXXII. I take refuge in and I pay homage to that great knower of whom nobody is greater, who has expounded this unique middle path in which three things [are explained]: viz. void, essence, law of causation.

rgya.gar.gyi. mk'an.po. dsā.na. gar.rba. daṅ. lo.tsā. wa. ban.de ra.khi.tas. bsgyur.te. gtan.la. p'ab.pa.'o.

The coloph. of the kārikās is:

rtsod.pa. bzlog.pai. ts'igs l'hur. byas.pa. žes.bya.ba. | slob.dpon. ạp'ags.pa. klu. grub.kyi. žal.sṅa. mdsad.pa. rdsogs.so. | rgya.gar.gyi. mk'an.po. jñā.na. garba. daṅ. bod. kyi. lo.tsā.va. ka.ba. dpal.brtsegs.kyis. bsgyur.ba.las. | slad. kyis. k'a.c'ei. pa.ndi.ta. dsa.ya. ananta. daṅ. lo.tsā.va. k'ui.mdo.sde.dpal.gyis. bsgyur.po.

ĀRYADEVA'S ŚATAŚĀSTRA.

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH.

ĀRYADEVA.

THE ŚATAŚĀSTRA.

Translated from the Chinese.

CHAPTER I.

RENUNCIATION OF SIN AND MERIT.

(I) bow (頂禮) at the feet of the Buddha, the compassionate and the blessed one (*bhagavant* 世尊), who in numberless Āeons (*kalpa* 劫) has suffered many sorrows and having exhausted all *kleśas* (煩惱) and having also expelled the *vāsanās*, was honoured by *Brahmā*, *Śakra*, the *Nāgas* and the deities. (I) also pay homage to the Law (*dharma*) which illuminates the world, to which there is no superior, which can cleanse of every impurity and weed, put a stop to illusion (*prapañca* 戲論) and which has been preached by the Buddhas, the blessed ones; at the same time (I also pay homage) to the Order (*Saṅgha*) of the *Arhats* (應眞) of the eight classes.

The unbeliever says: "The stanza says 'which has been preached by the blessed ones.' Who are the 'blessed ones?'"

The follower says: "How can you raise such a doubt?"

The unbeliever says: "Because in various manners are taught the characteristics of the blessed one, (I) raise (this) doubt. There are (some) men who say that *Viṣṇudeva* (韋紐天) is called the blessed one. Again (some) say that *Maheśvaradeva* (摩醯首羅天) is called the blessed one. Again (some) say that *Kapila* (迦毗羅), *Ulūka* (優樓迦), *Ṛṣabha* (勒沙婆), and other *ṛṣis* are all called the 'blessed ones.' How do you only say that Buddha is the blessed one? That is why (I) raise (this) doubt."

The follower says: "The Buddha knows the true characteristics (*lakṣaṇa* 相) of all *dharmas*. (In) discriminating he has no doubts; further (he) can explain the deep and the pure *dharma*. Therefore (I) state that Buddha alone is the 'blessed one.'"

The unbeliever says: "The other masters also can discriminate the characteristics of all *dharmas*, (and) also can explain the deep and the pure *dharma*. So, for instance, the disciples of *Kapila*, discussing on the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtras* teach that the general characteristics (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* 總相) and the particular characteristics (*viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa* (別相) of the good *dharmas* are included in the twenty-five principles. That portion of [our] intelligence, which is pure intelligence is called the good *dharma*. The disciples of Ulūka discussing on the *Vaiśeṣika-Sūtras* (衛世師經) say that (the true law) consists of six categories,—the category of *guṇa* (求那) (etc.). Washing three times a day, and again revering the fire, etc., combined together, produce the good *dharma* which is [only] a portion [of the *dharma*, which can adhere to] the *ātman*. The disciples of Ṛṣabha discussing on the *Nirgranthaputra-Sūtras* (尼乾子經) say that burning the body with five fires, tearing off the hair and other laws to asceticism (受苦) are called the good *dharma*. And there are masters who practise the laws of fasting, (or who) throw themselves into deep water, (or who) walk on fire, (and who) (let) themselves fall from high peaks, (and who) constantly remain in silence, (and who) maintain the vow of the bull (*govrata* 牛戒), and the like: these (practices) are (according to them) called the good *dharma*. All such are the deep and the pure *dharmas*. How do you say that the Buddha alone can teach [the pure *dharma*]?"

The follower says: "All these are false views (*mithyā-dṛṣṭi* 邪見) because (they) cover the right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi* 正見). (Therefore), they cannot explain the deep and

the pure law. This thing will afterwards be explained at length."

The unbeliever says: "What are the characteristics of the good law as explained by the Buddha?"

The follower says: "The *dharma* of stopping evil and practising good." (S.)

"The Buddha, in brief, (*saṅkṣepeṇa* 略) taught that the good *dharma* is of two kinds: (*viz.*,) [it has] the characteristics of 'the stopping' and the characteristics of the 'practising.' To put a stop to all evils (*pāpa*) is called the characteristic of 'the stopping.' To practise all good (*kuśala*) is called the characteristic of 'the practising.' What are the evils? (They are) the bad actions of the body, bad actions of the mouth and bad actions of the mind. The body kills (*prāṇātipāta*), steals (*adattādāna*), makes illicit love (*kāmamithyācāra*). The mouth utters lies (*mṛṣāvāda*), malicious words (*paiśūnya*), harsh words (*pāruṣya*), futile words (*sambhinna-pralāpa*). The mind is covetuous (*abhidhyā* or *lobha*), is hostile (*vyāpāda*), follows erroneous doctrines (*mithyādṛṣṭi*). And again, there are the ten bad actions, which are not included (in the *daśa-akuśala-patha*), viz., flogging, beating with a stick, binding, imprisoning and so on, and the various faults which precede or follow the *daśa-akuśala-patha*. This is called committing sin (*pāpa*). What is 'the stopping'? To put a stop to sin and not to commit (it). If, (the thought) in the heart is born, if the mouth speaks (it), (and) if one takes the vow that 'from to-day I will absolutely cease from committing (those sins),'—that is called 'the stopping.' What is 'good?' The right action of the body, the right action of the mouth, (and) the right action of the mind. (When) the body approaches [the Buddha] with folded hands and paying homage, etc.; (when) the mouth says true and coherent words, soft words (and) useful words; (and when) the mind is friendly, compassionate, (following) the right doctrines, and so on,—the various pure *dharmas*, like these, are called the good *dharma*. What is practice? Faith in and the exercise of these good *dharmas*—this is called the practice."

The unbeliever says: "Your books are faulty. Because in the beginning they do not speak of happiness." (S.)

"All masters who compose books on *dharma*, in the beginning speak of happiness; and therefore, the flavour of (their) meaning becomes easily explained and the sound of the *dharma* spreads abroad. If a man of knowledge reads and understands (these books) he, then, obtains long life, dignity and nobility. So, for instance, there are books called (those of) *Bṛhaspati* (婆羅呵波帝). Books like these and others [also], in the beginning speak of happiness and because happiness is in the beginning, there is also happiness in the middle and at the end. Your book in the very beginning speaks of evil and therefore of 'no happiness.' For this we say that your books are faulty."

The follower says: "Not so. In order to put an end to the evil doctrines (the Buddha) has expounded these books." (S.)

"(To say): this is happy and that not happy, is the influx of evil doctrines. Therefore, (our books) have no fault." And again:

"Because there is no happiness." (S.)

"If (even) a little happiness be existent, the books in the beginning must speak of the happiness. But there is really no happiness. And why? The same object (*vastu* 事) according to these is happiness and according to those is not happiness; according to others it is neither happiness nor not happiness; (*na sukhaṃ na asukham*). Because it is indeterminate (*aniyata* 不定), therefore, happiness does not exist. You, foolish men, without adequate means (*anupāya* 無方便), strongly desiring and searching for joy, give birth to false notions and say 'this thing is happiness, this thing is not happiness.' And again:

'(Happiness) can be demonstrated neither by itself nor by another nor by the two [causes] together.' (*svataḥ paratah, ubhayataḥ* 自他共)." (S.)

This *dharma* which is (called) happiness, does not arise by itself. And why? Because there is not a single *dharma*

which can be born by itself, and also, because there will be the mistake of having two characteristics (*lakṣaṇa* 相) viz., of being produced, and of being a producer. Again, it cannot be born from another; in fact since one's own characteristic is non-existent, another's characteristic also is non-existent; and again because there will be *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā* 無窮), inasmuch as birth would have birth [and so on.] And again it cannot be born by the two (causes) together; because the two [hypothesis] are both erroneous. Generally, the *dharma* [which is called] birth is of three kinds: [it can be] by itself, by another, or by the two (causes) together. If we search for (happiness) in these three kinds (of birth) we cannot find it. Therefore, a thing (which can be called) happiness does not exist."

The unbeliever says: "Happiness is born by itself as salt." (S.)

"E.g., the salt, which is salt by its own nature can make other things salty. So (regarding) happiness the same (thing can be said). Being happiness by its own nature, it can impart happiness to other things."

The follower says: "(No!), Because of the refutation made before, and also because the characteristic of salt is inherent in the salt." (S.)

"We have before refuted the spontaneous birth (*svabhāvotpāda* 自性生) of the dharmas which have no previous existence (*abhūtvā*). And now again, according to your opinion, you (mean to) say that the salt is derived from a cause and that therefore, salt is not salt by its own nature. We do not accept your theory, and now, on the contrary, we shall refute what you teach by your own theory. If salt is combined with other things, then these things are not salt; because the characteristic of salt is inherent in salt; as for instance, the characteristics of the bull are not the characteristics of the horse."

The unbeliever says:

"(This happiness can impart happiness to other things) as the lamp (which illuminates other objects)." (S.)

" E.g., the lamp is illuminating itself and at the same time can illuminate other (objects); the same thing (happens) as regards happiness also. It is by itself happiness and can cause (to be) happiness what is not happiness."

The follower says: " (No!), because in the lamp itself [as well as] in other (objects) there is no darkness." (S.)

" The lamp in itself has no darkness. Why? Because light and darkness cannot be together. And the lamp also could not be illuminating, because devoid of the power of illuminating. And also because there will be the error of admitting a double characteristic—that of being illuminating, and that of being illuminated. Therefore the lamp cannot illuminate itself, and the place which is illuminated also has no darkness. Therefore [the lamp] cannot illuminate the other (objects). Because, inasmuch as it destroys darkness it is called illuminating but if there is no darkness which can be destroyed, there is no illumination."

The unbeliever says: " (Yes,) ' because, at the time when it begins to arise both are illuminated together.' " (S.)

" I do not say, that the lamp arises before and then it illuminates: because in the time of its first rising it illuminates itself and can also illuminate the others."

The follower says: " It is not so. Because the characteristics of the existence and non-existence cannot be perceived (at the same time) in one and the same dharma.'" (S.)

When it begins to rise it is called half-born. What is half-(born) is not yet born. When it is born, it cannot illuminate, as it has been said before. How much less can the not-yet born have something to illuminate? And again, how can one and the same dharma have the characteristic of existence and also the characteristic of non-existence? And again

" Because it is not co-present with (litt. cannot reach) darkness." (S.)

The lamp, whether it is already born or not yet born, in both cases, is not co-present with (litt. cannot reach) darkness. Because this is contradictory to its nature. If the lamp cannot reach darkness, how can it destroy darkness?

The unbeliever says: "Because it is like the magic formulae (*mantra* 呪) and the stars." (S.)

The magic formulae can bring from afar, evil to distant men, and the change of stars which takes place in the sky, can bring unhappiness to men. The same happens as regards the lamp. Although it does not reach darkness it can destroy darkness.

The follower says: "(No!) Because the greatest errors will then be true." (S.)

"If the lamp has a force which does not reach darkness, and yet can destroy darkness, then why a lamp—in India cannot destroy the darkness in China (振 旦)?

If the force of the magic formulae and of the stars can reach to a distant place, yet the case of the lamp is not the same; and therefore your example is wrong. And again:

"If in the beginning there is happiness, what remains is not-happiness." (S.)

(If) your books (in the beginning, speak of happiness) what remains must be not-happiness. If what remains is also happiness, then your statement 'in the beginning there is happiness' is false."

The unbeliever says: "Because in the beginning there is happiness, the rest is also happiness. (S.)

"Because in the beginning there is the force of happiness-what remains also is happiness."

The follower says "Because the not-happiness is greater therefore the happiness becomes not happiness." (S.)

"Your books in the beginning speak of happiness; then the not-happiness is greater. Because the not-happiness is greater, the happiness must become not-happiness."

The unbeliever says: "As the trunk of the elephant." (S.)

"E.g., because the elephant (*hastin*) has a trunk (*hasta*), therefore it is named, 'having a trunk;' but because it has eyes, ears, head and so on, it is not named 'having eyes, ears, and head.' In the same way, owing to the force of (even) little happiness a greater not-happiness becomes happiness."

The follower says: "It is not so, because there will be the error of the non-existence of the elephant." (S).

"If the elephant is different from the trunk then the head, feet and so on also must be different. In the same way, then, there will not be an elephant as a separate [object]. If in the parts there is inherent the totality of the parts, why are the feet not in the head?—as it is explained (further) in the refutation of the diverse. If the elephant is not different from the trunk, there will also be no elephant as a separate [object]. If the whole (litt. having parts, *avayavin* 有分) and the parts (*avayava* 分) are not different, the head must be the foot; because both these things would not be different from the elephant, as it is explained (further) in the refutation of the identity. In the same manner, this thing which is happiness, sought for in various causes, cannot be obtained. How do you say that because in the beginning (there is happiness,) in the middle and at the end also there is happiness?

The unbeliever says: "Evil stops—the stopping is good. Why is not (that) (said) in the beginning?"

The follower says: "The man who acts must first know the evil, so that afterwards he can stop it; and therefore (we put) evil first and then (its) stopping."

The unbeliever says; "The practice of the good must be at the beginning, because it brings good fruits." (S.)

"The good dharmas bring all good fruits. Because the man who acts desires to obtain good fruits, (therefore) he stops the evil. In the same way one must beforehand speak about the practice of the good and then speak of the stopping of the evil."

The follower says. "Because the *dharmas* are in a series, first the coarse dust is got rid of and then the fine dust is got rid of. If the man who acts does not stop evil, he cannot practise the good. Therefore beforehand the coarse dust is to be got rid of and then one can be imbued with the good dharmas. E.g. the man who washes garments, first removes the dust (in them) and then (alone) he can dye (them)."

The unbeliever says, "(If it is so), when the stopping of

evil has been taught, you must not speak again of the practice of the good."

The follower says: "(We must.) Because gifts and so on are the good practice." (S).

"Gift is a practice of the good, but not a stopping of the evil; and again when the great *Bodhisattva* having beforehand stopped the evil, practises the four *apramāṇas* (無量) the compassion for all the creatures, and the protection of the life of others, that is, then, the practice of the good, not the stopping of the evil."

The unbeliever says: Gift stops the *dharma* of avarice; therefore gift must be stopping the evil."

The follower says: "It is not so. If not-giving were evil, then all those who do not give must commit sin. And again when the *āśravas* are destroyed, man's greed and covetousness also, having been destroyed, what evil is (then) stopped at the time when the gift is made? Or, there are men who although practising the gift, have their avaricious minds not—'yet stopped.' Afterwards again, they can stop it, and the practice of the good is considered as the basis. Therefore, gift is the practice of the good."

The unbeliever says: "Having spoken about the practice of the good, it is not necessary to speak of the stopping of the evil. And why? Because, the stopping of the evil is the practice of the good."

The follower says: "The characteristic of stopping is rest, the characteristic of practice is action. Because their nature is contradictory (*viruddha* 相違) therefore (we) say that the practice of the good does not include the "stopping of the evil."

The unbeliever says: "This thing is really so. I do not say that the stopping of the evil and the practice of the good have an identical characteristic but only that the stopping of evil is a good *dharma*. Therefore when one says; practice of the good, (he) must not say again "stopping of the evil."

The follower says: "It is necessary to say 'stopping of the evil and practice of the good'—Why? Stopping of the evil means suppressing the evil when one takes the vow. And practice of the good means the exercise of the good *dharmas*. If (we) only say, that the practice of the good is merit (*puṇya* 福) (and) do not say also that 'stopping of the evil' (is merit), (then supposing) that there is a man who has taken vows and stopped the evil, if his mind is not good (*akuśala* 不善) (or) if his mind is undetermined (*avyākṛta* 無記) he must not have merit inasmuch as at that time, he does not practice the good. But inasmuch as he stops the evil, at the time he must also have merit. Therefore, (we) must say 'stopping of the evil' and also must say 'practice of the good.' This *dharma* which is the 'stopping of the evil' and 'the practice of the good,' the Buddha following the mind of creatures, has divided into three kinds:"

"There are individuals, lower, middle and superior, (according to) the gifts, the vows and the knowledge." (S.)

"There are three kinds of those who practise. To men of lower knowledge (the Buddha) teaches gifts; to men of mediocre knowledge (he) teaches the keeping of vows; to men of superior knowledge he teaches wisdom. Gift is the thought concerned with the benefit of others and sacrifice of wealth; and also to bring about the action of body and mouth, (according to that thought). What is called the keeping of vows (or moral rules) (is there), if the mouth speaks [the following vow] if the will arises [as regards the practise of it] and if (this) vow is taken; 'from to-day I will never again practise the three kinds of bad actions of the body, and the four bad actions of the mouth.' Wisdom means that the will (is) fixed and steady concerning the characteristic of all the *dharmas*. Why has it been said lower, middle and superior? Because of the diminution in the benefit. Gift produces a small benefit, and is called the lower knowledge. The moral discipline produces a mediocre benefit and is called the middle knowledge. Wisdom produces the superior benefit and is called the superior knowledge; and again the recompense of gift is lower, the recompense of the moral rules mediocre, and the recompense of wisdom is

superior; therefore they are called "the inferior, the mediocre and the superior knowledge."

The unbeliever says: "Are all gifts inferior knowledge or not?"

The follower says: It is not so—and why? There are two kinds of gifts. The one is impure and the other is pure. Those who practice the impure gifts are called men of inferior knowledge."

The unbeliever says: "Which is called the impure gift?"

The follower says: "(When one gives) in order to receive recompense, it is the impure (gift). Such as the exchange in market." (S.)

Recompense is of two kinds: the recompense in the present, (*dṛṣṭadharme* 現) and the recompense afterwards. Recompense in the present means renown, honour, love and so on. Recompense in the future is wealth, nobility and so on in an after-life. This is called the impure gift; why? Because there is the desire for reward. E.g., a merchant sojourner, who comes from afar to other countries even though he brings various objects and many are liberally benifitted, nevertheless, has no feeling of pity towards the creatures, because he is seeking only for his own interests. This action is impure, and in the same way, the gift which seeks for recompense is also impure.

The unbeliever says: "Which is called the pure gift?"

The follower says: "If a man loves honours and does good to others, without seeking for a recompense in this life or in the afterlife, like the *Bodhisattvas* and all the superior men practising the pure gift, this is called the pure gift."

The unbeliever says: "Are those who observe the moral rules all men of mediocre knowledge or not?"

The follower says: "It is not so—and why? The observance of the moral rules is of two kinds. One is impure, the other is pure. Those who impurely observe the moral rules are called men of mediocre knowledge."

The unbeliever says: "Which is the impure observance of rules."

The follower says : " When one observes the moral rules in order to seek for a recompense of joy, with the desire for lust; [this is called impure observance of rules] 'as for instance, the characteristics (which appear in the gods, when they are on the point) of descending (from heaven to the earth).' " (S.)

" The recompense of happiness is of two kinds. The first, —to be born as god; the second—wealth and nobility among men. E.g., if one observes the moral rules in order to ascend to heaven and to enjoy pleasures with the celestial women (*apsaras* 天女), or, (if) among men, to enjoy the pleasures of the five desires. And why? Because of the 'desire for lust;' as for instance (in) the characteristics (which appear in the gods, when they are on the point) of descending (from heaven to the earth.) Inward desire for the beauty of others and a false outward show of virtue—this is called the impure observance of moral rules. As *Ānanda* spoke to *Nanda* 'Like he-goats goring each other with horns, they advance and then recede. When you desire (and) observe the rules, this action (of yours) resembles the same. Although you can observe the moral rules with the body, your mind is drawn by desire ; when the action is impure, what is the use of the moral rules ? "

The unbeliever says ; " What is called the pure observance of the moral rules ? "

The follower says: " when the man who acts, has this thought : (*i.e.*, to say) ' that the moral rules are the root and the basis of all the good dharmas,' the man who observes the moral rules, has nothing in his mind to repent of ; and when he has nothing to repent of, then he is glad ; when he is glad then his mind is happy ; when his mind is happy he attains the concentration of mind ; when he has the concentration of mind, then the true knowledge in him arises ; when the true knowledge is born, then he gets satiety ; when he is satiated, then he gets rid of desires ; when he gets rid of desires he obtains liberation (*vimukti* 解脫) when he is liberated then he obtains the *nirvāṇa*. This is called the pure observance of moral rules."

The unbeliever says : " As regards superior knowledge

Uddālaka (*Āruṇi*) (鬱陀羅伽) and so on are superior [men]." (S.)

"If a man practises knowledge, he is called (a man of) superior knowledge. Now, *Uddālaka Āruṇi* (阿羅邏) and other heretics must be men of superior knowledge.

The follower says: "It is not so. And why? Knowledge also is of two kinds. One is impure, the other is pure."

The unbeliever says: "What is called impure knowledge?"

The follower says: "Because it is bound with the world, therefore (the knowledge of the heretics) is impure, like (one who) hates and begins to love." (S.)

"The knowledge of the world (*laukika*) can beget births and deaths; why? Because, this knowledge is bound with the return. As for instance, when some one hates a family he begins to show a false love for it and becomes attached to it. And after a long time he commits an offence. The same happens with the knowledge of the world also."

The unbeliever says: "Only this knowledge can beget birth and deaths (*saṃsāra*, or in the same way can) gifts and moral rules too"?

The follower says: "To take (whatever is) merit and to reject whatever is evil, is the nature (*dharma*) of (all) motion (the acting impulse)." (S.)

"Merit means the recompense of merit."

The unbeliever says: "If merit means the recompense of merit, how is it that in this *Sutra* it is said only 'merit?'"

The follower says: "merit means the cause and recompense of merit means the effect. Some times the effect is taught for the cause and some times the cause is taught for the effect. Here the cause is taught for the effect. E.g., (when one says) [he has] 'eaten a thousand pounds of gold.' Gold cannot be eaten. But as food is obtained by gold therefore it is said that (such a man) has "eaten gold.' And so also when a man sees a picture, he says that it is (of) good hand because the picture is made by a good hand therefore it is called 'of good hand.' (In the same way) for merit, 'recompense of merit,' it is used

Evil has been spoken of before. 'Motion' means, that man constantly goes through births and deaths."

The unbeliever says: "What is the *dharma* of the not-motion?"

The follower says: "The renunciation of both (*i.e*, merit and sin)." (S.)

Both means the recompense of merit and the recompense of sin. Renunciation means that the mind does not attach itself to anything. When the mind does not attach itself to merit, then (those men) do not again go through the five destinies. This is called the *dharma* of not-motion.

The unbeliever says: "Merit must not be renounced, because the recompense and the fruit (of it) are beautiful. And also because the cause (of this) is not taught." (S.)

The recompense and fruit of all merit is good. All creatures constantly desire beautiful fruits. How can they be renounced? And the Buddha says: "O Bhikṣus, of merit do not be afraid." (And) you now do not explain the cause (of this.) Therefore, (we) must not renounce merit.

The believer says: "When there is the suppression of merit there is sorrow." (S.)

"Merit means recompense of merit, suppression means destruction. When there is the suppression of the recompense of merit, then there is separation from things which are joyful; and a great sadness and sorrow arise. As the Buddha said: 'When happiness is born, it is happiness. When it rests it is happiness, when it is suppressed it is sorrow.' And therefore (we) must renounce merit. And again if the Buddha said 'Of merit do not be afraid' (it means that) it must be practised, because it helps (us in our) way (to the *bodhi*). As the Buddha taught merit must be renounced, how much more then (should one renounce) the sin?"

The unbeliever says: "Inasmuch as merit and sin are contradictory, if you say 'that at the destruction of merit there is sorrow' then, when sin is born or stays, one must feel happiness."

The follower says : "When sin is present there is sorrow." (S.)

"Sin means the recompense of sin. And when the recompense of sin is born, then there is sorrow. How much more so when it is present ? As the Buddha said 'sorrow, when it is born, is sorrow, when it is present, is sorrow, when it is suppressed, it is happiness.' As regards your statement that 'inasmuch as sin and merit are contradictory, when sin is born one must feel happiness,' now we shall answer (by asking) 'why do not you say that,' inasmuch sin and merit are contradictory, when sin is suppressed, there is happiness, but when it is born or stays, there is sorrow ?"

The unbeliever says "merit is eternal ; because the cause is not renounced, therefore it must not be renounced." (S.)

"You teach that there is sorrow when the causes of merit are suppressed. Now, in the recompense of eternal merit, because there is no sorrow from the suppression (of the cause), therefore it must not be renounced. As the book says 'the man who can do the sacrifice of the horse (*aśvamedha* 馬 祀) surpasses misery, old age and death.' The recompense of merit is to be born eternally in eternal places. Therefore merit must not be renounced."

The follower says: "Merit must be renounced because of its double characteristic." (S.)

(1) "This merit has a double characteristic inasmuch it can give happiness as well as sorrow, like the food mixed with poison, which is delicious to eat, but is productive of pain when digested. The same happens as regards merit also."

(2) "And again, there is a recompense of merit which is the cause of joy ; but when felt in excess, it is a cause of sorrow. E.g., fire which is close by stops cold and therefore it brings happiness. (But) when it approaches nearer (it) burns the body and produces sorrow. Therefore, the merit has two characteristics. And as such it cannot be eternal. Therefore it must be renounced. As to what you say 'that the recompense of the merit of the sacrifice of horse is eternal," only this needs to be said :

" (It) is not, because it has a cause.' " (S.)

(3) "The recompense of the merit of the horse-sacrifice is not really eternal. And why? Because the cause of the action of the horse-sacrifice has a limit. In this world, if the cause has a limit, the fruit also has a limit. As (for instance), if the clod of earth is small, the pot also is small. Therefore, the action of the horse-sacrifice inasmuch as it has a limit is not eternal."

(4) "And again, your gods are subject to anger and they fight with and hurt one another; therefore they cannot be eternal."

(5) "And also your acts, (viz., sacrifices) as the horse-sacrifice and so on, inasmuch as they are derived from a cause, are all non-eternal." And again:

"If the merit which is pure and *sāśrava* must be renounced because it is not eternal how much more (should one renounce) the merit which is mixed with sin." (S.)

(6) "E.g., in the act of the horse-sacrifice, because there is the sin of killing and so on; and again, as it is said in the *Sūtras* of the *Sāṅkhyas*, that the *dharma* of sacrifice is impure, inasmuch as it has the characteristic of non-eternity. (7) And; of superiority and of inferiority; therefore it must be renounced."

The unbeliever says: "If one renounces merit, one must not act." (S.)

"If merit must be renounced really there must be no activity. Who among men, having reason, will emptily suffer from (painful) things, like a potter who makes vessels and then breaks them?"

The follower says: "The production of the right path is a progressive *dharma*. As for instance, the washing and dyeing of a dirty cloth." (S.)

"E.g., when a dirty cloth is first washed, and then, when it is clean, is dyed, the washing and the cleaning are not useless; why? Because of the progressive happening of that *dharma* which is dyeing, inasmuch as dirty cloths cannot receive the dye; in the same way, having before removed that dust which is sin, afterwards, with merit and virtue

the heart is purified. And afterwards that (one can) take this dyeing which is the way of *Nirvāṇa.*

The unbeliever says: "On what basis do you renounce merit?" (S.)

On the basis of merit you renounce evil, (but) on what basis do you renounce merit?

The follower says: "The *animitta* (無 相) is extremely high." (S.)

Taking merit one is born again among gods and men; taking sin, one is born in the three evil destinies. Therefore, the knowledge of the *animitta* is absolutely the first. The *animitta* is called, when all the *lakṣaṇas* (characteristics) are no more thought of, when all the conceptions (*grāha* 受) are got rid of, when the *citta* is not attached to any past, future or present *dharma*, because any real nature (*svabhāva*) of the *dharmas* does not exist and when there is nothing to depend upon. That is called the *animitta.* With these means (*upāya*), it is possible to get rid of merit. And why? Because, without the three *vimokṣa—mukha* (解 脫 門) the supreme profit (*paramārtha* 第 一 利) cannot be obtained. As the Buddha said to the Bhikṣus: "If there is a man who says: 'without employing the void (*śūnya*), the *animitta*, the not-action, I desire to obtain all the knowledge or the vision and not to increase pride' this man speaks empty words, not true."

CHAPTER II.

Refutation of the "Ātman."

The unbeliever says: "You must not say that all *dharmas* are void and *animitta.* Because *dharmas* like the *ātman* and so on are existent." (S.)

Kapila, Ulūka and others say that the *ātman* and the *dharmas* exist. *Kapila* says: 'From the primeval matter (*pradhāna*) in the beginning, the intellect (*buddhi* 覺) arises.

From the intellect arises the *ahaṅkāra* (我心); from *ahaṅkāra* arise the five subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhūta* 微塵): from the five subtle elements arise the five material elements (*mahābhūta* 大); from the five *mahābhūtas* arise the eleven organs of senses. The *ātman* is the rector (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), has the characteristics of being eternal and intelligent. He is indifferent (*udāsīna* or *madhyastha* 處中). He eternally remains and is neither destroyed nor perishes. He comprehends all the *dharmas*. Those who can understand these twenty-five principles obtain liberation. Those who do not understand these cannot get rid of the *saṃsāra*.' *Ulūka* says: (Really there is an *ātman* eternal; because of the characteristics of breathing out (*prāṇa* 出), inspiration (*apāna* 入) (*nimeṣa* 息 視) *unmeṣa* vitality *āyuḥ*, and so on; therefore it is known that there is an *ātman*. And again, because of (the necessity of the existence of) a place where desire and hatred, joy and sorrow, and the intelligence might adhere, it is known that there is an *ātman*. And therefore, the ātman is really existent. How do you say that it is not (existent)? If it is existent and you say that it is not existent, then you are a bad man, and bad men cannot be liberated. And therefore, you must not say that all *dharmas* are void and *animitta*.

The follower says: "If there is an *ātman*, it is bad to say that it is not existent, (but) if it is not existent and one says that it is not existent (what fault can there be)? If you carefully examine (it), the *ātman* does not really exist."

The unbeliever says: "Really there is an *ātman*, as is taught in the *Sāṅkhya-Sūtras*. This *ātman* is characterised by intelligence (*caitanyalakṣaṇa*)."

The follower says: "The *ātman* and intelligence, are (they) one or different"?

The unbeliever says: "The *ātman* and intelligence are one."

The follower says: "If intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman*, the *ātman* is not eternal." (S.)

If intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman*, then intelligence being not eternal, the *ātman* (also) must be non-eternal. E.g., heat is the characteristic of fire. Since heat is not eternal, fire also is not eternal. Now intelligence really is not eternal. And why? Because its characteristics are different; because it depends on causes; because it being originally inexistent, is now in existence and because (once) having existed, (it) is again non-existent.

The unbeliever says: "Because it is not born, therefore it is eternal." (S.)

Dharmas, which have the characteristic of birth are not eternal. Because the *ātman* has not the characteristic of birth, (therefore it) is eternal.

The follower says: "If it be so, the intelligence is not the characteristic of the *ātman*." (S.)

Intelligence is not eternal. [On the other hand] you teach that the *ātman* is eternal. (Therefore) the *ātman* must be different from intelligence. If the *ātman* and intelligence are not different, inasmuch as the intelligence is not eternal, the *ātman* also cannot be eternal. If one says that the intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman*, (we reply that) such a possibility (lit. place) does not exist. Why?

"Because intelligence is active (litt. goes) in only one place." (S.)

If intelligence be the characteristic of the *ātman*, since according to your doctrine the *ātman* is all pervading, the intelligence also must, at the same time, embrace all the five destinies (*gati*.) But the intelligence is active in only one place and cannot embrace everything (*vibhu* 周遍). Therefore intelligence is not the characteristic of the *ātman*. And again: "if so, the *ātman* must be the same as the intelligence." (S.)

(If) you maintain that intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman*, the *ātman* must be the same as intelligence. The *ātman* then must not be all-permeating. E.g., just as fire cannot have the characteristics of (both) heat and cold, so also

with regard to the *ātman*. It must not have the characteristic of all-pervasiveness, as well as not-all-pervasiveness. And again:

"If (it is considered to be) all-pervading, then it must have the characteristic of intelligence and non-intelligence." (S.)

If you desire to maintain that the *ātman* is all-pervasive, (then) the *ātman* will have a double characteristic, *viz.*, of intelligence and not-intelligence; why? Because intelligence is not all-pervading. If the *ātman* falls in a condition of intelligence, then there is intelligence. If it falls in to a condition of not-intelligence, then there is no intelligence.

The unbeliever says: "There is no mistake, because of the all-pervasive power (of the *ātman*)." (S.)

There are conditions in which the power of intelligence exists even if the intelligence is inactive. Therefore the mistake of the non-existence of intelligence does not exist.

The follower says: "It is not so. Because power and possessor of power are not different." (S.)

Wherever there is the power of intelligence, the intelligence, which is there, must have a function. [When you say that it has] no-function, such statement is not valid. If you similarly say that where there is no activity of intelligence, yet the power of intelligence is there, these are mere words.

The unbeliever says: "Because of the combination of causes, the power of intelligence has function." (S.)

The *ātman*, although it has the power of intelligence, can have function only owing to the combination of causes.

The follower says: "(No). Because the necessary implication would be that it has the characteristic of birth." (S.)

If intelligence can have function, only when there is the combination of causes, (then) it must necessarily have the characteristic of birth, because this intelligence depends upon causes. If intelligence and *ātman* are not different, then the *ātman* also must have the characteristic of birth.

The unbeliever says: "Like the lamp." (S.)

E.g., the lamp can illuminate things; but it cannot create the things (themselves); the same happens to the causes. These can cause intelligence to have a function, but they cannot produce intelligence.

The follower says: "It is not so. Even if the lamp does not illuminate a pot and so on, the pot and so on can still be perceived and may be taken; if intelligence cannot arise (litt. be obtained), until there is the combination of causes, the *ātman* also cannot perceive sorrow and joy; and therefore your example is not right."

The unbeliever says: "As *rūpa*." (S.)

As, for instance, *rūpa*, although it exists before the lamp, is not manifested, until it is illuminated, in the same way, intelligence, although pre-existent is not manifested, till the causes are not combined.

The follower says: "It is not so. Because its own characteristics are not manifested." (S.)

If there is not yet light, although men do not perceive *rūpa*, the characteristics (of it) are self-manifested. But the characteristic of intelligence as maintained by you, is not self-manifested and therefore, your example is not right. And again (it is not so), because it has the characteristic of non-existence. The characteristic of the *rūpa* is not considered as the characteristic of the *rūpa*, because men know it; and therefore, even when it is not yet seen, the *rūpa* always exists. According to you, knowledge is the characteristic of the *ātman*. You must not consider a place which is without knowledge as knowledge. To consider a place which is without knowledge as knowledge—this thesis is not right. In your doctrine, knowledge and intelligence are synonymous.

The unbeliever says: "The disciples of *Ulūka*, explaining the *Vaiśéṣika-Sūtras*, say that knowledge and the *ātman* are different and that therefore the *ātman* does not fall into the condition of non-eternity; but also that it is not without knowledge; why? Because:

"The *ātman* and knowledge are united, as a man possessing an ox." (S.)

E.g., if a man is with an ox, this man is described as 'having an ox.' In the same way, knowledge arises out of the union of the *ātman* with the perception by the senses, the *manas* and the objects, and because the *ātman* is united with knowledge therefore the *ātman* is called the knower (litt. having knowledge).

The follower says: "The characteristics of the ox exist in the ox, not in (the man) possessing the ox." (S.)

The characteristics of the ox are in the ox, but they do not exist in the man possessing the ox, and therefore even if the man and the ox are united, the man possessing the ox does not make the ox. But only the ox is the ox. In the same way, although the *ātman* and knowledge are united, the characteristics of knowledge exist in knowledge, but the *ātman* is not knowledge. Now you say that on account of the union of the *ātman* with the perception by the senses, the *manas* and the objects, knowledge arises; [then] this knowledge knows the objects like *rūpa* and so on. Therefore only knowledge can know, but it is not the *ātman* that knows. E.g., fire can burn, but it is not the man possessing fire that burns.

The unbeliever says: "Because it has for its *dharma* the power of employing [knowledge]." (S.)

Although men have the characteristic of seeing, they see by employing the lamp; but without the lamp, they cannot see; so, the *ātman*, although it has the potentiality of knowing, (still) it can know by employing knowledge, but without knowledge it cannot know.

The follower says: "It is not so. Because knowledge is really the power of knowing." (S.)

Out of the union of the perception by the senses, the *manas* and the objects, knowledge arises. This knowledge can know the objects such as the *rūpa* and so on. Therefore, knowledge is the power of knowing, (but) it is not [the instrument that] is employed. If knowledge is the power of knowing, what will be the use of the *ātman*? The example of the lamp is erroneous. Why?

"Because the lamp does not know the *rūpa* and so on." (S.)

Although the lamp exists before, it cannot know *rūpa* and so on. Because it has not the attribute of knowledge. Therefore only knowledge can know the *rūpa*.

If [on the other hand] (knowledge) cannot know, it cannot be called knowledge.

Therefore, if you maintain that it has the power of knowing, what will be the use of such a power?

The unbeliever says: "On account of the union with the body of a horse, the *ātman* becomes a horse. (S.)

E.g., on account of the union of the *ātman* with the body of a horse, the *ātman* is called a horse. Although the *ātman* is different from the body, yet the *ātman* is called a horse; in the same way on account of the union of the *ātman* with knowledge the *ātman* is called knowledge.

The follower says: "It is not so. Because, in the body, the *ātman* is not the horse." (S.)

The body of the horse is the horse. When you say that the body and the *ātman* are different, then the *ātman* and the horse must be different. How can the *ātman* be the horse?

Therefore this example is wrong. If you compare the *ātman* with the *ātman*, then you fall into a *nigrahasthāna* (負處).

The unbeliever says: "As the black shawl." (S.)

As for instance, the black shawl.—The black is different from the cloth; yet because the black is united with the cloth, therefore this is named black cloth. In the same way, although the knowledge is different from the *ātman*, still as the *ātman* is united with knowledge, therefore the *ātman* is called knowledge.

The follower says: "(If it be so), the *ātman* does not exist" (S.)

If, the *ātman* is called knowledge because the *ātman* is united with knowledge, then, the *ātman* must be not-*ātman*.

And why? We have said before that knowledge is the power of knowing. If knowledge is not called the *ātman*, the *ātman* also cannot be called the knower.

If, an object is named on account of its union with another (object), then, as knowledge is united with the *ātman*, why is knowledge not called the *ātman*?

And the example of the black cloth mentioned by you is contradictory to your books. According to your books, black is the quality, *guṇa*, and the cloth is the substance, *dravya*, (陀 羅 驃); the *dravya* does not make the *guṇa* and the *guṇa* does not make the *dravya*. (S.)

The unbeliever says: "As (the man) who has a stick (*daṇḍin*)." (S.)

E.g., because a man possesses a stick the man is described as 'having a stick.' It is not called only a stick and the stick, although it is united with man, is not described as 'having a man,' and also it is not called a man. In the same way, as the *ātman* is united with knowledge, the *ātman* is called the knower, and not merely knowledge; on the other hand, though knowledge is united with the *ātman*, knowledge is not called *ātman*.

The follower says: "It is not so. (The man) having a stick is not a stick." (S.)

Although the stick is united with (the man) having the stick, (the man) having the stick is not the stick. In the same way, the characteristics of knowledge are inherent in knowledge itself, but not in the *ātman*. Therefore the *ātman* is not the knower.

The unbeliever says: "The followers of the *Sāṅkhya* say again: 'If the knowledge were different from the *ātman*, there would be such a mistake as has been pointed out above. But in our *Sūtras* there is no such mistake. And why? Because intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman*. We believe that the *ātman* has the characteristic of intelligence, and therefore it is eternal intelligence and not non-intelligence."

The follower says: Although this has been refuted before,

we shall now explain it again. "If it is characterised by intelligence, the *ātman* is no longer one." (S.)

Intelligence has various perceptions of pain, joy, and so on. If intelligence is the characteristic of the *ātman* the *ātman* also must be various.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so. It is one, (but) with various characteristics, such as *sphaṭika*. (S.)

As one single gem of *sphaṭika* changes according to the *rūpa*, becoming blue, yellow, red, white, and so on, so also the intelligence, (although) one, is differentiated according to the objects; sometimes it perceives pain, sometimes it perceives joy, and so on. Although intelligence has various characteristics, it is fundamentally one and the same.

The follower says: "If it were so, sin and merit would have one characteristic." (S.)

If there is the thought of benefitting others, this is called merit, if there is the thought of offending others, this is called sin. All intelligent men believe in this law. If the thought of benefitting others and the thought of offending others are one sin and merit must have the same characteristic, and also gift and theft, and so on also must be one. Again as the gem, being already existent, changes according to the *rūpa*, so intelligence arises together with the cause; and therefore, your example is not right. And again, gems renew, (and) because [the characteristic of] the new is born and destroyed, therefore the characteristic [in the gem] is not one. When you say that the gem is one, then, also you are not right.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so. Although the products are many, the maker is one, such as the potter." (S.)

The potter makes pots, crockery and so on, but it does not follow that, the maker being one, products also are [of] one [kind]. In the same way, one single thought can make the action of offending and benefitting, and so on.

The follower says: "The potter is not different." (S.)

E.g., the body of the potter is one, and has not the characteristic of diversity; but it is different from pots,

crockery, and so on; so the thought of benefitting others and the thought of offending others have really the characteristic of the diversity. And yet offending and benefitting, and so on are not different from thought. And therefore your example is wrong.

The unbeliever says: "Really the *ātman* exists, because it is characterised by inference. (比 知)" (S.)

There are things which although cannot directly be perceived can still be known through inference. For instance, having seen that a man first goes and then reaches (a place), since the moon and the sun rise in the east and disappear in the west, although their movements are not seen, because they reach another (place), they are known to possess motion; in the same way, seeing that *guṇa* depends upon *dravya*, through the characteristic of the inference, we know that there is an *ātman*. And because the *ātman* is united with knowledge, therefore, the *ātman* is called the knower.

The follower says: This thing has already been refuted. Now we shall say again "that if there is no knowledge, there is no *ātman*." (S.)

According to your system, the *ātman* is pervading, and wide and great, but knowledge is limited. If the *ātman* knows, there would be places and there would be times where and when he would not know. Then there is no *ātman*. 'There are places' means 'outside of the body'; 'there are times' means 'inside the body,' *i e.*, during sleep, sadness, and so on he does not know. If the *ātman*, as characterised by knowledge, in (some) places or in (some) moments does not know, then, there is no *ātman*. And why? Because he has no more the characteristic of knowledge. When you say that the *ātman* is existent because of the characteristic of knowledge, your (words) are empty and untrue.

The unbeliever says: "On account of the non-existence of its function, knowledge is not existent, as smoke." (S.)

Take e.g., the smoke, which is the characteristic of fire; when there are ashes, there is no smoke, but at that time, although there is no smoke, there is fire. In the same way, although knowledge is the characteristic of the *ātman*, whether

there is knowledge or there is no knowledge [in it], the *ātman* must eternally exist.

The follower says "It is not so. Because the *ātman* can know." (S.)

If one wishes to affirm that the *ātman* is still there even when there is no knowledge, then, the *ātman* is not the knower: and it must not have the characteristic of knowledge. And why? Because, according to you, even when the *ātman* is without knowledge, the *ātman* exists. And again, when there is no smoke, (we) know that there is fire, by seeing that there is fire. (But) we cannot see the *ātman*, (either) if it has knowledge or if it has not knowledge. Therefore, your example is wrong. And again, you teach that the *ātman* is existent because we know it by inference. But this also is wrong. And why? "Since (we) see the goer, on account of the movement and the reaching to that [place]." (S.)

Without a goer there is no movement and without movement there is no goer; as regards 'reaching that place' the same happens. When, seeing a goer, we say that he has reached that place, we necessarily know that he possesses movement. To say that without the *ātman* there is no knowledge—such a statement is not valid. Therefore, we must not assume that there is an *ātman* only because knowledge exists. E.g. it is not possible to see a tortoise and have the idea of hair; or also it is not possible to see a barren woman and have the idea of a child. In the same way, we cannot have the idea of the *ātman* by perceiving knowledge.

The unbeliever says: "As [the action of] taking with the hand." (S.)

There is a time when the hand takes, and there is a time when it does not take; but it is impossible, on account of the time when it does not take, not to call it a hand. In fact a hand is always called a hand. The same happens with the *ātman*, though there are times when (it) knows and there are times when (it) does not know. But it is not possible, on account of the time when (it) does not know, not to call it the *ātman*. The *ātman* is always called the *ātman*.

The follower says: "The [action of] taking is not the characteristic of the hand." (S.)

Taking is the action, not the characteristic of the hand. And why? Because, only we do not know that it is a hand owing to the [action of] taking. You think that knowledge is the characteristic of the *ātman*. And therefore this example is wrong.

The unbeliever says: "Surely there is an *ātman* because he feels pain and joy." (S.)

If there is none that feels, then, there is no feeling of the *sparśa* (touch) of the body. Then it would be impossible to feel sorrow and pain. And why? A dead man has a body, but he cannot feel pain and joy; therefore we know that the possessor of the body can feel pain and joy. And this is the *ātman*. Therefore, surely the *ātman* exists.

The follower says: "If it suffers, then, it is cut." (S.)

Suffering arises, at that time, when a sword hurts the body. If the sword hurts the *ātman*, and the *ātman* also feels suffering, [the necessary implication is that] the *ātman* also has been cut.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so, because it has no touch, as the void." (S.)

Because the *ātman* has no touch, it cannot be cut. E.g., when a house is burnt, the void which is inside, because it has no touch, cannot be burnt, but is only hot. In the same way, when the body is cut, the *ātman*, which is inside, because it has not touch, cannot be cut, but feels only suffering.

The follower says: "If it be so, there is no going." (S.)

If the *ātman* has no touch, the body must not reach other places—and why? Movement arises out of reflection and the motion of the body. The body is without reflection: because it has not the attribute of thought. The *ātman* has no force of motion, because he has not the attribute of the body.

And therefore, the body must not reach other places.

The unbeliever says: "Like the blind and the lame." (S.)

E.g., the blind and the lame, helping each other, can go; in the same way the *ātman* has reflexion (and) the body has the power of motion. Out their union there is movement.

The follower says: "(No!) Because [their] characteristics are different." (S.)

The blind and the lame have two [separate] touches and two reflexions and therefore they must have the power of going. The *ātman* and the body are not two things; and therefore they cannot go. Therefore there is no movement. If it were not so, there would be the error of 'the cutting' said before. Again, when you say that the void is hot, the statement is not valid. And why? Because, the void is without touch. Heat in a subtile condition permeates the void and the touch of the body perceives the heat. But it is not that the void is hot.

The unbeliever says:

"[The suffering of the the *ātman* is] like the suffering of the master of the house." (S.)

E.g., when the house is burnt the master of the house suffers, but is not burnt; in the same way, when the body is cut, the *ātman* only suffers, but is not cut.

The follower says: "It is not so. (The house) burns, because it is not eternal." (S.)

When the house burns, grass, trees, and so on, since they are not eternal, burn and are hot. The void, because it is eternal, does neither burn nor become hot. In the same way, because the body is not eternal, it suffers, and is also cut. But the *ātman*, because it is eternal, does neither suffer nor is cut. And again, the master of the house, because he is distant from the fire, must not be burnt. But your books say that the *ātman* is all permeating, and therefore, it must also be cut and destroyed.

The unbeliever says: "Necessarily the *ātman* exists, on account of the perception of the *rūpa*, and so on." (S.)

The five senses cannot know the five objects, because they have not knowledge as (their) attribute. Therefore (we) know that the *ātman* is the knower. The *ātman* employing

the eyes, and so on, knows objects such as the *rūpa*, etc., as a man with a sickle reaps the crops.

The follower says: "Then how is it that it does not employ the ear in order to see?" (S.)

If the *ātman* has the power of seeing, how is it that it does not employ the ear in order to see the *rūpa*? Such as fire which can burn, and burns in every place, or such as a man when he has no sickle can cut with the hands or also like a house, which has six windows and where the man who is inside can see (through these six windows). The same would happen in the case of the *ātman* which must see everywhere.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so. Because (the organ which) is employed is fixed (*niyata*), as with the potter." (S.)

Although the *ātman* has the power of seeing, yet (the objects) towards which the eyes, etc. are directed, are not the same (for every sense). Because each one is fixed to a (particular) object, therefore it is not possible to see the *rūpa*, employing the ear. Just as the potter who, although he has the power of making pots, cannot make them without a clod of clay, in the same way, although the *ātman* has the power of vision, (it) cannot see without eyes.

The follower says: "If it be so, it is blind." (S.)

If the *ātman* sees, employing the eyes, then the *ātman* is different from the eyes. If the *ātman* is different from the eyes, then the *ātman* is without eyes. If it is without eyes, how can it see? And your example of the potter also is not right. Why? Because without the clod there is no pot, inasmuch as the clod is just the pot; but the eyes and the *rūpa* are different.

The unbeliever says: "There is the *ātman*, on account of the feeling of a different sense." (S.)

If there is no *ātman*, how is it that, when we see another (man) eating fruits, in (our) mouth saliva is produced? In the same way, it is not possible to know tastes with the eyes. Those who have eyes, can know. And again:

Because only one thing is known by the eyes and by the touch of the body." (S.)

E.g., if a man, with his eyes, has before known a pot and so on, then, (he) knows it, in the darkness, with the touch of his body, although he does not employ the eyes; therefore (we) know that there is an *ātman*.

The follower says: "This has been already refuted in the sūtra: 'as the blind.' And again, if saliva is produced in the mouth, when the eye sees another man eating a fruit, then, how is it that the other senses do not have any motion? The same happens with the body."

The unbeliever says: "As a man (who) burns." (S.)

Although a man can burn (things), yet (he) cannot burn if (he is) without fire; the same happens as regards the *ātman*, (which) can see, employing the eyes, but without the eyes cannot see.

The follower says: "The fire burns." (S.)

When you say, that 'a man burns,' this statement is not valid—and why? Man has not the characteristic of burning. Fire can by itself burn. E.g., when the wind moves the trees, fire is produced from the reciprocal rubbing and it burns the mountain-meadows. But there is no agent [who makes it]. Therefore fire by itself can burn; it is not the man, who burns.

The unbeliever says: "As the *manas*. (S.)

When a man is dead, although he has eyes, the *ātman* does not see, because he has no *manas*. But if there is *manas* then the *ātman* sees. In the same way the *ātman* sees employing the eyes, but without (them) it cannot see.

The follower says: You maintain that when there is *manas*, (we) can know; but when there is no *manas* we cannot know, and that it is only the *manas*, which going through the door of the eyes and so on, knows. What will then be the use of the *ātman*?

The unbeliever says: the *manas* does not know by itself. If the characteristic of a *manas* were known by another *manas*, then there would be *anavasthā*. Because the *ātman* is one, when we say that the *ātman* knows the *manas*, then there is no *anavasthā*.

The follower says: "The *ātman* also knows the *ātman*." (S.)

If the *ātman* knows the *manas*, who, then, will know the *ātman*? If again the *ātman* knows the *ātman*, then, there is again *aṇavasthā*. According to our system, we know the past *manas*, because of the present *manas*. Because eternity is not the attribute of *manas*, therefore there is no mistake (in our doctrine).

The unbeliever says: "How is it possible to dispense with the *ātman*?" (S.)

If we dispense with the *ātman* how can the *manas* alone know the objects?

The follower says: "As fire which has the characteristic of heat." (S.)

The heat of fire has no agent. The nature of fire is heat, and there is no fire without heat; in the same way, the *manas* is characterised by knowledge; and even if it is separated from the *ātman* it can know, because its nature is knowledge. (Then) because of the difference between the *ātman* and knowledge (which is the consequence of this assumption) the *ātman* must not know.

The unbeliever says: "There must be an *ātman* because owing to the continuity of the memory of the previous experience at the time of the birth there is joy and pain." (S.)

"Because of the continuity of the memory of the experience of a former life, a small child (as soon as he is) born knows objects which bring joy and pain, although there is nobody to teach him. And in this present life again he makes many kinds of actions. Therefore we know that there is an *ātman* and that it has the characteristic of eternity."

The follower says: "If (the *ātman*) is all pervading, how can there be memory?" (S.)

The *ātman* is eternal and pervades all objects and there is no time when he does not remember. But from what can memory arise? And again, if memory arises, in all places, then, memory also must pervade all places; so that all places must be remembered at the same time. If memory

arises in every particular place, then the *ātman* has parts; since it has parts, it is not eternal. And again, whether the *ātman* is not knowledge or knowledge is not *ātman*, these assumptions have been refuted before.

The unbeliever says: "Out of the union, memory arises." (S.)

If the *ātman* and the *manas* are united, memory arises, in so far as there is the manifestation of its potentiality; why? Although the *ātman* and the *manas* are united, yet, if its potentiality is not manifested, then, memory cannot arise.

The follower says: Although (this argument) has been refuted before, now we shall explain it with more [emphasis]. If the *ātman* is characterised by knowledge he must not produce memory; and if it is not characterised by knowledge, it cannot produce memory. And again:

"If there is memory, (it) knows." (S.)

"When memory arises, it knows. When memory does not arise, it does not know. Therefore we must acknowledge that memory is knowledge. What will, then, be the use of the *ātman*?"

The unbeliever says: "There must be the *ātman*, because to the left there is the vision, and to the right there is the recognition." (S.)

When a man first sees with the left eye and then knows with the right eye, it is not possible [to say] that 'that one sees' and 'this one knows.' Because inside there is the *ātman*, (this) sees with the left [eye] and knows with the right.

The follower says: "The two eyes are inter-related." (S).

A partial knowledge is not called knowledge; moreover if it were so, there would be no knowledge. And again, 'if it is all pervading—how can there be memory?' And again 'if there is memory, (it) knows.' And again, 'how could it not see, employing the ear?' And again 'like the blind.' Again if it 'sees with the left eye, it cannot recognize with the right eye.' The *ātman* must not also see with 'this part and recognize with that part.' Therefore, it is not possible (to demonstrate) that there

is an *ātman* because 'with the left eye one sees and with the right eye one recognizes.'

The unbeliever says: "Because memory is attached to the *ātman*, the *ātman* knows." (S).

Memory is called an attribute of the *ātman*. This memory is born in the *ātman*; therefore, with the help of the memory *ātman* knows.

The follower says: "It is not so, because a partial knowledge is not called knowledge." (S).

If, knowledge arises in only one part of the *ātman*, then, the *ātman* knows partially. If the *ātman* knows partially, the *ātman* cannot be called knowledge.

The unbeliever says: The knowledge of the *ātman* is not a partial knowledge; why? Although the *ātman* knows partially, the *ātman* is called knowledge.

"As the action of the body." (S.)

E.g., what is made by the hands, which are a part of the body, is called an action of the body. In the same way, although the *ātman* knows partially, the *ātman* is called knowledge.

The follower says: "If it is so, then, there is no knowledge." (S).

According to your system, the *ātman* is all pervading, but the *manas* is small. Out of the union of the *ātman* and the *manas*, the knowledge of the *ātman* arises. (And therefore) this knowledge is as small as the *manas*, etc. If owing to this small knowledge, the *ātman* is called the knower, why do you not say that because the not-knowledge is great, the *ātman* does not know? Again, your example of the action of the body is not true; why? Because it is not possible to prove unity or differentiation of the part and of the whole.

The unbeliever says: "As a cloth, which is burning in one part." (S.)

E.g., when a part of the cloth is burning, we say that the cloth is burning. In the same way, although a part of the *ātman* knows, we say that the *ātman* knows.

The follower says: "The same happens as regards the burning." (S.)

If only a part of the cloth is burning, we do not say (that) the whole cloth is burning. But we must say that a part is burning. But if you say that the whole cloth is burning, because only one part is burning, then, we must say that it is not burning because now a great part (of it) is not burning. Why ? Because, the greater part of the cloth is not burning and really it has, as yet, its own function. Therefore we do not rely upon your words.

CHAPTER III.

Refutation of Unity.

The unbeliever says: "There must be an *ātman*, because there are representations proper to the *ātman*. Such as existence, unity and pot and so on." (S.)

If there is an *ātman*, then, there are representations proper to the *ātman*. If there is no *ātman*, then, there are not representations proper to the *ātman*. Existence, unity, pot and so on—these are the representations of the *ātman*."

The follower says: It is not so; and why ? Because it has not been possible to prove the *ātman*. Now whether we consider existence, unity, and pot as unity or as diversity, both the hypothesis are mistaken.

The unbeliever says: "If existence, unity, pot and so on are considered as unity, what is the mistake ?"

The follower says: If existence, unity and pot are a unity, then, like unity, everything is either demonstrated or not demonstrated or erroneous (*viparyasta* 顛 倒) (S).

If existence, unity and pot are a unity, then, as *Indra Śakra* and *Kauśika* are identical, and in the place where *Indra* is, there *Śakra* and *Kauśika* must also be, in the same way, in the place of existence there will then be unity and pot. In the place of unity there will be existence and pot. In the place of pot there will be existence and unity. If so, all things such as

a cloth and so on also must be a pot, because existence, unity and pot are one. In the same way, existence, unity, object, all must be pot. Now, the pot, the cloth, and all other things must necessarily be identical. And again because of the eternity of existence, unity and the pot also must be eternal. Moreover, if one says, 'existence,' then he would say [at the same time] 'unity,' and 'pot'; then, since one is a number; existence and the pot also must be numbers. Moreover, if the pot is (the result) of five bodies, existence and unity also must have five bodies. If the 'pot' has shape and resistance, then, existence and unity also must have shape and resistance. Then if the pot is not eternal, existence and unity also must not be eternal. This is the meaning [of the sentence] "like unity everything is demonstrated." If there is existence in every place, but in every place there is not [always] a pot, then, in every place existence will be non-existent, because the pot and existence are not different. Again, the existence of every object is not the pot. Then, the pot is not existence, because the pot and existence are different. And again when one says 'existence,' if he does not include [in it] unity and the pot, then, saying unity and the pot also one must not include existence in them, because the pot and existence are not different. And again, if existence is not the pot, then, the pot also must not be 'pot,' because the pot and existence are not different. Therefore it is said "as unity everything is not demonstrated." If one desires to say 'pot' he must say existence, desiring to say existence one must say 'pot.' And again, since according to you the pot is demonstrated, existence and unity also must also be demonstrated. If existence and unity are demonstrated, then, the 'pot' also must be demonstrated, because of its identity [with those]. And this is the meaning [of the sentence] " as unity everything is erroneous.

The unbeliever says: " Because, things are existence and unity, there is no mistake." (S.)

In every thing, there is existence and there is unity. Therefore, if there is a pot in a place, there are necessarily existence and unity also. But, not in all the places where there is existence and unity, there is a pot. And again, if one says 'pot.'

we shall know, that existence and unity have been included [in it]. But when we say existence and unity, the pot is not necessarily included.

The follower says: "The pot and existence are two; how are the two not the pot?" (S.)

If existence, unity and the pot are a unity how is it that where there is existence and unity, there is no pot? And again, how is it that when [you] say existence and unity [you] do not include the pot.

The unbeliever says: "Because in the pot the existence of the pot [only] is absolute (*niyata* or *anaikāntika* 定)" (S.)

In the pot the existence of the pot is not different from the pot. But it is different from objects like cloth, etc. Therefore, there is the existence of the pot in a pot which is in a certain place and also there is the pot in the existence of the pot, which is in a certain place. But it is not that in the place where there is existence there is the pot.

The follower says: "It is not so. Because the pot and existence are not different." (S.)

Existence is the general characteristic (總 相); and why? If one says existence, then, one has the sure belief (*pratyaya* 信) of the existence of the pot and other similar things. If one says pot one has not the sure belief of the cloth and other things. Therefore, the pot is the particular characteristic (別 相), and the existence is the general characteristic. How can they be identical?

The unbeliever says: "As the father and the son." (S.)

As one man is a son as well as a father, in the same way the general characteristic is also the particular characteristic and the particular characteristic is also the general characteristic.

The follower says: It is not so.

"On account of the son one is the father. (S)."

If a man has not yet created a son, he is not called a father. As soon as a son is born, he becomes a father.

Moreover this example is similar to our (example); therefore you are wrong.

The unbeliever says: "The pot must exist because all believe in it." (S.)

Men of this world see with their eyes and believe that there is a function of the pot; therefore the pot must exist.

The follower says: "Because it is not different from existence, everything is not existent." (S.)

If the pot and existence are not different, the pot must be the general characteristic and not the particular characteristic. If the particular characteristic is not existent, the general characteristic is also not existent. Because, owing to a particular characteristic, there is a general characteristic. If the particular characteristic does not exist, then the general characteristic does not exist. Since these two are not existent, therefore everything is non-existent.

The unbeliever says: "As the parts viz., the foot, the head, and so on are called the body. (S.)

The head, the foot and the other parts are not different from the body yet the feet only are not the body; in the same way, although 'pot' and 'existence' are not different, yet the pot is not the general characteristic.

The follower says: "If the foot and the body are not different, how is it that the foot is not the head?" (S.)

If the head, the feet and the other parts are not different from the body, the foot must be the head, since both are not different from the body, just as *Indra* is *Śakra*, because *Indra* and *Śakra* are not different.

The unbeliever says: "Because all the parts are different, there is no mistake." (S.)

The part and the whole are not different. But, (this does) not (mean) that the part is not different from the part. Therefore, the head and the foot are not one.

The follower says: "If it be so, then there will be no body." (S.)

If the foot and the head are different, and the head is different from the foot and the other parts, then, only the parts would be existent, but not the whole. (The totality of the parts) is called the body.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so, because, from many causes only one effect is manifested. So the *rūpa* and so on are the pot." (S.)

From many causes, such as the *rūpa* and the other parts, one single effect is manifested *viz.*, the pot; in this case not only the *rūpa* is the pot, but also the pot is not separated from the *rūpa*. Therefore, the *rūpa* and the other parts, are not identical. The foot and the other parts are in the same relation with the body.

The follower says: "As the *rūpa* and so on, the pot also is not one." (S.)

If the pot is not different from the five parts, *rūpa*, *śabda*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *sparśa*, then, one must not say 'one pot.' If one says 'one pot', the *rūpa* and the other parts also must be one, because the *rūpa* and so on are not different from the pot.

The unbeliever says: "As an army or a forest." (S.)

If elephants, horses, chariots and foot soldiers are united in great numbers they are called 'an army' and also because many trees such as cypresses and pines are collected they are called 'a forest.' Neither does one pine form a forest, nor without pines there is any forest. The same is to be said as regards the army also. In the same way, neither the *rūpa* alone is called the pot, nor without the *rūpa* is there a pot.

The follower says: "[As regards] plurality it is also like the pot." (S.)

If pines and cypresses and so on are not different from the forest, one must not say 'one forest.' If one says 'one forest,' pines and cypresses also must be one, because they are not different from the forest. And as regards the pine-tree, the root, the stem, the branches, the joints, the flowers and the leaves, they also must be refuted in the same way. Like the army and so on, all the objects must absolutely be refuted in the same way.

The unbeliever says: (The pot must exist), because you admit many pots." (S.)

You say, that as the *rūpa* and the other parts are many, the pot also must be many. Therefore, wishing to refute one pot, you admit many pots.

The follower says: "Not because the *rūpa* and so on are many, the pot also is many." (S.)

We say that you are wrong, but this does not mean that we admit many pots. You yourself said that the *rūpa* and the other parts are many and that therefore the pot does not exist as a separate *dharma* to be considered as the effect of the *rūpa* and so on.

The unbeliever says: "The effect is there, because the cause is not refuted. Because there is the cause, the effect is demonstrated." (S.)

You refute the pot as an effect, but you do not refute the *rūpa* and so on, which are the causes of the pot. If there is a cause, there must necessarily be an effect, because there is no cause without effect. Again, the cause of the pot consisting of the *rūpa* and so on is the effect of the atoms. Since you admit the *rūpa*, etc., the cause and the effect are both demonstrated.

The follower says: "As the effect is not existent, the cause also is not existent." (S.)

As the pot is not different from the many parts such as the *rūpa* and so on, the pot must not be one. Now, since the many parts such as the *rūpa*, etc., are not different from the pot, therefore, the *rūpa* and so on must not be many. And again, if you say that there is no cause without effect, then, the effect being refuted, the cause also is by itself refuted, because, according to your system, cause and effect are one. And again "The three times would be one. (S.)

The time, when (the pot) is a rounded clod of earth, is present; the time when it is not yet a pot is future; the time when it is earth is past. If cause and effect are one, then, in the round clod there must be the pot and the earth, and therefore the three times would be one. (Now) what is already made.

what is now being made and what will be made would therefore be annulled.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so, in as much as cause and effect are demonstrated, since they are reciprocally interdependent, "such as long and short." (S.)

As on the basis of the long we recognise the short, and on the basis of the short, we recognise the long, so also the clod with regard to the pot is the cause, with regard to the earth, is the effect.

The follower says: "Because the cause would be another and because of the contradiction—for both these mistakes, neither in the long there is the characteristic of the long, nor in the short, nor in both." (S.)

If there is really a characteristic of the long, it will exist either in the long or in the short or in both. But this cannot be proved—and why? In the long there is not the characteristic of the long, because it would have (for cause) another [long]. If it is long on account of the short, then, in the long there must not be the nature of the long, because of the contradiction. If in the short there is the long, then it can not be called short. And in the long and the short together also there is not the long, because of both mistakes. Whether it exists in the long or in the short—there would be the mistakes as said before. The same happens as regards the characteristic of the short also. If long and short are not existent how are they interdependent?

CHAPTER IV.

Refutation of Diversity.

The unbeliever says: "You said before that (to affirm) the difference between existence, unity and the pot, is also wrong. What mistake is there?"

The follower says: "If existence and so on are each different from the other, then, they are non-existent." (S.)

If existence, unity and the pot are different, each one is not existent. If the pot is different from existence and unity, the pot is neither existence nor unity. If existence is different from unity and the pot, it is neither the pot nor unity. If unity is different from the pot and existence, it is neither the pot nor existence. In this way, each one is lost; and again, if the pot is lost, existence and unity must not be lost. If existence is lost the pot and unity must not be lost. If unity is lost, existence and the pot must not be lost, because of the difference. E.g., if this man disappear, that man does not disappear.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so. Since existence and unity are united (with the pot), existence, unity and pot are demonstrated." (S.)

Existence, unity and the pot are different; yet, because the pot is united with existence, therefore the pot is called existent. Because the pot is united with unity, therefore the pot is called one. If you say that when the pot is lost, existence and unity must not be lost, then, your words are not valid. And why? Because there is the union with a different (thing). There are three kinds of differences. (1) difference, [between] combined [things] (2) difference, [between] separate [things] and (3) difference through transformation; difference [between] combined [things] such as *dravya* and *guṇa*; difference, [between] separate [things] such as this man and that man; difference through transformation such as a ball of cow-dung changing into a ball of ashes. Because there is unity of different (things), if the pot is lost, unity is also lost. If unity is lost, the pot is also lost. Existence, because it is eternal, is not lost.

The follower says: "If it is so, then there are many pots." (S.)

"Because the pot is united with existence, therefore, the pot is existent. Because the pot is united with "unity" the pot is one. The pot is also pot, and therefore there are many pots. As to what you say that there is the difference between combined things, as (between) *dravya* and *guṇa*, and that therefore if the pot is lost, the unity also is lost, and if the unity is lost the pot also is lost; we desire to refute your

(theory) of difference. Why through the difference the difference is realised ? You must explain the cause [of this].

The unbeliever says: " Because, (the one) is the general characteristic and (the other) is *guṇa*, (therefore) existence and unity are not the pot." (S.)

Existence is the general characteristic and therefore it is not the "pot." Unity is *guṇa*, therefore it is not the pot. The pot is *dravya*.

The follower says: " If it is so, the pot is not existent." (S.)

If existence is not the pot, because it is a general characteristic, if unity, is not the pot, because it is *guṇa*; and if the pot is neither existence nor unity, because is *dravya*, then, the pot is not existent.

The unbeliever says: " (You) admit many pots." (S.)

You said before: ' (many pots) ' desiring to refute one pot. Then you admit [the existence of] many pots.

The follower says: " Because the one is not existent, the many also is not existent." (S.)

You say that because the pot is united with existence, the pot is existent; and that because the pot is united with unity, the pot is one; and that the pot also is the pot. If it is so, what, in this world, is said to be one pot is considered by you to be many pots. Therefore, one pot becomes many pots. Because one pot becomes many, therefore, there is no more one pot. Because one pot is not existent, therefore, many also are not existent; because, first there is the one, and afterwards there is the many. And again:

" Because of the non-existence of the initial number." (S.)

The one is the first of those *dharmas* which are [called] numbers. If the pot and unity are different, then, the pot is not one; because of the non-existence of the one, the many also is not existent.

The unbeliever says: " (The pot is existent), because the pot is united with existence." (S.)

Because the pot is united with existence, the pot is said to be existent. It is not absolutely existent. In the same way,

because the pot is united with unity, it is called one ; but it is not the absolute unity.

The follower says: "Existence alone is a [mere] word. This thing has been refuted before. If existence is not the pot, then, the pot is not existent. Now, we shall explain that the pot must be not-pot." (S.)

If, because the pot is united with existence, the pot is existent, this existence is not the pot. If the pot is united with the not-pot, how the pot is not considered a not-pot ?

The unbeliever says : "Because the union with the non-existence is not existent, (the pot) is not non-pot." (S.)

Non-pot means non-existent pot. It there is non-existence, then there is no union. Therefore, the pot is not a non-pot. Now, it exists; on account of the existence it must be united with existence ; the pot is existent because it is united with existence.

The follower says : "Because the pot is now united with existence." (S.)

If it is non-pot, then it is not existent. If it is not existent, then there is no union. Now, because the pot is united with existence, existence must be the pot. If you say that because the pot is not yet united with existence, it does not exist, then, because it is not existent, there is no union [with existence]. As it has been taught before, that a *dharma* being non-existent, there is no union [of it with existence], so also, when it is not yet united with existence, the pot is a *dharma* which is not existent. Because it is a *dharma* which is not existent, therefore, it cannot be united with existence.

The unbeliever says : "It is not so. Because the existence manifests the pot, etc., like the lamp." (S.)

Existence is not only the cause of the things like the pot and so on, but it can also manifest things such as the pot and so on. As the lamp which can illuminate things ; (in the same way), because existence can manifest the pot, therefore we know that the pot exists.

The follower says : "If existence can manifest (the objects) like the lamp, the pot must be already existent." (S.)

Now, when things are already existent, then only, they are manifested and illuminated by the lamp. If it happens in this way, then, at the time when there is not yet union with existence, things like the pot and so on must be already existent. If they are already existent, which is the use of a posterior existence ? If things, like the pot and so on, are not existent, when they are not yet united with existence, but they are existent out of the union with existence, then, existence would be the material cause (*kāraṇa-hetu* 作 因), but not the manifesting cause (*vyañjana-hetu* 了 因). And again :

"If (the thing) characterised is demonstrated, through the characteristic, how is it that unity does not become a duality ?" (S.)

If, inasmuch as you consider existence as the characteristic of the pot, you know that the pot is existent, then, without the characteristic, the thing characterised is not demonstrated. Therefore, existence also must have the characteristic of existence. If we know that existence is existence, without this characteristic, then, the same must also be the case as regards the pot and so on. The example of the lamp has been refuted before. Now, the lamp shines by itself, and not because it depends on an external light ; so the pot also, being existent by itself, would not depend upon an exterior existence."

The unbeliever says: "As the characteristic of the body" (S).

In as much as there are parts, such as the foot, we know that the whole is the body ; but the foot does not seek for any characteristic ; in the same way, because existence is the characterstic of the pot, therefore, we know that the pot is existent. But existence does not seek for a characteristic.

The believer says : "If the whole, is in the part, how is it that the head is not in the foot ?" (S.)

If there is a *dharma* which is the body, then in the parts such as the foot and so on, does it exist as a totality or (does it exist) as a part ? Now, if it exists as a totality, the foot must exist in the head ; on account of the unity of that

dharma which is the body. If it exists as a part, this also is not possible; and why?

"The whole is like the part." (S.)

If (one says that) in the foot the whole is similar to that part which is the foot, etc., and the same is the case as regards the other parts, then, the whole must be one with the parts. And therefore, that whole which is called the body must be non-existent. In the same way, the existence by itself of the parts like foot and so on, is equally refuted as the whole. Because the whole does not exist the parts also are not existent.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so, because there are the atoms." (S).

The parts are not non-existent; and why? Because there is no part in which there are no atoms. Because the atoms are collected, therefore they can produce this effect which is the part, etc. And therefore there must exist a whole.

The follower says: "If collected they are the pot, all are pots." (S.)

We shall afterwards refute your theory that the atoms, having no part, are only existent. Now we shall briefly say that, if the collection of atoms forms the pot, and if the whole collection of them is the pot, then, all atoms must be the pot. If the entire collection is not the pot, all is not pot.

The unbeliever says: "What happens with the force in the collection of threads and drops happens with the atoms as well." (S.)

As each one of the threads cannot restrain an elephant and one drop of water cannot fill a pot, but a collection of many can produce (an effect) like this, so the atoms, when collected together, have the force to produce a pot.

The follower says: "It is not so, because this is not absolute." (S.)

As no barren woman can have a son and none of the blind men can see *rūpa*, and no grain of sand can produce oil they cannot do it, even if they are collected together; also the same is the case with regard to the atoms; because each one [of them] cannot [produce that effect], then, many also cannot (do it).

The unbeliever says: "Because each part has this force, therefore, this [argument] is not non-absolute." (S.)

The thread and the drop have separately the power of restraining an elephant and filling the pot; but because a barren woman, the blind, a grain of sand, have not any power separately, when they are many. also they have no power. Therefore, this (argument) is not non-absolute. And you must not have recourse to the examples of the barren woman, the blind and the grain of sand.

The follower says: " Because there is the mistake of the unity and diversity of the parts and of the whole". (S.)

" The parts and the whole, whether they are one, or they are different, [cannot be proved] and the mistake (in both cases) has been refuted before; and again because the whole is not existent, therefore parts also are not existent. If, the parts cannot be demonstrated, when the whole does not yet exist, how can they have the power of the cause? If the whole already exists, what use will the power of the parts have?

The unbeliever says: " You are a man whose *dharma* is refutation." (S.)

In this world men see things like the pot and so on. You refute them, with various causes, and therefore, you are a man whose *dharma* is refutation.

The follower says: This is not so. You say that existence and the pot are different. We teach that if existence and pot are different, then, there is no pot, and again:

" You see the non-existent as existent. You see the existent as non-existent and so on." (S.)

You are like a man whose *dharma* is refutation; moreover the mistake is very important; and why? It is evident that the union of the parts such as the head, the foot and so on is the body, but you say that it is not the body, and that the whole which is the body separately exists beyond these. Again, when the wheel, the axle and so on, are united, it is evident that they make a chariot; but you say that a chariot exists beyond these as a separate thing. Therefore, you are a man who says false things.

CHAPTER V.

REFUTATION OF PERCEPTION BY THE SENSES.

The unbeliever says: "Really, there is the *ātman*, and there are *dhármas* which are a representation of the *ātman*, because direct perception exists. (S.)

Knowledge arises owing to the union of the perception of the objects and of *manas*. This knowledge is a direct knowledge. Because this knowledge really exists, the perception by the senses, the objects and the *manas* exist.

The follower says: "If knowledge arises after having seen the *rūpa*, what will be its use?" (S.)

If, first, the eye sees the *rūpa* and then the knowledge arises, what will be the use of knowledge? If knowledge arises before and afterwards the eye sees the *rūpa*, then, this [assumption] also is not valid. Why?

"If (the eye) does not see the *rūpa*, on account of the non-existence of the cause, the birth (of the knowledge) also is not existent." (S.)

If the eye does not see the *rūpa* first, then, there is no union with the cause [of vision]. Because there is no union, knowledge must not arise. You say that owing to the union of the perception by the senses, of objects and of *manas* the knowledge arises. So if (one says that) knowledge arises, when there is no union, such a statement is not valid.

The unbeliever says: "What is the mistake if it arises at the same time?"

The follower: If it arises at the same time, then, the thesis is not valid, because birth and non-birth cannot be born at the same time together, on account of the existence (of the one), on account of the non-existence of the other, and on account of the refutation mentioned before." (S.)

If vision and knowledge arise at the same time either, being already existent as reciprocally interdependent, or being before not-existent or being before half-existent and half not existent, in all these three cases, the birth at the same time is not valid; and why?

If vision and knowledge are existent before, then, they must not arise, because they are existent. If they are before non-existent, they also must not arise, because they are not existent. If they are non-existent, then, they are not interdependent and also there is no birth. If they are half-existent and half non-existent each one (of the two hypotheses) has been already refuted in the two preceding *sūtras*. Moreover—how can one *dharma* be existent and also non-existent? And again, if they arise at the same time, knowledge is not dependent on vision, and vision is not dependent on knowledge. Moreover does the eye see inasmuch as it reaches the *rūpa* or does it see without reaching the *rūpa*?

" If the eye goes far it sees by and by." (S.)

If the eye sees inasmuch as it goes and reaches the *rūpa*, a *rūpa* which is distant must be seen by and by; and a *rūpa* which is near must be quickly seen; and why? Because the law of motion is such. But now, a pot which is near and the moon which is distant are seen at the same time and therefore we know that the eye does not go. If it does not go, then, there is no union [with the cause of vision]. Again, if the strength of the eye does not reach the *rūpa* and yet it sees the *rūpa*, how is it that do we see things which are near, but do not see things which are distant? What is near and what is distant ought to be seen at one time. And again let us suppose that the eye goes; should we think that, it goes after having seen, or that it gose without seeing? If it goes after having seen, " what is the use (of going)?" (S.)

If the eye, sees the *rūpa* first, then, the object having been recognised, which will be the use of the motion [of the eye]? If it goes without seeing, then " this is not like the perception of the *manas*." (S.)

If the eye, without having seen the *rūpa* first, goes [towards it], then, it cannot have the perception of what the *manas* perceives, because the eye has no knowledge. It can go towards the east and towards the west, and again, " a place without eyes, cannot perceive." (S.)

If the eye goes and reaches the *rūpa* and then perceives

the *rūpa*, then the body would be without eyes; because the body is without eyes, there is no perception. If the eye perceives the *rūpa* without going, the *rūpa* also is without eyes, and because the *rūpa* is without eyes, therefore that also would be without perception. And again if the eye perceives the *rūpa* without going, one must see the *rūpa* which is above the sky and the *rūpa* which is behind an obstruction. But this is not seen. Therefore this thesis is not valid.

The unbeliever says: "Because the characteristic of the eye is vision." (S.)

The follower says: "If the eye is characterised by vision, the eye must see itself." (S.)

If the eye is characterised by vision, then, like fire which is characterised by heat and heating itself can heat also other things, the eye, being characterised by vision, must see itself as eye. But this is not so seen. And, therefore, the eye is not characterised by vision.

The unbeliever says: "As the finger." (S.)

Although the eye is characterised by vision, it cannot see itself as eye; as the tip of the finger cannot have the touch of itself; so also the eye although characterised by vision, cannot see itself.

The believer says: It is not so. "Because touch is the action of the finger." (S.)

Touch is the action of the finger; it is not the characteristic of the finger. If you say that vision is the characteristic of the eye, then, how is it that it does not see itself? Therefore, the example of the finger is wrong.

The unbeliever says: "On account of the light, and the movement of *manas* one sees the *rūpa*." (S.)

On account of the eye, of the light, and of the movement of the *manas*, [this] reaching that object can perceive the *rūpa*.

The follower says: "If the *manas* goes and reaches the *rūpa*, then, this [body] is without intelligence." (S.)

If the *manas* reaches the *rūpa*, the *manas* then stays in that (object). It the *manas* stays in that, the body also is

without *manas*; such as that of a dead man. Therefore, the *manas* really does not go, because what is distant and what is near are perceived at the same time. Although it thinks of the past, and of the future, the thinking is neither in the past nor in the future, because in the time of thinking it does not go.

The unbeliever says: "The *manas* stays in the body." (S.)

Although the *manas* stays in the body, it can know things which are distant.

The believer says: "If it is so, then, there is no connection." (S.)

"If the *manas* stays in the body, and the *rūpa* stays in that (place), then there is no connection [with that], because the *rūpa* stays in that (place). If there is no connection, this [*manas*] cannot perceive *rūpa*."

The unbeliever says: "It is not so, because, one sees owing to the union of the light, the *manas* and the *rūpa*." (S.)

The eye and *manas* co-exist in the body. It is through the force of the *manas* that the eye and the light are united with the *rūpa*, and in this way, *rūpa* is seen and therefore the union is not dispensed with.

The follower says: "If, the vision arises out of this union, then there is no seer." (S.)

You say that one sees the *rūpa* out of that union; then, when you say that only the eye sees the *rūpa* and only the *manas* perceives the *rūpa* your statement is not valid.

The unbeliever says: "Because you admit the union, therefore the perception of the *rūpa* is demonstrated." (S.)

You admit the union, then, the union is existent. If the union is existent, then, there must be the perception of the *rūpa*.

The follower says: "The *manas* does not see: the eye does not know, the *rūpa* does neither see nor know. How is there any vision?" (S.)

"Because the *manas* is different from the eye, therefore the *manas* has not the characteristic of vision. It cannot see because it has not the characteristic of vision. Because the eye is com-

posed of the four material elements, therefore it has not the characteristic of knowledge. Because it is not characterised by knowledge, it cannot know the *rūpa*, so that it has neither the characteristic of the vision nor the characteristic of knowledge. In the same way, although there is union, how can one perceive the *rūpa* ? The same refutation (is to be made) with regard to the ear, the nose, the tongue, the touch [litt. body] also.

CHAPTER VI.

Refutation of the Objects.

The unbeliever says : " The senses, must exist, because the pot and so on can be perceived." (S.)

Now it is evident that objects like the pot and so on can be perceived. If the senses did not perceive the external objects, to whom would then the function of perception belong ? Therefore it is known that the senses exist, and can perceive objects such as the pot and so on.

The follower says : " The *rūpa* only is not the pot. Therefore the pot is not (an object) of direct perception." (S.)

The *rūpa* which is in the pot, can be seen by direct perception ; but the smell and so on cannot be perceived. Only the *rūpa* is not the pot, but the union of the smell and so on is the pot. If the pot could be seen by direct perception the smell and so on could also be seen by direct perception. But because they are not seen, therefore the pot is not seen by direct perception.

The unbeliever says : " In as much as one part is perceived there is the belief of the perception of the whole." (S.)

" Because one part of the pot can be seen, it is said that the pot is perceived by direct perception. And why ? Because men, after having seen the pot, believe and know " I see this pot."

The follower says : " If a part is perceived, the whole is not perceived." (S.)

If one part of the pot, *i.e.*, the *rūpa* can be seen, the other

parts like the smell and so on cannot be seen. Now the part does not make the whole. If the part could make the whole, the parts like smell and so on could be seen as well. Therefore, the pot cannot be seen at all. As far as this object is concerned, the refutation already made of unity and of diversity is to be repeated [again].

The unbeliever says. "There is the visibility of the pot because you implicitly admit the visibility by direct perception of the *rūpa*." (S.)

Because you admit that the *rūpa* is perceived by direct perception, therefore, the pot also must be seen by direct perception.

The follower says. "If this part is seen by direct perception, that part is not seen by direct perception." (S.)

You say that the *rūpa* is seen by direct perception, but this thing is not right. Because the *rūpa* has a shape. The pot in that part is not seen by direct perception, because there is the impediment of this part. The same thing happens with regard to that (other part) also. And again, as it has (been said) before, "if one part is perceived; all the [other] parts are not perceived. This must be answered here.

The unbeliever says. "Because the atoms have no parts, therefore this is no complete refutation." (S.)

Because the atom has no parts, therefore it can be seen in its totality by direct perception; what is the mistake here?

The follower says: "The atom is not seen by direct perception." (S.)

Your books say that the atom is not seen by direct perception. Therefore it is not possible to demonstrate *dharmas* which can be seen by direct perception. If the atom also be seen by direct perception, the refutation must be that of the *rūpa*.

The unbeliever says: "The pot must be seen by direct perception, because the men of the world believe so." (S.)

"The men of this world absolutely believe that the pot is seen by direct perception, because it has some use."

The follower says: " (We say) that direct perception does not exist, [but] not that the pot does not exist." (S.)

You say that if the pot is not seen by direct perception, then, the pot does not exist, but this is not right. Although the pot is not seen by direct perception, this does not mean that the pot is not existent; therefore the pot is not seen by direct perception.

The unbeliever says: " Because it is not yet united with the eye, there is no mistake." (S.)

Although the pot is characterised by direct perception, man cannot by himself see it, when it is not yet joined with the eye. But this does not mean that the pot is not characterised by direct perception.

The follower says: " As the birth of direct perception does not exist, so the existence also is not real." (S.)

If at the time when the pot is not yet united with the eye it has not yet a different characteristic, but if in a posterior time, there is the birth of a characteristic slightly different, then we shall know that this characteristic of the direct perception of the pot is born. Now, in fact, there is no birth of a different characteristic; therefore the characteristic of direct perception does not arise; since the birth of the characteristic of direct perception does not exist, the existence of the pot also does not exist."

The unbeliever says, " Of the five bodies (of the pot), one part has been refuted, but the other parts are existent." (S.)

Five bodies make the pot. You have refuted only the *rūpa*, but [you have] not refuted the smell and so on. Now, because the smell and so on are not refuted, the object must exist.

The follower says, " If not all are perceived by the *sparśa*, how are the *rūpa*, etc. united ? " (S.)

You say that the five bodies make the body, but these words are not exact. And why ? Because a part like the *rūpa* and so on is tangible, but the other parts are not tangible. How can the tangible and the non-tangible be united ? Therefore the five bodies do not constitute a pot.

The unbeliever says, "Because of the union with the pot." (S.)

The parts such as the *rūpa* and so on are not united each with one another, but the parts such as *rūpa* and so on are united with the pot.

The follower says. "If it is different and without [it], how is the pot united with the tangible?" (S.)

"If the pot is different from the tangible, then, the pot is not tangible. How can what is not tangible be united with the tangible? If it is without *rūpa* and so on, then this *dharma*, which is the pot, does not exist. If this *dharma*, which is the pot, does not exist, how can the tangible and the pot be united?

The unbeliever says, "The *rūpa* must be seen by direct perception, because that is accepted in your books." (S.)

"Your books say: the *rūpa* is the four material elements (*mahābhūta* 大) and also the four secondary material elements (*mahābhautika* 大 造). The *rūpa-āyatana* is included in that part which is the *rūpa-bhautika* and this is seen by direct perception. How can you say that the *rūpa* cannot be seen by direct perception?

The follower says, "The four material elements are not seen by the eye. How do they produce direct perception?" (S.)

Earth has for its characteristic solidity, fire has for its characteristic heat, water has for its characteristic fluidity, wind has for its characteristic movement. These four material elements are not seen by the eye; and therefore the secondary material elements also must not be seen by direct perception.

The unbeliever says, "Because, the organs of the body perceive them, therefore, the four material elements exist." (S).

Now, the four material elements exist because the organs of the body perceive the four material elements. And therefore objects such as fire and so on, which are derived from the four material elements, must also exist.

The follower says, "Because in fire all are heat." (S.)

Among the four material elements only fire has the characteristic of heat, but the others have not the characteristic of heat. Now, in fire, all the four material elements, have the characteristic of heat. And therefore, fire is not a fourfold body.[1] If the others are not heat, they cannot be called fire, therefore fire is not a fourfold body. The same happens with regard to solidity which is the characteristic of earth, to fluidity which is the characteristic of water, and to motion, which is characteristic of wind.

The unbeliever says, "The *rūpa* must be perceived because the present time exists." (S.)

Through the perception of the eyes and so on in the present time, there is the perception of the objects. And therefore this is called the present time. If the perception by the eyes and so on could not perceive the object and the *rūpa* etc., then the present time would not exist. Now the present time does really exist and therefore the *rūpa* can be seen.

The follower says, "If the afterwards of the *dharma* is ancient, the beginning also is ancient." (S.)

If the characteristic of the ancient is manifested in the afterwards of the *dharma*, then, this characteristic does not arise at the time which is [called] ancient. The characteristic of the ancient is not known, because at the time of the initial birth it exists in a subtle condition. Gradually it manifests itself and then at that time it can be known. As a man who wears a sabot; because in the beginning the ancientness of it is minute, therefore it is neither perceived nor known, but after a long time, it is made manifest. If the beginning be not ancient, the afterwards also could not be so. Therefore, it must be eternally new. If so, the characteristic of the ancient must not arise. Therefore, the ancient in the beginning is minute, and afterwards it is made manifest. Now, in as much as the *dharma* does not last, the time of duration does not exist. If the time of duration does not exist, then, there is no place for the perception of the object.

The unbeliever says, "Because the new and the ancient are admitted, therefore the present is existent." (S.)

You admit the characteristic of the new and the characteristic of the ancient. What is seen at the time of birth is called new, what is seen at a different time is called ancient. These two characteristics cannot be perceived in the past and also cannot be perceived in future. But the characteristic of the new and the ancient are perceived on account of the present time.

The follower says, "It is not so, on account of the birth it is new, because of the difference, it is ancient." (S.)

If the *dharmas* were born long ago, the characteristic of the new would have already surpassed the characteristic of the new. What is other than new is called ancient If the characteristic of the ancient produces the ancient, then, this is to be considered as new. 'This is new and this is ancient' are only words, but in the real sense, (*paramārtha*) neither the new nor the ancient exist.

The unbeliever says, "If it is so, what is the benefit obtained?"

The follower says, "What is obtained is the absolute separation." (S.)

If the new does not cause the intermediate, the intermediate does not cause the ancient. E.g. the flower and the fruit are not united with each other, when the seed, the bud, the knobs are destroyed; because they are not connected with each other, therefore *dharmas* do not last; because they do not last, they are separated; because they are separated, therefore they cannot be perceived.

CHAPTER VII.

REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EFFECT IN THE CAUSE.

The unbeliever says, "It is not that the *dharma* does not last, because there is no loss of existence, and because there is no birth of non-existence." (S.)

The *dharma* has the characteristic of existence, as a clod

of earth (*mṛtpiṇḍa.* 泥 團); the bottom [is produced] from the clod, from the bottom the belly (of the pot), from the belly the throat, from the throat the mouth. The before and the after are the cause and the effect. The various causes are not lost, at the time when the various effects arise. If the effect is not in the cause, then, the effect can not be born. The effect is only a modification of the cause. Therefore, *dharmas* are existent.

The follower says, "If on account of the birth of the fruit, existence is not lost, then, on account of the loss of the cause there is the loss of existence." (S.)

You say that when the pot, which is the effect, is born, the clod of earth is not lost; then, the pot is only the clod of earth. If when that effect, which is the pot, is born, the cause, which is the clod of earth, is lost, then, there is no cause. If the clod of earth is not lost, then, one must not distinguish any difference between the clod of earth and the pot. Now in fact we see that they have the diversity of form, function, time, name, and so on, and therefore, existence must be lost.

The unbeliever says, "As a finger, which is crooked and straight." (S.)

Although the finger has difference of form, in as much as it can be crooked and straight, yet, there is really only one finger. In the same way, although the form of the clod of earth and the form of the pot are different, yet, the earth is not different (from the pot).

The follower says, "It is not so! Because the action and the agent are different." (S.)

To be crooked and straight are the actions of a finger, but the finger is the agent. If the action be the agent, at the time when it is crooked, then, the finger must be lost. And again, to be crooked and to be straight must be one because, according to your books, the clod of earth is just this pot, therefore the example of the finger is wrong.

The unbeliever says, "As the man, in childhood, youth and old age." (S.)

As the body of a man is the same in childhood and in youth as in old age; the same is the case with regard to the cause and the effect.

The follower says "No. Because they are not one." (S.)

The child does not cause the youth, the youth does not cause the old man—therefore your example is wrong. And again:

"If existence is not lost, non-existence is lost." (S.)

If you say that existence is not lost, then, the clod of earth must not change and become a pot. Then the pot must be non-existent. If existence is not lost, non-existence also must not be lost, because non-existence does not exist; then nothing is lost.

The unbeliever says, "If nothing is lost, what is the fault?" (S.)

If, there is no loss on account of the eternity, the clod of earth must not change and become a pot. If the non-eternal does not exist, what is the mistake?

The follower says, "If the non-eternal does not exist, merit and sin, etc., are not existent." (S.)

If the non-eternal does not exist, sin and merit also will not exist at all; and why? Because a sinner would eternally be a sinner, and must not acquire merit. And the man of merit would eternally be a man of merit, and he must not become a sinner. The sinner and the meritorious, gift and theft, observance of moral precepts and their non-observance must in the same way be non-existent.

The unbeliever says, "The effect pre-exists in the cause, on account of the existence of the cause." (S.)

If, the pot does not pre-exist in earth, then, earth could not become the cause of the pot.

The follower says, "If the effect exists, because the effect is pre-existing in the cause, then, on account of the non-existence of the effect, the cause would be without effect." (S.)

If the clod of earth is the cause of the pot, and inas much as the clod of earth is not lost, in the cause there is the effect, then, if the pot is destroyed, there must be no effect in the cause.

The unbeliever says, "Because the cause and the effect are one." (S).

As earth is the cause and the clod is the effect, so the clod is the cause and the pot is the effect. Then, it is by a change that the cause becomes the effect; so that these are not different *dharmas*. And therefore it is not possible to maintain that the effect is not in the cause.

The follower says, "If cause and effect are one, there is no future." (S).

The clod of earth is present, the pot is future. If cause and effect are one, then, there must be no future. Because there is no future, therefore, there will also be no present. Because there is no present, there will also be no past. In this way there will be a confusion of the three times.

The unbeliever says, "Because the name and so on are lost and the name and so on are born." (S).

There are no new *dharmas* nor are ancient *dharmas* lost; but only the name according to the time is different. As a clod of earth becomes a pot, and the pot is destroyed and becomes a fragment; and the fragment, when it is broken, again becomes earth, so there is no past and future. How can the pot and the fragment stay? Only according to the time they obtain a name. But their essence is not different.

The follower says, "If it is so, the cause is without any effect." (S).

If (you say that) a name is lost and a name is born, because this name does not exist before, but exists afterwards, the pot does not exist as an effect in the cause. If the name existed before, earth would be the pot. Therefore, we know, that the effect does not pre-exist.

The unbeliever says, "Because it is not absolute." (S).

The pot does not absolutely come out from the clod of

earth and therefore, the name does not absolutely exist in the earth.

The follower says, "If (the cause which is) earth is not absolute, the effect also is not absolute." (S).

If the pot is not absolutely existent in the clod of earth, your words that the effect pre-exists in the cause are also not absolute.

The unbeliever says, "(Yes). Because that is existence in a subtle form." (S).

The form of the pot is subtle in the clod of earth, and therefore it is difficult to recognise (it). It becomes manifest, through the force of the potter. Although the pot cannot be known in the earth, we shall admit that there is a subtle form (of it) existing in the earth. There are two kinds of unknowable; either something is not known because non-existent, or it is not known on account of some causes. There are eight kinds of such a cause; what are these eight kinds? Because of the distance (it is not known), e.g., the land of a distant kingdom; through proximity (it is not known) e.g., when the eye is too near to the object; through the defect of the senses (it is) not known, e.g., deafness and blindness; on account of the unsteadiness of mind (it is) not known, as when the mind of a man is bewildered; through smallness, as the atoms; through an obstacle, e.g., things which are beyond a wall; through excess it is not known, e.g., little salt in much water; through reciprocal similarity it is not known, e.g., a grain of rice thrown in a great heap of rice In the same way the pot which is inside the clod of earth, although it is not seen by the eyes, cannot come out from the willow. And therefore, the subtle pot absolutely stays in the earth. (S).

The follower says, "If a subtle form pre-exists, the cause is without any effect." (S).

"If, when the pot is not yet born, a subtle form of it pre-exists in the earth which afterwards, becoming gross, can be known, then there is no effect in the cause; and why? Because the characteristic of grossness originally non-existent is born afterwards. Therefore the effect does not exist in the cause." (S).

The unbeliever says, "The effect must exist in the cause, because each one takes the cause." (S.)

The effect must pre-exist in the cause. And why? Because in order to make a pot one takes earth, but does not take the willow. If the effect did not exist in the cause, then, one night take the willow as well. But man absolutely knows that the earth can produce the pot, because the earth, mixed with water, can form a pot, and is able to bear the fire. Therefore the effect exists in the cause.

The follower says, "If it exists, it exists. If it does not exist, it does not exist." (S.)

You say that because the pot will come out of the earth, the effect pre-exists in the cause. Now because the pot is destroyed, there must be no existence of the effect. Therefore there is no effect in the cause.

The unbeliever says, "Because birth, duration, and destruction exist in a series, therefore, there is no mistake." (S.)

The characteristic of destruction is in the pot, yet, it must first arise, then have a duration and afterwards be destroyed; and why? Because what is not born cannot be destroyed.

The follower says, "If it is born before and not afterwards, then, it is similar to the non-existence of the effect." (S.)

If, inasmuch as in the earth there is the birth of the pot, there is also its destruction, for what cause must it be born before and afterwards be destroyed, and not be destroyed before, and afterwards be born? As to what you say, that because it is not yet born, there is no destruction, if so, when the pot is not yet born, there is neither duration nor destruction. Inasmuch as, being before not-existent, these two are afterwards existent, so the effect is not pre-existent in the cause.

The unbeliever says, "You refute the existence of the effect, therefore [in your doctrine] there is the fault of annihilation (*uccheda*.) (S.)

If the effect which is existent in the cause is considered to be non-existent, then, there must be no effect in the cause. If there is no effect in the cause, then, you fall into the theory of annihilation."

The follower says, "Because of the continuity there is no annihilation; because of the destruction there is no eternity." (S.)

You perhaps, do not know that on account of the reciprocal continuity of the sprout and the bud, etc. [as derived] from the seed, there is no annihilation and that on account of the destruction of the cause which is the seed, etc., there is no eternity. In this way, the Buddhas have taught that the *dharmas* are produced according to the *pratītyasamutpāda* of twelve branches. Because (their doctrine) does neither maintain that there is the existence of the effect in the cause nor the non-existence of the effect, therefore, neither adhering to the theory of destruction nor to that of eternity, but going through the middle path, one enters into *Nirvāṇa*.

CHAPTER VIII.

Refutation of the theory according to which there is no effect in the cause

The unbeliever says, "Unity will be demonstrated because of the existence of birth." (S.)

You say that *dharmas* are born because of the *pratītya-samutpāda*; [then] this is birth. Whether it exists before in the cause, or it does not exist before in the cause, in as much as there is birth, there will necessarily be unity."

The follower says, "Birth and non-birth are not born." (S.)

"If there is birth, either it exists before in the cause, or it does not exist before in the cause; but these two opinions cannot be demonstrated by you. (How much less (then) the non-birth? If the birth of the pot exists, do you believe that (this birth) exists at the time when the pot begins to be a pot; or do you believe that it exists after the clod of earth, when this is not yet a pot? If you think that there is the birth of the pot, when the pot begins to be a pot, your assumption

is not valid. And why? Since the pot is already existent, the beginning, the intermediate, and the subsequent are reciprocally interdependent. If there is no intermediate and subsequent, then there is no beginning. If there is a beginning of the pot, necessarily there must be the intermediate and the subsequent. Therefore, if the pot already exists, what will be the use of the birth? If the pot is born after the clod of earth, when this is not yet the pot, this also is not valid. And why? Because, it does not yet exist. If the pot has no beginning, no intermediate and no subsequent, then there is no pot also. If the pot does not exist, how can there be the birth of the pot? And again, if the birth of the pot exists, it must exist either after the state of the clod of earth, when there is the pot, or it must exist when there is the beginning of the pot, when the clod of earth is (in transformation). At the time when there is a pot, after the clod of earth, there is no birth of the pot: and why? Because it already exists; and also there is no birth of (the pot), in the beginning of the pot, when there is the clod of earth (in transformation); and why? Because it is not yet existent.

The unbeliever says, "There is no mistake, because the being born (*utpādyamāna*) is born." (S.)

We do not say that, if it is already born or if it is not yet born, there is the birth of the pot. When a second *dharma* is being born this is the birth.

The follower says, "As regards the 'being-born' the same happens." (S.)

As to the being-born, this has been said before. If it is born, then, it is already born; if it is not yet born, where is the birth? (If you say) that the being-born is half not-yet-born, and half-born, then, these two mistakes also are to be refuted as before. Therefore, there is no birth.

The unbeliever says. "Because born and being-accomplished are synonymous." (S.)

We do not say that what is already accomplished and born has a birth and also we do not say that the not-yet-born has birth. Now we see that the accomplished is accomplished, therefore the accomplishment is born.

The follower says, "If it is so, the birth comes afterwards." (S.)

'Accomplished' means that it is already born. If it has no birth, it has neither beginning nor middle. If it has no beginning, it has also no middle and no accomplishment. Therefore, it is impossible to consider the accomplishment as the birth, because the birth would happen afterwards.

The unbeliever says. "There is no mistake, because the beginning, the intermediate and the subsequent are born in a series." (S.)

The clod of earth in a series produces and accomplishes the basis, the belly, the throat and the mouth and so on of the pot. The beginning, the intermediate and the subsequent are born in a series. Therefore, it is not the clod of earth which in a series completes the accomplishment (of the pot). Therefore, when there is the clod of earth, there is no birth of the accomplishment and also at the time of the accomplishment (of the pot) there is no birth of the accomplishment. And also, it is not [true] that the birth of the accomplishment does not exist.

The follower says. "The beginning, the intermediate and the subsequent are not born in a series." (S.)

Beginning means what has nothing before, but has something afterwards. Intermediate means what has a 'before' and an 'afterwards.' 'Subsequent' means what has a 'before,' but no 'afterwards.' In this way, the beginning, the intermediate, and the subsequent are interdependent. If they are separated, how can they exist? Therefore, the beginning, the intermediate and the subsequent must not be born in a series.

"If (one says that they are) born at the same time, then, that also is not right." (S.)

If they are born at the same time, then also one must not say "this is the beginning, this is the intermediate, this is the subsequent". And they would not be interdependent; therefore this [assumption] is not valid.

The unbeliever says, "As birth, duration, and destruction." (S.)

The characteristic of the *saṃskṛta* is the existence in

a series of birth, duration and destruction. With regard to the beginning, the intermediate and the subsequent also, the same happens.

The follower says, "(It is) also the same as regards birth, duration, and destruction." (S.)

Either existence in a series, or existence at the same time—these two (cases) are not valid. And why? If there is no duration, then, there is no birth. If (one says, that) without duration there is birth, then, (one must admit that) without birth there is duration. The same is to be said as regards destruction. If (they exist) at the same time, it will be impossible to distinguish and say: "this is the birth, this is the duration, this is the destruction." And again:

"In all places there would be all." (S.)

All places, means the three-fold characteristic of the *saṃskṛta*. If you say, that birth, duration and destruction also have the characteristic of the *saṃskṛta*, then, in birth there would be a three-fold characteristic, in as much as it is a *saṃskṛtadharma*. In each one there will be a three-fold characteristic and then there will be *anavasthā*. The same happens as regards duration and destruction also. If the three-fold characteristic does not exist in the birth, the duration and the destruction, then, birth, duration and destruction must not be called characteristic of the *samskṛta*. If you say that the birth of birth is born together, such as fatherhood and sonship, your statement is not valid. Such birth of the birth is either interdependent with the preceding existence in the cause, or is interdependent with the preceding non-existence in the cause, or is interdependent with an anterior partial existence and a partial non-existence in the cause. These three kinds of refutations have already been explained in the chapter of "Perception by the senses." And again, the father first exists, and then he gives birth to a son and then this father is a father, therefore this example is not valid.

The unbeliever says, "Birth is certainly existent, because of the existence of *dharmas* which can be born." (S.)

If there is birth, there is an object which can be born. If there is no birth, then, there is nothing which can be born.

Now, because we see the existence of *dharmas* which are born such as the pot, etc., therefore, birth also necessarily exists.

The follower says, "If there is the birth, that which can be born is not existent." (S.)

If the pot has a birth then the pot is already born and cannot be called a thing which is born; and why? If there is no pot, then, also there is no birth of the pot; therefore, if there is birth, then, what can be born is not existent. How much less [will be existent] that which is not yet born? And again: "(The same is to be said as regards birth) by itself, by another, and by both." (S.)

If the birth and the object which is born are two [things] they are born either by themselves, or by another or by both. But this has been refuted in the refutation of happiness.

The unbeliever says, "It exists absolutely, because birth and the object which is born are proved together." (S.)

It is not that birth exists first, and then comes the object which can be born. But they are together proved at the same time.

The follower says, "Birth and the object which can be born can not cause birth."

If what can be born could prove birth, then, birth would be the object [itself] that can be born, and it could not be called that which can cause birth. If there is no birth, then, how that which is born, can exist? Therefore, the two things together are not existent. And again, "that existence and non-existence are mutually interdependent is not valid." (S.)

Now what can be born, because it is not yet existent, is not existent. But birth exists; existence and non-existence —how can they be mutually interdependent? Therefore every thing is not existent.

The unbeliever says, "Because birth and what can be born are mutually interdependent, therefore, *dharmas* are proved." (S.)

Not only are birth and what can be born proved to be reciprocally interdependent, but because these two are

reciprocally interdependent, the pot and other objects are proved.

The follower says, "If it is born from two, how is it that there is no three?" (S.)

You say that because birth and what can be born are mutually interdependent, all *dharmas* are proved. If from two [things] there is the birth of the effect, how is it that there is not a third *dharma*? E.g. father, and mother, who give birth to a son. Now, besides birth and what can be born, there is not a third *dharma* which is called pot and so on. Therefore this [argument] is not valid.

The unbeliever says, "Birth must exist, because of the destruction of the cause." (S.)

If the effect is not born, the cause must not be destroyed; now, because we see that the cause of the pot is destroyed, therefore, there must be birth.

The follower says, "Because the cause is destroyed, the birth also disappears." (S.)

If (one says that) the effect is born, this effect is considered to be existent *when* the cause is destroyed, or it is considered to be existent *after* its destruction. If it exists *when* there is destruction of the cause, because it is not different from destruction, the birth also must disappear. If it exists *after* destruction, then the cause being already destroyed, there is no cause. Beacause there is no cause, the effect also must not be born. And again:

"Because in the cause the effect is certain." (S.)

Whether there is the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, or there is non-pre-existence of the effect, there is no birth in either case; why? If there is no effect in the cause, how is it that the pot is only in the clod of earth and the cloth in the threads? If they are both not existent, the clod must have the cloth, and the threads must have the poc [as their effect]. If the effect does pre-exist in the cause, [then] the birth of this effect must be in this cause; but this thing is not right; and why? This cause is only this effect; because according to your system the cause and the effect are not

different. Therefore, whether the effect pre-exists in its cause or not in neither case is there any birth. And again :

"On account of the multiplicity of the cause and effect." (S.)

If the effect pre-exists in the cause, then, there would be curd and butter in milk; and also there would be curd and milk and so on in butter. If in milk, there is curd and butter, then, in one cause there must be many effects. If there is milk and curd in butter, then, for one effect there would be many causes. Therefore there is a mistake whether the cause and effect are one before or after the other, or they are contemporary. If there is no effect in the cause, then, there is the same mistake. Therefore, whether the effect is or is not in the cause there is no birth in any case.

The unbeliever says, "Because the cause and the effect are not refuted, birth and what can be born are proved." (S.)

You say that (to maintain) that in the cause there are many effects and that in the effect there are many causes, is a mistake, but you do not say that cause and effect are not existent. Therefore birth and what can be born are proved.

The follower says, "A thing does not produce a thing; nothing does not produce no-thing." (S.)

Things do not give birth to things, no-thing does not give birth to no-thing A thing does not give birth to no-thing. No-thing does not give birth to a thing. If (one says that) a thing gives birth to [another] thing, as the mother gives birth to a child.—this [statement] is not valid, and why? Because the mother really does not give birth to a child; inasmuch as the child, being already existent, comes out from the mother. If, in order to maintain that a thing gives birth to a thing, one says that it is born from part's of the blood of the mother,—this is not valid, and why? Because a mother cannot be conceived without the parts of blood and so on. In order to maintain that a thing gives birth to a thing, if you say that it is born by a modification,—this also is not valid; and why? Because the youth changes and becomes an old man, but it is not that the youth produces an old man. If in order to maintain that thing gives birth to thing, you say

that it is like an image in the mirror—this also is not right; and why? Because there is nothing from which the image in the mirror comes. And again, as the image in the mirror is similar to the face, in the same way, the effect must be similar to the cause,—but this is not so. Therefore, a thing does not give birth to another thing. No-thing does not give birth to no-thing. E.g. a horn of a hare does not give birth to another horn of a hare. A thing does not produce no-thing, just as a barren woman does not give birth to a son. No-thing does not produce a thing. As the hair of a tortoise does not give birth to a cloth. Therefore, that *dharma* which is birth does not exist. And again, if a thing could give birth to another thing, there would be a birth of two kinds of *dharmas*. Either the effect must be existent in the cause or the effect must not be existent in the cause. But this is not valid; and why?

If the effect is not pre-existent in the cause, then, the cause must not give birth to the effect, because the cause being absolutely different, the effect could not be obtained. If the effect pre-exists in the cause, how is it that there is birth, since this is not different from destruction?

If the pot is not different from the clod of earth, the clod of earth must not disappear after the birth of the pot takes place. Or the clod of earth also must not be the cause of the pot. If the clod of earth is not different from the pot, the pot must not be born and the pot also must not be the effect of the clod of earth. Therefore whether (one says) that the effect is in the cause or (one says) that no effect is in the cause, a thing does not give birth to another thing.

CHAPTER IX.

Refutation of Eternity.

The unbeliever says, "The *dharmas* without cause must be existent, because eternal *dharmas* are not refuted [by you]." (S.)

Although you have already refuted *dharmas* which have

a cause, you have not refuted eternal *dharmas*, which have no cause; e.g. ether (ākāśa), time, space, atoms, and *nirvāṇa*. These are *dharmas* without any cause; as they have not been refuted, *dharmas* must be existent.

The follower says, "If you strive to consider them as eternal, they should be like the not-eternal (*dharmas*)." (S.)

Do you call them eternal, because they have a cause or do you call them eternal, because they have no cause? If the eternal *dharmas* have a cause, then, having a cause they are not eternal. If you call them eternal, because they have no cause, then it is possible to call them not eternal."

The unbeliever says, "Since this is the manifesting cause (*vyañjana hetu*), there is no mistake." (S.)

There are two kinds of causes, one is the efficient cause (*kāraṇa hetu*) and the other the manifesting cause. If (the cause) is considered as an efficient cause, then, (the *dharmas*) are not eternal. But according to us, the eternal *dharmas*, like the ether and so on, are called eternal, because [they have a] manifesting cause, but it is not that they are called eternal because they have no cause. And also they cannot be called non-eternal, because they have a cause. Therefore, we do not strive to consider them eternal, at any rate."

The follower says, "This cause is not valid." (S.)

Although you say that the eternal *dharmas* have a cause, yet, this cause is not a valid one. The *ātman* has already been refuted, the other eternal *dharmas* will be refuted afterwards.

The unbeliever says, "The eternal *dharmas* must be existent; because the *kṛtaka dharmas* are not eternal, therefore the *akṛtaka dharmas* are eternal." (S.)

Objects which are seen by the eye such as the pot and so on are not eternal; *dharmas* different from these must be eternal.

The follower says, "(Then, they would be) not existent as well as existent." (S.)

"As they have a characteristic opposed to that of the *kṛtaka dharmas*, so you call these (*dharmas*) *akṛtaka*. Now, because

we see the characteristic of existence in the *kṛtaka dharmas*, therefore, the *dharmas akṛtaka* must be not existent. And again, since, according to you, the *dharmas akṛtaka* are eternal, as they have a characteristic opposed to that of the *kṛtaka dharmas*, so, these (*akṛtaka dharmas*) must be not eternal, because they have a characteristic not opposed to those of the *kṛtakas*. And why? Because, *dharmas akṛtaka* and *dharmas kṛtaka* are equally intangible; therefore the *akṛtaka dharmas* must be non-eternal. And in this way (the *dharmas*) (that are considered as) eternal and omnipresent are neither omnipresent nor eternal. This has been refuted briefly. Now, we shall refute this in detail.

The unbeliever says, "Certainly, there are *dharmas* like ether, which are eternal and omnipresent and also without parts in all places and in all times, because it is believed that they are existent." (S.)

Men of this world believe that there is ether in all places, and therefore it is omnipresent. They believe that there is ether, in the past, in the future, in the present, in all times and therefore it is eternal.

The follower says, "Because (the ether) which is in the part is united with the part, therefore, it is not different from the part." (S.)

If there is ether inside the pot or in the window, is the ether considered to be there in its totality, or is it considered to be there as a part? If it is there in its totality, then, it is not omnipresent. If it were omnipresent, then, the pot also must have been omnipresent. If it is considered to be there as a part, the space would be that part only. And there would not be that whole which is called ether. Therefore, ether is neither omnipresent nor eternal.

The unbeliever says, "Certainly ether is existent, as it is possessed of the characteristic of omnipresence, and it is eternal, because there is motion." (S.)

If ether were not existent, then, there would be neither rising up nor going down, nor going and coming and so on, and why? Because there would be no place, (where

these movements) would be contained. But now, there is motion which is done and therefore ether must be omnipresent and also eternal.

The follower says, "It is not so, because ether stays in ether. (S.)

If there is a *dharma* which is ether, there must be a place where it is staying. If there is no (such) a place where it (can) stay, then, there is no (such) *dharma*. If ether stays in the middle of a hole, then, ether will stay within ether, because there is a place which contains it. But this is not right. Therefore, ether, though it does not stay inside the hole, does also not stay inside of that which is full; and why? Because:

"What is full has no void." (S.)

That which is full is not called void. If there is no void, then, there is no place where (the ether) can stay, because there is no place which can contain it; and again, you say that the place where motion [takes place] is the ether; (but), as in what is full, there is no place for motion, so there must be no ether. Therefore, ether also is neither omnipresent nor eternal. And again, as it has no characteristic, so ether is non-existent. Each *dharmas* has a characteristics of its own. It is from their characteristics that we know that there are *dharmas*; e.g., the characteristic of earth is solidity, the characteristic of water is fluidity, the characteristic of fire is heat, the characteristic of wind is motion, the characteristic of understanding is knowledge. But ether has no characteristic. Therefore, it is not existent.

The unbeliever says, Ether has [its] characteristics. Because you do not know them, you say that they are not existent. The characteristic of ether is *arūpa*.

The follower says, It is not so; *arūpa* is called the destruction of *rūpa*. But it is not an existent *dharma*; e.g. if one cuts a tree, then, it becomes a non-existent *dharma*. Therefore, the characteristic of ether is not existent. And again, ether has no characteristic; and why? You say, that the *arūpa* is the characteristic of ether, [but]

when the *rūpa* is not yet born, at that very time, there is no characteristic of ether. And again, the *rūpa* is not an eternal *dharma*, but ether [according to you] is an eternal *dharma*. The *dharma* ether must be existent, when the *rūpa* is not yet existent; or, when the *rūpa* does not yet exist, what is to be destroyed is also non-existent, and so ether would be without a characteristic. But if it has no characteristic, then, it is a *dharma* non-existent. Therefore, it is not (true) that the *arūpa* is the characteristic of ether. It is only a name, but it has no reality. In this way what is omnipresent and what is eternal are briefly refuted.

The unbeliever says, "There is that *dharma* which is time, because it has the characteristic of eternity." (S.)

There are some *dharmas* which, although they cannot be directly perceived, can be known through the *anumāna sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*, such as time. Although when it is very subtle it cannot be seen, yet through the seasons, flowers, fruits and so on we know that time exists. And then, seeing the effect we know the cause. And again, through (phrases like these), 'one moment,' 'not one moment' and from the characteristics of distance and nearness, etc, we know that there is time. But it is not true that time is not existent. Therefore, it is eternal.

The follower says, "It does exist, neither in the past nor in the future, and therefore the future is not existent." (S.)

E.g. the time when (the clod of earth) is the clod of earth, is present, the time when it was only earth is past, and the time when (it will be) a pot is future. Because the characteristic of time is eternity, therefore the past time is not the cause of the future time. Your books say that time is a *dharma*. Therefore, the past time can never be the cause of the future time, and also cannot be the cause of the present time. If the past were the cause of the future then, there would be the mistake of [assuming a] variety [in it]; and again, in the past there is no future; therefore, there is no future. The present also is to be refuted in the same way.

The unbeliever says, "Because the past is admitted, time is existent." (S.)

As you admit the past time, so of necessity the future time is existent, and therefore that *dharma* which is time is really existent.

The follower says, "It is not that the past has the characteristic of the future." (S.)

Did you not hear what we said before, that the past earth is not the cause of the future pot ? If (the past) acquires the characteristic of the future, then, it would have the characteristic of the future. How could it be called past ? And therefore there is no past.

The unbeliever says, "Time must be existent, because of the distinction of its own characteristic." (S.)

Either the present has the characteristic of the present, or the past has the characteristic of the past, or the future has the characteristic of the future. Therefore time is existent.

The follower says, "If it is so, everything is present." (S.)

If the three times are existent with their own characteristics, then, of necessity they must be present. If there is a future, it is not (yet) existent. If it exists, then, it cannot be called a future. But it must be called already come. Therefore, this argument is not valid.

The unbeliever says, "As the past and the future are undergoing their own characteristics, so there is no mistake." (S.)

The time which is past and the time which is future, do not undergo the characteristic of the present. The past time undergoes the characteristic of the past and the future undergoes the characteristic of the future. Because each time undergoes its own characteristic, therefore there is no mistake.

The follower says, "The past is not past." (S.)

If the past is past, then, it cannot be called past—and why ? Because, it is separated from its own characteristic E.g. if fire loses the heat, it cannot be called fire, because it is deprived of its own characteristic. If (one says) that the

past is not the past, then, it is impossible to say that the past time undergoes the characteristic of the past. The future is refuted in the same way. Therefore that *dharma* which is time is not real, but mere words.

The unbeliever says, "Space (方) really exists, because it has the characteristic of eternity." (S.)

The sun united with a place—that is the mark of the space. As our books say, "Either past or future or present, when a place is the first to be united with the sun, it is called the eastern country. In the same way, the other regions are called according to [position of] the sun."

The follower says, "It is not so. Because as regards the eastern country there is no beginning." (S.)

The sun goes through the four quarters, going round the mount 'Sumeru;' when the sun is in the middle in *Uttarakuru*, it rises in *Pūrvavideha*, and men of *Pūrvavideha* believe that that is the eastern country. When the sun is in the middle in *Pūrvavideha* the sun rises in *Jambudvīpa* and men of *Jambudvīpa* think that that is the eastern country. When the sun is in the middle in *Jambudvīpa*, it rises in *Aparāgodanīya*,—and men of *Aparāgodanīya*)—think that that is the eastern country. When the sun is in the middle in *Godanīya* then it rises in *Uttarakuru* and men of *Uttarakuru* think that that is the eastern country. In this way this eastern country is the southern country, the western country, the northern country. And again where the sun is not united with a place, there would be no space. Because it has no characteristic. And again (we cannot accept what you say) because these (arguments) are not absolute (*aniyata*). As (these men) consider this region as the oriental country and those consider it as the western country, therefore there is no space, which is really existent.

The unbeliever says, "It is not so. Because this characteristic of the space, is said as regards one quarter only." (S.)

The characteristic of this space, is based on the words of a quarter only. But these are not words belonging to all.

Therefore, (in saying) that there is an Eastern country, there is not the mistake (of admitting) that it [space] has no beginning.

The follower says, "If it is so, it has a limit." (S.)

If (you say) that the place which is first united with the sun is called the eastern region, then, space has a limit. Because it has limit, it has parts; because it has parts, it is not eternal. Therefore, in teaching that there is space, you really consider space as non-existent.

The unbeliever says, "Although it is not omnipresent, the atom eternally exists. It is not omnipresent, but eternal because the characteristics of its own effects exist." (S.)

Men of this world sometimes, seeing the effect, know that there is a cause; sometimes seeing the cause know that there is an effect. E.g. on seeing a sprout and so on, they know that it has a seed. It is a law of this universe. Seeing that all things which are born are first minute and afterwards they become gross, (therefore) it is possible to know that double atoms (*dyyaṇuka*) are the initial effect, while an atom only is the cause. Therefore, the atom exists, round and eternal, because it has no cause.

The follower says, "Two atoms are not united with their whole body, because the effect is not round." (S.)

In the moment, when the effect of the atoms is born, they are not united with their whole body. And why? Because the effects such as the *dvyaṇuka* and so on are seen by the eyes as being not round. If the atoms were completely united with their body the effect of the two-atoms and so on must also have been round; and again, if their body were completely united, the double-atom, in the same way, would be destroyed If the atoms are united with heaviness, then, the effect is high. If there is a conjunction of many (atoms), then, the effect is great. Because the atoms are united with one part, (therefore) they must have parts. And because they have parts they cannot be eternal. And again:

"The atoms are not eternal because they are separated by ether." (S.)

If there are atoms, they must be separated by ether. And therefore atoms would have parts. Having parts they cannot be eternal. And again:

"Because of the difference of the *rūpa*, taste and so on." (S.)

If atoms are existent, the [various] parts such as *rūpa*, taste and so on must be existent; therefore, the atom would have parts, and on account of its having parts it could not be eternal. And again, they must have a shape because *dharmas* have [this] characteristic. If the atoms have a shape they must be long, short, square, round and so on; and therefore the atoms must have parts; on account of their having parts they could not be eternal. Since they are not eternal, there is no atom.

The unbeliever says, "That *dharma* which is *nirvāṇa* is existent, because the eternal non-existence of *kleśas* is not different from *nirvāṇa*." (S.)

When *tṛṣṇā* and other *kleśas* have been completely exhausted, this is called *nirvāṇa*. If there are *kleśas*, then, there is the *saṃsāra*. If there are no more *kleśas*, then, there is no more *saṃsāra*; and therefore *nirvāṇa* is eternal.

The believer says, "It is not so, because (in this way) the *nirvāṇa* would be a *kṛtaka dharma*." (S.)

If you affirm that on account of the practice of the *mārga*, the *kleśas* are no more existent and that, if there are no *kleśas*, then, there is *nirvāṇa*, then, the *nirvāṇa* would be a *kṛtaka dharma*. Being a *kṛtaka dharma*, it cannot be eternal. And again, the non-existence of the *kleśas* is called *nirābhāsa*. If the *nirvāṇa* is not different from the non-existence of the *kleśas*, *nirvāṇa* is not existent.

The unbeliever says, "Because it is the efficient cause (*kāraṇa hetu*)." (S.)

Nirvāṇa is the efficient cause of the non-existence of the *kleśas*.

The follower says, "It is not so. What can destroy is not destruction." (S.)

"If *nirvāṇa* can cause liberation, then, it is not liberation.

And again, when the *kleśas* are not yet exhausted, there is no *nirvāṇa*. And why ? Because, since the effect is not existent, the cause does not exist.

The unbeliever says, " It is the effect of the non-existence of the *kleśas*." (S.)

This *nirvāṇa* is not the non-existence of the *kleśas* and also it is not the cause of the non-existence of the *kleśas*, but it is the effect of the non-existence of the *kleśas*. Therefore, it is not (true) that *nirvāṇa* is not existent.

The follower says, "(In this way), the bond and bound, and the means are different (from *nirvāṇa*). This is inefficiency (*akriyā*)." (S.)

" The bond are *kleśas* and *karmas* ; the bound are the creatures. The means are the eightfold holy path ; because through the path there is the breaking of the bonds and therefore the creatures obtain liberation. If there is a *nirvāṇa* different from these three *dharmas*, then, it is inefficient. And again, the non-existence of the *kleśas* is called *nirābhāsa*, and *nirābhāsa* cannot be cause."

The unbeliever says, " *Nirvāṇa* is existent, if these are not existent." (S.)

If in a place these three things—the bond, the bound, and the means—are not existent, then, it is called *nirvāṇa*.

The follower says, " A terrible place, how can it be longed for ? " (S.)

Because non-eternity is a calamity those who know reject and are freed from every desire for the *saṃskṛta dharmas*. If in *nirvāṇa* there are no individuals, and there are no objects which can be desired, then, *nirvāṇa* is a far more dreadful place than the *saṃskṛta dharmas*. How can your mind desire it ? *Nirvāṇa* is called [the condition of] being freed from all attachment, the destruction of every notion. It is neither being, nor not being ; ineffable, as the lamp which is extinguished.

The unbeliever says, " Who obtains *nirvāṇa* ?" (S.)

" Which man obtains *nirvāṇa* ?"

The follower says, " Nobody obtains *nirvāṇa*." (S.)

We said before, "like the lamp, which is extinguished." We cannot say whether it goes to the East or to the South or to the West or to the Northern region, or whether it goes upwards or downwards. The same happens as regards *nirvāṇa*. It is the extinction of all words. It cannot be explained. It is *nirābhāsa*. Who will obtain it ? And let us suppose that there is a *nirvāṇa*. Still there is nobody who can get it. If [you maintain that] the *ātman* obtains *nirvāṇa*, because the *ātman* is omnipresent and eternal, therefore, it must not obtain *nirvāṇa*. The five *skandhas* cannot obtain *nirvāṇa* ; and why ? —because the *skandhas* are non-eternal, and because the five *skandhas* are born and perish. In this way, to whom will *nirvāṇa* belong ? When one says : 'the attainment of *nirvāṇa*' these are words of this world.

CHAPTER X.

Refutation of the Void.

The unbeliever says, "[Some] *dharmas* must be existent, on account of the existence of the refutation. If there is no refutation, the other *dharmas* are existent." (S.)

You refuted the characteristics of all *dharmas* ; then, if this refutation is existent, it is impossible to say that all *dharmas* are void, on account of the existence of the refutation. Because this refutation is existent, it is not possible to say that (you) refute *all dharmas*. (On the contrary) if refutation is non-existent, all *dharmas* are existent.

The follower says, "The refutation is like that which can be refuted." (S.)

Because you attach yourself to the refutation, through *dharmas*, existent and non-existent, you desire to refute this refutation. But do you not know that because the refutation is proved, all *dharmas* are void and *nirābhāsa* ? If this refutation is existent, then, it has already been refuted, and [therefore] is void and *nirābhāsa*.

If refutation is non-existent, what is to be refuted by you? as for instance, if one says that a second head is not existent, this does not become existent, on account of its refutation. When a man says that it is non-existent, [this does not imply that it] does not exist on account of this mere word 'non-existence.' The same happens as to the refutation and what is to be refuted.

The unbeliever says, "*Dharmas* must be existent, because there is the notion of this and that." (S.)

Because (you) accept diversity, you say that unity is a mistake. Because you accept unity, therefore you say that diversity is a mistake. As these two theories are demonstrated, therefore all *dharmas* are existent.

The follower says, "Unity is not accepted. Diversity is also the same." (S.)

Unity and diversity cannot be demonstrated. They have been already refuted. As they have been already refuted, there is nothing which can be accepted. And again, if there is a man saying: "you have nothing to maintain, but we maintain unity and diversity" then, when there is such a proposition, this must be refuted, in this way.

The unbeliever says, "Because you refute the *dharmas* of others, therefore, you are a man who refutes the *dharmas*." (S.)

You like to refute other's *dharmas* and you try your very best in order to find (in them) a mistake. But yourself have nothing to maintain and therefore you are refuters.

The followers says, "You are the refuters." (S.)

Those men who teach the void have nothing to maintain. As they have nothing to maintain, so they are not refuters. But you, accept your own *dharmas* and refute the affirmations of others. Therefore you are the refuters.

The unbeliever says, "On account of the refutation of other's *dharma*, one's own *dharma* is proved." (S.)

When you refute other's *dharma*, your *dharma* is then demonstrated. And why? If *dharmas* of others are overcome,

one's own *dharma* prevails, and therefore, we are not refuters.

The follower says, "It is not so, because to demonstrate and to refute are not one and the same thing." (S.)

Demonstration means praise and to be glad of merit. Refutation means to expose the mistakes. To be glad of merit and to expose the faults cannot be the same thing. And again: "Demonstration means to have fear." (S.)

Fear means lack of strength. If a man is afraid about his own *dharma*, he cannot demonstrate. Because he is not afraid of the *dharmas* of others, he likes to refute. Therefore demonstration and refutation are not the same. If refutation of other's *dharmas* were the same as the demonstration of one's own *dharma*, then, why did you say before that men who teach the void only refute the other *dharmas*, but they have nothing to maintain?

The unbeliever says, "To state that other's thesis is wrong means that one's own thesis is proved." (S.)

How do you, without any thesis of your own, demonstrate the *dharma* and only refute other's *dharmas*? On account of the refutation of other's *dharmas*, there is the demonstration of your own *dharma*.

The follower says, "If on account of the refutation of other's *dharmas* one's own *dharma* be demonstrated, everything would be undemonstrated." (S.)

Because of the refutation of other's *dharmas* one's own *dharma* is demonstrated. Because one's own *dharma* is demonstrated all is not demonstrated. Because all is not demonstrated, we have nothing to demonstrate.

The unbeliever says: "It is not so. Because it is contrary to the world (belief)." (S.)

Men of this world absolutely cannot believe and accept that the *dharmas* are void and without any characteristic.

The follower says, "This *dharma* is accepted as true by the world." (S.)

This *dharma* of the causality is believed and accepted by the world; and why? *Dharmas* which are *pratītysamutpanna*

have the characteristic of non-existence. You say that there is curd and ghee in milk, that there is fœtus in the young girl, in the food there are the excrements and that besides beams and pillars there is such a distinct thing as the house, that separated from the thread there is such a distinct thing as cloth. Some say that the effect exists in the cause. Others say that there is no effect in the cause, or some say that the *dharmas* are born without the law of causality. This is real void, and cannot be said a worldly thing. Whatever those men may affirm,—who will believe and accept it? But in our *dharma*, it is not so. Because it is in accordance with the (belief) of the men of this world. And therefore everybody believes in and accepts it.

The unbeliever says, "Your non-acceptance of any thesis—this is the demonstration of your *dharma*." (S.)

When you say that there is no thesis that is the thesis. And again you say 'our *dharma* is in accordance with the belief of the men of the world'—this is your own thesis.

The follower says, "The non-thesis is not called thesis, as non-existence." (S.)

We said before that all *dharmas* are *pratītyasamutpanna* and that they are devoid of any characteristic. Therefore we have no thesis. To have no thesis is not called a thesis. E.g. when we say 'non-existence' this is real non-existence; but it is not on account of the fact that we say 'non-existence' there is then non-existence. The same [must be understood] as regards the non-existence of the thesis.

The unbeliever says, "Because you say that all *dharmas* have the characteristic of non-existence, therefore it means that you are a man who destroys *dharmas*." (S.)

If *dharmas* are void and have the characteristic of the non-existence, such a thesis also must be non-existent. Then all *dharmas* are not existent. Because *dharmas* are non-existent—this means to be a man who destroys *dharmas*.

The follower says, "The man who refutes the destruction of *dharmas* is called a man who destroys *dharmas*." (S.)

According to me there is no *dharma* and there is nothing to

be refuted. You say that we destroy *dharmas* and you wish to refute me. Then you are a man who destroys *dharmas.*

The unbeliever says, "*Dharmas* must be existent, because they are interdependent." (S.)

If there is the long, there must be the short; if there is the high, there must be the low; if there is the void, there must be the full.

The follower says, "How can they be interdependent since one has been refuted?" (S.)

If one is non-existent, there is no interdependence. If there is something non-void, there must be a reciprocal interdependence. If there is not the non-void, then, how could the non-existence of the void be interdependent with it?

The unbeliever says, "According to you, the demonstration of non-existence is proved." (S.)

If one says: 'the house is empty, there are no horses [in it];' then, the non-existence of the horse is there. In this way although you say that all *dharmas* are void and without any characteristic, yet, because it can produce various feelings, therefore non-existence must be existent.

The follower says, "It is not so, because existence as well as non-existence are non-existent." (S.)

As regards their true characteristic, we say that existence and non-existene of the various classes of *dharmas* are all void. And why? If existence is non-existent, then, non-existence also is not existent. And therefore, existence and non-existence are non-existent.

The unbeliever says, "This refutation is not valid, on account of the voidness of its nature." (S.)

If the essence of all *dharmas* is void, and there is no cause [for refutation], on account of the non-existence of the cause, the existence of refutation is not possible. (If it is not so), it will be like a stupid man who, wishing to refute some void (imaginations), undertakes tiresome work.

The follower says," Although they are void by their own

nature, they bind because we assume the characteristic, [as existent]." (S.)

Although all *dharmas* are void in their own nature, yet, only on account of the imaginations of bad ideas, they bind. In order to refute these false conceptions, we expound "the refutation," but really there is nothing to be refuted. As for instance, a stupid man, when he sees a mirage, in summer, falsely lets the idea of water arise within himself. And therefore, he runs towards it. If another who knows, says to him "this is not water," then, he destroys the idea of that man, but does not refute [the existence] water. In the same way, the nature of all *dharmas* is void. But the creatures adhere to them, because they assume some characteristic of them [as existent]. In order to refute these false ideas, we expound our refutation, but, really, there is nothing to be refuted.

The unbeliever says, "This *dharma* is not explained, because it is not in the great *sūtras*." (S.)

You refute existence, refute non-existence, refute existence and non-existence. Now you fall into the theory of neither existence nor non-existence. This [doctrine] of not non-existence and non-existence cannot be explained. And why ?—because the characteristic of existence and non-existence cannot be realized. This is called a *dharma* which cannot be explained. This *dharma* is not explained, because it is not found in the great books of the *Vaiśeṣikas*, *Sāṅkhyas*, *Nirgranthas* and other *dharmas*. Because it is (everywhere) not existent, therefore, it cannot be accepted.

The follower says, "There is a fourth (*dharma*)." (S.)

In your great books also, there are *dharmas* which are not explained, e.g., in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, sound is not called great and is not called small. And in the *Sāṅkhya Sūtras* the clod of clay is not a pot and is not not-pot. According to the *dharmas* of the *Nirgranthas* light has neither brightness nor darkness. Like all those books, there is a fourth *dharma*, which is not explained. Why do you say that it is not existent ?

The unbeliever says, "If there is void, there must be no teaching." (S.)

If the void is considered to be a *dharma* which is not explained, then, how do you teach good and bad dharmas, in order to instruct [others] ?

The follower says, " Because it is in accordance with the worldly speech, there is no mistake." (S.)

The Buddha taught the law, constantly basing himself on the worldly truth, and on the absolute truth. These both are real, and not false words. E.g. the Buddha, although he knew that dharmas have no characteristic, yet, spoke to *Ānanda*, 'Go to the town of *Śrāvasti* and ask for alms.' A town cannot be conceived if we take away earth, wood, and so on. But being in accordance with the worldly speech, he did not fall into a false speech; we also, because we follow the teaching of the Buddha, do not commit mistake.

The unbeliever says, "Because the worldly [truth] is not not-true." (S.)

If the worldly truth is real, then, it becomes the absolute truth; if it is not real, how can it be called a truth ?

The follower says, "It is not so. Because they are interdependent, as the great and the small." (S.)

The worldly truth according to the men of this world is considered to be real; but according to the holy men is considered not real. E.g. a greengage is bigger than a date, but it is smaller than a cucumber. These two (affirmations) are both true. But, if we say of the date that it is small and of the cucumber that it is big, this would be a false speech. In the same way, there is no mistake, because we follow the worldly speech.

The unbeliever says, "Knowing these mistakes,—what is the profit ?" (S.)

From the beginning where merit and sin have been rejected up to the refutation of the void—you have considered in this way all *dharmas* as wrong; now what profit will be obtained ?

The follower says, " In the same way, the renunciation of the feeling of the ego is called attainment of liberation." (S.)

In this way the refutation of *dharmas* is of three kinds. In the beginning, in the renunciation of sin and merit, the *ātman* has been refuted. Afterwards all·*dharmas* have been refuted. This is called non-existence of the ego, and non-existence of what belongs to the ego. And there is no attachment to a *dharma* whatsoever. If hearing existence there is no joy, hearing non-existence there is no sorrow,—this is called liberation.

The unbeliever says : "How with words only do you say that there is the attainment of liberation, when really there is no attainment of liberation ?"

The follower says, "On account of the absolute purity. On account of the refutation of the *ātman*, there is no individual. On account of the refutation of *Nirvāṇa*, there is no liberation ; how is it possible to say that man obtains liberation ? (We say that) there is liberation only according to the worldly truth"

PART II.

NOTES ON TŚ.[1]

P. 3. l. 2. This Chapter contains an example of the illogical refutation, *anyāyakhaṇḍana* or *ayuktakhaṇḍana* or °*dūṣaṇa* 無道理難. The *dūṣaṇa* is chiefly based upon sophistical arguments, the non-validity of which can easily be recognized. It may be considered as an exemplification of *chala*, translated by Ki-tsang as 難難, NS. I, ii, 10.

P. 3. l. 3. *Śāstram āha.* This sentence of the Chinese text shows that the opinion of the author is expressed here, to distinguish it from the views maintained by the opponent. Therefore, it is evident that it does not belong to the original Sanscrit text. So, I have put it within round brackets which I have always used, when we are confronted with sentences that were probably not in the Sanscrit text but were added by the Chinese translators in order to make it clearer to Chinese readers. On the contrary, I have used square brackets when some word, not found in Ch., has been added by me.

P. 3. l. 16. The Chinese word which has been translated by me as *samakālīnam* might also be translated as *yugapat* which is more technical. We have here the refutation of the opponent's view, based upon the theory of the *traikālyāsiddhi*. This argument is analogous to the jāti called *ahetusama*, which is so enunciated in the NS., V,I, 18: *traikālyāsiddher hetor ahetusamaḥ.*

P. 4. l. 6. That is, if your sentence has in itself the power of refuting, it must refute itself; so that, being self-annulled, it

[1] In the text the following corrections must be made: p. 11. l. 12 for: *yad uktaṃ bhavatā etadvacanam* read: °*bhavatā, etad*° p. 13. l. 17 for *pakṣadharmma* read: °*dharma*; so also at p. 14. l. 20; p 13 l. 17 for *sapakṣasatvaṃ* read: °*sattvaṃ* p. 16. l. 12 after *viparītam etat khaṇḍanam* insert the *daṇḍa*; p. 18. l. 23 for *parasparotpādake ity* read: °*tpādaka ity*; p. 23. l. 9. for *kāryyabheda* read: *kāryabh.*; p. 24. l. 69 for: *hetur na tvutpatti*° °*natūtpa*°; p. 24. l. 19 for *pratidṛṣṭārtha* read: *pratidṛṣṭānta*, p. 26. l. 26, for *vastvīva* read: *vastviva*; p. 35. l. 20 for: *śabdo pyanitya* read: *śabdo'py* p. 37. l. 9. for *paurvāparyya* read: *paurvāparya*; p. 38. l. 11 for *karmmavat* read *karmavat*: p. 38. l. 19 for *duḥkhaṃ duḥkham.* P. 39. l. 9 for *karttavya* read *kartavya.*

cannot refute other views. If it has not in itself the power of refuting, it cannot refute anything.

P. 4. l. 11. In this first part of the Chapter the A. replies to the objection of the opponent, viz., that his words are illogical, and maintains that words by the fact that they are words cannot be illogical; Cfr. *sarvaṃ vacanaṃ mithyā* considered as *svavacanaviruddha* in NM., NBT. 85. *Vākyapadīya*, Kāṇḍa III, p. 108.

P. 4. l. 16. Here we have in fact a list of *pakṣābhāsas*:

(*a*) *svavacanaviruddha*; *mātā me bandhyā* NP. 2, PKm. 190, NM. *sarvaṃ vacanaṃ mithyā*, NBT. 85, *sarvaṃ mithyā bravīmi*.

(*b*) *pratyakṣaviruddha:* (since words are heard they are *siddha*) *aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdaḥ* or *anuṣṇo 'gniḥ* NM. NR. 363, NP. 2, NB. 84, PKm. 190.

(*c*) *anumānaviruddha: nityo ghaṭa* NM. NP. 2., NB. 84 *nityaḥ śabdaḥ*; *apariṇāmī śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt.* PKm. 190.

(*d*) *lokaviruddha* (NB. 84 *pratītiviruddha*): *acandraḥ śaśī* NM. NP.[2] *suci naraśiraḥkapālaṃ prāṇyaṅgatvāc chaṅkhaśuktivat* NP. 3, PKm. 190.

There is no mention of the *āgamaviruddha* which is to be found in NM. PS., NP. But this does not necessarily imply that it was not known to the author of TŚ. (But, *āgamaviruddha* is unknown also to NB.) The examples of the *pakṣābhāsas* as given by Diṅnāga are referred to and refuted by NV. 113, (where no mention is to be found of the *anumānaviruddha*).

P. 5. l. 11. The TŚ. knows therefore a fivefold syllogism, like NS. This is proved by this passage and the list of the *pañca-avayava* given below.

This same theory was held by the old Buddhist logicians such as Asaṅga.

P. 5. l. 23, On this notion of *anya* cfr. MMK., XIV. 5.

P. 7. l. 13. 名 "name" here must be taken adverbially: *nāma*, *iti*. Cfr. WELLER *Dharmasaṅgraha*, p. 23, WALDSCHMIDT. *Bruchstücke des Bhikṣuṇīpratimokṣa*, p. 22, n. 4.

P. 8. l. 16. This is another objection raised by the opponent. If words are destroyed, as soon as they are uttered, then my thesis, after being formulated, is no longer existent; so that there is nothing to refute. If, on the other hand, my words

are eternal, they cannot also be refuted, on account of their eternity.

P. 8. l. 23. Here again there is the *kālaparīkṣā* of the thesis and refutation.

P. 9. l. 15. The *vādin* objects that the *prativādin* does not state why his words are logical, but only shows that the refutation is inconsistent with the thesis. This is a *hetvantara*; so this argument is implicitly a *nigrahasthāna*. The opponent replies that the objection is not valid, inasmuch as this mistake is to be found also in the argument of the *vādin*. Moreover in a *vāda* it is necessary to say a *hetvantara*.

P. 10. l. 6. This is the reply to the second objection of the *vādin*, who holds that such an argument as advanced by the *prativādin* is another kind of faulty discussion, viz., the *arthāntara* (*nigrahasthāna*). Inasmuch as the *prativādin* must maintain a view contrary to that of the *vādin*, his argument must necessarily be different. If they were identical, the *vādin* refuting the *prativādin* would in fact refute himself, etc.

P. 10. l. 19. The *vādin* has objected that in the argument of the *prativādin* there is another *nigrahasthāna*, viz., *pratijñāntara*. Refutation as before. This is a *chala* as regards the word *anya*.

P. 11. l. 10. This is another *chala* as regards *sarva*; if the sentence "*sarvaṃ nānujñāyate*" is not included in the "all," since the "all" is not admitted by you, my words that are not "the all" must be admitted by you.

P. 12. l. 1. This Chapter is called "Refutation according to logic." 道理難 It corresponds to the *jāti*-section of NS. It is divided into three parts: (*a*) *viparītakhaṇḍana*, (*b*) *asat* or *abhūtakhaṇḍana*, (*c*) *viruddhakhaṇḍana*. The same classification of the *jātis* was followed by Vādavidhi, but it was not accepted by Diṅnāga either in PS. or in NM. Besides the sources referred to below cp. ṢDSm., p. 81 foll.

P. 12. l. 12. The author gives two examples of the *sādharmyasama*. The one is based upon the *sādharmyadṛṣṭānta* or *sapakṣa* (positive instance; pot—effect of some effort—non-eternal). The other is based upon the *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta* (negative instance: *ākāśa*—non-effect of some effort—eternal.)

(Cfr. NV. 531 and TR. 235). In the first case the *sādharmya-jāti* consists in showing the mere analogy with the *vipakṣa* (*ākāśa*), viz., its immateriality. In the second case it consists in pointing out that if the *vaidharmya* (effect of some effort, non-effect of some effort) with the *vipakṣa* is sufficient to prove, then, the *sādharmya* with the same *vipakṣa* (immateriality) will also be sufficient to prove. NS. V. i. 2; NB. 830; NV. 531; NVTT. 673; NMj. 632; NM.; PS. VI; PSVa fol. 90a; PKm. 196; PM. 86; TR. 254.

P. 13. l. 16. I have referred to this passage in BLBD. p. 483. It shows that the *trairūpya* theory of the *hetu* was anterior to Diṅnāga. The refutation of the argument advanced by the opponent is based upon the *trairūpya* theory, since it shows that a *hetu* which depends on *sādharmya* or *vaidharmya-mātra* is *anaikāntika*. On the contrary, the reason "because a product" answers this condition of the *trairūpya*; but the reason: "because incorporeal" is *savyabhicāra*, inasmuch as it is found in the *sapakṣa* as well as in the *vipakṣa*, e.g., in such *vipakṣa* as *buddhi*, etc. Cfr. NVTT 674. *svabhāvasambaddhaṃ ca kṛtakatvam anityatvena, na tv amūrtatvasya nityatvena svābhāvikaḥ sambandhaḥ buddhikarmādau vyabhicārāt.*

P. 13. l. 20. The thesis "Sound is non-eternal, because it is the consequence of some effort," can refute the proposition: "sound is eternal, because incorporeal" but not *vice versa*.

P. 13. l. 24. Instead of *vyaktīkartum na śakyate* one could also translate: *pratipattum na śak.* Cp. NV. p. 532. l. 14.

P. 14. l. 1. Cp., for the sources, note on the *sādh..s.*

P. 14. l. 18. I have maintained the difference of reading which is in Chinese, *viz.*, *aniyata* or *aniścita* instead of *anaikāntika*, 不定因不能難決定.

P. 14. l. 21. For *trayalakṣaṇa* read: *trila°*.

P. 14. l. 23. The *pakṣadharma* that occurs in the *sapakṣa* as well as in the *vipakṣa* is *anaikāntika* and a reason the *pakṣadharma* of which is inconclusive is *asiddha*.

P. 14. l. 24. I have translated the character 顯 as *pratyavasthāna* in order to make it clear that it is a reply of the *prativādin*, but it corresponds usually to *varṇaka, khyāti, pratipādana*, etc.

NS. V, i, 4, 5, 6; NV. 533 foll.; NVTT. 674; NMj. 623; TR. 263; NM.; PSV. a. 90b, PSV. b. 173b; PM. 86 PKm. 196.

P. 15. l. 23. NS. I, i, 23; NV. 542; NVTT. 684; NMj; 629; TR. 287; NM.; PSV. a. 91a, PSV.b. 174a; PM. 88 PKm. 198.

Our text knows two kinds of *aviśeṣasama* of which the first includes the first and the third of NM. and PS. and the second is the same as that of NM. and PS: I, *a*) If sound is eternal, on account of its *sādharmya* with the pot, then, since everything can be analogous with everything (inasmuch as there are general attributes such as existence, etc., common to everything) the conclusion must be that everything is similar to everything. I, *b*) If you maintain that, though everything has some analogy with everything, still each notion has its own peculiar aspects; then, the reason is common both to the *pakṣa* and to the *pratipakṣa*, so that it cannot necessarily prove the probandum. In fact the pot and ether may be equally products, but the pot is burnable, while ether is unburnable and therefore the one is non-eternal but the other is eternal (cfr. *vikalpasama*). II) It consists in showing that the *sādhya*: "non-eternal" and the reason; "because a product" convey the same meaning, viz., "non-existent." *a*) When the cause is not yet active, sound is not yet born; since it is not born it is *abhāvamātra*, (*pragabhāva*.) *b*) The *sādhya*: "non-eternal" means that sound, being previously non-existent, comes into existence, inasmuch as there is a cause, and then it disappears. Since it disappears it is also *abhāva* (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) cfr. NB. on *kāryasama*, 881.

P. 17. l. 8. For the *vādin* the *probandum* "*anitya*" corresponds to *pradhvaṃsābhāva*, viz., *vināśād abhāva*, while the *hetu* shows the *pragabhāva* or *pragutpatter abhāva* (NS. II, ii, 12, NV. 280). For the Sāṅkhyas the *pradhvaṃsābhāva* is *asiddha*, in so far as the cause is continuing in the effect.

P. 17. l. 14. The criticism is directed against the Mīmāṃsakas. Cfr. NS. II, ii, 18 and Vātsyāyana upon it.

P. 17. l. 19. NS. V, i, 7-8; NV. 535; NVTT. 677; NMj. 624; TR. 271; PM. 87; PKm. 197; NM. PSV. a, 88a; PSV. b. 172a.

P. 17. l. 24. Same example in NM. Cfr, NVTT. 677 *gaṅgā sāgaraṃ prāptā sāgareṇa saṅgatā sāgareṇābhinnā.*

P. 18. l. 6. The text has: 因有二種一生因二顯不相離因. It is evident that the three characters: 不相離 must be suppressed, since they do not convey any proper meaning here. Cfr. NM. and also NV. 536 *iyaṃ ca jātiḥ sarvahetvapavādadvārikā yadi jñāpako hetur apadiśyate tathāpi, yadi kārakas tathāpi.* It is evident that we have a refutation of a jāti, which was used by Nāgārjuna and his followers against the validity of the pramāṇas. Cfr. VV. 37-38. On the pramāṇas as *upalabdhihetu* (*vyañjanahetu*) as distinguished from the *kārakahetu* cfr. NSB. 239.

P. 18. l. 13. Same example in PKm. 198.

P. 18. l. 6. NS. V, i, 18 foll.; NSB. 857; NV. 541. NVTT. NMj. 628; TR. 284; PM. 88; NM. It is evident that such a jāti is contained in the *traikālyaparīkṣā* of the pramāṇas made by Nāgārjuna and expounded at length in VV. That is proved also by the fact that TR. and NVTT. refer to the discussion contained in NS. II, i, 8.

P. 18. l. 22. The text has: 如牛角種芽等 viz. "like the horns of a bull and the seed and the sprout." Here the sentence: "like the seed and the sprout" must have been interpolated, since the seed and the sprout cannot be *yugapatsamutpanna.*

P. 19. l. 12. But in NSB. 223 three possibilities are given (*a*) *upalabdhihetu* pre-existent, *upalabdhiviśaya* coming into existence afterwards; (*b*) *upalabdhiviśaya* pre-existent, *upalabdhihetu* appearing later; (*c*) *upalabdhihetu* and *upalabdhiviśaya* contemporary.

P. 19. l. 6. 是因 twice in the text.

P. 19. l. 7. But 名 can be taken, here, as well as throughout the passage in its literal sense, *viz.*: *nāman* "A *hetu* can be called a *hetu* only if it is possessed with its function etc."

P. 19. l. 11. The objection of the opponent is that if the *hetu* exists before the *kriyā*, when the *kriyā* manifest itself, the *hetu* disappears, so that the *kriyā* cannot derive from the *hetu*

inasmuch as this is no longer existent. The reply is that the *kriyā* does not manifest itself when the object in which it resides is destroyed, but a thing, being already existent, obtains the name *hetu*, as soon as the *kriyā* develops in it.

P. 19. l. 17. NS. V, i, 27. foll.; NSB. 867; NV. 543; NVTT. 687; NMj. 631; TR. 290; PM. 88; PKm. 198; NM.; PSVa. 92, a, PSV. b. 175 b.

In the following discussion our text does not show the fact contained in NS. and NM. (PS.) that this *jāti* is so called since it consists in assuming that the probandum can be proved also by other reasons and so there is no relation of indissoluble concomitance between the *sādhya* and the *hetu* (*na khalu prayatnānantarīyakatvam anityasādhanam; sādhanam hi tad ucyate yena vinā na sādhyam upalabhyate; upalabhyate ca prayatnānantarīyakatvena vināpi vidyudādāv anityatvam*. Nyāyakalikā by Jayanta, p. 20 which I quote on account of its clearness, and conciseness). The chief argument contained in our text is the *avyāpakatva* of the *hetu* suggested by the wrong assumption that all the *sādhya* must be the effect of that particular *sādhana*: NV. 543: *sarvasādhyāropeṇāvyāpakatvaṃ sādhanasya*. The vādin replies that his thesis is not that all non-eternal must be the effect of some effort, but that whatever is the effect of some effort must be non-eternal.

P. 19. l. 24. Doubtful; the text has: 如離火立火煙. I think that we must transpose the two characters 火煙: *yathā dhūmena vināgnisthāpana*.

P. 20. l. 6. Same example in NBT. 31 *cetanās taravaḥ svapāt*. This kind of argument is called according to the later logic *pakṣaikadeśāsiddha*.

P. 21. l. 3. NS. V, i, 14; NSB. 851; NV. 539; NVTT. 680; NMj. 626; TR. 280; PM. 87; PKm. 197; NM.

The treatment of this *jāti* is different from that contained in NS.; according to this text *saṃśayasama* can be formulated as follows: (Nyāyakalikā 19) *kiṃ ghaṭasādharmyāt, kṛtakatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ, uta tad vaidharmyād ākāśasādharmyād vā niravayavān nitya iti*. On the other hand the example contained in our text, as well as in NM., corresponds to *kāryasama* according to which: *prayatnakāryam anekadhā dṛṣṭam iti kiṃcit*

prayatnānantaraṃ vyajyate, kiṃcit prayatnāntaram utpadyate NV. 546. That this *kāryasama* was considered by some logicians as similar to the *saṃśayasama* can be gathered from NV. 547. The *kāryasama* was differently formulated by our text and Buddhist logicians in general. See down below.

P. 22. l. 2. Text corrupt: 功力事有二種無常; I think that it is necessary to add the characters 亦常, as we may gather from the following sentence. The author replies to the objection of the opponent; even if the *abhivyakti* is the consequence of a *prayatna*, still a doubt is always possible since the effect of a *prayatna* can equally be eternal and non-eternal. The non-eternal is the *pragabhāva*, or *abhūtvā bhāva*, produced by a *prayatna*; the eternal is the *dhvaṃsa*. The argument of the *vādin* is meant to show that *dhvaṃsa* cannot be either eternal or non-eternal, because it is a purely negative concept.

P. 22. l. 22. The forms *upalabdhi, utpattisama*, etc., to which, in fact, this kind of *jāti* is strictly related suggested to me the word: *anuktiḥ* by which I have translated the Chinese: 未說. But, so far as I know, it cannot be found in any other source, except NM. PS. and PSV. *a* 89 a, and *b* 172 b, (from which we deduce that it a was common also to VVi.). It consists in assuming that the non-eternity of sound is produced by the mere utterance of the reason: "because the effect of some effort."

P. 23. l. 7. Viz. it implies that the quality of being *anitya* as expressed by the reason, brings with it the destruction of the previous eternity of sound.

P. 23. l. 9. Equal to *kāryasama* of NS. V, i, 37; NSB. 881; NV. 547; NVTT. 692; NMj. 634; TR. 306; PM. 89; PKm. 198. NM. PSV. a, 89; b, 173 b.

The text gives various examples of *kāryasama*, but this *jāti* is expounded in a quite different way than in NS. The treatment of the *kāryasama* as given there is considered in our text, as we saw, as a kind of *saṃsáyasama*. On the other hand Diṅnāga is in accordance with TŚ. and so also Dharmakīrti whose definition is quoted and refuted in NVTT. 693, and TR. 4. 307.

sādhyenānugamāt kāryasāmānyenāpi sādhane |
sambandhibhedād bhedoktir doṣaḥ kāryasamo mataḥ ||

An example is given in TR. ibid: *anityaḥ śabdaḥ kāryatvād, ghaṭavad ity ukte ghaṭasya kāryatvam anyan mṛddaṇḍādipūrvakaṃ śabdasya cānyat tālvādivyāpārapūrvakam iti kāryatvasya bhedaḥ.* The other example of kāryasama supposes a different interpretation.

a) If the *āśraya* is *nitya*, the *guṇa* must be *nitya*, *e.g.*, *aṇu* and sphericity, *pārimaṇḍalya*; so *ākāśa* and *śabda* (*guṇa* of *ākāśa*, b) *śravaṇatva* is *nitya* according to the Vaiśeṣikas and so *śabda* must be also *nitya*. These seem to be arguments of the Mīmāṃsakas against the Vaiśesikas.

P. 23. l. 18. Read: *kāryabheda* for: *kāryaviśeṣa*.

P. 24. l. 2. viz. a *nigrahasthāna*: then it is not necessary to refute this wrong argument.

P. 24. l. 5. Here also the opponent assumes that the *hetu* is an *utpādahetu* or *kāraka*, while it is simply *vyañjaka*, or *upalabdhi* or *jñāpaka-hetu*.

P. 24. l. 20. NS. V, i, 9; NSB. 844; NV. 536; NVTT. 678; NMj. 525; TR. 274; PM. 87; PKm. 197; NM. PSV. a 93; b, 176 b.

P. 25. l. 4. Read *kṛtrima* for *sahetuka*.

P. 25. l. 6. NS. V., 1, 22; NSB. 861; NV. 541; NVTT. 683; NMj. 629; TR. 285; PM. 88; PKm. 197; NM.; PSV. a, 93a; b. 176 b.

The argument of the *prativādin* is this: "if you say that the *ātman* is non-existent because it is *anabhivyakta*, as the son of a barren woman, then, the evident inference (*arthāpatti*) from such an argument is that whatever is *abhivyakta* is existent and whatever is *anabhivyakta* is non-existent. But we see that what is *abhivyakta* is sometimes real and sometimes non-real (*asat*); the *anabhivyakta*, on account of the evident inference, must also be so. But such a thing as a mirage is *abhivyakta*, but unreal. If the *abhivyakta* is not necessarily real, how is it possible to state that the *anabhivyakta* is not real? The *vādin* replies that this is not implied by his statement, and that the absolute unreality of the *anabhivyakta* cannot be maintained. Moreover the *abhivyakti* itself cannot lead to any sure conclusion; it is in fact *anaikāntika*. This passage is of very great

importance because it is alluded to in the NS. II, ii, 3: and is almost *verbatim* quoted by NSB. 352 *arthāpattir apramāṇam anaikāntikatvāt* (S); *asatsu megheṣu vṛṣṭir na bhavati, satsu bhavatīty etad arthād āpadyate satsv api caikadā na bhavati seyaṁ arthāpattir apramāṇam.* This same argument was also expounded by Vasubandhu in his *Pratītyasamutpāda-vibhaṅga* (*vedanā-vibhaṅga*): see my forthcoming edition of the fragment of this work found in Nepal in JRAS.

P. 25. l, 24. This means that the *alātacakra*, etc., presuppose in fact some *rūpa* that represents the substratum of their manifestation, but the manifestation itself is not real, since it appears as such, only for a little while and then disappears. It refers to the example of the *prativādin.*

P. 26. l. 3. That is the author shows the difference between the example, as formulated by the *prativādin,* and his own example viz., *bandhyāputra*, which indicates the non-reality of whatever *always* remains *anabhivyakta.* His example does not refer at all to such things, as atoms, ether, etc., which, though existent, may be *abhivyakta* as well as *anabhivyakta.*

P. 26. l. 12. This second kind of *anarthāpattisama* is just that described in NS. but it appears that it was not accepted by our author who considers it as a variety of *sādhyasama* Cfr. NVTT. 683.

P. 26. l. 18. NS. V, i, 9; NSB. 844; NV. 536; NVTT. 678; NMj. 625; TR. 277; PM. 87; PKm. 198.

P. 26. l. 24. As in NS. The objection consists in replying that *ākāśa* is *asat* (*abhāvamātra* MMV. i–5 SV. *śabdanityatva* 20 ff. and as such no eternity can be predicated of it. Even admitting that *ākāśa* is existent, the example would be *anaikāntika*, because there are other things which, though incorporeal, like *ākāsa* are nevertheless non-eternal; e.g., *icchā, dveṣa*, etc.

P. 27. l. 13. Cfr. *saṃśayasama.*

P. 27. l. 17. The text has here 滅 but it is evident that we must correct 常.

P. 27. l. 21. Allusion to the Vaiśeṣika view of the non-eternity of sound; *sāmānyam* (*śravaṇatva*) is for the Vaiśesikas eternal (VS. IV, i, 13, V, i, 6–12) and still perceivable; similarly so sound, being perceivable, can be eternal as the *śravaṇatva.* But

for the Buddhist the *sāmānya* is not something separately existent, *arthāntara*, and distinct from the *vyakti*, individuals, as the Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas hold. For Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti and their school *jāti* is *kalpanā*, *nāman* cfr. NV. 315 ff.; NMj. 309 ff. Śālikanātha's, *Prakaraṇapañcikā* p. 17, etc.

P. 28. l. 5. *Pariṇāma* and *gurutva* are distinct, *arthāntara*, from the object for the Vaiśeṣikas as well as for the Naiyāyikas. NK. 133; NV. 233.

P. 28. l. 19. NS. V, i, 12; NSB. 849; NV. 539; NVTT. 679; NMj. 626; TR. 278; PM. 87; PKm. 197; NM; PSV 89 a; PSVb. 172b.

P. 29. l. 4. According to our text the *utpattisama* cannot be considered as a new kind of *jāti*, since it is a variety of *asatkhaṇḍana*, viz., of *arthāpattikhaṇḍana*. It is of the highest interest to note that this passage is quoted and refuted by Uddyotakara p. 539 (NVTT. 681). The same theory is also alluded to in NV. 133.

P. 29. l. 11. NS. V, i, 35; NSB. 878; NV. 545; NVTT. 691; NMj. 633; TR. 300; PM. 89; PKm. 198; NM., PSV. a. 88 b; b. 172 b. Cfr. NS. IV, I, 26 *nānityatānityatvāt*.

P. 29. l. 20. This definition of the *anitya* is also to be found in NM. and PSV. and it is quoted also from Diṅnāga by NV. 283 *ye punar varṇayanti sa eva bhāvo bhūtvā'bhavan, bhūtvā cābhavann anityam ity ucyate sā cāvasthā bhāvapratyayenānityatā*.

P. 30, l. 2. The examples that follow represent in fact two different formulations of the *prāptyaprātisama* and *ahetusama* already referred to. But the text shows here another refutation which consists in indicating that if this kind of refutation is valid it could also be refuted by the same argument. This criticism is probably directed against the Mādhyamika view.

P. 30. l. 18. Viz. We do not refute your refutation, so that my refutation is not based upon yours, but we only show the contradiction that is inherent in your own argument.

P. 30. l. 24. Sāṅkhya view. Cfr. Sāṅkhyakārikā 17, NV. 344.

P. 31. l. 19. I read 則 instead of 無.

P. 33. l. 12. That is, in a *vāda*, when one of the speakers

commits a *nigrahasthāna*, the other must not refute it, but only point it out that he is defeated. The list of *nigrahasthānas* corresponds, as we saw, to that of NS. V, II. No mention of *nigrahasth.* is contained in Diṅnāga's works. In Dharmakīrti they have been reduced to two forms; viz., *asādhanāṅga-vacana* and *adoṣodbhāvana* according to a verse that is quoted very often NVTT. 723, NMj. 639; PM. 104.

asādhanāṅgavacanam adoṣadbhāvanaṃ tayoḥ |
nigrahasthānam anyat tu na yuktam iti neṣyate ||

This verse is to be found in the beginning of the Codanā-nyāya preserved in a Tibetan translation (bsTan-ḥgyur. mdo. ce). This book expounds with great detail the views of Dharmakīrti, which were refuted by NVTT. and NMj. the latter quoting the ācārya very often (NMj. 639, 640, 646 bhikṣu 642, etc., NVTT. 707, etc.). The Jainas PKm., and PM. (that follows almost verbatim the first) do not accept either the view of NS. or that of Dharmakīrti. Cfr. ṢDSm. pp. 87 ff.

P. 33. l. 14. NS. II, 2; NSB. 892; NV. 551; NVTT. 699; NMj. 640; TR. 320; PM. 92; PKm. 200; (they criticise Vātsyāyana as well as Uddyotakara) KKK. 952.

P. 34. l. 8 NS. V, ii, 3; NSB. 895; NV. 553; NVTT. 701; NMj. 641; TR. 325; PM. 96; PKm. 200; KKK. 965.

P. 35. l. 3. NS. V, ii; NSB. 896; NV. 554; NVTT. 702; NMj. 642; TR. 327; PM. 96; PKm. 200; *hetunā pratijñāyāḥ pratijñātve niraste prakārāntarataḥ pratijñāhānir eveyam uktā syād dhetudoṣo vātra viruddhatālakṣaṇo na pratijñādoṣaḥ.*

That *pratijñāvirodha* is not an *ābhāsa* of the *pakṣa* was already asserted by Diṅnāga, in NM, and in PS. (from this passage we learn that *pratijñāvirodha* was on the other hand accepted by VVi.) KKK. 984.

P. 35. l.14. NS. V, ii, 5; NSB, 897; NV. 554; NVTT. 706; NMj. 644; TR. 329; PM. 98; PKm. 200.

P. 35. l. 21. Cfr. note ad. 27. l. 21.

P. 36. l. 3. NS. V, ii, 6; NSB. 899; NV. 554; NVTT. 707; NMj. 645; TR. 330; PM. 98; PKm. 200.

I am not quite sure whether *aviśeṣahetu*, in the definition is exact. The Ch. has 同 相 因 = "similar-characteristic-*hetu*."

P. 36. l. 19. *Arthābhidhanam* ? uncertain; 說證義 litt: to say realized meaning.

NS. V. ii, 7; NSB. 902; NV. 554; NVTT. 708; NMj. 645; TR. 332; PM. 98; PKm. 201.

P. 36. l. 23. NS. V. ii, 8; NSB. 903; NV. 555; NVTT. 710; NMj. 646; TR. 333; PM. 98; PKm. 201.

P. 37. l. 1. NS. V, ii, 9; NSB. 904; NV. 555; NVTT. 711; NMj. 647; TR. 335; PM. 98; PKm. 201.

P. 37. l. 9. NS. V, ii, 10; NSB. 905; NV. 555; NVTT. 711; NMj. 648; TR. 338; PM. 99; PKm. 201.

P. 37. l. 12. NS. V, ii, 11; NSB. 906; NV. 555; NVTT. 712; NMj. 649; TR. 339; PM. 100; PKm. 201.

P. 37. l. 23. NS. V, ii, 12; NSB. 906; NV. 556; NVTT. 715; NMj. 659; TR. 342; PM. 100; PKm. 202.

P. 38. l. 7. NS. V, ii, 13; NSB. 907; NV. 557; NVTT. 716; NMj. 650; TR. 644; PM. 101; PKm. 202.

P. 38. l. 16. NS. V, ii, 14-15; NSB. 908; NV. 557; NVTT. 717; NM. 650; TR. 346; PM. 101; PKm. 201.

P. 38. l. 25. NS. V, ii, 16; NSB. 910; NV. 557; NVTT. 717; NMj. 652; TR. 347; PM. 102; PKm. 202.

P. 39. l. 3. NV. V, ii, 17; NSB. 910; NV. 558; NVTT. 720; NMj. 653; TR. 350; PM. 102; PKm. 202.

P. 39. l. 5. NS. V, ii, 18; NSB. 911; NV. 558; NVTT. 720; NMj. 654; TR. 351; PM. 103; PKm. 202.

P. 39. l. 15. NS. V, ii, 19; NSB. 911; NV. 559; NVTT. 720; NMj. 654; TR. 652; PM. 103; PKm. 202.

P. 39. l. 17. Translation doubtful. 此時不去事則不辦遮他立難.

P. 39. l. 20. NS. V, ii, 20; NSB. 912; NV. 559; NVTT. 721; NMj. 655; TR. 252; PM. 103; PKm. 202.

P. 39. l. 24. NS. V, ii, 21; NSB. 913; NV. 559; NVTT. 721; NMj. 655; TR. 354; PM. 103; PKm. 202.

P. 40. l. 3. NS. V, ii, 22; NSB. 914; NV. 530; NVTT. 723; NMj. 650; TR. 356; PM. 104; PKm. 202.

P. 40. l. 8. NS. V, ii, 23; NSB. 915; NV. 530; NVTT. 723; NMj. 757; TR. 359; PM. 104; PKm. 202; KKK. 995. Then follows a sentence in which worldly science is opposed to the religious conduct, as an example of *apasiddhānta*. I did not

translate it, because the sentence here seems to be defective. 若自攝持 (if one keeps himself) 明巧書射 (*vidyā, śilpa?* archery) 與生因律 (and produces *hetu vinaya*) 沙門 (*śramaṇa*), the *siddhānta* is illogical.

P. 40. l. 10. NS. V, ii, 24; NSB. 918; NV. 530; NVTT. 725; NMj. 658; TR. 260; PM. 204; PKm. 202.

This shows that our book is a fragment. In no other place of the extant Chinese text is there any allusion to *hetvābhāsas.* Anyhow we deduce from this passage that TŚ : as well as VVi and Diṅnāga assumed the existence of three *hetvābhāsas* only viz., *asiddha, anaikāntika, aviruddha.* The example of the *asiddha* (VS. III, 16) is given in PB. 341 as an example of *viruddha* (*yasmād viṣāṇī tasmād aśvaḥ*) ; the example of the *anaikāntika* is = VS. III, 17 and PB. 342 (*sandigdha*).

NOTES ON UH.[1]

P. 3. l. 5 fll. This objection against the utility of the *Vāda* probably refers to the orthodox view of the old Buddhists by whom *hetuvidyā* and *tarka* were viewed with contempt. (Dīghanikāya, I. 33.)

P. 3. l. 13. For similar expressions cfr. NV. pp. 13 and 22. NSB. 826.

P. 4. l. 9. It is interesting to note that our text knows and follows the threefold method of a *śāstra* alluded to by NSB. 51: *uddeśa, lakṣaṇa, parīkṣā.* Here also we have first of all the simple enunciation, then, the definition, and finally the full discussion.

P. 5. l. 6. For *kāraka-hetu* and *vyañjaka-hetu* cfr. Laṅkāvatāra, p. 83. and supra.

P. 5. l. 17. This definition of dṛṣṭānta is analogous to that contained in Caraka: *dṛṣṭānto nāma sa yatra mūrkhaviduṣāṃ buddhisāmyam* and NS. I, i, 25 *laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṃ yasminn arthe buddhisāmyaṃ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ.*

P. 5. l. 18. For this example cfr. Laṅkāvatārasūtra, p. 68.

P. 6. l. 3. The explanation of siddhānta given here corresponds to that contained in CS.: *siddhānto nāma sa yaḥ parīkṣakair bahuvidhaṃ parīkṣya hetubhiḥ sādhayitvā sthāpyate.* The character 廣 which I have translated as *vistareṇa* may correspond to *bahuvidhaṃ* or to an intensive preposition *pra.* etc.

P. 6. l. 6. As regards the four kinds of *siddhānta*, the first two correspond respectively to *sarvatantrasiddhānta* and *paratantrasiddhānta.* of CS. and NS. The third example may also be considered as a variety of *adhikaraṇasiddhānta.* In fact if it is accepted that only whatever is perceived is existent one must also accept that whatever is not perceived is non-existent. As to the fourth I do not see any relation between this and *abhyupagamasiddhānta* either of CS. or of NS.

[1] In the text the following corrections should be made: p. 16 l. 13 for *bhavatopy* read: *bhavato 'py*; p. 19 l. 7 for *pūrvam anutkā* read: *pūvam anuktvā* p. 25. l. 5 for: *prakāśayitumiḥcchu* read: *'śayitum icchuḥ.*

P. 6. l. 11. The four pramāṇas are discussed below; I think, therefore, that this is a gloss intended to explain the criticism of the pramāṇas contained in the *ātmaparikṣā* expounded in the third variety of *siddhānta.*

P. 6. l. 17 flg. This passage contains a criticism against the existence of ātman based upon its impossibility to be known. The same arguments are attributed to the Lokāyatas, Cfr. ṢDSm. p. 139, Syādvādamañjarī ad VI, and my: Linee di una storia del materialismo Indiano, p. 293 fll. and 283 fll. cfr. Ts'ng-mu on MMK. Chp. XVIII.

P. 7. l. 16. The *padārthas* of the Vaiś. have been referred to before p. 4, p. 20 fll.

P. 7. l. 19. But in the Yoga system mahābhūtas are five in number; cfr. Vyāsa Com. ad. III, 44. The text gives 空 意 明 無 明. The identification of the other terms is doubtful; for ākāśa as a separate principle see Yogasūtras, III, 45. (*aṇimādi*), and Vyāsa thereon.

There is a similar list of the eight *aiśvaryas* in Mārkaṇḍeyapurāṇa p. 105 (Lucknow edition) Cp. MV. p. 63, 201:

> *aṇimā mahimā caiva laghimā prāptir eva ca* |
> *prākāmyam ca tatheśitvaṃ vaśitvaṃ ca tathāparam* ||
> *yatrakāmāvāsāyitvam.*

Instead of *kāyavibhāga* we could also translate *kāyavyūha.*

P. 7. l. 23. The Ch. has *anāśrava* 無 漏 but it corresponds, perhaps, to *nirjarā* (so also Ui).

P. 7. l. 24. The last three kinds of jñāna are doubtful. They are in Ch. *a*) 自 覺 智 *b*) 慧 | *c*) 義 | litt. (*a*) self-intelligence knowledge, (*b*) mind (*mati*, *buddhi*, etc.,) knowledge, (*c*) meaning know.

P. 8. l. 4. These two *pakṣas : sarvam ekam, sarvaṃ pṛthak* which have already been referred to in the paragraph dealing with *pratitantrasiddhānta* are also discussed and refuted as two of the five *ekāntavādas* in NS. *Sarvam ekam* corresponds to the Sāṇkhya NS. IV, i, 41 (NSB. 715, *sarvam ekaṃ sadaviśeṣāt*) *sarvaṃ pṛthak* is alluded to and refuted in NS. IV, i, 35-36.

In our text two kinds of *pṛthag-vāda* are alluded to; one

refers to the difference of the *avayavas* and the *avayavin* and the other to the difference of things on account of the difference of their *lakṣaṇas.*

P. 8. l. 16. If the thesis : '*sarvam ekam*' be true, then, since the series of buddhist *satyas* and tenets begins with *duḥkha*, everything must be *duḥkha*. If on the contrary *sarvaṃ pṛthak*; *duḥkha* would be separate and distinct from the rest, so that everything should be *sukha.*

P. 8. l. 19. For the various theories about *nirvāṇa* and its relation to *sukha*, etc. I must refer to L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Nirvāṇa*, and STCHERBATSKY, The conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa.

P. 9. l. 3. If it is accepted that nirvāṇa is *nitya* it is useless to ask whether it is different or not from *saṃskāras*, inasmuch as the characteristic of *saṃskāras* is non-eternity.

P. 9. l. 7. As to the theory of *upalabdhi* of the *pudgala* as *rūpa* cfr. the long discussion in Abhidharmakośa, chp. IX. Trad. L. DE LA VALLIE POUSSIN, IV, 229 ff. STCHERBATSKY. Soul Theory.

P. 9. l. 20. The Chinese has 何名聲物 which could also be translated *kiṃ nāma śabdaḥ dravyaṃ*. *Aniścaya* is doubtful : 若未分別 "if it has not yet been discriminated." Perhaps *avicārite* is better.

P. 9. l. 22. The Chinese reads : 我身與命 (the ego, body and life), where, I suppose, the three last characters are a gloss meant to explain that *ātman* is used in the sense of the body as well as in the sense of the soul, *jīva*.

P. 10. l. 5. That is according to our text there are two kinds of *viruddha*: (*a*) contrary to logic and (*b*) contrary to example. Cfr. infra, p. 17.

P. 11. l. 10. *Śabdaḥ saṃyogaja* VS. II, II, 31 PB. 355 NSB. 364.

P. 11. l. 11. *ākāśaguṇaḥ śabdaḥ* NSB. 392.

P. 11. l. 20. The Chinese has 又同異法 = also *sama + anya + dharma*; this could also be understood (cp. UI) as *sāmānya*, which has been rendered sometimes in Chinese by : 同異, on account of a wrong etymology of the word *sāmānya*; 法 is also used for 性 abstract termination, = tva

(tā). *Sāmānya* is eternal for the Vaiśeṣikas, but not for the Buddhists.

The Chinese characters for *vadet* are : 分 別 These are, as a rule, used in the sense of 'discrimination' which correspond to *vikalpa*, *bheda*, etc., but in this case it seems to be used for "to explain," "to expound."

P. 12. l. 1. We should expect here the discussion about the other varieties of *vākyapraśaṃsā* ; but we have instead *prāpta-kāla* which in the list of the eight *vādadharmas*, given in the beginning, ought to come after the *pramāṇas*.

P. 12. l. 2. Cfr the sūtra : *asti karma asti phalam*. cp Abhidharmakośa IX, 73, etc.

P. 12. l 6. The character 證 can also be translated as *anubhava* or *sākṣātkāra* or *pratīti*.

P. 12 l. 12. That is two kinds of *punarukta* are here referred to; *arthapunarukta* and *śádbapunarukta*. No mention is to be found of *arthāpattipunarukta*.

P. 12. l. 20. This refers to *anarthaka*.

P. 12. l. 23. This may be considered as an example of *apārthaka* (*paurvāparyāyoyād apratisambaddhārtham*. NS, V, II, 10). I cannot find its original nor do I dare to restore the *gāthā* in its metrical form. We know that *Tripuravināśī* is not Indra but Śiva.

P. 13. l. 9. I think that a sentence is missing here. The author perhaps wanted to indicate that even *āgama* is based on the previous perception of the *āptas*.

P. 13. l. 13. That is perception must be *abhrānta* (or *avyabhicārin*). This definition which was rejected by Dinnāga, but was defended by Dharmakīrti is already in YBŚ. and APB. For the example cf NSB. 33 *grīṣme marīcayo*, etc.

P. 13. l. 20. For these three varieties of *anumāna* v. Introduction.

P. 14. l. 6–7. Translation doubtful. The Ch. reads. 若見眞實者舊長宿諸佛菩薩從諸賢聖聽受經法能生見.

P. 14. l. 17. 因知 which I have translated before as pramāṇa.

P. 14. l. 25. This example of *vakchala* is referred to by all Nyāya-treatises, though nowhere I remember to have found the four cases expounded in our text.

P. 15. l. 13. This example according to NS. is not *vakchala* but *upacāra-chala* (perhaps the Ch. 隨言而生過 must be translated only as *chala*).

The example of NS I, ii, 14 is *mañcāḥ krośanti* (cfr. II, ii, 60). Upacārachala is unknown also to CS.

P. 15. l. 21 fll. Refutation of *satkāryavāda* based upon the *sāmānyachala*: *sadbhāva*.

P. 16. l. 3. We must compare this passage with the others to be found in the III ch. (p. 14) It is evident that for the author *saṃśayasama* is similar to the *anaikāntika*, since he insists upon the fact that a *hetu* is valid when no doubt is possible as regards its absolute relation with the thing to be proved.

P. 16. l. 6 ff. There are therefore two examples of *atīta-kala*. The second of them corresponds to its interpretation as *aprāpatakāla* referred to and criticised by Vātsyāyana 188 *avayavaviparyāsavacanam*.

P. 16. l. 14. For this example of *prakaraṇasama* cfr. CS.: *anyaḥ śarīrād ātmā nityaḥ*.

P. 16. l. 21. The *varṇyasama* contained here finds its analogue in CS. *asparśatvād buddhir anityā śabdavat*. For the author of our text *ākāśa* must be *abhāva* and therefore it cannot be either *nitya* or *anitya*, so that both the things are to be proved.

P. 17. l. 3. That is perceptibilty by senses is not a sufficient reason to infer non-eternity; in fact the sixth *vijñāna* may have as its objects notions which do not correspond to existent things such as *kūrmaroman*, etc.: its *gocara* are mental dharmas, and therefore it differs form the other five *vijñānas* which are related to the experience of the senses.

P. 18. l. 5. According to *Tattvasiddhiśāstra* the *mahābhūtas* are only *prajñapti*, since they are nothing else than mere assumptions based upon the five *mahābhautikas* which are believed to be their manifestation.

P. 18. l. 9. cfr. NS. III, 1, 27, *pārthivaṃ śarīram*.

P. 18. l. 11. When one of the opponents holds a view that is evidently wrong, there is no reason for further discussion.

P. 19. l. 4. This implies that all *nigrahasthānas* are supposed to be divided into three fundamental groups according as they refer to the *vākya* (*sthāpanā, pratijñā*), the *hetu* and the *dṛṣṭānta* wrongly formulated. (Cfr. above p. 10, 11 the same classification as regards *adhika* and *nyūna*.)

P. 19. l. 6. This is therefore an example of *aprāptakāla*, since there is no order in the enunciation of the arguments. It is impossible to understand how *saṃjñā* can destroy *saṃyojanas* if it is not stated before that knowledge develops from *saṃjñā*; shall we translate 智 as 識 *vijñāna*?

P. 19. l. 9. In fact *aprāptakāla* has been referred to above in the discussion of *kālātīta*.

P. 19. l. 11. CS. has *anuyojyasyānanuyoga* NS. V, ii, 21 has *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*.

P. 19. l. 11. *Prativaktavye 'prativaktavyatā* is *apratibhā* NS. V, ii, 18: *uttarasyāpratipattir apratibhā*.

P. 19. l. 12. NS. V, ii, 9.

P. 19. l. 13. NS. V, ii, 17.

P. 19. l. 14. This corresponds better to NS. V, II 21 *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇam*, so that this is either a repetition of the first or there must have been some difference between the *anuyojyasyānanuyoga* of CS. and the *paryanuyojyopeksaṇa* of NS.

P. 19. l. 17. *Ananuyojyasyānuyoga* CS.; *niranuyojyānuyoga* NS. V, ii 22.

P. 19. l. 19. *Ananubhāṣaṇa* NS. V, ii 16.

P. 19. l. 23. I cannot find elsewhere any theory which may be compared with this.

P. 20. l. 11. This *nigrahasthāna* corresponds to *vikṣepa*; NS V, II, 19.

P. 20. L. 14. This refers to the *vākyadoṣas* enunciated before p. 10.

P. 20. l. 17. This treatment of *nigrahasthānas* concerned with *pratijñā* shows signs of confusion and it seems that the Chinese translators were not quite sure in their renderings of the technical terms. We have here four different enunciations of the mistake of *pratijñā*.

The first time we have: 捨本宗; the second: 違本宗; the third: as the first; the fourth; as the second. The character 捨 corresponds to: to let go, to part with *viz. tyāga, saṃnyāsa*. The character 違 corresponds usually to *viruddha, apa°*.

Though there is evident contradiction between *pratijñāvirodha* and *pratijñāsaṃnyāsa*, one at the beginning and the other at the end of the first example, my translation follows necessarily the original. Prof. Ui supposes that the first is an example of *pratijñāhāni*, but, as the text now stands, I cannot see how the characteristic of *pratijñāhāni*, viz., *pratidṛṣṭāntadharmābhyanujñā svadṛṣṭānte*, (NS. V, II. 2) is present in our example. The second example corresponds in fact to *pratijñāntara*: *pratijñātārthapratiṣedhe dharmavikalpāt tadarthanirdeśaḥ pratijñāntaram* (NS. V, II, 3).

P. 21. l. 11. I prefer to read 何 for 可: if one wants to maintain this character, the translation should run thus: *kiṃ ca tad eva yuktisaham.*

P. 22. l. 2. There are many synonims in the buddhist texts for ātman; they are: *pudgala, poṣa, jīva, sattva, puruṣa*, etc.

P. 22. l. 6 ff. That is, *arhatphala* is given here as a *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*. While *ātman* is always existent, *arhatphala* is sometimes existent and sometimes non-existent; the example of the *dvitīyo murdhā* is another *vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*; so also that of the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*. The reply is that *arhatphala* is existent but non-perceived, since it is not *abhivyakta*, manifested, as subterranean water. The opponent objects again that this is not the case, since subterranean water is not perceived on account of the *āvaraṇa*, obstruction; but as regards *arhatphala* such an obstruction is not perceived *āvaraṇānupalabdhi*. But this answer also is not correct, since there are things such as *parimāṇa*, quantity, which though unperceived, are still existent.

P. 22. l. 20. The second head is non-existent, but the first head which makes its assumption possible is really existent (Cfr. Laṅkāvatāra as regards the *śaśasṛṅga*, pp. 51 ff.)

P. 24. l. 15. We have already seen, that *saṃśaya* is for the author = to inconclusive.

P. 24. l. 18. This is an example of *matānujñā* NS. V, ii 20.

P. 25. l. 5. In this passage an example of the *ṣaṭpakṣī kathā* is given, which is referred to at length in NS. V, i. 41 ff. and NB. thereon. There is accordance between the two texts.

P. 25. l. 9. In fact if the pūrvapakṣin wants to speak again he cannot help repeating what he has already stated, *punarukta*.

P. 26. l. 1. This section corresponds to the list of the jātis. These are here twenty, and not 22 as in NS., because the *sādharmya* and *vaidharmya* are separately enunciated in the beginning, on account of their being the fundamental principles upon which all jātis are based.

P. 26. l. 19. So the text; but the emendation proposed by Ui: 瓶 instead of 色 rūpa must be accepted: read therefore: *ghaṭasya*.

P. 27. l. 3. For references to the various jātis in *nyāya*-literature see notes on TŚ. Chapter II.

P. 27. l. 3 ff. nn. 3, 4, 5, 6 cannot be easily identified with any of the jātis contained in TŚ. or in NS.; for n. 6 Prof Ui proposes *sādhyasama*.

P. 27. l. 23. For *bhedābheda* Ch. has: 同 異: *similar-different* which sometimes corresponds to *sāmānya*. It may be compared with *vikalpasama* of NS. and *vikalpakhaṇḍana* of TŚ.

P. 29. l. 2. I have translated *kālasama* in order to follow the Chinese; but it is evident that this *jāti* corresponds to the *ahetusama* of TŚ. and NS.

P. 29. l. 10. This is in fact *pratijñāvirodha* and such a thesis was considered by Diṅnāga in NM. as *viruddhapakṣābhāsa*.

P. 29. l. 10. *Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam.*

P. 29. l. 22. This *jāti* corresponds to *anupalabdhisama* of TŚ. and NS.

P. 30. l. 18. Translation wrong. Read: *Yadi* [*atmā*] *sann eva na tadā . . . . . .* ; *yadi cāsann eva tadā.*

Cp. the *ṣaṭpakṣī* referred to above.

NOTES ON VV.[1]

P. 2. l. 8. The sentence "what is the meaning ... stanza" is not in Tib. and it is added by the Ch. translators. It always introduces the *vṛtti*.

P. 3. l. 16. The Tibetan has here: "just as the sprout is without essence, and because it is without essence, it is void, so also dharmas are void, since they are without essence." Here ends the *pūrvapakṣa* viz. the mādhyamika theory that the supposed opponent intends to refute.

P. 2. l. 25. "If words are non-existent......must be void.," is absent in Tib.

P. 2. l. 30. This criticism against the *svabhāva* of words is to be found in many Mahāyāna books. A detailed one is *e.g.* in the 佛 性 論 Buddhagotraśāstra attributed to Vasubandhu, ch. I., where it is stated that the *śūnya* of words depends upon the fact that they are the outcome of many *hetus* and *pratyayas*. These are eight: (1) 覺 *buddhi* (2) 觀 examen (3) 功 用 *prayatna* (4) 風 氣 *mārut* (5) 八 處 *aṣṭau sthānāni* (6) 音 聲, *svara* (7) 名 字 *akṣara* (8) 開 閉 *uccaraṇa*.

Our text enumerates only the eight places, that is the eight organs, *viz.*

咽 *uras*	齒 *danta*
喉 *kaṇṭha*	齗 *tālu*
脣 *oṣṭha*	鼻 *nasikā*
舌 根 *jihvāmūla*	頂 *śiras*

咽 is really: *esophagus*. The *Buddhagotraśāstra* (Taishō Ed. Vol. 31. p. 79) has: 臍 胸 "chest." Our text reads: 舌

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[1] In the Tib. text the following corrections are necessary: P. 11. l. 22 for: *gtaṅ. snoms.* read: *btaṅ. snoms.*; *ibid.* l. 29 for: *gñer pa.* read: *gñer, ba.* P. 13. l. 1 for: *sbyaṅs. pa.* read: *spyaṅs. pa.*; *ibid.* l. 6 for: *'legs. par. daṅ. pa.* read: *'dad. pa.* P. 13. l. 7 for: *gnam. pa.* read *gnam. po.* P. 65. l. 1 for *de. ni.* read: *de. na.*

齒根 tongue root of the teeth: but following *Buddhagotra* it is better to transpose the character 根 (The Tib. reads: *soi. brun,* an expression which is not registered in the dictionaries at my disposal.) It is evident that this passage refers to the theory expounded in grammatical work, such as the Pāṇini Śikṣā and adopted by the Tantras.

Kārikā 2. p. 5. Com. Tib.:" If you suppose that the assumption of such a mistake is illogical and you think that your words possess an essence and therefore are non-void, so that they can refute the essence of all dharmas, then, your previous thesis that "all dharmas are void" is annulled (in so far as a part of the dharmas *viz.*, words are non-void.) Moreover (this argument is wrong since) your words are included in the totality of things. What for? Inasmuch as words are not void like dharmas which are void, your words by which the essence of all dharmas is refuted, are not void. If you say such a thing you fall into a sixfold difficulty. Which are (these six difficulties)? (1) If you say that "all" dharmas are void, then, your words also must be void, since they are included in the totality of things. But, if they are void, they cannot refute. Therefore your refutation (which consists in arguing that) all dharmas are void is not valid. (2) [If you reply] that such a statement is not valid, [and that your refutation holds good], then, on account of your refutation: "all dharmas are void," your words also must be void. Inasmuch as they are void, no refutation is possible by them. (3) If [on the other hand] all dharmas are void, what could be refuted [by words?] (4) If you object that your words are not void, then, your words would not be included in the totality of things, so that you commit that logical mistake called the contradictory example. (5) If, [in order to avoid this objection you say] that your words are included in the totality of things, then, since all dharmas are void, these [words] also must be void; so no refutation can be made by them. (6) If, in spite of the fact that they are void, those (words) can refute dharmas, stating [that they are] void, then, all dharmas would be void and would also be capable of developing a function. But this is an

undesirable [implication.] If you think that it is out of place to state that there is the logical error consisting in the contradictory example and that no dharma, being void, can develop any function, then, your word, being also void, cannot refute the essence of the all dharmas....." Basing myself on the Tib. I have added the word: "*not*" in the sentence; "the void of dharmas can *not* become a cause" (pag. 6, l. 26), though the negation is not in Chinese.

Kārikā 4. Commentary. The Chinese is not clear in its rendering. Tib.: "according to you the refutation of the refutation made in such way is improper; as regards this point, you think that those words which refute the word refuting the essence of the dharmas are not valid. But if you say such a thing, this also is not valid...."

That is: "you cannot say that a refutation cannot refute your refutation, because if you think that my objection is void and cannot refute your thesis, the same would be the case with your argument."

Kārikā 5. Tib. "Now it is possible to refute dharmas in so far as they are perceived by direct perception; [but] this perception by which dharmas are perceived does not exist."

In Tib. no mention is to be found of *anumāna*, etc. Instead of the sentence: "if you suppose....to refute (p. 10 l. 9–15)", Tib. has: "that by means of which things are perceived is also void; therefore there is no perception by a *pramāṇa*. Since refutation of what is not perceived is not admissible, then, it is wrong to state that all dharmas are void."

The Mādhyamika is supposed to reply that even if it is granted that dharmas cannot be proved by *pratyakṣa*, since this is non existent, there are other *pramāṇas*, which can prove them *viz.*, *anumāna*, *upamāna* and *āgama*. The reply will be that these three pramāṇas are dependent upon *pratyakṣa* and since this is non-existent, these three also must be non-existent.

Kārikā 6. Tib. "Inference, authority and analogy, the *probandum* of inference and authority and the object to be proved by analogy, have been answered by the argument concerning direct perception, (contained in the previous stanza)."

Com. "Inference, analogy and authority have been

answered by the argument concerning that *pramāṇa* (called) direct perception; *viz.*, this *pramāṇa* of direct perception is void, since all dharmas are void."

"So also inference, analogy and authority must be void, since all dharmas are void. The [objects] also to be proved by inference, analogy and authority must be void, since all dharmas are void. And the perception of all dharmas due to inference, analogy and authority is also void. Therefore dharmas are not perceived. Since the refutation of a non-perceived essence is illogical, the statement that all dharmas are void is wrong."

Kārikā 7. The text is improperly rendered by the Chinese translators. Many of the technical terms that were in the original have been rendered by unusual or erroneous equivalents. Moreover, the list of the dharmas is incomplete in the Chinese which gives 106 items as well as in the Tibetan which has 115 items instead of 119. Moreover, some items have been repeated in Chin. as well as in Tib., or the same word has been used for different expressions. This will clearly be seen in the following table.

	Tib.	Scr.	Ch.
1.	rnam. par. šes. pa.	vijñāna	*deest.*
2.	ts'or. ba.	vedanā.	১ 受 as Tib.
3.	ạdu. šes.	saṃjñā.	২ 想 as Tib.
4.	sems. dpa' but I think it must be *sems. pa.*	cetana.	৩ 覺 as Tib., (?) but it corresponds usually to: mati buddhi; also to bodhi.[1]
5.	reg. pa.	sparśa.	৪ 觸 as Tib.
6.	yid. pa. la. byed. pa.	manaskāra.	৫ 觀 察 as Tib? But it corresponds usually to parīkṣā.
7.	ạdun. pa.	chanda.	৬ 欲 as Tib.
8.	mos. pa.	adhimukti.	৭ 信 解 脫 as Tib.

[1] cp. *Démieville*, Milindapañha, 143 and 176 *vijñāna*.

[2] The nn. 2-11 correspond to the 10 *mahābhūmika-dharma* of the Sarvastivāda and Yogācāra; but instead of *mati*, there is *vīrya* (cp. n. ১১).

	Tib.	Scr.	Ch.
9.	brtson. ạgrus	vīrya.	८ 精進 as Tib.
10.	dran. pa.	smṛti.	९ 憶念 as Tib.
11.	tiñ. ṅe. ạdsin.	samādhi.	१० 三摩提 as Tib.
12.	šes. rab.	prajñā.	११ 慧 as Tib.; but also: mati.
13.	btaṅ. sñoms.	upekṣā.	१२ 捨 as Tib.
14.	sbyor. ba.	yoga.	१३ 修 as Tib.
15.	yaṅ. dag. par. byor. ba.	saṃyoga.	१४ 合修 as Tib.
16.	t'ob. pa.	prāpṭi.	१५ 習 often = abhyāsa, bhāvanā vasanā.
17.	lhag pai. bsam. pa.	adhyāśaya.	१६ 得 = lābha, prāpti, as Tib. 16.
18.	k'on. k'ro. ba. med. pa.	apratigha.	१७ 成 = siddhi, sādhana, vidhi (cp. Tib. 65) abhinirhāra.
19.	dga'. ba.	prīti.	१८ 辯才 = pratibhāna.
20.	ạbad. pa.	prayatna.	१९ 適 = Tib. 19 ?
21.	rtsol. ba.	vyāyāma.	२० 勤 as Tib.
22.	rmoṅs. ạbrel.	*amoha (but cp. 33).	
23.	spros. pa (=spro ba ?).	autsukya.	२१ 思 = citta. cetanā.
24.	gnod. pa. med.	avighāta, anapakāra.	२२ 求 *autsukya.
25.	ạbaṅ. daṅ. ldan.	vaśitā.	२३ 勢力 it corresponds usually to *vīrya*.
26.	k'oṅ. k'ro.	pratigha.	२४ 不嫉 anīrṣyā.
27.	yid. la. gcags pa. med. pa.	*avipraṭisāra.	२५ 自在 vas'itā.
28.	ạdsin. pa.	grāha.	२६ 善辯才 = *su-, samyak-, sat,-pratibhāna.
29.	mi. ạdsin. pa.	agrāha.	२७ 不悔 avipratisāra.
30.	dran. pa.	smṛti.	२८ 悔 vipratisāra.
31.	brtan. pa.	sthira.	२९ 少欲 alpeccha
32.	lhag. par. žen. pa.	adhyavasita.	३० 不少欲 *an-alpeccha.

	Tib.	Scr.	Ch.
33.	rmoṅs. pa. med. pa.	amoha.	༣༡ 捨 *upekṣā* but see supra n. [illegible].
34.	mi. rtsol. ba.	avyāyāma.	༣༢ 不 思 cfr. n. ༢༡.
35.	spro. ba. med. pa.	anautsukya.	༣༣ 不 求 *anautsukya
36.	don. du. gñer. ba.	arthika arthin.	༣༤ 不 願 apraṇidhi.
37.	smon. lam.	praṇidhi.	༣༥ 樂 說 priyabhāṣā.
38.	rgyags. pa.	mada.	༣༦ 著 境 界 as Tib. 39.
39.	yul. daṅ. mi. ldan. pa.	aviṣayin. nirviṣaya.	༣༧ 不 行 as Tib. 40 ?
40.	ṅes. par. ạbyin. pa. ma. yin. pa.	anairyāṇika.	༣༨ 生 as Tib. 41. ༣༩ 住 as Tib. 42.
41.	skye. ba.	jāti, utpatti.	༤༠ 滅 as Tib. 43.
42.	gnas. pa.	sthiti.	༤༡ 集 samudaya.
43.	mi. rtag. pa.	anitya.	༤༢ 老 jarā.
44.	dga'. ba. daṅ. ldan. pa.	saprīti.	༤༣ 熱 惱 *kleśa*.
45.	yoṅs. su. gduṅ. ba.	paritāpa.	༤༤ 悶 as Tib. 45.
46.	mi. dga'. ba.	aprīti.	༤༥ 疑 vicikitsā Tib. 76.
47.	rtog. pa.	vitarka.	༤༦ 思 量 as Tib. 47.
48.	sdug. pa.	iṣṭa.	༤༧ 愛 it may correspond to: *tṛṣṇā, upādāna* or as Tib. 48.
49.	daṅ. ba.	prasāda.	༤༨ 信 as Tib. 49.
50.	ạdod. pa mi. mt'un. pa.[1]	*a*) kāma, icchā + *b*) pratiloma, pratikūla.	༤༩ 樂 sāta=Tib. 50*a*. ?
51.	mt'un. par. ạd sin. pa.	saṅgraha.	༥༠ 不 順 as Tib. 50*b*.

[1] But it is quite possible that the conjunction *daṅ* is dropped between *ạdod* and *mi. mt'un. pa.* which then would represent two different items; this seems to be proved by the Ch. which has in fact two numbers ༥༠ and ༥༡.

	Tib.	Scr.	Ch.
52.	rjes. su. mi. mt'un. par. gzuṅ. ba.	*asamanugraha.	༥༡ 順取 as Tib. 51.
53.	mi. ạjigs. pa.	viśārada.	༥༢ 不畏大衆 as Tib. 53.
54.	že. sa.	gaurava.	༥༣ 恭敬 as Tib. 54.
55.	ri. mor. byed. pa.	mānanā.	༥༤ 作勝法 as Tib. 55.
56.	dad. pa.	bhakti. śraddhā.	༥༥ 敬 as Tib. 56.
57.	ma. dad. pa.	abhakti aśraddhā, aśraddhya.	༥༦ 不敬 as Tib. 57.
58.	bsgo. ba. bžin. byed. pa.	anuvidhāna.	༥༧ 共給 as Tib. 59.
59.	gus. pa.	ādara.	༥༨ 不共給 as Tib. 60.
60.	ma. gus. pa.	anādara.	༥༩ 定順 *as Tib. 58.
61.	rgol. ba. (perhaps to correct: rtsol: ba. vyavasāya).	vāda.	༦༠ 宿 usually it corresponds to pūrvanivāsa (-anusmaraṇa).
62.	šin. tu. spyaṅs. pa.	praśrabdhi.	༦༡ 發動 * vyavasāya.
63.	ṅag.	vākya.	༦༢ 不變 *asāta.
64.	mgul. pa.	kantha.	༦༣ 覆 mrakṣa.
65.	grub. pa.	siddhi, vidhi.	༦༤ 不定 *aniyama.
66.	ma. dad. pa.	aśraddhā.	༦༥ 愁惱 pradāsa.
67.	šin·tu. ma. spyaṅs. pa.	apraśrabdhi.	༦༦ 求不得 aprāpti ?
68.	rnam. par. byed. pa.	vikāra.	༦༧ 荒亂 dauṣṭulya or vikṣepa.
69.	brtan. pa.	dhīra [tā].	༦༨ 懈怠 kausīdya.
70.	ṅes. pa.	niścaya, niyama.	༦༩ 憂憒 as Tib. 72.
71.	yid. la. gcags. pa.	vipratisāra.	༧༠ 希淨 search after purity.

	Tib.	Scr.		Ch.
72.	mya. ṅan.	śoka.	༧༡	內信 inner-faith. as Tib. 78.
73.	ạk'rug. pa.	krodha.	༧༢	畏 bhīrutā, santrāsa.
74.	rgyags. pa.	mada.	༧༣	信 śraddhā.
75.	mi. mt'un. par. ạdsin pa.	*asaṃgraha.	༧༤	慚 hrī.
76.	t'e. ts'om.	vicikitsā.	༧༥	質直 ṛju
77.	sdom. pa. yoṅs-su. dpag. pa.	*saṃvara. parimāna.	༧༦	不誑 a-śāṭ
78.	naṅ. legs. par. dad. pa.	one who has faith within himself.	༧༧	寂靜 as Tib. 84.
79.	ạjigs. pai. p'yogs. gcig.	a) bhaya. b) ekadeśa.	༧༨	不驚 *anudvega.
80.	dad. pa.	śraddhā.	༧༩	不錯 as Tib. 86.
81.	ṅo.ts'a.šes. pa.	hrī.	༨༠	柔軟 praśrabdhi.
82.	gnam. po.	ārjava.	༨༡	開解 open-understanding.
83.	mi. ạdrid. pa.	no deception.	༨༢	嫌 suspicion.
84.	ñe. bar. ži. ba.	upaśama.	༨༣	燒 tāpa. ?
85.	rags. bag. ma. yin. pa.	nimittapramāda.	༨༤	惺 tranquil.
86.	bag. yod. pa.	apramāda.	༨༥	不貪 alobha (Tib. 92).
87.	byams. par. lta. ba.	maitrīdṛṣṭi.	༨༦	不瞋 adveṣa (Tib. 93).
88	so. sor. brtags. pa.	pratyavekṣā. pratisaṅkhyā	༨༧	不癡 amoha (Tib. 94).
89.	yid. byuṅ. ba.	udvignamāṇasa.	༨༨	不一切知 asarvajñatā (perhaps the negation wrongly here; Cfr. Tib. 95, 96).
90.	yoṅs. su. gduṅ. ba. med. pa.	aparitāpa.	༨༩	放捨 parityāya, tyāga.
91.	rgyags. pa. med. pa.	amada.	༩༠	不有 as Tib. 97.

	Tib	Scr.	Ch.
92.	c'ags. pa. med. pa.	alobha.	༩༡ 愧 as Tib. 99.
93	že. sdaṅ. med. pa.	adveṣa	༩༢ 不自隱惡 as Tib. 99.
94.	gti. mug. med. pa.	amoha.	༩༣ 悲 as Tib. 100.
95.	t'ams. cad. šes. pa. ñid.	sarvajñatā.	༩༤ 喜 muditā,
96.	mi. gtoṅ. ba.	atyāga.	༩༥ 捨 upekṣā.
97.	ạbyor-pa.	vibhava.	༩༦ 神通 abhijña, prabhava as Tib. 105.
98.	k'rel-yod. pa.	apatrāpya.	༩༧ 不執 agraha.
99.	mi-ạc'ab. pa.	amrakṣa.	༩༨ 不妬 anirṣya, as Tib 118.
100.	sñiṅ. rje.	karuṇā.	༩༩ 心淨 *citta paryavadana.
101.	sems. pa. mi. gtoṅ. ba.	*cittavikṣepa.	༡༠༠ 忍辱 kṣānti.
102.	byams. pa.	maitrī.	༡༠༡ 利益 labha
103.	žum. pa. med. pa	anavalīna, aviṣāda.	༡༠༢ 能用 ābhoga ?
104.	dgra. bral. ba.	araṇā.	༡༠༣ 福德 puṇya.
105.	rdsu. ạp'rul.	ṛddhi.	༡༠༤ 無想定 asamjña-samāpatti.
106.	k'on. du. mi. ạdsin. pa.	anupanāha.	༡༠༥ 不一切知 cf. n. ༨༨.
107.	p'rag. dog. med. pa.	an-īrṣyā.	༡༠༦ 無常三昧 anitya-samādhi.
108.	sems. yoṅs. su. gtugs. pa. med. pa.	cittāparyādāna.	
109.	bzod. pa.	kṣānti.	
110.	rnam. par. spoṅ. ba.	virati.	
111.	ṅes. pa. ma. yin. pa.	aniyama, aniścaya.	

Tib.	Scr.	Ch.
112. yoṅs. su. loṅs. spyod. pai. rjes. su. mt'un. pa.	paribhogānu-rūpa.	
113. bsod. nams.	kuśala.	
114. adu. šes. pa] ñid.	saṃjñatā.	
115. ạdus. ma. byas.	asaṃskṛta.	

P. 14. l. 15. "The undefined dharmas and the undefined dharmas in their own nature" 無記本性無記 correspond to Tib.: *bsgribs. la. luṅ.du. ma. bstan. pa.* and to: *ma. bsgribs. la. luṅ. du. ma. bstan. pa.* viz. to *nivṛta-avyākṛta* and to *anivṛta-avyākṛta*, the undefined dharmas that are covered (*kliṣṭa*, infect, bad) or non-covered. Cfr. STCHERBATSKY, *Central Conception of Buddhism* p. 102. *Abhidharmakośa*, translated by L. De La Valleé Poussin, I, p. 315 ff. II, 31, ff. etc.

Kārikā 8. The *nairyāṇika* and *anairyāṇika dharmas* are those conductive or non-conductive to *mokṣa*.

The *bodhipakṣas* are 37; the *bodhyaṅgas* or *saṃbodhyaṅgas*, seven in number, are included in the *bodhipakṣas*. See KERN, *Manual* pp. 66–67.

The Ch. uses the same character for *pakṣa* as well as for *aṅga*: 分.

Kārikā 9. Com. Tib.: Suppose that you state: "Since all dharmas have no essence, in them there is also no essence." Then, when we say that in them there is no essence, these words (litt. this name) also are similarly non-existent. Why? Because no name exists without a support (represented by the object to be specified.) Therefore, since words (litt. name) exist, all things must have an essence. Since essence exists, all dharmas are not void, so that when you state that all dharmas have no essence, and on account of this fact are void, such a statement is wrong.

Kārikā 10. Tib. "Now if such an essence exists, but it does not reside in the dharma, this would be a logical assumption for the man who thinks that there is an essence, [though] non-existent in the dharmas."

Com. "Suppose that you think: "it is not logical to maintain that a name exists without the object that it specifies," and that you maintain: "an essence exists, but it is impossible that this resides in dharmas. So, since there is no essence in dharmas, their voidness is proved, but at the same time names are not without their fundament (*viz.* the object that they specify)." If you think so, we reply that if it is so, it would be logical to state that this essence is something real and existing separately from dharmas. Since this has not been stated, then, to imagine that the essence exists, but that it is not in the dharmas is a mistake.

Kārikā 11. In Chinese we have two stanzas instead of a single one.

Tib. "Inasmuch as we see that refutation [is possible only if something is existent] as when someone says: 'this pot is not in the house,' this refutation of yours must be (a refutation) of some essence [really] existent."

The last sentence (pag. 17 l. 27) is in Tib: "Inasmuch as refutation is existent, the essence of dharmas is proved." (*Viz.* you cannot say that *all* dharmas are void, since refutation at least is existent.)"

Kārikā 14. Com.: Instead of: "if there is a man;" Tib. better has: *sattvānām*.

Kārikā 15. It is evident, in fact, that refutation presupposes a perception to be refuted.

Kārikā 17 and 18. Cfr. TŚ. p. 31 where the same arguments are given.

Kārikā 20. For this argument containing an example of the *traikālyaparīkṣā* cfr. above TŚ. p. 3 UH. p. 28.

Kārikā 21. I have followed, in my translation of *a* and *b*, the Tib. The Chinese has no negation, unless we should give a negative value to 離 that, in fact, I have found, in some logical works, in the sense of *tiraskṛtya*, *abhāva*.

Kārikā 22. Litt.: for every man for whom there is the *pratītyasam°*, that *pratītyasamutpanna* is non-existent.

Kārikā 23. Com. p. 30. l. 18. For this sixfold refutation see pag. 6. Com. on Kārikā 2.

Kārikā 24. The mistake alluded to, as we deduce from the Tib. is the *vaiṣamyadoṣa*.

Kārikā 26. This is a stanza in Tib. "If it were possible to refute non-essence by non-essence, then, on account of the refutation of the non-essence, the essence would be proved."

Kārikā 27. Com. p. 34. l. 15. Text not clear and translation doubtful. "Tib. "The auditors of the Tathāgatas [in the case] of a magical appearance created by their magical powers refute the wrong perception of the one by the others. So also my word void and similar to a magic creation refutes the wrong perception of the dharmas devoid of any essence and similar to a woman created by magic.

Kārikā 28. Com. p. 36, l. 3. Tib.: "Moreover it is not possible to understand that dharmas are void without accepting, *i.e.* without depending on the conventional truth (*vyavahārasatya*). It is not possible to teach it without accepting this conventional truth."

The stanza quoted in the commentary is wrongly attributed by the Chinese translators to the Buddha. It is in fact the stanza 10 of Chapter XXIV of MMK., quoted very often in the Mahāyāna literature; cfr. Bodhicaryāvatāra p. 365.

Kārikā 29. It is in fact known that the mādhyamika has no *pratijñā*, thesis, to demonstrate, but his discussion is only meant to show the logical contradiction and antinomy of all notions. Hence the *prasaṅga* method. This stanza is quoted by Candrakīrti in his Com. on MMK. p. 16.

Yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eva me bhaved doṣaḥ
nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ.

Here begins a long discussion which represents, so to say the bulk of the treatise and contains the criticism of the *pramāṇas*. The arguments expounded here can briefly be summarized thus: If a *pramāṇa* proves things, this means that it is demonstrated by other *pramāṇas*, since whatever is not demonstrated cannot prove. But if it be so, there is *regressus in infinitum*, since each pramāṇà necessitates another pramāṇa which may prove it and so on. (kk. 31, 32). If you say that the *prameya* only needs a *pramāṇa* in order to be proved, but that the *pramāṇa* itself does not require another *pramāṇa* in order to be proved, then, there is the *vaiṣamyadoṣa*, since

certain things would necessitate a *pramāṇa*, and others could be proved without a *pramāṇa*. (33). If you say that a *pramāṇa* is *svataḥsiddha*, self-proved, as fire, which being self-illuminating can also illuminate other things (34), we cannot accept this thesis. Why? Fire is not self illuminating, because illumination presupposes darkness, so that either you must admit that fire contains darkness in itself or that it does not contain darkness; in the first instance there would be contradiction, in the second, since no illumination is possible without darkness, it is absurd to state that it is self-illuminating. (35) Moreover, if fire illuminates itself, as well as other things, then, how is it that though fire burns other things, it does not burn itself? (36) Moreover, if fire illuminates itself, as well as other things, you are compelled to admit that darkness also covers itself as well as other things (37). Again illumination pre-supposes the destruction of darkness, but in fire as well as in places, where there is fire, there is no darkness; so nothing can be destroyed by fire and it is impossible to state therefore that fire illuminates itself as well as other things (38). Nor is it possible to maintain that in the very moment in which fire is produced it can illuminate, because in that very moment of its being produced it cannot be co-existent with darkness (39). If you suppose that fire can destroy darkness, without being co-existent with darkness, then, the fire of one place could destroy the darkness of all places, since contact of fire and darkness would not represent the necessary cause of illumination (40).

If a pramāṇa is self-proved, it cannot have relation with the *prameya*, if it has relation with the *prameya* it is not self-proved (41). If a *pramāṇa* has no relation with the *prameya* it would be useless to employ a *pramāṇa* for discriminating the *prameya* (42). If a *pramāṇa* on the other hand has some relation with the *prameya*, the *probandum* would in fact be the proof as it is impossible to be related with the non-existent (43). If *pramāṇas* are proved in so far as they are related to the *prameya*, then, the *prameya* would be proved independently of the pramāṇa (44). If the *prameya* is proved without any relation to the *pramāṇa*, it is useless to have recourse to the *pramāṇa* in order to prove the *prameya* (45). If you insist on saying that *pramāṇas* are proved in so far as they have some

relation with the *prameya*, then, the *prameya* is in fact the proof and the *pramāṇa* becomes the *prameya* (46). If you say that both the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* are proved in relation to each other, then, the proof, being itself unproved, cannot prove the objects to be proved. So that everything would be unproved (47, 48). Moreover, it would be impossible to distinguish between the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya*, just as it is impossible to distinguish between the notions of fatherhood and sonship, since each of them is possible only in so far as the other exists, but not because it possesses a reality of its own. (49, 50). (Cp. same discussion in Buddhagotraśastra, Cp. I.)

There is no doubt that this refutation of *pramāṇas* was known to the compilers of NS. and to Vātsyāyana. The *traikālyāsiddhi* (NS. II, i, 8) is not fully explained in our text, but it is clearly enunciated in k. 20 and kk. 70–71. while it has a prominent part in the refutation of the various categories all throughout MMK. Moreover it is implicated in the discussion of the reciprocal dependence of the *pramāṇa* and the *prameya* (cfr. kk. 43, 45). The objection of the *pūrvapakṣa* k. 20 is in fact the same as that of NS. *traikālyāsiddheḥ pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ* (II, i, 12). The reply of Nāgārjuna that this refutation is erroneous since it implies the *abhyupagama* on the part of the opponent of the *traikālyaparīksā* (comm. on k. 70, end) is alluded to by NV. 189. The other objection by Nāgārjuna *viz.*, that concerning the *anavasthā* that follows, if we are to admit that a pramāṇa needs another pramāṇa in order to be proved, is (31-32) also referred to and refuted by NS. (II, i, 17). So also the argument expounded in k. 45 is refuted by NS. II, i, 18.; again the theory expounded by the *pūrvapakṣa* 14, viz., that if there is no *pramāṇa* the *pratiṣedha* is also impossible, is the same at that of NS. II, 1, 13. *sarvapramāṇapratiṣedhāc ca pratiṣedhānupapatti.*

The reply of NS. to the objection of Nāgārjuna *viz.*, that one *pramāṇa* cannot be the object of another pramāṇa; "*na, pradīpaprakāṣasiddhivat tatsiddheḥ* (II, i, 19)" is interpreted by Vātsyāyana in the following manner: "as light is a means of perceiving objects, but can at the same time be perceived by the eyes, so the *pramāṇa* is at the same time means and object of perception." But the example of the opponent, as quoted by

Nāgārjuna, is interpreted is another way *viz.*, just as fire is self-illuminating and does not need another *pramāṇa* in order to be illuminating, so also a *pramāṇa* being self-proved does not require another *pramāṇa* in order to be proved. Now this interpretation as given by the *Ācāryadeśīya* (NVTT. 371) is in fact alluded to and refuted by Vātsyāyana p. 247 "*kecit tu dṛṣṭāntam aparigṛhītam hetunā viśeṣahetum antareṇa sādhyasādhanāyopāpadate, 'yathā pradīpaprakāśaḥ pradīpāntaraprakāśam antareṇa gṛhyate, tathā pramāṇāni pramaṇāntaram antareṇa gṛhyanta, iti.*' Then follows a *sūtra* (given as *sūtra* in the NSN), in which this wrong view is refuted. But in NV. there is no trace of that sentence being considered as a *sūtra*; moreover the interpretation of NS. in the sense accepted by Nāgārjuna is in accordance with NS. V, i, 10. From all these facts the conclusion seems to follow that NS. II, i, 19 was interpreted in the way expounded by Vātsyāyana (Cfr. NS. II, i, 16 *prameyatā ca tulā-prāmāṇyavat*) probably to avoid the criticism of Nāgārjuna. In any way the interpretation of Vātsyāyana represents an advance upon the older one.

Kārikā 30. Tib. "If there be something perceived by the pramāṇas, such as direct perception, etc., that could be proved or refuted. But since there is nothing (that can be perceived) your blame has no value." This stanza is also quoted by Candrakīrti ibid.

Yadi kiṃcid upalabheyam pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyam vā pratyakṣādibhir arthais tad abhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ.

The end of the commentary (p. 38. l. 6) introduces the argument of the following stanza (31), but in Tib. we have: "therefore neither the proof is to be formulated nor the refutation; so that it is not possible for you to direct the following criticism against me *viz.*, "If objects are perceived by some pramāṇas, then, it is possible to refute them; [but] the pramāṇas also are non-existent [for you], since the objects that must be discriminated by them are non-existent."

Kārikā 32. This stanza is in Chinese, in prose. Com. p. 38. l. 35. If there is *regressus in infinitum* the absence of any beginning is demonstrated; what for? These *pramāṇas* also would be proved by other *pramāṇas*; these also by others; these again by others, and here there is no beginning."

Kārikā 33. p. 40. l. 18. The sentence: 'now—stanza' not in Tib.

Kārikā 35. Tib: "These words are not consentaneous (to logic), because in this case we do not see that non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) which we have when a pot is in darkness; [so] fire cannot illuminate itself."

Kārikā 38. So in the Chin., but I think that the text is corrupt.

Tib: "This (fire being) illuminating dispells darkness.

"In fire, wherever there is fire and elsewhere there is no darkness. How can it be illuminating?"

The Chinese has: "Now I say" (pag. 44. l. 7) which is a mistake. In Sanscrit, as we see from Tib., there was the usual sentence: *atrocyate* introducing the objection of the opponent.. It is evident also that we must add a negation. The opponent accepts the conclusion of Nāgārjuna and admits that darkness cannot co-exist with fire. But he then brings forth another argument.

Kārikā 40. Same argument is ŚŚ. pag. 9.

Kārikā 41. Instead of "can prove 能成" it is evident that we must read: 'is proved'; perhaps 得 for 能; so also Tib.: "If the *pramāṇa* is self poved, without relation with the things to be proved, this pramāṇa of yours, being self proved, is self-proved quite indipendently of another [notion]." The sentence: "this is what........self-proved" repeats what has been said above and is therefore useless. In fact it is not in Tib.

Here also (p. 46. l. 16.) I have corrected *you* for *I* (*atrocyate*).

Kārikā 42. In the kārikā and the Com. read: "is proved" for: 'can prove'. Tib.: "If your pramāṇas are proved without relation to the things to be proved, these indeed could not be pramāṇas of anything." It is evident that something is missing in the Tib. before *gaṅ. gi. p'yir*.

Kārikā 43. This stanza is inserted in Ch. in the commentary; moreover the text reads: "If all dharmas are proved without being related to the pramāṇas." It is evident that the negation is out of place. Tib. is clearer: "If one maintains

that these [pramāṇas] are related to [the things to be proved] what will be the mistake in this assumption? [I reply] that no relation is possible with something else which is not [already proved] and so the proof [must be already] proved." In the Com. (p. 48. l. 3) read: 'is proved' for 'can prove.'

Kārikā 44. The Chinese is here wrong, unless we suppose that the translator has followed exactly the sanscr. original, constructing the character 待 *apekṣā*, with the preceding sentence. But this is against the Chin. syntax. In Tib. the stanza and the comm. have been rendered in the following manner:

"If the *pramāṇas* are proved having relation to the things to be apprehended, then, the things to be apprehended would be proved without any relation to the *pramāṇas*."

Com. "If you maintain that the *pramāṇas* are related to the things to be apprehended, then, the things to be apprehended are not proved having relation to the *pramāṇa*. What for? The thing to be proved cannot prove the proof, while it is acknowledged that to the *pramāṇas* (only) belongs the (capacity of being) a proof and (of having as object) the things to be proved."

Kārikā 46. Tib: "If you (mean to say) that the *pramāṇas* are proved in relation to the notions to be apprehended, then, for you, the *pramāṇas* and the things to be apprehended would certainly be the opposite (to what they are)." C. "If you say that such a mistake as pointed out before is not possible, since the *pramāṇas* are related to the things to be apprehended, then, for you the pramāṇas and the things to be apprehended would become the opposite [of what they are]. The *pramāṇas* would be the notion to be apprehended, because they are proved by the notions to be proved. And the notions to be proved would be also be *pramāṇas*, since they can prove the *pramāṇas*."

Kārikā 48. Com. The reason is given in the Tib. which adds: "since both are to be proved, how could they prove?"

Kārikā 50. That is a man is a father inasmuch as he has given birth to a son, but this very son is the reason why he is a father. This is a subject very often discussed in the Mādhyamika

school in order to show that all notions are interdependent and therefore void of any essence of their own. Cfr BCAT., IX, 114, MMK, 81, etc.

Kārikā 51. Com. P. 52. l. 25. The Com. reads 'cannot' here as well as in l. 31; "it cannot be doubted" but this is a mistake probably derived from a scr. *nanu*. The last sentence of the commentary is repeated twice in Ch. without any reason.

Kārikā 52. Tib. "The *pramāṇas* are not self-proved, nor are they reciprocally proved, they are not proved by another pramāṇa nor by the things to be apprehended nor also without a cause."

In this *kārikā* the previous discussion is briefly summarised.

Com. p. 54. The Chin. "by themselves and by another" perhaps corresponds to scr. *paraspara*.

Com. p. 54. l. 21. In Tib. we have only 20, 30, 40, 36, I think that these numbers refer to the stanzas. But in this case there is the difficulty that the 20th. *Kārikā* contains the last argument of the *pūrvapakṣa*.

Kārikā 55. The quotation corresponds to scr.: "*yo bhikṣavaḥ, pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati, sa dharmaṃ paśyati*, This is a famous sentence taken from the Śālistambasūtra. De La Vallée Poussin., Theorie des douze causes. p. 70. l. 7.

Kārikā 56. Tib. is clearer: "Since whatever is devoid of causes is eternal, so all dharmas must be eternal. When dharma or adharma are non-existent, the practice (*vyavahāra*) of the world also is non-existent."

Kārikā 58. Tib.: "If somebody says that name is existent inasmuch as it possesses its own essence, then, he could be blamed by you in the way [you stated]. But I do not say that name is existent."

C. If somebody states that name is existent in so far it possesses an essence of its own, then, such a criticism as advanced by you could be formulated. If the thing possessing a name has no essence, then, this name also is necessarily without any essence. Since, when something is non-existent, the name [that designates it] is devoid of essence, we also cannot say that name possesses an essence of its own......

Kārikā 59. In Chinese there are two stanzas. The commentary of which is also rather obscure.

Tib. " As to what (you say *viz* that if the object) is non-existent, the name also is non-existent, (then), is it (viz. this proposition) existent or non-existent ? Whether it exists or not, both the statements made by you are wrong.

C. When you say that if there is no (object), then, the name also is non-existent; then, (we may ask whether according to you) this (statement): " name is non-existent " is or is not ? Whether it is the name of something existent or of something non-existent there is a twofold mistake in your thesis. If (the statement) 'the name is non-existent' is of something existent, then your thesis : 'name is non-existent,' is annulled. This is not non-existent since that is existent. If, on the other hand, you say that your statement : 'name is non existent,' is of something non-existent, then, your thesis *viz.* that the essence of a name is existent, would be annulled, because when there is no object, there is no name.

Kārikā 61. Com. Tib. : " Now even the essence of dharmas is not refuted, nor the essence of a thing whatsoever distinct from the dharmas is accepted [by me]; so that if you criticise my point and state : " when there is no essence in the dharmas, it is logical to declare that this essence is of a thing whatsoever distinct from the dharmas " [this criticism] is disposed of and your blame is out of place."

Kārikā 62. CH is wrong. Tib. : " If you maintain that refutation is possible only if there is something real, then, the void is proved, on account of your refutation of the non-essence of all things." The meaning is that if refutation is only possible when the thing to be refuted is real, then, voidness must be really existent because the opponent refutes the theory of the voidness. If it be not so the opponent would contradict his thesis.

Kārikā 63. Tib. : " Where is the void, if this void which is refuted by you is also non-existent ? But, then, how your statement, *viz.* that the refutation is possible only if something is existent, is not wrong ? "

Comn. " If you refute voidness, *viz.* non-essence of dharmas, and [so] this void is also non-existent, then, your thesis that refutation is possible if the object to be refuted is existent, but impossible if this is non-existent, is annulled.

Kārikā 65. "If you say that the refutation of the non-existent is proved even without words, then I say that the word is meant to make (others) understand non-existence, but not to exclude what is [really existent]."

"What is produced by these words" (pag. 68. l. 8.) is added, according to the Tib., Tib. "When there is no essence, dharmas are said to be without essence in order to make (others) understand it"

Kārikā 68. p. 70. l. 31. The six perceptions corresponding to the six senses.

Kārikā 69. "Here the non-essence of the reason has been answered (by the argument said) before, because the *probandum* is the same; it is that which has been said before on the occasion of the wrong proposition (established) by the example of the mirage."

Cfr. Stanzas XXVIII, LXVII.

Just as before "sound" has been proved to be void as the probandum '*dharmas* are void', so also here "mirage" taken by the opponent as the *dṛṣṭānta* is similarly void, like the probandum.

Kārikā 70: Tib. "[As to what you say regarding] the reason in the three times, this has been replied before, since [the argument] is the same. The reason [based] on the non-existence of the three times is [only] possible for those who accept the voidness of things.

Com. "The statement concerning the refutation of the three times of the reason has already been answered. In fact it is analogous to the probandum (*viz.* void). Therefore (if you say) so: "the refutation made by your words cannot take place in any of the three times; the notion to be refuted is like the refutation itself and therefore, because the refutation and the thing to be refuted are non-existent, the refutation is [thereby] refuted" your assumption is illogical.

"As to the refutation of the three times of the reason (which consists in saying that) the refutation (also) is in the three times, I say that this is only true in the doctrine of those who maintain the voidness (of things) according to the principle which refutes all dharmas, but that is not (true) in your system.

If you ask: "How is it possible to reply to that objection." I say: (stanza 64). So I reply."

End of the Com. "Moreover if it were so, you would admit the possibility of the notion refuted, so that if this were not proved, your thesis also would be involved in a mistake. In this way also the refutation of the essence of (dharmas) is proved."

Kārikā 72: Tib. 'void and *pratītyasamutpanna* are one and the same in the middle path.'

NOTES ON ŚS.

P. 3, l. 6. This *śloka* contains the *maṅgalācaraṇa* with which every work must begin, according to the rule generally followed, that *karmārambhe devatā guruś ca namaskriyante.* Here the author pays his homage to the *triratna*: Buddha, dharma, and saṅgha, which, according to the *Buddhagotra* theory, represent the threefold nature of the Buddha himself.

The dharma alluded to here is manifestly the doctrine of voidness, *śūnyatā*, viz., *śūnyatā* of the *pudgala* or individuum, *śūnyatā* of dharmas (*i.e.* primary elements of the various forms of the so called existence), *śūnyatā* of the *śūnyatā* itself (against the *dṛṣṭi* of *śunyatā*, the *śunyatāgrāha*, the attachment to the theory of voidness).

The eight classes in which the Sangha is said to be divided correspond to the fruits, *phala*, i.e. the fruits of the four stages in the *mārga*: *śrota-āpanna*, *sakṛd-āgāmin*, *anāgāmin*, *arhat*, along with the four tendencies, *pratipatti*, that precede the attainment of the four fruits.

In this chapter one of the fundamental theories of the Mahāyāna is expounded, *viz.* that sin as well as merit must be equally avoided. Merit is as much a bondage as sin; the only difference is that this is a *sthūla-āvaraṇa* while the other is a *sūkṣma-āvaraṇa.* Moreover sin is sorrow even at the moment when it is committed and also afterwards, for the necessary consequence that it will bring; merit turns into sorrow when the good that is derived from it is exhausted. Sin and merit are two *grāhas*, and, as such, must be annihilated in the realization of the *śūnya.*

P. 3. l. 23. Here the author alludes to various Indian schools such as: Īśvaravāda, (Viṣṇu and Śiva), Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika and Jainas. The last three sects are therefore opposed to the first as atheistic sects, in which Bhagavān is no more god, but himself the founder of the school.

P. 4. l. 1. The sentence: "Knows the true characteristics of all dharmas" alludes to the *prajñā* of the Buddha; "he can explain the deep and pure dharmas" alludes to his ability

(*kuśalatā, kauśalya*) to speak according to circumstances and the various capacities of the individuals (*upāya*). The *upāya-kuśalatā* is considered in the Mahāyāna as one of the fundamental characteristics of the Buddha and it was largely used by the dogmatics in order to explain and to combine the different views expounded in the various *sūtras*.

P. 14. l. 12. *Viz.* the 25 *tattvas* of the Sāṅkhya.

P. 14. l. 19. The ātman being eternal cannot be produced, but all meritorious actions constitute a *dharma* which adheres to the *ātman*.

P. 4. l. 28. On *govrata* and *govratika* see MBH. V 3560, (94, 14) Majjhimanikāya, sutta 57, Śikṣāsamuccaya, 332, etc.

P. 5. l. 5. Here the two aspects of the Buddhist dharma are expounded, *viz.* the negative one which consists in abstaining from doing evil and the positive one which is represented by the practice of the good. Bad as well as good actions are divided into three groups, according as they are performed by the body, the voice, and the mind.

P. 5. l. 25. This, according to Ki-tsang, can indicate the order in which the various moments of taking a vow follow each other, and refers as well to the three categories of men : superior, middle, and inferior. The first takes the vow mentally, the second formulates it in words, the third must undergo the prescribed ceremony.

P. 5. l. 9. Reference is made here to the Lokāyatas, who, as it is known, considered Bṛhaspati as their guru, Cfr. my : *Linee di una Storia del materialismo indiano*, Accademia dei Lincei, Memorie, V, XVII, VII, 1924.

P. 6. l. 32. On the contradictoriness of a notion as the result of the impossibility to demonstrate it either by itself, or by another cause, or by itself and by another, see Mūlamādhyamikakārikā, I, i and the commentary of Candrakīrti thereon, Prajñākaramati on Bodhicaryāvatāra, IX 11. etc.

P. 9. l. 29. This doctrine was refuted by the lokāyatikas. Cfr. quotation in Mādhavacārya, *Sarvadarśanasaṅgraha*, I. If happiness is only in the beginning, then, it is not in the two other moments, implied by the beginning *viz.*, the middle and the end. Since these are two and the beginning is one, non-happiness is greater than happiness.

P. 10. l. 6. That is, a) the *avayavin* is not different from the *avayavas* nor b) is the *avayavin* the same as the *avayavas*. The first view is that of the Nyāya (Vaiśeṣikas) for which the *avayavin*, as it is known, is *arthāntara*, is something different from the parts, though related to these in the peculiar relation of inherence, *samavāya*; the other view is that of the Sāṅkhyas. For this question one may refer to NSB. ad NS. II, I, 33 ff; NV 216 ff. Aśoka's, *Avayavinirākaraṇa*, etc.

P. 10. l. 18. That is, if the stopping of evil is good in itself, why did you not state this positive moment just in the beginning of your book?

The reply is that this positive moment must be preceded by the negative one, *viz.* the suppression of evil.

P. 10. l. 3. "Dust" means here "impurity."

P. 11. l. 3. Here the author replies to the objection of the opponent, and maintains the necessity of the separate enunciation of the two moments of the *caryā*, conduct, since the one does not imply the presence of the other.

P. 11. l. 7. *Maitrī*, *karuṇā*, *muditā*, *upekṣā*, are the four *apramāṇas*.

P. 11. l. 17. In fact the *dānapāramitā* is the first in the list of six or ten *pāramitās*, that must be practised by the in bodhisattva his path to Buddhahood.

P. 12. l. 9. The *avyākṛta* is the resultant of a previous action; it is therefore *vipākahetu*, and cannot bring out any other result.

P. 12. l. 19. For all this passage and the threefold division one must compare *Ta che tu lun* (*Mahāprājñāpāramitā-śāstra*, Taishō. XXV, p. 82).

The three categories of individuals correspond to the three aspects of conduct, according as one follows *dāna* or *śīla* or *prajñā*. In each of these categories we must distinguish a pure and an impure one; the impure is the practice for obtaining a recompense.

P. 14. l. 12. That refers to the gods; when their merits are exhausted they come down again to the earth. *Itivuttaka* 83 *Diyāvadāna* 193, *Mbh.* I, 88, 3 *Dīghanikāya*, *I*, 27.

P. 14. l. 17. These verses are a quotation from the *Saundarānandakāvya* of Aśvaghoṣa XI, 25, 30:

Tāḍayiṣayā sṛpto yathā meṣo 'pasarpati |
tadvad abrahmacaryāya brahmacaryam idaṃ tava ||
hṛdi kamāgninā dīpte kāyena vahato vratam |
kim idaṃ brahmacaryaṃ te manasābrahmacāriṇaḥ ||

P. 15. l. 1. The famous master of the *Chandogya-upaniṣat*. Cfr. also the Uddālakajātaka.

P. 15. l. 14. We have here a reference to the Nītiśāstras.

P. 17. l. 23. It is a postulate admitted by all schools that whatever has two characteristics at the same time cannot be considered as eternal.

P. 17. l. 25. There are, according to Ki-tsang, seven arguments by which the commentator shows that merit also must be renounced.

P. 18. l. 2. It is maintained by all schools that if the *hetu* is non-eternal the result also must be non-eternal. Now the *aśvamedha* is non-eternal, since it lasts three years or one hundred days only ; the merit, therefore, which is derived from it cannot be eternal.

P. 18. l. 19. Here we have a quotation from the Sk. 2 *dṛṣṭavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikṣayātiśayayuktaḥ.*

P. 19. l. 7. The opponent objects ; you have renounced sin in order to realize merit, but what do you intend to realize after renouncing merit ? The reply of Āryadeva is that both sin and merit must be renounced on the basis of the *animitta*, which consists in the suppression of all notions which are necessarily antinomical.

P. 19. l. 19. The three *vimokṣamukha* are, as it is known, ***śūnyatā, animitta, apraṇihita*** MV. 73, KERN. *Manual* 55. MMK. 363.

P. 20. l. 5. For this definition of the *puruṣa* Cfr. SK. 17 ***adhiṣṭhānāt***, and Saṣṭitantra in *Gauḍapāda* com. page 20 : "*puruṣādhiṣṭhitaṃ pradhānaṃ* ;" *mādhyasthyam*, SK. 19 ***bhoktṛbhāvāt*** ibid. 17.

P. 20. l. 11. We have here a quotation from V.S. III ii 4 ***prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāś cātmano liṅgāni.*** Cfr. N.S. I, i, 10. ***Icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam.***

P. 20 l. 21. *Viz.* a nāstika.

P. 20. l. 28. From here up to page 23. l. 30. there is the refutation of the Sāṅkhya theory of the ātman. According to this school, as it is known, ātman is intelligence itself, *cid-rupa cin-maya*. Cfr. SS. I, 12, etc.

P. 21. l. 1. The objections raised by Āryadeva may be summarised, according to Ki-tsang, under five fundamental items 1) if the nature of the ātman be determined by the nature of intelligence, then, since intelligence is non-eternal, the ātman also must be non-eternal 2). If the nature of intelligence be determined by the nature of the ātman, since the ātman is eternal, intelligence also must be eternal 3). If intelligence is non-eternal, but the ātman is eternal, then, the ātman must be different from intelligence 4). If the ātman is eternal, but intelligence is non-eternal, then, intelligence must be different from the ātman 5). If one insists upon maintaining the unity of ātman and intelligence, then, the necessary implication is that the ātman is invested with a double characteristic, *viz.* that of the eternity and that of the non-eternity.

P. 21. l. 6. Sorrow is different from pleasure, etc.

P. 21. l. 25. That is, if one assumes that the ātman and the intelligence are the same thing, then, either the ātman must not be all pervading, just as the intelligence, or the intelligence must be all-pervading just as the ātman; but this assumption is contrary to evidence. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, one maintains that the ātman is all-pervading, but the intelligence is not all-pervading, and yet is identical with the ātman, then, the ātman must have a double aspect, that of the intelligence, when it is not all-pervading, and that of the non-intelligence, when it is all-pervading. The intelligence would then be an epiphenomenon, but not the essence itself of the ātman.

P. 22. l. 12. The opponent replies to this objection, and distinguishes (*a*), between intelligence, as a mere potentiality, inherent in the ātman and representing its fundamental characteristic and therefore all-pervading as the ātman and (*b*) intelligence as actual function. For Āryadeva potentiality cannot be separated from function. Cp. Tattvasaṅgraha and *pañjikā*. Vol. I. pp. 9 ff.

P. 22. l. 19. Because no potentiality can be considered as separate from function.

P. 22. l. 30. If potentiality cannot develop into function without the operation of some external agency, then, this function is produced, and therefore cannot be considered as eternal.

P. 23. l. 1. That is we have in this case not the *kāraka-hetu*, the efficient cause, but only the *abhivyaktihetu* which does not produce a thing, but only makes manifest what is already existent.

P. 23. l. 12. Cfr. NB. 226.

P. 23. l. 31. Having so refuted the Sāṅkhya theory, the Author discusses the Vaiśeṣika view, according to which intelligence is not identical with the ātman, but it is the characteristic of the ātman; *ātmaguṇo jñānam* NSB. p. 603.

P. 24. l. 2. Cfr. VS., III, i, 18: *ātmendriyārthasaṃnikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat.*

P. 25. l. 10. The supposed syllogism of the Vaiśeṣika comes to this; the ātman possesses intelligence and is therefore called intelligent (proposition); *e.g.*, when the ātman is in the horse, is called horse. (example). The reply is that this syllogism is wrong, because the example is *asiddha*, on account of the difference that exists, according to the Vaiśeṣika, between the body and the ātman; so when one says 'horse,' he speaks of a particular form of being. If, in order to avoid this objection, you say that you compare the *ātman* only with the *ātman* the example would be identical with the thing to be proved (*sādhyasama*); so an argument of this nature is not valid.

P. 25. l. 33. If intelligence is not the essence of the ātman but on account of its union with intelligence the ātman is called intelligent, then, since intelligence is not the ātman, the ātman is united with something that is non-ātman, and so it should have all the characteristics of the non-ātman already referred to.

P. 26. l. 1. That is: knowledge cannot be separated from the power of knowing, so knowledge must be regarded as the power which knows, just as the *ātman*, so that knowledge would

be the ātman; if you do not accept this implication, we cannot accept that ātman is the power which knows.

P. 26. l. 4. *Viz.*; If you say that the ātman is called intelligence, because it is united with knowledge, why do you not equally admit that knowledge is called *ātman* on account of its union with knowledge?

P. 26. l. 12. For this example cfr. NMj, pag. 85.

P. 27. l. 6. This *sūtra* expounds the Sāṅkhya view that though the *antaḥkaraṇa* is one, still its functions appear to be many as regards the variety of perceptions. Cfr. SS. I, 19 and NS. III, ii, 9 *sphaṭikānyatvābhimānavat tad anyatvābhimānaḥ*.

P. 27. l. 24. This refers to the *kṣaṇika* view according to which there is a continuous *utpāda, sthiti, bhaṅga* of the dharmas. Cfr. N.S. III, ii, 10, *sphaṭike 'py aparāparotpatteḥ kṣaṇikatvād vyaktīnām ahetuḥ*.

P. 27. l. 29. The A. shows that the example given is wrong, in so far as the potter is different from the pot, but the various thoughts cannot be considered separated from thought itself.

P. 28. l. 9. This *anumāna* is the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam anumāna* (Cfr. introduction) MSB. pag. 8, NV. pag. 47 (*gatimān āditya*) where this kind of anumāna is refuted. In NSB. the example given of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* corresponds to that of our text: *icchādibhir ātmā icchādayo guṇāḥ guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṃ sthānaṃ sa ātmeti.* pag. 79. Here the author refutes again the Vaiśeṣika (Nyāya) point of view.

P. 28. l. 29. So that it is impossible to say that knowledge is the essential *guṇa* of the ātman.

P. 29. l. 11. This argument of the non-existence of the ātman, because it is not perceived by direct perception, was also accepted by the Lokāyatikas. Cfr. also Pāyāsisuttanta (Dīghanikāya XXIII) Rāyapaseṇaijja, part II, Samarāicchakahā, 170.

P. 29. l. 15. The A. refers to the rule that the anumāna must be *pratyakṣapūrvaka*. Cfr. NV. pag. 48.

P. 30. l. 8. NS. I, i, 10, VS. III, ii, 4.

P. 30. l. 24. For the idea cfr. NS. III, i, 4, *śarīradāhe pātakābhāvāt*.

P. 30. l. 32. There cannot be any relation between the material and the immaterial; the ātman therefore possessed

with intelligence, but incorporeal, cannot be the cause of the impulse of any of the actions of the body, which is *jaḍamātra*.

P. 30. l. 36. See Gauḍapāda, comm. on SK. 21; the example seems to be exclusively sāṅkhya (Cfr. Cowell SDS. 229, note 2).

P. 31. l. 6. That is they are two individuals possessing the same properties.

P. 31. l. 27. Cp. NSB, p. 444: *na jātu kaścin nityaṃ hiṃsitum arhati: atha hiṃsyate nityatvam asya na bhavati.*

P. 32. l. 9. In this example the house with six windows corresponds to the body, with its six senses, and the man inside is the ātman.

P. 32. l. 14. Cfr. NS. III, i, 3: *tad vyavasthānād evātmasadbhāvād apratiṣedhaḥ*, and NSB. thereon.

P. 32. l. 29. Quotation from NS. III, i, 12: *Indriyāntaravikārāt.*

P. 32. l. 35. Another quotation from NS. III, i, 1, *darśanasparśanābhyām ekārthagrahaṇāt.*

P. 1. On the Chineso expression 川 澤 cp. Chavannes *Cinq Cent Contes et apologues*, tome I, pag. 15 n. 1.

P. 34. l. 21. Another literal quotation from NS. III, i, 18; *pūrvābhyastasmṛtyanubandhāj jātasya harṣabhayaśokasampratipatteḥ.*

P. 35. l. 20. Quotation from NS. III, i, 7: *savyadṛṣṭasyetareṇa pratyabhijñānāt.*

P. 35. l. 28. Cp. sūtra p. 34. l. 30.

P. 35. l. 29. Cp. sūtra p. 35. l. 16; sūtra p. 32. l. 3; sūtra p. 32. l. 22.

P. 36. l. 3. That is the ātman knows only in so far as there is *smṛti* Cfr NS. III, i, 14.

P. 36. l. 26. On the *aṇutva* of *manas* Cfr. NS. III, ii, 59.

P. 37. l. 12. With this chapter the refutation of dharmas begins. In fact, in the preceding chapter it has been shown that the notion of the *pudgala* or of the *ātman* is contradictory. This thesis, as it is known, is common also to the Hīnāyāna. Now the author must prove that even the dharmas, the existence of which was not denied by the Hīnayāna, are as contradictory as the ātman.

P. 37. l. 14. The Ch. 所有 corresponds to: *ābhāsa* cp. the expression *nirābhāsa* 無所有; but in this case it can also be: *ātmīya*.

P. 38. l. 8. The five *kāyas*, bodies, are, as it is known, *rūpa*, *śabda*, *sparśa*, *rasa* and *gandha*.

P. 38. l. 17. But we have an endless series, *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*, etc.

P. 39. l. 6. That is, if wherever there is existence and unity, the pot is not necessarily there, then, the pot and existence are two different things. If they are not so, how is it that existence and unity do not necessarily include the pot?

P. 40. l. 1. Because you implicitly accept that the father and the son have no definite essence of their own, but are interdependent.

P. 40. l. 13. If the general characteristic and the particular characteristic are not different from each other, then, either of them might be the other; but since they are interdependent, the suppression of one implies the suppression of the other, so that neither would exist.

P. 41. l. 20. Cp. NS. II, i, 37.

P. 42. l. 13. From here there is the refutation of the *satkāryavāda*, which, as it is known, represents one of the fundamental tenets of the Sāṅkhyas and which leads to a discussion showing the inconsistency of this doctrine with the *traikālya* view and the contradictoriness of the *itaretarāpekṣā*. For this Cfr. NS. IV, i, 39.

P. 43. l. 28. This theory is generally attributed to the Vaiṣeśikas.

P. 45. l. 3. *Sattā* is in fact the *paraṃ sāmānyam* according to VS., while number (one) is '*guṇa*' I, ii, 4, 7–10; I, i, 6.

P. 45. l. 10. *Abhāva*, is not considered as a category by VS.

P. 47. l. 27. The foot, as well as any other part of the body, is the *lakṣaṇa* and the whole, *avayavin*, is the *lakṣya*; *lakṣaṇa* does not need another *lakṣaṇa* to be characterised. Here another refutation of the *avayavin*. Cp. supra.

P. 48. l. 33. Your argument is not conclusive, *aikāntika*, since you give as example things in which there is no possibility to bring out any such effect.

P. 49. l. 19. Or "a man who refutes the dharmas"; *viz.*, a man who has no thesis to maintain, but only argues against other's views.

P. 50. l. 6. Cp. VS. III, i, 18.

P. 50. l. 19. Here we have a *traikālyaparīkṣā* as regards knowledge.

P. 52. l. 14. The question discussed here is that of the *prāpyakāritva* and *aprāpyakāritva* of the senses, Cfr NV. pag. 33. ff. where Uddyotakara quotes, if not from our text, from a very similar one. *yat khalu gatimad bhavati tat tāṃ gatiṃ abhindhat saṃnikṛṣṭam āśu prāpnoti viprakṛṣṭaṃ cireṇa*; *śākhā-candramasos tulyakālagrahaṇaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tasmād aprāpyakāri.*

P. 52. l. 11. MMK. III. 2.

P. 54. l. 32. Cfr. NS. II, i, 31 *pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ekadeśagrahaṇād upalabdheḥ.*

P. 56. l. 16. When the eye is not yet in contact with the pot, but, (according to the opponent), the pot is already existent, though not perceived, this implies that the pot is not necessarily perceptible. If you again say that it is called "perceived" only when there is connection with the eye, then, the characteristic of its being perceived is produced, and therefore it is different from the previous moment in which it was not yet perceived. If there is no production of such characteristic of its being perceived, then, there is no pot.

P. 57. l. 1. It is evident that the A. after having refuted the realistic view of the Vaiśeṣika-nyāya, refutes also the *bhūta* and *bhautika* theory, as expounded in the hīnayāna schools, chiefly Vaibhāṣika (of Kashmir). According to them matter is composed of four *mahābhūtas* (beyond perception) to which their relative manifestations mahābhautikas correspond. Cfr. Abhidharmakośa I 35, etc. STCHERBATSKY. *Central Conception of Buddhism.*

P. 57. l. 18. All dharmas are divided into external and internal *āyatanas*; the first of the external *āyatanas* is *rūpa-āyatana* (colour and shape according to the Sarvāstivādins, colour only according to the Sautrāntikas). It is the object of vision-faculty *cakṣurindriyāyatana.*

P. 58. l. 1. This refers to the theory that each *saṅghāta-paramāṇu,* composed at least of eight mahābhūtas, includes the other three elements (the four *mahābhūtas* and the *bhautika* in equal proportion), but its appearance as a particular one, depends on the intensity of one of the composers.

P. 59. l. 5. Cfr. NS. II, i, *41 tayor apy abhāvo vartamānābhāve tad apekṣatvāt.*

P. 59. l. 15. Because it is born.

P. 59. l. 29. This chapter contains a refutation of the *satkāryavāda* of the Sāṅkhyas. According to it the effect derives from an internal modification of the cause in which therefore it potentially pre-exists. In the discussion, reference is also made to Hīnayāna's theories, that involved continuity of the three times. (Cfr. the Sarvāstivāda school and chiefly Dharmatrāta views).

P. 61. l. 10. That is: if the clod is still existent as a clod, and is not changed into a pot, the pot is non-existent; whatever is non-existent, by the fact itself that it is non-existent, cannot disappear and leave place for the existence of the pot. Therefore, neither existence disappears nor non-existence (non-pot).

P. 61. l. 20. On account of the eternity of our actions, a sin will always remain sin, etc.

P. 63. l. 17. On these eight kinds of hinderances BLBD. p. 468.

P. 64. l. 10. That is if the effect exists, the cause will also exist with it: but if the effect is destroyed, the cause will also be destroyed with it.

P. 65. l. 16. Here begins the refutation of the *asatkārya-vāda* (of the Vaiśeṣikas).

P. 65. l. 18. That is you hold the same view as we, since you admit that there is birth. The opponent refers to the last paragraph of the preceding chapter.

P. 65. l. 29. This implies that we must distinguish, as Ki-tsang points out, two beginnings of the pot; (*a*) when the pot begins to be perfect, then, it is already existent; therefore no birth is possible of what is already born; (*b*) the very beginning of making the pot. At that time the pot is not yet there and

therefore there cannot be the birth of what is non-existent. The same must be understood as regards the two sequences of the clod.

P. 66. l. 37. But according to other editions: "Now we see that the pot is finished and therefore the pot is born."

P. 68. l. 15. This shows that the author is referring to the Sarvāstivādins for whom the fundamental elements of existence, are dharmas, point instants, *dharma kṣaṇika*, though real, *dravyataḥ santi.* They incessantly appear and disappear through the agency of some forces, *viz.*, *utpāda* birth, *sthiti* duration, and *bhaṅga*, destruction. So they have the characteristic of the *saṃskṛta.* But these three forces, inasmuch as they are elements, depend again upon secondary forces *upalakṣaṇas*. Cfr. Abhidharmakoṣa II 46, DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN I 224, STCHERBATSKY. *The central conception of Buddhism* pag. 39. ff.

P. 69. l. 10. Cfr. the refutation of the *svataḥ parataḥ ubhayataḥ* at pag. 6. l. 32.

P. 69. l. 22. *Viz.*, if we translate this argument into logical terms, "if the *utpādya* (*ghaṭa*) could be the *sādhana* of *utpāda*, this would be the *sādhya* (*viz.*, *utpādya*), so that it could not be called the *utpādaka*. But, then, without *utpādaka* how could there be any *utpādya* ?"

P. 70. l. 5. That is: if you say that dharmas are proved because the *utpāda* and the *utpādya* are related or interdependent, *sāpekṣa*, this implies that there is a third dharma born of these two.

P. 73. l. 7. That is, if you insist upon maintaining that these dharmas are eternal and having recourse to logical arguments you state that their eternity depends on the fact that they have no cause, then, this eternity, being the consequence of your reason (*hetu*), is implicitly a product, and therefore non-eternal. (Cfr. TŚ.).

P. 73. l. 12. The reply of the opponent is that his argument is based on the logical reason *vyañjana-hetu*, but not upon the efficient cause *kārakahetu*. (Cfr. TŚ.).

P. 73. l. 27. *Kṛtaka* is a synonim of *saṃskṛta*. For the Sarvāstivādins the *asaṃskṛta dharmas* (three: *ākāśa*, *pratisaṅkhyānirodha*, *aprat.-nirodha*) are existent.

P. 74. l. 13. This is the first of the five eternal things that

are refuted in this chapter: 1. *ākāśa* 2. time 3. space, *dig* 4. atom 5. *nirvāṇa*. The refutation of *ākāsà* is directed against the category of the Vaiśeṣikas, as we can deduce from the following *sūtra*, in which the unbeliever quotes from the V.S. But *ākāśa* was considered as *asaṃskṛta* and therefore as eternal by the Sarvāstivādins (Ābhidharmikas) and even by some Mahāyāna schools as that of the Parinirvāṇa.

P. 74. l. 32. Cfr. VS II i 20 *niṣkramaṇaṃ praveśam ity ākāśasya liṅgam.*

P. 75. l. 6. Because whatever is existent must occupy a place.

P. 75. l. 9. In this case there would be an ether which contains (*āśraya*) and an ether which is contained (*āśrita*) and so the ether must have parts. Whatever has parts is non-eternal.

P. 75. l. 30. Here the A. refutes the *ākāśa* theory as expounded by the Hīnayāna schools.

P. 76. l. 12. On time as *dravya* cp. VS. II, ii, 6-8.

P. 76. l. 19. Cp. Ibid. *sūtra* 6.

P. 77. l. 1. According to the theory that the *atītānāgatasiddhi*, demonstration of the past and the future, is *sāpekṣa* dependent on both. This theory is alluded to and refuted in NS. II, i, 42.

P. 77. l. 23. Litt. going through.

P. 78. l. 5. On *dig* as *dravya* cfr. V.S. II, ii, 10-12. For the passage contained in the Com. upon this and the f. sūtra cp. VS. II, ii, 10, 14, 15 *ita idam iti yatas tad diśyāṁ liṅgam, ādityasaṃyogād bhūtapūrvād bhaviṣyato bhūtāc ca prācī*; *tathā dakṣiṇā pratyudicī ca*, cfr. Lokaprajñaptiśāstra p. 307.

P. 79. l. 9. In this sūtra is contained the definition of atoms as expounded in VS. IV, i, 1-4.

P. 79. l. 21. For this refutation cfr. Vasubandhu's Viṃśikā 11 ff. (NV. upon it pag. 515 ff.) NSB. 292.

P 79. l. 31. Cfr. VS. VII, i, 9 *kāraṇabahutvāc ca.*

P. 80. l. 6. But it is evident that Āryadeva does not refute here the Vaiśeṣikas only, but also the Hīnayāna schools according to which the atom is existent (Vaibhāṣikas, Cfr. Sthiramati on Viṃśikā 12).

P. 80. l. 15. Here also the A. refutes non-Buddhist as

well as Buddhist theories (Hīnayāna). Upon the Hīnayāna conceptions of nirvāṇa see LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, *Le Nirvāṇa* and STCHERBATSKY, *Nirvāṇa.*

P. 80. l. 18. *Viz.*, the nirvāṇa is *abhāva* of *kleśas* and this *abhāva* is eternal. Two objections: if it be so, (*a*) the nirvāṇa, being the result of the practice of the *mārga* (*kleśanirodha*) would be *kṛtaka* (*viz. abhūtvā bhāva*) and therefore non-eternal, (*b*) non-existence cannot be eternal, because it is a purely negative notion.

P. 80. l. 31. This is the second view. It implies that nirvāṇa is something different from the non-existence of *kleśas*. Nirvāṇa is eternal and existent; and when it is realized is the cause of the suppression of *kleśas*. Ki-tsang attributes this view to the Sāṅkhyas.

P. 81. l. 2. Since, according to the *satkāryavāda*, the cause persists in the effect, so, when there is no effect, there is no cause.

P. 81. l. 24. Cfr. NSB. 45: *apavarge bhīṣmaḥ khalvayaṃ sarvakāryoparamaḥ sarvaviprayoge 'pavarge bahu bhadrakaṃ lupyate.*

P. 81. l. 35. Since there is no *pudgala* or *jīva*, or *sattva*, there is no individual being that attains *nirvāṇa*.

P. 82. l. 12. Refutation of voidness must be understood as the refutation of the *śūnyagrāha*.

P. 82. l. 21. Same argument as in the VV.; if refutation exits, then, you cannot say that all dharmas are non-existent, inasmuch as refutation exists. If refutation does not exist, dharmas must exist, since they have not been refuted.

P. 82. l. 27. That is: you refute refutation, assuming either that it is existent or that it is non-existent, but these two attributes have no meaning for the *mādhyamika*. Moreover, such an argument is against your thesis. Supposing that refutation proves the non-existence, or better the *nirābhāsa* of dharmas, then, it would also be nirābhāsa, inasmuch as whatever is existent is capable of being refuted. If it is non-existent there is nothing to refute, since non-existence does not imply existence. If there is nothing really existent, the *pratiṣedha* also is non-existent.

P. 83. l. 1. Because for the A. *pratiśedha* is *śūnya*.

P. 85. l. 14. That is: you say that you have no thesis, but just this is your thesis, *viz.*, either the logical impossibility of every thesis, or the *lokasatya* as asserted in the preceding *sūtra*.

P. 85. l. 28. That is: you are a *nāstika* inasmuch as you maintain that all dharmas are non-existent.

P. 85. l. 35. In so far as dharmas are *śūnya* for me, but are realities for you.

P. 88. l. 6. The school of Nāgārjuna and after it all Mahāyāna sects insisted upon the double truth, the conventional truth and the absolute truth, a theory that proved very useful in order to combine the contradictory teachings of the Mahāyāna-sūtras. Upon the two truths (which do not appear in the canon before the Milindapañha), see De la Vallée Poussin, *Études sur la Dogmatique*, J.A. 1903.

P. 88. l. 16. Viz., if it is *satya*, then, it is equal to the *paramārtha*; if it is not true, then, it is not *satya*.

P. 89. l. 11. Because everything is *śuddha*, viz., there is no notion of any kind.

INDICES.

I.

Index of Chinese *nyāya*-terms, with their probable sanskrit original, and the Tibetan equivalent.*

1. 一 義, UH., * *ekārtha.*
2. 一 處, NM., gcig. la. *ekatra.*
3. 不 信, TŚ., *apratīti, anabhyupagama.*
4. 不 共, NP., t'un. moṅ. ma. yin. pa.; NM. (PS.: mi. mt'un. pa.) *asādhāraṇa.*
5. 不 到, UH., *aprāpti* [*sama*].
6. 不 增, UH., *anadhika.*
7. 不 定, NM., ma. ṅes. pa. *aniścita., aniyata.*
8. 不 容, NP., med. pa., *asambhava.*
9. 不 實, NP., mi. ḥgyur. ba.; *abhūta*; TŚ., *abhūta, asat.*
10. 不 成, NP., ma. grub. pa. *asiddha.* NM. TŚ. UH.
11. 不 減, UH., *anyūna.*
12. 不 然, TŚ., UH, *ayukta, na yujyate.*
13. 不 生, UH., *anutpatti* [*sama*].
14. 不 男, NM., *apuṃsaka.*
15. 不 疑, UH., *asaṃśaya* [*sama*].
16. 不 轉, NM., (PS.: mi. ḥjug. pa.) *apravṛtti.*
17. 不 遣, NP., ldog. pa. med. pa.; NM., (PS.: ldog. pa. med. pa) *avyāvṛtta.*

* In this Index I have included, besides the terms to be found in the text collected in this volume, those also contained in the *Nyāyapraveśa* and the *Nyāyamukha.* The characters are arranged according to the progressive numbers of the 'keys.'

The sign * indicates that the equivalence is hypothetical. PS. refers to the passages of Pramāṇasamuccaya corresponding to TŚ. and NM.; *a* is the first translation of PSV.; *b* the second.

18. 不遍, NM., (PS.: k'yab. pa. med. pa.) **avyāpin.** TŚ., *avyāpti.*

19. 不關, TŚ., *nirapekṣa,*

20. 不離, NP., ldog. pa. med. pa., *avyatireka.*

21. 一切同, UH., *sarvasama* (=*sarvatantrasiddhānta*).

22. 一切異, UH., *sarvabhinna*(=*pratitantrasiddhānta*).

23. 不可顯, TŚ., *anabhivyakta.*

24. 不容有, NM., (PS.: mi. srid.) *asambhava.*

25. 不極遠, YBŚ., AS., ASS., t'ag. riṅ. po. ma. yin. pa., *anatidūratā, atisaṃnikarṣa.*

26 不決定, YBŚ., AS., ASS., *aniścita, anaikāntika, savyabhicāra.*

27. 不相違, UH., TŚ., *aviruddha.*

28. 不具應, VV. bzaṅ. po. ma. yin.; mi. ạt'ad.; mi. ruṅ. *na yujyate, ayukta.*

29. 不實義, TŚ., (P.S., (*a*) yaṅ. dag. pa. ma. yin. pa. (*b*) mi. bden.) *abhūta, asat.*

30. 不能難, TŚ., *apratibhā.*

31. 不能誦, TŚ., *ananubhāṣaṇa.*

32. 不至時, TŚ., *aprāptakāla.*

33. 不見障, UH., *darśanāvaraṇa.*

34. 不解義, TŚ., *ajñāna.*

35. 不遍同, UH., **avyāptisama.*

36. 不具足分, TŚ., *nyūna.*

37. 三說法要不令他解, UH., *avjñātārtha.*

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38. 了因, NM., ŚS., *vyañjanahetu, upalabdhihetu.*

39. 事, TS., *kārya.*

40. 事異, TŚ (=PS.: ạbras. bu.) *kāryasama,* (*litt. kryabheda-*[*sama*]).

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41. 他用 NP., gžan. gyi. don. ñid., *pārarthya*
42. 以喻知. UH., *upamāna*.
43. 信, SŚ., *pratyaya, pratīti*
44. 作, UH., *karma* (*padārtha*)
45. 作因, ŚS., *kārakahetu*.
46. 作具作者, NM., byed. pa. poi. rgyu *kārakahetu*.
47. 作有緣性, NP., yod. pa. rkyen. gyis. byas. pa. *satpratyayakartṛtva*.
48. 何所至, TŚ., *kiṃ prāpyate, kiṃ prāptam, kim āyātam*.
49. 修諸義. ŚSc., *jalpa* (?)
50. 似, NP., ltar. snaṅ. ba. *ābhāsa*.
51. 似喻, NP., dpe. ltar. snaṅ. ba., *dṛṣṭāntābhāsa*.
52. 似因, NP., NM., rtags. ltar. snaṅ. ; gtan. ts'igs. ltar. snaṅ. ba.; UH.; *hetvābhāsa*.
53. 似破, NM., *dūṣaṇābhāsa*.
54. 似義, NM., *arthābhāsa*.
55. 似立宗, NP., p'yogs. ltar. snaṅ. ba. *pakṣābhāsa*.
56. 似能破, NP., sun. ạbyin. ltar. snaṅ. ba. *dūṣaṇābhāsa*.
57. 信許, TŚ., *abhyupagama, anujñā*.
58. 信許他難. TŚ., *matānujñā*.
59. 俱不成, NP., gñis. ka. la. ma. grub. pa, *ubhayāsiddha* gñis. kai. c'os. ma. grub. pa *ubhayadharmāsiddha*.
60. 俱決定, NM., *ubhayatrāvyabhicāra*.
61. 俱不極成, NP., gñis. ka. rab. tu. grags. pa. ma. yin. pa. *aprasiddhobhaya*.
62. 俱品一分轉, NP., gñis. kai. p'yogs. gcig. gi. yul. la. yod. pa. *ubhayapakṣaikadeśavṛtti*.
63. 倒合, NP., rjes. su. ạgro. ba. p'yin. ci. log. pa. *viparītānvaya*.
64. 倒離, NP., ldog. pa. p'yin. ci. log. pa. *viparītavyatireka*.

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65. 共, NP., t'un. moṅ.; NM. *sādhāraṇa.*

66. 共 集; NM. (=PB.,) *saṃnipāta.*

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67. 冥 初, UH., *pradhāna.*

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68. 分, NP., yan. lag. *avayava.* TŚ. SS.

69. 別, UH., *viśeṣa* (*padhārtha*).

70. 到, TŚ., *prasaṅga*, UH., *prāpti* [*sama*

71. 分 位, NM., (PS. gnas. skabs.), *avasthā.*

72. 分 別, NP., rtog. pa. *kalpanā, vikalpa* (cp. n. 79)

73. 分 別, NM., (PS. bye. brag.) *viśiṣṭa, viśeṣa.*

74. 別 喩, NM., *pratidṛṣṭānta* [*sama*].

75. 別 相, ŚS., *viśeṣalakṣaṇa.*

76. 前 宗, NM., (PS., p'yogs. sṅa. ma. *pūrvapakṣa*).

77. 前 比, UH., *pūrvavadanumāna.*

78. 前 無, UH., *prāgabhāva.*

79. 分 別 相 似, NM., (PS., rnam. rtogs. mts'uṅs. pa. *vikalpasama.*

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80. 功 力, TŚ., *prayatna.*

81. 功 力 無 中 間 生, TŚ., *prayatnānantarīyaka.*

82. 勝 因, VV., gtan. ts'igs. kyad. pa. *viśeṣahetu.*

83. 勝 論 師, NP., bye. brag. pa. *Vaiśeṣika.*

84. 勤 勇 無 間 所 發, NM., (PS., brtsal. ma. t'ag. tu. byuṅ. ba.; rtsol. las. byuṅ. ba) *prayatnānantarīyaka.*
| | | | | | 性 N.P., *prayatnānantarīyakatva.*

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85. 取 異 自 立 義, TŚ., *pratijñāntara.*

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86. 唯, NM., (PS., tsam.) *mātra, eva.*

87. 合: (1) NM., (PS., ạbrel) *sambandha*; (2) NM., PS., a), ñe. bar. ạjal.; b), ñe. bar. sbyor.) AS., ASS., *upanaya.* (3) *v.* 無 合.

88. 同, NM., (PS., c'os. mts'uṅs.) UH., *sādharmya.*

89. 同 [性], NM., (PS., spyi) *sāmānya.*

90. 和 合, NP., ạdus. pa., *saṅghāta.*; TŚ., *saṃyoga.* (cp. n. 112.)

91. 品 類, NM., *prakaraṇasama.*

92. 同 世, TŚ., *yugapat.*

93. 同 品, NM., (PS., mt'un. p'yogs.) *sapakṣa.*

94. 同 時, TŚ., *samakālīna, yugapat.*

95. 同 比, UH., *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa* (*anumāna*).

96. 同 法, NP., c'os. mt'un. pa., c'os. mt'un. pa. ñid; NM., *sādharmya.*

97. 同 相, TŚ., (PS., c'os. mt'un. pa); *sādharmya* [*sama-jāti*].

98. 同 類, TŚ., *sapakṣa, sajātīya. samāna* YBŚ. AS. ASS., mt'un. pa. (3) NM., (PS. ạdei. rigs; (*b*) rigs. mt'un. pa.) *sajātīya.*

99. 可 顯, TŚ., *abhivyakta.*

100. 名 障, UH., *nāmāvaraṇa.*

101. 周 遍, NM., (PS., k'yab. pa.) *vibhu.*

102. 告 作, UH., *kṛtaka.*

103. 喻 破, UH., *pratidṛṣṭānta.*

104. 喻 知, UH., *upamāna.*

105. 喻 相 違, UH., *dṛṣṭāntaviruddha.*

106. 命 盡 障, UH., *āyurāvaraṇa.* (?)

107. 同 所 成, YBŚ., AS., ASS., VV., bsgrub. bya. daṅ. mts'uṅs., bsgrub. par. bya. ba. daṅ. ạdra. ba., *sādhyasama.*

108. 同 類 義, UH., *sajātīya.*

109. 同 異 性, TŚ., *sāmānya.*

110. 合 譬 言, TŚ., *upanaya.*

111. 可得相似, NM., (PS., dmigs. pa. mts'uṅs.) *upalabdhisama.*

112. 和合因緣, NP., ạdu. bar. byed. pa. can., *samavāyikāraṇa.*

113. 同品徧轉, NP., mt'un. p'yogs. la. k'yab. pa. *sapakṣavyāpin.*

114. 同法相過, NM., (PS., c'os. mt'un. par. mts'uṅs.) *sādharmyasama.*

115. 喻不相當, VV., ạgal. ba. dpe. *viruddhadṛṣṭānta.*

116. 同品定有性, NP., mt'un. pai. p'yogs. ñid. la. yod. par. ṅes. pa., *sapakṣe sattva.*

117. 同品一分轉, NP., p'yogs. kyi. p'yogs. gcig. la. yod., *sapakṣaikadeśavṛtti.*

118. 同異尋言生過, UH., *sāmānyachala.*

31

119. 因, (1) NP., sgrub. par. byed. pa. *sādhana.* (2) NP., gtan. ts'igs. TŚ., *hetu.*

120. 圓, TŚ., *pārimāṇḍalya.*

121. 因同, UH., *hetusama* or *kāraṇasama.*

122. 因緣, TŚ., *kāraṇa.*

123. 因言, TŚ., *hetu.*

124. 因義, TŚ., *hetu.*

125. 圓滿, NP., yaṅ. dag. par. ts'aṅ. ba., *sampūrṇa.*

126. 因果道理, TŚ., *hetuphalanyāya.*

127. 因與立義相違, TŚ., *pratijñāvirodha.*

32

128. 均, NP., spyis., *sāmānya.*

129. 增益, (1) NM., (PS., ạp'el. ba.) *utkarṣa* (*sama*). (2) NM., (PS., sgro. btags.) *āropa.*

130. 增益, UH., *utkarṣa* (*sama*).

131. 壞義, ŚSc., *vitaṇḍā.*

132. 壞自立義, TŚ., *pratijñāhāni.*

133. 壞滅無有, TŚ., *pradhvamsābhāva.*
134. 妙辯, NP., legs. šes. bya. *suvicārita.*
135. 如有成立, NP., ạdi. lta. ste., *tad yathā.*

40

136. 宗, NP., p'yogs., NM., *pakṣa. pratijñā.*
137. 實, NP., rdsas., *dravya.*; TŚ., *sat.*
138. 宗法, NP., p'yogs. kyi. c'os., *pakṣadharma.*
139. 宗言, NM., (PS., p'yogs. brjod. pa.), *pakṣavacana.*
140. 宗違, NM., (PS., dam. bca'. daṅ. ạgal. ba.) *pratijñāviruddha, pratijñāvirodha.*
141. 審定, NM., (PS.a.) ṅes. par. gzuṅ., b) ṅes. par. bzuṅ. *nirdhāraṇa, avadhāraṇa.*
142 審察, NM., (PS., a) šes. pa. ạdod. pa., b) šes. pa. *jijñasā.*
143. 宗法性, NP., p'yogs. kyi. c'os. ṅid. *pakṣadharmatā.*

41

144. 對人, TŚ., *prativādin.*
145. 對治, NM., (PS., gñen. poi. p'yogs.) *pratipakṣa.*
146. 尊勝, UH., *īśitva.*
147. 對譬難, TŚ., *pratidṛṣṭānta (sama)-jāti.*
148. 對治相違, TŚ., *pratipakṣavirodha.*

42

149. 少分, NM., (PS. c'a.) *leśa.*

43

150. 就同異而爲生過, UH., *sāmānyachala.*

48

151. 差別, YBŚ., AS., ASS., byc. brag., *viśeṣa.*
152. | | 性, NP., k'yad. par. du. byas. pa. *viśiṣṭatā.*

50

153. 常住相似, NM., (PS., rtag. par. mts'uṅs.) *nityasama.*

63

178. 所作, NM., (PS., ạbras. bu) *kārya*; (PS. byas) *kṛtaka*.

179. 所依, AS., ASS., *āśraya*.

180. 所受, NM., (PS., ñams. su. myoṅ,) *anubhava*.

181. 所說, NP., brjod. pa. *upadiśyamāna*.

182. 所遣, NM., (PS. bsal. ba.) *nirākṛta*.

183. 所量, ŚŚc. TŚ., VV., *prameya*.

184. 所隨, NM., (PS., rjes. su. ạgro.) *anugama*.

185. 所對義, TŚ., *vipakṣa*.

186. 所成義, YBŚ., AS., ASS., bsgrub. par. bya. bai. don. *sādhyārtha*, *sādhya*.

187. 所成就, TŚ., *siddha*.

188. 所立義, TŚ., *sādhya*.

189. 所見邊, AS., ASS., *dṛṣṭānta*.

190. 所量性, NP., gsal. bya. ñid. NM., (PS. gžal. bya), *prameyatva*.

191. 所隨逐, NM., (PS., rjes. su. ạgro), *anugama*.

192. 所作相似, NM., (PS. ạbras. bu. mts'uṅs.), *kārya-sama*.

193. 所依不成, NP., gži. ma. grub. pa., *āśrayāsiddha*.

194. 所成立性, NP., sgrub. bya. *sādhyatva*.

195. 所立不遣, NP., bsgrub. par. bya. ldog. pa. mod. pa., *sādhyāvyāvṛtta*.

196. 所立宗壞, VV., dam. bca'. ñams. *pratijnāhāni*.

197. 所樂違害, NM., *iṣṭavighāta*.

198. 所立法不成, NP., bsgrub. par. bya. bai. c'os. ma. grub. pa., *sādhyadharmāsiddha*.

199. 所別不極成, NP., k'yad. par. can. rab. tu. grags. pa. ma. yin. pa., *aprasiddhaviśeṣya*.

64

200. 捨言, YBŚ., AS., ASS., brjod. pa. gtoṅ. ba. *vacana-saṃnyāsa*.

201. 損減, UH., NM., (PS., agrib. pa. mts'uṅs.) *apakarṣa (sama)*.

202. 損理, YBŚ., AS., ASS., rigs. pa. las. ñams. pa., *yuktihāni*.

203. 捨本宗, TŚ., *pratijñāhāni*.

204. 捨集過難, YBŚ., AS., ASS., ltag. gc'od. pa,, *jāti*.

205. 捨自立義, TŚ., *pratijñāsaṃnyāsa*

65

206. 支分, NM., (PS., yan. lag.) *avayava*.

66

207. 故, °*āt*., (ablative) °*tvāt*., °*artham*.

208. 敵論, NM., *prativādin*.

209. 數論師. NP., graṅs. can. pa., *sāṅkhya*.

70

210. 方, ŚS., *diś*.

211. 方便, NM., (PS., sbyor. ba.) *prayoga*.

212. 方隅, NP., NM., *diṅmātra*.

213. 於是處, NP., gaṅ. la., *yatra*.

214. 方便避難, TŚ., *vikṣepa*.

215. 於同異而爲生過, UH., *sāmānyachala*.

216. 於墮負處不顯墮負, TŚ., *paryanuyojyopekṣaṇa*.

72

217. 時同, UH., *kālasama* (=*ahetusama*).

73

218. 最勝, NM., (PS., gtso. bo.), *pradhāna*.

74

219. 有, NP., yod. pa., NM., (PS., yod.) *sat*.

220. 有命, UH., *jīva*.

221. 有形, UH., *mūrta*.

222. 有 性, (a) NP., dṅos. po. *bhāva*; (b) yod. pa. ñid. *astitva*.
223. 有 法, NP., c'os. can., NM., (PS., c'os. can) *dharmin*.
224. 有 身, TŚ., *mūrta*.
225-26. 有 一 實, NP., rdsas. gcig. pa. can. ñid., *ekadravyatva*.
227. 有 作 用, NP., (Tib. is different here) *savyāpāra*.
228. 有 義 不 可 解, TŚ., *avijñātārtha*.

75

229. 業, NP., las. *karman*.
230. 未 生 難, TŚ., (PŚ., mi. skyes. pa.) *anutpattisama*.
231. 未 說, TŚ., (PS., mi., brjod. pa.), **anukti* [*sama*].
232. 果 同, UH., *kāryasama*.
233. 根 水, TŚ., *mūla*[*kīla*]-*udaka*.
234. 根 覺, UH., *aindriyaka*.
235. 極 成, NP., rab. tu. grags. pa. *prasiddha*.
236. 未 了 義, NP., ma. rtogs. pai. don. *apratīta*.
237. 根 所 執, TŚ., *aindriyaka*.
238. 根 本 法, TŚ., *pakṣadharma*.
239. 樂 成 立, NP., bsgrub. par. bya. bar. ạdod. pa.; *sādhayitum. iṣṭa*; NM., *sādhyatvenepsita*.
240. 未 生 無 有, TŚ., (*anutpattyabhāva*)=*prāgabhāva*.

77

241. 正 智, NP., šes. pa. *jñāna*.
242. 顯 示 正, NP., brjod. pa. *udbhāvana*.

79

243. 毀 謗 論, YBŚ., AS., ASS., ts'ig. ṅan. pa. smra. ba. *apavāda-vāda*.

81

244. 比, VV., rjes. dpag. *anumāna*.
245. 比 智, UH., *anumāna*.

290. 猶預不成, NP., t'e. ts'om. za. nas. ma. grub. pa, *sandigdhāsiddha.*

96

291. 現, VV., mṅon. sum. *pratyakṣa.*

292. 理, NP., rigs. *yukti,* NM., (PS., rigs., rigs. pa., ts'ul.) *yukti, nyāya.*

293. 現見, UH., *pratyakṣa.*, NM., (PS., mt'on. ba.) *darśana.*

294. 理量, YBŚ., AS., ASS., mṅon. sum. pa., NP., mṅon. sum. *pratyakṣa.*

295. 理相違, UH., *yuktiviruddha.*

100

296. 生, TŚ., *utpatti.*

297. 生[相似], NM., (PS., skyes. mts'uṅs) *utpattisama.*

298. 生理, NM., *upapattisama.*

299 生過相似, NM., (PS. (*a*) t'al. agyur. mts'uṅs. (*b*) t'al. ba. mts'uṅs.) *prasaṅgasama.*

300. 用, ŚŚc., *prayojana.*

102

301. 異, UH., (*a*) *vaidharmya* (*b*) *pṛthak.*

302. 異因, TŚ., *hetvantara.*

303. 異性, NP., k'yad. pa. *viśeṣa.*

304. 異法, NP., c'os. mi. mt'um. pa.; NM., (PS., mi. mt'un. pa. ñid.) *vaidharmya.*

305. 異相, TŚ., (PŚ., c'os. mi. mt'un. pa.) *vaidharmya* [*sama*].

306. 異義, TŚ., *arthāntara.*

307. 異類, (*a*) TŚ., *vipakṣa, vijātīya.* (*b*) YBŚ., AS., ASS., mi. mt'un. pa. *vaidharmya.*

308. 異方便, NM., (PS. (*a*) gnod. byed. (*b*), zla. bo.) *pratiyogin.* (?)

309. 異類義, UH. *vijātīya.*

310. 異品徧轉, NP., mi. mt'un. p'yogs. la. k'yab. pa. *vipakṣavyāpin.*

117

330. 端, NM., *ārambha.*

331. 立 宗, NP., dam. bca'. ba. *pratijñā.*

332. 立 義, TŚ., *pratijñā.*

333. 立 者, UH., *pūrvapakṣin, vādin.*

334. 立 論, NM., *vādin.*

335. 立 無 執 義, UH., *avijñātārtha* (?).

336. 立 異 因 義, TŚ., *hetvantara.*

118

337. 第 五, NM., (PS., lṅa. pa.) *pañcamī* (*vibhakti*).

338. 等, NP., mts'uṅs. pa. *samāna.*

339. 答 多 問 少, UH., *vikalpasama* (?).

340. 簡 別, NM., (PS., rnam. par. bcad. pa.) *avaccheda.*

341. 簡 持, NM., *avadhāraṇa.*

120

342. 結, AS., ASS., *nigamana.*, NM., mjug. bsdus. pa. *id.*

343. 總, UH, *sāmānya.*

344. 總 攝, NP., bsdus. pa. *saṅgraha.*

345. 總 類, NM., rjes. ạgro. *anugama, anvaya.*

121

346. 缺 減 過 性, NP., ma. ts'an. ba. *nyūnatva.*

123

347. 義 准, NM., (PS.,) (*a*) don. go. (*b*) don. rtogs. *arthāpatti.* NM., (PS., don. gyi. šugs. kyis. or only: šugs. kyis.) *sāmārthyāt.*

348. 義 至, UH., *arthāpatti* [*sama*].

349. 義 重, UH., (*artha*) *punarukta.*

350. 義 不 決 定, YBŚ., AS., ASS., ma. ṅes. pa. *aniścita.*

351. 義 無 序, YBŚ., AS., ASS., don. daṅ. mi. ạbrel. pa. *asambaddha.*

124

352. 翻, NM., (PS., bzlog.) *viparīta.*

128

353. 耳所聞 TŚ., *srāvaṇa, śrāvaṇatva.*
354. 聞智, UH., *śrutajñāna.*
355. 聲顯論, NP., sgra. mṅon. par. gsal. bar. smra. ba *śabdābhivyaktivādin.*
356. 聽衆, TŚ., *pariṣat.*

130

357. 能作, NM., rgyu. *kāraka.*
358. 能別, NP., k'yad. pa *viśeṣa.*
359. 能小, UH., *aṇimā.*
360. 能成, YBŚ., AS., ASS., sgrub. pa. *sādhana.*
361. 能破, NP., sun. ạbyin., sun. ạbyin. pa. NM., *duṣaṇa.*
362. 能立, NP., sgrub. pa., NM., *sādhana.*
363. 能別不極成, NP., k'yad. par. rab. tu. grags. pa. ma. yin. pa. *aprasiddhaviśeṣa.*
364. 能立法不成, NP., sgrub. par. byed. pai. c'os. ma. grub. pa. *sādhanadharmāsiddha.*

132

365. 自性, YBŚ., AS., ASS., ṅo. bo. ñid., *svabhāva.*
366. 自教, NP., yid. c'es. *āgama.*
367. 自相, NP., raṅ. bžin., *svarūpa.*
368. 自害過, NM., (PS., (a) raṅ. gnod. ñes. pa., (b) raṅ. la. gnod. pai. ñes. pa.) *svavighātadoṣa.*
369. 自性緣, NM., *bhāvapratyaya.*
370. 自三說法而不別知, UH., *ajñāna.*

133

371. 至事, TŚ., *prāptikriyā.*
372. 至教, YBŚ., AS., ASS., yid. c'es. pai. lun. *āgama.*

373. 至不至, TŚ., (PS., p'rad. pa. daṅ. mi. p'rad.) *prāpty-aprāpti* [*sama*].

134

374. 與所成等, NP., bsgrub. par. bya. ba. daṅ ạdra. ba. *sādhyasama*.

375. 與世間相違, TŚ, *lokaviruddha*.

376. 與證智相違, TŚ., *pratyakṣaviruddha*.

377. 與比相違, TŚ., *anumānaviruddha*.

378. 舉, NM., *utkṣepaṇa*.

140

379. 苦受障, UH., *duḥkhavedanīyāvaraṇa*.

141

380. 處中, ŚS., *udāsīna*, *madhyastha*.

145

381. 表, NP., ston. pa. *ucyate*.

147

382. 觀察, YBŚ., AS., ASS., brtag. pa. *parīkṣā*.

148

383. 觸對, NM., (PS., reg. par. bya. ba.) *mūrta*.

149

384. 言, NP., sgra., *śabda*.

385. 語, NM., (PS.) ts'ig., *vacana*.

386. 論, YBŚ., AS., ASS., (*a*) smra. ba., *vāda*, *ukti*. (*b*) rtsod. pa. NM., TŚ., *vāda*. (*c*) NP., bstan. bcos. *śāstra*.

387. 諦, UH., *padārtha*.

388. 證, (*a*) NM., grub. pa. *sādhana*. (*b*) UH., *pratīti* (*c*) NP., rtogs. pa. ñid. *adhigama*.

389. 論失, UH., *vākyadoṣa*.

390. 論異, UH., *savyabhicāra*.

391. 論過, YBŚ., AS., ASS., brjod. pai. ñes. pa. *vādadoṣa.*
392. 論詭語, NM., *chala.*
393. 語多, UH., *adhika.*
394. 語少, UH., *nyūna.*
395. 語善, UH., *vākyapraśaṃsā.*
396. 說同, UH., *sādhyasama.*
397. 說者, UH., *vādin.*
398. 論者, UH., *vādin.*
399. 譬喻, ŚSc., UH., VV., (dpes. ạjal.) *dṛṣṭānta.*
400. 證智, TŚ., *pratyakṣa.*
401. 論議, ŚSc., *vāda.*
402. 譬如言, TŚ., *udāharaṇa, dṛṣṭānta.*
403. 論墮負, YBŚ., AS., ASS., smra. bai. c'ad. pas. gcod. pa. *vādanigraha.*
404. 語許分別, ŚSc., *avayava.*
405. 證智成就, TŚ., *pratyakṣasiddha.*
406-407. 言詞復重或復減少, YBŚ., lhag. par. dañ. don. zlos. pa. *ādhikya-nyūnatā.*
408-409. 言詞重疊所說義理或增或減, AS., ASS., *ādhikya-nyūnatā.*

151

410. 豈不, NM., *nanu.*

154

411. 負, UH., *nigrahasthāna.*
412. 負處, TŚ., ŚS., *nigrahasthāna.*

157

413. 足目; NM., Akṣapāda.

159

414. 輕舉, UH., *laghimā.*

160

415. 辯因, YBŚ., AS., ASS., gtan. ts'igs, *hetu*.

162

416. 遣, NP., agog. par. byed. pa., NM., *nirākaraṇa*
417. 遮, NP., ma. yin. pa., *pratiṣedha*.
418. 遍同, UH., *vyāptisama*.
419. 過失, NP., skyon. *doṣa*.
420. 過類, NM., (PS., ltag. c'od.) *jāti*.
421. 道理, TŚ., *nyāya, yukti, nyāyya*.
422. 違害, NM., (PS., gnod. pa.) *vighāta*.
423. 違義, YBŚ., AS., ASS., don. pa. med. pa., *apārthaka*.
424. 遠到, UH., *prāpti*.
425. 遠離, NP., bzlog. pa. *vyatireka*.
426. 遮遣, NM., (PS., agag. pa.) *nivṛtta*.
427. 過時語, UH., *kālātīta*.
428. 違本宗, UH., *pratijñāvirodha*.

163

429. 邪, NM., (PS., p'yin. ci. log. tu.) *viparīta*.
430. 鄰近均等, NM., (PS., spyis,) *sāmānya*.
431. 邪證, NM., (PS., p'yin. ci. log. tu. sgrub. pa.) *viparīta-sādhana*.

166

432. 重說, TŚ., *punarukta, punarukti*.
433-434. 重分別, UH., *punarukti, punarukti*.

168

435. 長分, TŚ., *adhika*.
436. 長相(難), TŚ. (PS. rnam. par. rtog.) *vikalpasama*.

169

437. 門, NP., sgo, *mukha.*

438. 開悟, NP., rab. tu. rtogs. par. bya., rab. tu. rtogs. pa. *pratyāyana.*

439. 開示, NP., rab. tu. rtogs. par. byed. pa., *pratipādyate, pratipādana.*

440. 闕, NM., ma. ts'aṅ. *a*) *nyūnatā*, *b*) *vikala.*

170

441. 陀羅驃, UH., *dravya.*

442. 隨, NM., (PS., rjes. ągro.) *anugama.*

443. 隨, UH., *prakāmya.* ?

444. 隨自, NP., raṅ. gis. *svayam.*

445. 隨所執, UH., *siddhānta.*

446-447. 隨經書, UH., *āgama.*

448. 隨自意, NM., *svayam.*

449. 隨負處, UH., *nigrahasthāna.*

450. 隨語難, UH., *vākchala*, or *chala* only.

451. 隨一不成, NP., gaṅ. yaṅ. ruṅ. ba. la. ma. grub. pa. *anyatarāsiddha.*

452. 隨同品言, NP., p'yogs. la. rjes. su. ągro. ba. brjod. *sapakṣānugamavacana.*

453-454. 隨其言横爲生過, UH., *vākchala.*

455. 隱沒, UH., *tirobhava.*

172

456. 難, TŠ., *khaṇḍana*, *dūṣaṇa.*

457. 離, NP., bral. ba. *rahita.*

175

458. 非, NP., med. pa., *abhāva.*

459. 非愛, NM., (PS., mi. ądod.) *aniṣṭa.*

460-461. 非有, NP., med. pa. *a*) *asambhava*. *b*) *asat* *c*) *abhāva.*, NM., (PS., med.) *asat.*

II.

Index of works.[1]

(a) *Indian.*

(b) *Chinese.*

[1] This index does not include the works already indicated in the list of Abbreviations. Roman numbers refer to the Introduction, arabic numbers to the notes.

III.

Index of Indian Authors.

IV.

Index of Chinese Authors.

V.

Index of Modern Authors.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS.

P. XV n. 1 *vādālaṅkāra* notes on VV. p. 23.

P. XX L. 30 read: *adhigata*.

Considering the difficulty of the text I thought that a brief summary of the arguments expounded in VV. would perhaps be of some use.

A resumé of this work is therefore appended here in which the arguments of the *pūrvapakṣa* and those of the *uttarapakṣa* are reciprocally compared.

K. 1. If all dharmas have no essence, words also, being dharmas, must be unreal, therefore void (*niḥsvabhāva*, *śūnya*). How, then, can they refute the essence or the reality of dharmas?

K. 20–23. This objection has no value, because everything, words as well as dharmas, are void. This voidness of things is derived from the fact that they are interdependent and reciprocally conditioned (*pratītyasamutpanna*). But this fact does not imply that they cannot have any function whatever, *e.g.*, a pot has no essence in itself and still it can contain milk, it can be taken in the hands, etc. The relation between words and things (*viz.*, refuter and refuted) is the same as that which passes between two phantasms created by magic.

2. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you state that words can refute the reality of dharmas, inasmuch as they are not void, then, a logical mistake is implied in your argument, because you maintain that something is void, (*dharmas*) and something (words) is not void.

1–24. Words as well as dharmas are void, because they are equally *pratītyasamutpanna*; therefore no logical mistake is implied in the Mādhyamika thesis.

3. You cannot reply that words, though void, can refute the essence of dharmas. You support your thesis with the following example: *e.g.*, a man prevents another man from speaking and so he, with his words, annuls the existence of another's words. But, in this case, words are existent, because only if they are existent they can prevent another man from expressing his thoughts. But, if this be the case, your example is against

25. The example given by you cannot be my example, because for me sound is not non-void, but it is necessarily void as all other things.

26. Nor can you attribute to me the thesis that words, being unreal, can refute *unreal* things, because the result an argument in this way would be just the opposite, *viz.*, only the reality (*viz.*, result of negation of unreal things) would in fact be proved.

your thesis, inasmuch as your system maintains that refuter as well as notion refuted have no reality.

27. The fact is that words are void as well as dharmas and we say that we refute dharmas not in so far as words are real, but because we must correct the wrong view of men like you who falsely consider as real what is non-real.

28. Moreover your *hetu* or reason, as given in the above example, is just like the *probandum*, *viz.*, void, because sound is unreal in itself. Nor can you forget that whatever is acceptable in the plan of the relative or conventional truth is not so in the plan of the absolute truth. That example holds only good when we remain in the conventional truth.

4. You cannot say that it is illogical to refute a purely negative view like yours because I follow your very thesis which consists in the refutation of things said by you to be unreal.

29. You are wrong when you state that I have a thesis, because this assumption would be against my doctrine. When we maintain the voidness of everything, even such a thing as a thesis is void.

30. And because I have no thesis, inasmuch I cannot either affirm or deny, I cannot accept any other means of knowledge such as direct perception, inference, example, authority.

The discussion which follows *viz.*, 5, 6; 30–52 has already been summarized in my notes on VV. pp. 34 ff.

7-8. When you say that all dharmas are unreal, you state a thing which is against the holy teaching, because the Buddha has taught the reality of the good and bad dharmas, as those which are either conductive to liberation or to *saṃsāra* and has therefore admitted that they possess some essence.

53, 54, 55. If there is such a thing as the essence of the good or bad dharmas, then, you must show it to us. Since you are unable to do it, it is evident that you are wrong. Moreover these good dharmas are they *pratītya-samutpanna* or not? If they are *prat. s.*, then, they must be void, as stated above. If they are not *prat. s*, then, the law of causality, preached by the Buddha, would in fact be rejected by you; so that it would be impossible to attain liberation.

56. Moreover, if dharmas are not *prat s.*, they would be eternal. But, then, there would be neither

progress nor regress as all dharmas would, then, be *asaṃskṛtas*. Useless and fruitless would therefore be any striving after liberation.

9. Name presupposes an object which is named ; so that for you no name could exist since no object exists. But in fact there are names and therefore your thesis cannot be maintained.

58. The objection has no value, because I have already stated that objects as well as words are void.

59. Moreover, when you say that the name does not exist, if the object that it is supposed to express is non-existent, then, does such a sentence imply existence or non-existence ? In both cases you are wrong. If it implies existence, your thesis that name is non-existent is contradicted. If it implies non-existence your thesis that name has an essence is annulled.

No such mistake is in my thesis, since I am coherent in admitting the voidness of everything.

10. In order to avoid this difficulty, you could say that name cannot be without svabhāva, but that, at the same time, this svabhāva or essence is not in the *dharmas*. But this comes to assume that the essence is existent, though separate from the dharmas.

61. The objection has no value, because for us no essence exists whether in the *dharmas* or outside them.

11. The refutation is made only when the object to be refuted is real ; so from the fact itself that you admit a refutation, you implicitly assume that there is a thing to be refuted.

62. If this be true, then, since you refute the doctrine of the unreality of things, then, my doctrine would in fact be real, so that *śūnyatā* would be proved.

63. If, in order to avoid this difficulty, you state that voidness is not real and is non-existent, then, your thesis that refutation is only possible if the thing to be refuted is existent would be illogical.

12. If you say that dharmas have no essence and that this essence is absolutely non-existent, then, what is refuted by you ? Negation of the non-existent is self-proved and does not need any demonstration.

65. No, because when I say that dharmas are non-existent, this non-existence is not created by my words, but only expounded so that others may understand it.

13, 14, 15, 16. You say that your statement is meant to refute the wrong conceptions of those who consider as real things which in fact are unreal; such is the case when a fool thinks that there is real water, when there is only a mirage and some intelligent person makes him understand that he has taken as water a simple mirage. But this example is wrong, because it implies the existence of six things, *viz.*, perception, perceiver, thing perceived, refutation, refuter, and thing refuted. If you reply that perception, perceiver and thing perceived are non-existent, the same must necessarily be said as regards refutation, etc. But if refutation, etc., be non-existent, then, the existence of all dharmas is proved on account of the non-existence of their negation.

17. For you, the reason itself, by which you want to establish your point of view, must be void; if it is void, your thesis is not proved, because no argument can be proved without a reason.

18. Nor can you assume that it is possible for you to prove your thesis even without any reason, because, then, we also could prove just the opposite, *viz.*, the existence and reality of all dharmas, without having recourse to any reason.

19. Nor can you state, in order to avoid this difficulty, that the reason is existent, while all other dharmas are non-existent, because your point of view is that everything is non-existent.

20. The refutation, upon which your system is based, is not logical; in fact you cannot say that the refutation comes first and then the notion to be refuted follows. This is contrary to logic. If refutation comes after the notion to be refuted, this is already existent and therefore it

66, 67, 68. Such an example is not conclusive, because if the perception is real it cannot be conditioned (*pratītyasamutpanna*). If it is *pratītyas.*, it must necessarily be void. Moreover, if it is self-existent it could not be argued against.

The same reply must be given to the other objections raised by you, concerning the perceived, etc.

69. This is no new argument; we must reply with the same statements as we did when discussing the example (kārikās 66–68).

70. We must, in this case also, repeat what we have already said before, because it is not my thesis that the reason is existent. Only if this were my point of view you could have recourse to your objection. Moreover, such an argument as the threefold refutation made now by you, can

cannot be refuted. If, on the contrary, the two notions are supposed to be contemporary, then, they are no longer interdependent, so that refutation is impossible. The conclusion is that in every way the voidness of things cannot be established.

only be formulated by those whose doctrine is the *reductio ad absurdum* of notions in order to prove the ultimate voidness of things, but not by you. It contradicts in fact your system.

71. So that only believing in the voidness one can believe in the doctrine of Buddhism.

VV. p. 8 kārikā IV. for: is not valid, then; *read* is not valid, then. VV. p. 63 comm. on Kārikā 60 the reading *med par* of VV. B. must be accepted in accordance with the text itself of the *kārikā*.

P. 41, notes on VV. kārikā 61 "when there is, etc." read: "if there is no essence in the dharmas, this would be a logical assumption (only) for that man for whom the essence is something else distinct from the dharmas."

Notes p. 28 n. 48 *tṛṣṇā*.

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